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ABSTRACT
THE Japanese occupation dramatically altered Malaya’s prewar pattern 
of race relations and politics. Relations between Malays and Chinese, 
which previously had been civil , broke down and led lo the two races 
fighting one another. The Japanese occupation also gave certain 
political groups an opportunity to come to the forefront. Due to 
the growing strength of its resistance movement the Malayan Communist 
Party became a major political force. Japanese plans to grant 
Indonesia independence raised the hopes of the Kesatuan Melayu Muda 
to try to achieve its goal of Malay independence within Indonesia 
Raya (Creater.Indonesia). But the Japanese surrender once again 
dramatically altered the situation in Malaya. For nineteen days or 
more, depending on the location, neither the Japanese, the British, 
nor any Chinese or Malay oriented group could be said to control 
events. Instead, local resistance units, religious mystics, vengeful 
and fear-ridden citizens roamed the countryside, swept into the towns 
and took the law into their own hands. While the arrival of British 
troops may have brought outward order, the fabric of society had been 
rent, attitudes permanently altered. This study concentrates on the 
causes of wartime inter-racial conflicts between Malays and Chinese, 
the breakdown of authority during the post-surrender interregnum 
and the confrontation between the Malayan Communist Party, the Malay 
population and the British during the period of the British Military 
Administration.
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PREFACE
MY interest in the post-Japanese surrender interregnum in Malaya was 
first aroused while I was doing an undergraduate course at the 
University of Malaya in 1969. Dr Anthony Reid, one of my supervisors, 
taught the course on new approaches to the study of Indonesian history 
and introduced students to John Smail's stimulating work, Bandung in 
the Early Revolution: A study in the social history of the Indonesian
Revolution, Ithaca, 1964. Smail attempted to reconstruct the story 
of the Indonesian revolution based mainly on the oral accounts of 
Indonesians in Bandung. It stimulated me to attempt a similar type 
of study in Malayan history. The only Malayan equivalent to his 
Bandung period, it seemed to me, was the post-surrender interregnum.
In May 1969, too, occurred the race riots in peninsular 
Malaysia (or West Malaysia), described by local and foreign newspapers 
of that time as the worst riots the country had ever experienced.
The little knowledge I had then about inter-racial conflicts during 
the post-surrender interregnum in 1945 led me to believe that there 
were similarities with 1969. If so, why had the May 1969 riots 
occurred? Had people forgotten the lessons of 1945? In 1969 there 
was the similar phenomenon of the Malay 'invulnerability cults' in 
the countryside. In the urban centres other racial groups had begun 
to put emphasis on the martial arts too - karate, judo and the kung tow. 
The government did all it could to restrict discussion of the causes 
of the May 1969 riots in the mass media, on the principle that the 
less said about the episode the better for the country.
When I undertook research on the post-surrender interregnum 
in 1976, I began to realise that my earlier expectations regarding 
the project were somewhat ambitious. I found I had one year to do 
fieldwork, which had to be divided between seven months in the archives 
in London and Tokyo and five months for working in the archives and 
conducting interviews in Malaysia. WTiile I succeeded in collecting 
a great deal of relevant archival materials and research data, 
including private papers in London and Tokyo, I found that the five 
months left for research and interviews in Malaysia were insufficient 
to do the type of study accomplished by Smail. He had spent two and 
a half years on fieldwork in Holland and Indonesia, and his study on
ill.
Bandung was based primarily on interviews. Still, given the short time 
I had left in Malaysia, I selected two areas, one in Perak, the other 
in Batu Pahat (Johor), for fieldwork. Unfortunately the political 
climate in peninsular Malaysia in late 1976 was not conducive to my 
field investigations.
Owing to anti-communist hysteria sweeping the country, as 
a result of which many university students and academics were among 
those who came under criticism and surveillance by the authorities, 
it became advisable for me to avoid being too overt about my enquiries, 
especially as some of my research related to the wartime role of the 
now proscribed Malayan Communist Party. i was accompanied on one 
trip to Perak by Professor Yoji Akashi (of Nanzan University) and my 
former colleague, Dr Stephen Leong, of the University of Malaya.
We wanted to visit the Kampung Temengor dam area in Upper Perak, 
where the Kuomintang guerrillas had been active during the Japanese 
occupation. The purpose was to interview Malay and Chinese villagers 
in the area. We were advised by a Straits Times journalist in Ipoh 
to forget about the trip, however, because the Kampong Temengor area 
had been declared a security zone (i.e., communist activity was 
reported there). Police screening would be required before anyone 
could get a permit to enter the area. Since we were from the university 
the journalist said he did not see much hope of us getting the permit. 
’Anyway, why the hell do you wish to go there?’ he asked suspiciously-. 
Nonetheless, the trip proved useful in oLher respects - we succeeded 
in locating and interviewing a few people in Ipolv willing to talk about 
the Japanese occupation.
The study which has emerged is therefore mainly focussed on 
race and politics in Malaya (i.e., the name West Malaysia had before 
the federation of Malaysia was formed in 1963). When compared to 
the numbers of people killed and the areas affected during the post­
surrender interregnum of 1945, the May 1969 race riots pale into 
insignificance. Yet, for some reason, many people in Malaya seemed 
to have shut their minds off to the 1945 period. Perhaps it was the 
magnitude of the killing and the terror of the times that shut 
people's minds off the subject. It was a time of much violence and 
suffering, when ’the pistol and knife ruled’. It was also notable 
for the ’communist reign of terror'. Only those in authority seemed
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to remember the 1945 incidents. The SulLan of Perak, in a speech in 
May 1975, reminded his subjects to support the Malaysian Government's 
anti-communist campaign 'if you do not want a repetition of communist 
atrocities experienced immediately after the Japanese occupation.'
While many studies of local history pertaining to the post­
surrender interregnum in Malaya are beginning to appear, mostly done 
by Malay undergraduate students, there is as yet no study attempting 
a Malaya-wide spectrum. It was mainly to fill this gap that I decided 
to undertake research on the period. The theme is that of social 
and political conflict, a deadly serious contest for survival and 
advancement in which the main -contestants were Malays and Chinese.
The importance of this period has become more obvious than ever to me. 
Only by understanding what happened in that crucial period, I believe, 
can a Malaysian truly fathom Malaya's postwar politics and society.
For instance, Malay political primacy today can only be comprehended 
in relation to the events of 1945. Secondly, Malay opposition to 
communism also stems mainly from that period, and is one of the reasons 
why the ongoing communist insurgency continues to fail. Pan-ethnic 
cooperation and racial harmony, which are essential for the present 
and future peace and prosperity of Malaysia, can be strengthened 
not by Malaysians closing their minds about the past but by learning 
the lessons of the past.
In studying what is clearly regarded as a sensitive topic 
in Malaysia today, J am mindful of the need to treat the topic 
objectively and not to pass moral judgements or to take sides.
Like Smail, I, too, am aware that I have my own sympathies and aversions 
and hope I have been able to control my feelings in a scholarly study.
If I have erred, it lias probably been mostly in one direction. As 
a Malaysian of Chinese origin, I have found it easier to criticise 
Chinese than Malays. Hopefully, however, I have been able to control 
even this tendency by the guidance I have received from my supervisors 
and others. if evidence of this still persists in the thesis, the 
fault must lie squarely on my shoulders and not on theirs.
There are ample sources for the study of the Japanese 
occupation and the post-surrender interregnum. In Britain, they are 
found mainly in the War Office records deposited at the Public Record 
Office in London. The volume of material in the South East Asia
VCommand files alone (about 10,000 documents) ensures that they will 
not all be put on microfilm for a long time, if ever. As a result,
I spent several months reading through the files, and was rewarded 
by coming across several Force 136 papers on guerrilla activities 
in Malaya which still remain classified in Force 136 files. There is 
also a splendid collection of private papers deposited at Rhodes House, 
Oxford, by former British civil servants in Malaya. These include 
the papers of former BMA officials such as H.R.H. Hone, W.L. Blythe,
V.W. Purcell and others.
These British official and private records also contain 
numerous reports on inter-racial conflicts and communist activities 
during the Japanese occupation. However, there is still a paucity 
of MCP documents for the Japanese occupation. This lacuna has been 
filled, to the degree that it is possible, by British and Japanese 
military intelligence reports.
In Tokyo I was able to interview a number of members of the 
wartime Japanese administration, including General Fujiwara Iwaichi 
and Professor Itagaki, and to collect materials from the Boeicho 
(Self Defence Agency Archives). The help I was given by Dr Michiko 
Nakamura of Waseda University and Professor Nagai Shinichi (then of 
the Institute of Developing Economics, Tokyo and now' of Hiroshima 
University) was most valuable. I also interviewed Mr Shiro Mizusawa 
of the Equator Association t whose members were former administrators 
of Japanese-occupied territories during the war. Professor Itagaki 
took special interest in my research project and was responsible for 
arranging many vital interviews for me with other Japanese personalities 
a favour for which I am most grateful.
In Malaysia the National Archives contains many important 
BMA (Malaya) records which are now open to researchers. It also had 
collections of local newspapers which carried MCP documents of the 
postwar period. I interviewed many local people of all races who had 
lived through the Japanese occupation. Although most of the interviews 
were done In Run Ja J.umpur, 1 poll, Penang and Singapore, the interviewees 
were able to recall experiences not necessarily confined to these 
areas.
Finally, some points deserve immediate mention. The name 
'Malaya' is used in the full, awareness that this was the convenient
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British name applied to a geographical area which otherwise comprised 
three political units - the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay 
States and the Unfederated Malay States. As of 1941 none of the 
three major races - Malays, Chinese and Indians - had started to regard 
themselves as pan-ethnic 'Malayans' with common duties and problems.
This was the first problem which had to be faced by them if the country 
was to advance towards nationhood and self-government. On the one 
hand, Malays cherished a definite loyalty towards their rulers, and 
this feeling conflicted with the development of any allegiance towards 
a larger unit than the State. On the other hand, non-Malays had to 
be weaned from their nostalgia for the homeland of their ancestors by 
making Malaya the real basis of an enduring loyalty. At the end of 
the war it seems clear that none of the leaders of the major races 
in the country had thought seriously yet about resolving these problems. 
Nor had the MCP. It was to be the British Government that introduced 
the Malayan Union plan, which, among other tilings, aimed at fostering 
a Malaya-oriented loyalty for the non-Malays and an identity larger 
than the Malay state for the Malays.
The absence of a pan-ethnic 'Malayan' nationalist movement 
in 1941 serves as the starting-point of this study. I then examine 
the political activities of various groups and the social conflict 
which local peoples went through during the Japanese occupation and 
in the immediate postwar period of the British Military Administration. 
It was only after the bitter wartime and interregnum ordeal brought 
the conflict to a violent head that some understanding began to emerge 
of the long-term consequences of trying to share a nation and a future.
Throughout the study the. new Malay spelling, or ejaan baru, 
has been used. 'Johor' is spelled in the Malay way without the letter 
'e' at the end of the word. Unless otherwise specified, the currency 
referred to is the Malayan dollar, which was Worth sterling 2s.4d. 
during the prewar period.
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CHAPTER I
MALAYA BEFORE 1942
MALAYA was a convenient administrative and geographical term coined by 
the British to cover the three political units in the Malay peninsula: 
(a) the Colony of the Straits Settlements (SS) comprising Singapore, 
Malacca and Penang, including Province Wellesley; (b) the Federated 
Malay States (FMS) of Perak, Se-langor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang; and 
(c) the Unfederated Malay States (UFMS) of Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, 
Trengganu and Perlis. For the purposes of this study the term 'Malaya1 
will be used throughout, as the British used it, to mean one political 
entity inclusive of the three political units in the Malay peninsula.
The following historical background is given to put the subsequent story 
in the thesis in some context.
'The Malay States
Most of the Malay States on the peninsula had existed for several 
centuries, each with its own dynasty. The Malacca Sultanate (c.1400-1511) 
is regarded by Malays as their ’Golden Age'. Their earliest written history, 
the Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals), written probably about 1540, records 
the court life and traditions of the Malacca Sultanate as well as the 
traditions of earlier periods. The later Malay States are believed to 
have inherited from the Malacca Sultanate both their traditions and their 
form of political organisation. After being expelled from Malacca by 
the Portuguese in 1511, the Malay Sultans of Malacca and their nobles 
eventually established themselves in Johor, with dependencies in Perak and 
Pahang. The later States eventually resembled Malacca and each constituted 
the negeri (State) as their major political unit with a royal ruler and 
a hierarchy of lesser office holders. Due to the frequent rise and fall 
of royal dynasties, Johor and Pahang lacked an acknowledged royal ruler 
until late in the nineteenth century. The Malay States to the north were 
nominal dependencies of Siam, as the Malacca Sultanate had been of China.
The social structure of traditional Malay society in the nineteenth 
century could be divided into two strata: rulers and subjects. Below the
2l e v e l  o f  t h e  S t a t e  were d i s t r i c t s  u n d e r  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  l o c a l  c h i e f s ;  
t h e  d i s t r i c t s  were o r g a n i s e d  i n t o  v i l l a g e s  c o n t r o l l e d  by p e n g h u lu ^ 
(headman) who was t h e  l i n k  be tw een  t h e  d i s t r i c t  c h i e f s  and t h e  r a a y a t  
( t h e  p e o p l e ) ,  and imam ( r e l i g i o u s  o f f i c i a l ) .  A f t e r  t h e  m i d - n i n e t e e n t h  
c e n t u r y ,  the  w e s t e r n  Malay S t a t e s  e x p e r i e n c e d  a p e r i o d  o f  i n s t a b i l i t y .  
D i s p u t e s  a r o s e  be tw een  l o c a l  c h i e f s ,  and be tween  c h i e f s  and S u l t a n s  
o v e r  t h e  i s s u e s  o f  r o y a l  s u c c e s s i o n  and c o n t r o l  o f  t i n  m in ing  a r e a s .
These d i s p u t e s  a l s o  i n v o l v e d  W este rn  and C h inese  m e r c h a n t s  and e v e n t u a l l y  
l e d  t o  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  government  i n  the  t i n  m in ing  
S t a t e s  o f  S e l a n g o r  and P e r a k  i n  1874.
One r e a s o n  why t h e  S u l t a n s  o f  S e l a n g o r  and P e rak  had  n o t  been  
a b l e  t o  e x e r c i s e  t h e i r  powers  f u l l y  as  r u l e r s  o f  t h e i r  r e a lm  was b e c a u s e  
t hey  had  e i t h e r  w i l l i n g l y  d e l e g a t e d  o r  h e l p l e s s l y  l o s t  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  
powers t o  t h e  l o c a l  c h i e f s .  The c h i e f s ,  and t h e  a r i s t o c r a t s  who 
s u r r o u n d e d  them, e n j o y e d  t h e  a l l e g i a n c e  o f  t h e  r a a y a t  i n  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s .  
Each c h i e f  drew h i s  income m ain ly  from t a x e s  l e v i e d  on t h e  p roduce  and 
goods t r a d e d  i n  t h e  a r e a .  The e x t e n t  t o  which th e  i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  the  
d i s t r i c t  were s u b j e c t e d  t o  t a x a t i o n  was in  p r o p o r t i o n  to  t h e  competence 
o f  t h e  c h i e f  to  c o l l e c t  and h i s  income n e e d s ,  and was a l s o  d e t e r m i n e d  
by t h e  p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  t h e  c h i e f  and t h e  p e o p l e .  Only a 
nom ina l  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  the  t a x e s  c o l l e c t e d ,  i f  any ,  was r e m i t t e d  t o  t h e  
S u l t a n .  ' I n  t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s , '  w r i t e s  a Malay h i s t o r i a n ,  ' i t  may
1 The p e nghu lu  was the  headman o f  a group o f  v i l l a g e s  who o c c u p ie d
a low er  rank i n  t h e  Malay a r i s t o c r a c y .  He was n o m i n a l l y  a p p o i n t e d  
by t h e  S u l t a n ,  and h i s  o f f i c e  was h e r e d i t a r y  and r e f l e c t e d  ' p e r s o n a l  
p r e s t i g e  w i t h i n  the  v i l l a g e  o r  group o f  v i l l a g e s ,  economic  s t a t u s ,  
p i e t y  and f o r c e  o f  c h a r a c t e r  as  w e l l  as  (and e s s e n t i a l l y )  t h e  a p p r o v a l  
o f  the  d i s t r i c t  c h i e f . ' His d u t i e s  were m a n i f o l d ,  r a n g i n g  from 
k e e p i n g  th e  p e a c e ,  a r b i t r a t i n g  i n  d i s p u t e s ,  and s u r r e n d e r i n g  s e r i o u s  
o f f e n d e r s  to  h i s  c h i e f ,  t o  t a x  c o l l e c t i o n ,  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  k e r a h  
( f o r c e d )  l a b o u r ,  and k e e p i n g  t h e  d i s t r i c t  c h i e f  g e n e r a l l y  i n fo r m e d  
a bou t  v i l l a g e  l i f e .  Cf.  W i l l i a m  R. R o f f ,  The O r i g i n s  o f  Malay 
N a t i o n a l i s m , Kuala  Lumpur, 1967,  6 - 7 ,  19-20 .
2 The above s e c t i o n  i s  drawn l a r g e l y  from the  works o f  J .M. G u l l i c k ,  
I n d ig e n o u s  P o l i t i c a l  Sys tems o f  W es te rn  M a la y a , London,  1958, and 
W.R. R o f f ,  o p . c i t . ,  p a s s i m .
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be s a i d  t a x a t i o n  was n e i t h e r  s e v e r e  n o r  e x L e n s i v e . '
F o l lo w in g  the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  t h e
Malay S t a t e s ,  however ,  t h e r e  was i n c r e a s i n g  i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  p a t t e r n s
o f  t h e  p a s t .  The i n t e r n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  ea ch  S t a t e  underw ent  r e f o r m
and r e o r g a n i s a t i o n .  One o f  t h e  f i r s t  a r e a s  t o  f e e l  t h e  im pa c t  was the
d i s t r i c t .  Among t h e  most  p r o v o c a t i v e  a s p e c t s  o f  r e f o r m  was the
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  a new s y s te m  o f  p u b l i c  r eve nue  c o l l e c t i o n ,  i n i t i a l l y
u t i l i s i n g  e x i s t i n g  p roduce  t a x e s  and l a t e r  l a n d  r e n t s .  The w o r k in g  of
t h i s  s y s t e m ,  i n s o f a r  as  i t  was e f f i c i e n t l y  e n f o r c e d ,  r ed u c e d  t h e  c h i e f ' s
power t o  n o t h i n g  and s u b j e c t e d  t h e  p e o p le  t o  s t r i c t  r u l e s  o f  t a x a t i o n
4
o f  an u n f a m i l i a r  k i n d .  Under  t h e  B r i t i s h  A d v i s e r ,  t he  d i s t r i c t  was 
a d m i n i s t e r e d  n o t  by the  c h i e f  b u t  by a D i s t r i c t  O f f i c e r  (DO) who i n  t h e  
w e s t e r n  Malay S t a t e s  was u s u a l l y  a E u ro p e an ,  b u t  i n  the  n o r t h e r n  and e a s t e r n  
S t a t e s  and i n  J o h o r  was a Malay.  The DO was a B r i t i s h  government  a g e n t  
whose du ty  was to  f i l l  t h e  T r e a s u r y  w i t h  as  much revenue  as p o s s i b l e  and 
whose i n i t i a t i v e  i n  i n c r e a s i n g  r e v e n u e  c o n s t i t u t e d  one o f  the  most  
i m p o r t a n t  c r i t e r i a  i n  j u d g i n g  h i s  e f f i c i e n c y .
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e r e  was g e n e r a l  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h e  new s y s t e m  o f  
r ev e n u e  c o l l e c t i o n .  In  most c a s e s ,  i n s t e a d  o f  the p roduce  t a x e s  imposed 
p r e v i o u s l y ,  a  f i x e d  l a n d  r e n t  was l e v i e d ,  and s im p le  t i t l e s  were i s s u e d  
i n  due c o u r s e  f o r  l a n d s  upon which r e n t  was p a i d .  For  l andow ners  such  as  
t h e  c h i e f  and th e  a r i s t o c r a t s  who had  n o t  p r e v i o u s l y  worked t h e i r  own 
l a n d ,  t h e  l a n d  r e n t  a c t u a l l y  amounted to  a new t a x .  O th e r  t r a d i t i o n a l  
a r e a s  which B r i t i s h  r e fo rm s  b i t  i n t o  were t h e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  d e b t  s l a v e r y ,  
t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  p e r m i t s  f o r  c o l l e c t i n g  j u n g l e  p r o d u c e ,  and the  
emplacement  o f  the  c h i e f s  on an e s t a b l i s h e d  l i s t  unde r  which t h e y  drew 
f i x e d  s t i p e n d s  from t h e  S t a t e  and l o s t  most  o f  t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  p r i v i l e g e s .  
The q u e s t i o n  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  t o  t h e  t h r o n e  on t h e  d e a th  o f  a r u l e r  was i n  
f u t u r e  to  be d e t e r m i n e d  by th e  c h i e f s  i n  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h
3 I b r a h i m  Nik Mahmood, 'The To’ J a n g g u t  R e b e l l i o n  o f  1915’ , i n  W.R.
R o f f  ( e d . )  K e l a n t a n :  R e l i g i o n ,  S o c i e t y  and P o l i t i c s  i n  a Malay
S t a t e , Kua la  Lumpur, 1974, 69.  I  have  found I b r a h i m ' s  l u c i d  
d e s c r i p t i o n  of  t r a d i t i o n a l  Malay s o c i e t y  i n  K e l a n t a n  u s e f u l  i n  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  Malay s o c i e t y  i n  t h e  o t h e r  s t a t e s .
4 I t  was t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  such c hanges  i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t  o f  P a s i r  
P u t i h ,  K e l a n t a n  which l e d  t o  t h e  To' J a n g g u t  u p r i s i n g  o f  1915.
See I b r a h i m  Nik Mahmood, o p . c i t . , 68 .
4A d v i s e r  whose v o i c e  was d e c i s i v e .  While t h e  S u l t a n  was t h e  r u l e r  o f  the  
S t a t e  and cha i rm an  o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  C o u n c i l ,  h i s  s o v e r e i g n t y  was on ly  
n o m in a l ;  t h e  a c t u a l  c o n t r o l l i n g  a u t h o r i t y  was t h e  B r i t i s h  A d v i s e r .
Th is  was t h e  sy s tem  o f  i n d i r e c t  r u l e  which  t h e  B r i t i s h  i n s t i t u t e d  i n  
t h e  n i n e  Malay s t a t e s .
The B r i t i s h  r e f o r m s ,  how ever ,  ca use d  t h e  l o c a l  c h i e f s  t o  become 
d i s a f f e c t e d .  They s u f f e r e d  g r e a t  h u m i l i a t i o n  n o t  on ly  by v i r t u e  o f  b e i n g  
d e p r i v e d  o f  t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  power and income,  b u t  a l s o  b e c a u s e  t h e y  were 
f o r c e d  to  pay t a x e s  l i k e  t h e  common p e o p l e .  The P e r a k  c h i e f s  r a i s e d  t h e  
i n i t i a l  r e s i s t a n c e  a g a i n s t  t h e  r e f o r m s ,  k i l l i n g  t h e  f i r s t  B r i t i s h  R e s i d e n t  
J.W.W. B i r c h ,  i n  November 1875. But t h e i r  u p r i s i n g  was s h o r t - l i v e d .  The 
B r i t i s h  a r r e s t e d  S u l t a n  A bdu l l ah  and s e v e r a l  m a jo r  c h i e f s  and e x i l e d  
them to the  S e y c h e l l e s  I s l a n d s  f o r  t h e i r  p a r t  i n  t h e  r e v o l t . “* There  
were a l s o  l o c a l i s e d  c h i e f l y  u p r i s i n g s  i n  Pahang ,  be tw een  1891 and 1895, 
and i n  K e l a n t a n  i n  1915. Each r e s i s t a n c e  was i n  t u r n  c r u s h e d ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  
i n g e n i o u s l y  i s o l a t i n g  the  S u l t a n  from th e  o t h e r  c h i e f s  and u s i n g  him to  
d e c l a r e  t h e  c h i e f l y  u p r i s i n g  as  p e n d e rh a k a a n  ( r e b e l l i o n )  a g a i n s t  h i s  
t h r o n e ,  r e g a r d e d  i n  Malay s o c i e t y  as  a most  d i s l o y a l  and t r e a s o n a b l e  
a c t ,  u s u a l l y  p u n i s h a b l e  by d e a t h .  (See f i g . l ,  p . 5 ,  f o r  c h a r t  on 
p a t t e r n  o f  Malay c h i e f l y  u p r i s i n g s  be tw een  1875 and 1915) .  T h e r e a f t e r  
t h e  Malay c h i e f s  no l o n g e r  a t t e m p t e d  t o  l e a d  any u p r i s i n g .  T h i s  was 
c l e a r l y  e v id e n c e d  in  T rengganu ,  t h e  l a s t  s t a t e  t o  a c c e p t  a B r i t i s h  
A d v i s e r  ( i n  1919) where t h e  Malay u p r i s i n g  i n  1928 a g a i n s t  B r i t i s h  r e fo rm s  
was n o t  r a i s e d  by a c h i e f ,  b u t  by a lower  c l a s s  I s l a m i c  m y s t i c .  A l though  
th e  r e b e l  l e a d e r  was s a i d  to  have  r e c e i v e d  token  s u p p o r t  from a c h i e f  
b e l o n g i n g  t o  a f a c t i o n  o f  t h e  Trengganu  a r i s t o c r a c y ,  t h e  u p r i s i n g  was 
n e i t h e r  i n s p i r e d  n o r  l e d  by the  l o c a l  c h i e f .  The emergence of  t h i s  lower  
c l a s s  Malay r e l i g i o u s  l e a d e r  i s  o f  u tm o s t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  b e c a u s e  i n  t h e  
f u t u r e  i n  any s i t u a t i o n  o f  c r i s i s  wh ich  a f f l i c t e d  Malay s o c i e t y ,  t h e  
Malays a t  t h e  l o c a l  l e v e l  would t u r n  t o  such  a l e a d e r ,  and n o t  to  t h e i r  
l o c a l  c h i e f ,  t o  o r g a n i s e  t h e i r  s e l f - d e f e n c e ?  o r  r e s i s t a n c e .  (See C h a p t e r  VII )
5 R.O. W in s t e d t  and R . J .  W i l k i n s o n ,  'A H i s t o r y  o f  P e r a k ’ , i n  JMBRAS.
X I I ,  P t . l  ( June  1934) ,  113-16 ;  and C.D. Cowan, N i n e t e e n t h  C en tu ry  
Malaya:  The O r i g i n s  o f  B r i t i s h  P o l i t i c a l  C o n t r o l , London,  1961,
234 -35 ,  245.
6 M .C . f f  She ppa rd ,  ’A S h o r t  H i s t o r y  o f  T r e n g g a n u ' ,  i n  JMBRAS, XXII , 
P t . I I l ,  1949, 6 4 - 6 6 ;  Khoo Kay Kim, ’The B e g in n in g s  o f  P o l i t i c a l  
Ext remism i n  Malaya ,  1 9 1 5 - 1 9 3 5 ' ,  Ph.D t h e s i s ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Malaya ,  
1973, 92-94 ;  Alun J o n e s ,  ' I n t e r n a l  S e c u r i t y  i n  B r i t i s h  M alaya ,  
1 8 9 5 - 1 9 4 2 ' ,  Ph.D t h e s i s ,  Ya le  U n i v e r s i t y ,  1970, 182.
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6F o l lo w in g  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  t h e  
Malay s t a t e s ,  the  money economy became p r e v a l e n t  i n  the  r u r a l  a r e a s .
But  i t  had few d i s r u p t i v e  e f f e c t s  on Malay s o c i e t y  be c a u s e  the B r i t i s h  
s low ed  down t h e  r a t e  o f  economic deve lo pm en t  o f  t h e s e  a r e a s .  The Malays 
r em a ined  c o n f i n e d  t o  s u b s i s t e n c e  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  w h i l e  t h e  B r i t i s h  c o n c e n t r a t e d  
on d e v e l o p i n g  t h e  m ajo r  t i n  and r u b b e r  i n d u s t r i e s  w i t h  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  o f  
l a r g e - s c a l e  im m ig r a t i o n  o f  Chinese  and I n d i a n s .  Although, i n i t i a l l y  many 
Malay t i n  min ing  l a n d s  p a s s e d  t o  t h e  hands  o f  t h e  C h inese  b e f o r e  some o f  
them were t a k e n  ove r  by W este rn  com pan ies ,  Malay a g r i c u l t u r a l  l an d s  
r em a in e d  i n  Malay c o n t r o l  and c o n t i n u e d  t o  remain  so u n t i l  t h e  o u t b r e a k  
o f  t h e  Second World War. The b e g i n n i n g  o f  the  r u b b e r  i n d u s t r y  i n  t h e  f i r s t  
decade  o f  the  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y  was ,  i n  f a c t ,  accompanied soon a f t e r  by 
t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  Malay R e s e r v a t i o n  Lands i n  1913 .^  The Malays w ere ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  n o t  f o r c e d  t o  g ive  up t h e i r  s u b s i s t e n c e  a g r i c u l t u r e  and t h e i r  
more i n d e p e n d e n t  way o f  l i f e  in  o r d e r  t o  become w o r k e rs  on t h e  r u b b e r  
e s t a t e s  o r  t h e  t i n  mines o f  European  o r  Chinese  c a p i t a l i s t s .  What 
m o t i v a t e d  t h e  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  to  a dop t  p r o t e c t i v e  m easures  on b e h a l f  
o f  the  Malays was r i s i n g  c o n c e rn  among t h e  Malay r u l i n g  c l a s s  o v e r  B r i t i s h  
n e g l e c t  of  Malay w e l f a r e ,  and B r i t i s h  p r o m is e s  to  p r o t e c t  Malay i n t e r e s t s  
i n  t h e  t r e a t i e s  s i g n e d  w i t h  the  S u l t a n s .  There was t h u s  a c e r t a i n  t i n g e  
o f  p a t e r n a l i s m  i n  B r i t i s h  p o l i c i e s  tow ards  the  Malays .  Moreove r ,  u n l i k e  
t h e  J a v a n e s e  i n  the  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  t h e  Malays d i d  n o t  s u f f e r  e i t h e r  
f rom a s h o r t a g e  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l a n d s  o r  f rom t h e  p rob lem  of  o v e r - p o p u l a t i o n .
7 I t  was a wave o f  l a n d  p u r c h a s e s  d u r i n g  the  f i r s t  r u b b e r  boom which 
a r o u s e d  f e a r s  among t h e  B r i t i s h  R e s i d e n t s  in  t h e  FMS t h a t  i t  would  
have  a d i s a s t r o u s  e f f e c t  on t h e  Malay p e a s a n t r y  i f  a l l o w e d  to  
c o n t i n u e  unchecked .  A d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e i r  a rgum ents  and 
moves which l e d  to  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  Malay R e s e r v a t i o n s  
Enac tment  o f  1913 i s  found i n  Lim Teck Ghee, ' P e a s a n t  A g r i c u l t u r e  
i n  C o l o n i a l  Malaya ,  1 8 7 4 - 1 9 4 1 ' ,  Ph.D t h e s i s ,  A .N .U . ,  1971,  145-61 .  
A par t  from t h i s  p o l i c y ,  s u r v e y s  and l a n d  p o l i c y  i n  g e n e r a l  were 
aimed a t  m e e t in g  the  l e g a l  anä  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  
modern s e c t o r  and were n o t  o f  much b e n e f i t  t o  the  p e a s a n t  s e c t o r .
See Gayl  D. N e ss ,  B u r e a u c r a c y  and R u r a l  Development  i n  M a l a y s i a , 
B e r k e l e y ,  1967,  33. The m in in g  l a n d  p o l i c y ,  however ,  f a v o u r e d  
l a r g e  Weste rn  companies  u s i n g  m ac h in e ry  and l a b o u r - s a v i n g  t e c h n i q u e s  
o f  e x p l o i t a t i o n  and l e d  t o  a m a jo r  s h i f t  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  and ow nersh ip  
o f  t i n  min ing  l a n d s  from C h inese  m in e r s  t o  W este rn  companies .
See Wong Lin Ken, The Malayan Tin I n d u s t r y  t o  1914 , Tuscon ,  1965,
2 2 .
7Nor did the British force the Malays to plant cash crops, so that the
hardships which affected the Javanese peasants did not fall on the Malay 
8peasantry.
As Malay society expanded and became influenced by modem
ideas of progress and social organisation, from the Middle East and
from the West, different social groups increased, such as the alim-ulama
(the Islamic scholars, teachers and religious officials), the bureaucratic
elite and the non-aristocratic professional class, such as journalists
and school teachers. By 1941, the social stratification of Malay society
had become so varied that it was no longer possible to speak of Malay
society as comprising merely two groups. However, relationships between the
various strata were still governed by traditional Malay customs. A Malay,
whether an English-educated bureaucrat of high birth or office, or a
middle class vernacular-educated journalist, or an illiterate Malay
peasant, still addressed himself as patek (slave, meaning ’I’ or 'me')
when speaking to a Sultan, the Sultana or Raja Perempuan (reigning queen)
9and to all anak-anak raja (princes and princesses). This was part of 
the language traditionally used for royalty and showed that while in 
substance Malay society may have changed, in form it was still intact.
For this, the British were largely responsible since, by leaving Malay 
customs and the Islamic religion in the hands of the traditional Rulers, 
they ensured that these practices would continue.
Finally, there was one other aspect of continuity which should 
be noted. The disappearance of the traditional power of the Malay chiefs, 
following the establishment of British administration in the Malay States, 
had, in fact, created in its wake a host of new patronage roles in Malay 
society, particularly as they touched on various aspects of Malay rural life. 
British rule increased the need of Malay peasants to cultivate the favour 
of local officials, or failing that, friends of officials, to protect
8 For an account of the Dutch Culture System in Java in the early 
nineteenth century and the social and economic effects following 
upon its implementation, see C. Day, Ike Dutch in Java, Kuala 
Lumpur, reprint 1966.
9 Alwi bin Sheikh Alhady, Malay Customs and Traditions, Singapore, 
1962, 61.
8t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  i n  m a t t e r s  o f  t a x a t i o n ,  l a n d  t i t l e s ,  c o u r t  l i t i g a t i o n ,  
and so  f o r t h .  I n  many S t a t e s ,  members o f  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  a r i s t o c r a c y  
s t e p p e d  i n t o  t h e  new e l i t e  r o l e s  of  t h e  c o l o n i a l  d i s t r i c t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  
such  as  A s s i s t a n t  D i s t r i c t  O f f i c e r  (ADO), o r  DO, m a g i s t r a t e ,  l a n d  o f f i c e r  
o r  p e n g h u l u , t h e  l a s t  was a key f i g u r e  i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  Malay s o c i e t y  whose 
o f f i c e  t h e  B r i t i s h  c o n t i n u e d  t o  use b e c a u s e  they  found i t  a v a l u a b l e  
i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  c a r r y i n g  out  t h e  r o u t i n e  work o f  r u r a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
The pen g h u lu  and k e t u a  kampong ( v i l l a g e  headman) had a s p e c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
w i t h  the  r a a y a t  whom th e y  would c a l l  anak buah (meaning ' p e o p l e  who a r e  
members o f  a f a m i l y  o r  g r o u p ' ) .  Th is  r e l a t i o n s h i p  c o u ld  c l e a r l y  be 
i d e n t i f i e d  as  t h a t  o f  ' p a t r o n '  and ' c l i e n t '  as  d e s c r i b e d  by James S c o t t . ^  
These new e l i t e s  were a b l e  t o  c a p i t a l i s e  on t h e i r  new power as  ' p a t r o n s ' ,  
and t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  o r d i n a r y  Malay p e a s a n t s  w i th  some de g re e  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  
i n  r e t u r n  f o r  c o n t i n u e d  r e s p e c t ,  s e r v i c e s  and s u p p o r t .  These ' p a t r o n -  
c l i e n t '  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  were u s u a l l y  good;  so were t h o s e  be tween  th e  l o c a l  
Malay ADO o r  DO and t h e  r a a y a t . But such  ' p a t r o n - c l i e n t '  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
f a i l e d  t o  o p e r a t e  where t h e  d i s t r i c t  o f f i c i a l s  were o u t s i d e r s  ( e . g . ,
B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s ,  o r  Malays from o t h e r  S t a t e s ) .  Dur ing t h e  J a p a n e s e  
o c c u p a t i o n ,  t h e r e  was some e r o s i o n  o f  t h e  r u r a l  ' p a t r o n - c l i e n t '  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  g e n e r a l l y ,  b u t  i t  d id  n o t  l e a d  to  any v i o l e n t  s o c i a l  c o n f l i c t s .
The S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s
The a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  Penang i n  1786,  P r o v in c e  W e l l e s l e y  ( a  s t r i p  
o f  l a n d  i n  Kedah o p p o s i t e  Penang)  i n  1800,  and S in g a p o re  i n  1819,  and 
t h e i r  use as  f r e e  p o r t s  and t r a d i n g  c e n t r e s ,  marked t h e  b e g i n n i n g s  o f  
B r i t i s h  c o l o n i a l  e x p a n s i o n  i n t o  the  Malay p e n i n s u l a .  Malacca was a c q u i r e d  
from t h e  Dutch i n  1824 unde r  t h e  A nglo-Dutch  T r e a t y , * *  and i n  1826
10 See James C. S c o t t ,  'The E r o s io n  o f  P a t r o n - C l i e n t  Bonds and S o c i a l  
Change i n  R u r a l  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a ' , i n  J o u r n a l  o f  As ian  S t u d i e s , XXXII,
1 (November 1 9 72 ) ,  5 - 3 7 .
11 In  August  1795,  as  a r e s u l t  o f  the  French  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  a rm ies  
o v e r r u n n i n g  the  N e t h e r l a n d s ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  Navy c a p t u r e d  Malacca and 
Bengkulen  i n  Sum at ra ,  which were i n  Dutch h a n d s .  The French  c o n q u e s t  
of  the  N e t h e r l a n d s  ha d  f o r c e d  t h e  Dutch to  conc lu de  an a l l i a n c e  w i t h  
F r a n c e ,  who was a t  war  w i t h  B r i t a i n .  See K.G. T re g o n n in g ,
A His  tor}7 o f  Modern M a la y a , 1964, 93 ,  and a l s o  C.N. P a r k i n s o n ,  War i n  
t h e  E a s t e r n  S e a s ,  17 9 3 -1 8 1 5 , London, 1954.
9was j o i n e d  w i t h  S in g a p o re  and Penang ,  i n c l u d i n g  P r o v in c e  W e l l e s l e y ,  a s  t h e  
S t r a i t s  P r e s i d e n c y .  H e n c e f o r t h ,  B r i t i s h  and C h inese  commerc ia l  i n t e r e s t s  
b a s e d  i n  S in g a p o re  began  t o  s t e p  up t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  Malay 
S t a t e s .
A f t e r  t h e  I n d i a n  Mutiny i n  1858, t h e  B r i t i s h  E a s t  I n d i a  Company 
was a b o l i s h e d  and the  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s ,  wh ich  had  been  unde r  the  
c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  in  I n d i a ,  p a s s e d  unde r  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  
t h e  I n d i a  O f f i c e  i n  London. I n  1867 th e  S e t t l e m e n t s  were t r a n s f e r r e d  
t o  t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  and became a Crown Colony.  Th is  s t e p  had  been  
s o u g h t  by the S t r a i t s  m e r c h a n t s  and t h e  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  i n  t h e  
S e t t l e m e n t s  on s e v e r a l  g r o u n d s ,  one o f  which was t h a t  the  p rob lem s  o f  
Malaya were v e ry  u n l i k e  t h o s e  o f  I n d i a .  A f u r t h e r  p o i n t  o f  d i s a g r e e m e n t  
was t h a t  the  o f f i c i a l s  f rom the  I n d i a n  S e r v i c e s  were b a d l y  e q u ip p e d  t o  
d e a l  w i t h  the  M alays ,  and more p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i t h  the  C h in e s e ,  who
12i n c r e a s i n g l y  c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  b u l k  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  the  S e t t l e m e n t s .
Throughout  t h i s  p e r i o d  t h e  t r a d e ,  p r o s p e r i t y  and p o p u l a t i o n  
o f  the  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  s t e a d i l y  i n c r e a s e d .  The most  numerous r a c i a l  
g roup  was the  C h in e s e ,  who came v e r y  l a r g e l y  from Kwangtung and Fukien  
p r o v i n c e s  i n  s o u th  China.  In  t h e  s e co n d  h a l f  o f  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  
p a r t l y  as  a r e s u l t  of  t u r b u l e n c e  c a u s e d  by th e  T a i p i n g  R e b e l l i o n  (1849-  
1 8 60 ) ,  g r e a t e r  numbers o f  Chinese  were added to  t h o se  a l r e a d y  l i v i n g  in  
t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  and o t h e r  a r e a s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia .
B r i t i s h  Rule i n  the Malay S t a t e s
Dur ing  a l l  t h i s  t im e  th e  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  
to wards  the Malay S t a t e s  was one o f  n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n .  However , as  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  w e s t e r n  Malay S t a t e s  worsened  i n  1873,  t h e  S t r a i t s  
m e r c h a n t s  began to  c lamour  f o r  B r i t i s h  i n t e r v e n t i o n  to  end t h e  d i s o r d e r .  
These  m e r c h a n t s  were a b l e  to  lobby  e f f e c t i v e l y  t h ro u g h  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e ­
ments  L e g i s l a t i v e  C ou n c i l  in  which  t h e y  were g iv en  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  1867.
The w a r f a r e  o v e r  m in ing  l a n d s  i n  S e l a n g o r  and P e rak  i n v o l v e d  r i v a l  f a c t i o n s  
o f  Malay c h i e f s  and C h inese  s e c r e t  s o c i e t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  Ghee Hin and 
Hai  San.  F i n a l l y  in  1874 the  new Governor  o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s ,
12 These a c c o u n t s  a r e  t r e a t e d  in  d e t a i l  in  L.A. M i l l s ,  ’ B r i t i s h  
Malaya ,  1 8 2 4 - 1 8 6 7 ' ,  JMBRAS, I I I ,  2 ,  1925,  and C.M. T u r n b u l l ,  
The S t r a i t s  S e t l .Lemonts , 1826-186 7 , S i n g a p o r e ,  1972.
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Sir Andrew Clarke, decided to intervene. The deciding factor which led
to this decision is believed not to have been the protests of the Straits
merchants but the fear of intervention by Germany, the rising European
power, who was showing great interest in the Malay States.^
Clarke imposed the Pangkor Treaty of 1874 upon all the major
chiefs and the headmen of the Chinese secret societies in Perak, where the
fighting was worst. The Treaty also settled the succession dispute
over the throne, which went to Raja Abdullah. Sultan Abdullah was, however,
forced to accept a British Resident and instructed that the Resident's
'advice must be asked and acted upon in all questions other than those
touching Malay religion and custom.’ This famous formula, by which the
Sultans agreed to accept British Residents at their courts, carried a
very wide meaning. It in effect ended the real independence of these
States and established British suzerainty and effective control. Within
the same year, Selangor and Sungei Ujong accepted British Residents.
In 1888, during the second phase of expansion, British rule was extended
to the rest of Negri Sembilan and to Pahang. The four States of Perak,
Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang were next brought together as the
Federated Malay States (FMS) in 1895. The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909
allowed the British to increase their control further in the north of
the Malay peninsula. By this Treaty, Siam transferred to Britain all its
claims, rights and responsibilities in the States of Kelantan, Trengganu,
Kedah and Perlis. In 1914 Johor accepted a British Adviser. The unification
of Malaya in the sense defined at the start of this chapter was completed
14in 1919, when Trengganu accepted a British Adviser. The spread of 
British influence brought coordination in many things, but the separate 
identities of the States were nonetheless a reality. There were eleven
13 C.D . Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of British
Political Control, London, 1961, 169. For a detailed account of the 
strong connections between the Straits merchants and the Malay 
States, see Khoo Khay Kim, The Western Malay States 1850-1873: The
effects of commercial development on Malay Politics, Kuala Lumpur, 1972.
14 Although the four northern States of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and 
Perlis were transferred by Siam to Britain in 1909, it took the 
British some time to establish actual control in these States.
British officers took over Kelantan in 1909, and Kedah and Perlis 
in 1910.
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S t a t e  g o v e r n m e n t s  (o ne  SS, f o u r  FMS, one FMS f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t ,  an d  l i v e  
UFMS) w hi ch  w e r e  c o o r d i n a t e d  by t h e  G o v e r n o r  o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  i n  
h i s  c a p a c i t y  a s  High C o m m i s s i o n e r  o f  t h e  Malay S t a t e s .
In  e a c h  S t a t e  w h e re  a B r i t i s h  R e s i d e n t  was a p p o i n t e d ,  a S t a t e  
C o u n c i l  was i m m e d i a t e l y  s e t  up t o  s e r v e  as  an a d v i s o r y  body t o  b o t h  
t h e  S u l t a n  an d  t h e  R e s i d e n t .  B e s i d e s  t h e  R e s i d e n t ,  t h e  C o u n c i l  u s u a l l y  
c o n s i s t e d  o f  a  few Malay c h i e f s  a n d  a  C h i n e s e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  I n c r e a s i n g l y  
t h e r e  was p r e s s u r e  f r om  t h e  p l a n t e r s  and t h e  p o w e r f u l  c o m m e r c i a l  c o m p a n i e s  
f o r  a v o i c e  i n  t h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t .  Malay c r i t i c i s m ,  t o o ,  
h a d  b e g u n .  In  1903 a t  t h e  s e c o n d  D u r b a r ,  o r  C o n f e r e n c e  o f  R u l e r s ,  S u l t a n  
I d r i s  o f  P e r a k  became c r i t i c a l  o f  t h e  f e d e r a t i o n .  He d e p l o r e d  t h e  l a c k  
o f  M al ay s  i n  t h e  g r o w i n g  C i v i l  S e r v i c e .  He was p e r t u r b e d  a t  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  
o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  s t a t e  by t h e  c e n t r a l  s e c r e t a r i a t  and was e a g e r  t o  s e e  
M a l a y s  b e i n g  t r a i n e d  and e m p lo y ed  i n  g o v e r n m e n t  s e r v i c e . ^  One r e s u l t  
o f  t h e s e  c r i t i c i s m s  was t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  i n  1909 o f  a F e d e r a l  C o u n c i l ,  
c o n s i s t i n g  o f  t h e  High C o m m i s s i o n e r ,  t h e  R e s i d e n t  G e n e r a l ,  t h e  R u l e r s  
an d  R e s i d e n t s  o f  t h e  f o u r  S t a t e s  an d  f o u r  u n o f f i c i a l  members ,  t o  c o n s i d e r  
a l l  m e a s u r e s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  f e d e r a t i o n .  I n  1910 t h e  FMS G overn m en t  
i n t r o d u c e d  a ’ p r o - M a l a y ’ p r e f e r e n t i a l  p o l i c y  i n  r e c r u i t m e n t  t o  t h e  l o w e r  
an d  h i g h e r  r a n k s  o f  t h e  FMS p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s .  T h i s  l e d  t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  
o f  t h e  Malay A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  S e r v i c e  (MAS) w h ich  was m a i n l y  t o  s e r v e  t h e  
d i s t r i c t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  C o m p e ten t  M alay  o f f i c i a l s  i n  t h e  MAS c o u l d  
move up t o  t h e  M al ayan  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  (MCS), t h e  s u p e r i o r  s e r v i c e  
d o m i n a t e d  by B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s .
B e g i n n i n g  f rom 1920 s u c c e s s i v e  B r i t i s h  G o v e r n o r s  a d o p t e d  v a r i o u s  
m e a s u r e s  o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  i n  t h e  FMS t o  r e s t o r e  t o  t h e  Malay s t a t e  
g o v e r n m e n t s  some o f  t h e  p o w ers  an d  f u n c t i o n s  w h ic h  t h e y  h a d  l o s t  t o  t h e  
f e d e r a t i o n .  By 1939 s i x  f e d e r a l  d e p a r t m e n t s  w e re  d e c e n t r a l i s e d ,  an d  t h e  
S t a t e  C o u n c i l s  wre r e  e n l a r g e d  and g i v e n  i n c r e a s e d  f i n a n c i a l  an d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  The m e a s u r e s  w e r e  a im e d  a t  g i v i n g  power  t o  M a lay s  i n  
t h e  FMS and t o  a t t r a c t  t h e  o t h e r  Malay S t a t e s  known c o l l e c t i v e l y  a s  t h e
15 T r e g o n n i n g ,  o p . c i t . ,  2 1 6 - 2 5 .  See a l s o  E u n i c e  T h i o ,  B r i t i s h  P o l i c y  
i n  t h e  Malay  P e n i n s u l a  1 8 8 0 - 1 9 1 0 , K u a la  Lumpur ,  1968.  On t h e  
e a r l i e r  S t a t e  c o u n c i l s ,  s e e  E m i ly  S a d k a ,  The P r o t e c t e d  Malay S t a t e s , 
1 8 7 4 - 1 8 9 5 ,  K u a la  Lumpur ,  1968.
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U n f e d e r a t e d  Malay S t a t e s  i n t o  j o i n i n g  t h e  f e d e r a t i o n .  A l t h o u g h  much 
FMS Malay s u p p o r t  o r  t a c i t  a p p r o v a l  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  was won by t h e s e  
m e a s u r e s ,  d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  f a i l e d  t o  l u r e  t h e  UFMS i n t o  t h e  f e d e r a t i o n  
r i g h t  up t o  t h e  J a p a n e s e  i n v a s i o n ,  a s  t h e y  had  s e e n  much o f  t h e  p ow ers  
o f  t h e i r  b r e t h r e n  i n  t h e  FMS t a k e n  away by t h e  h i g h l y  c e n t r a l i s e d  
E u r o p e a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
A p o l i c y  t o  e n c o u r a g e  v e r n a c u l a r  e d u c a t i o n  up t o  p r i m a r y
l e v e l  was a l s o  a d o p t e d  i n  t h e  FMS. A g r i c u l t u r a l  s c h o o l s  and s p e c i a l
E n g l i s h  an d  Malay s c h o o l s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  Malay  C o l l e g e  a t  K u a la  K a n g s a r
(MCKK) an d  t h e  S u l t a n  I d r i s  T e a c h e r s  C o l l e g e  (SITC) a t  T a n j o n g  Mal im,
w e re  o p e n e d  i n  1903 an d  1922 r e s p e c t i v e l y  f o r  M a l a y s .  The MCKK, m o d e l l e d
on t h e  E n g l i s h  p u b l i c  s c h o o l  i n  g e n e r a l  an d  u s i n g  E n g l i s h  a s  t h e  medium
o f  i n s t r u c t i o n ,  t r a i n e d  t h e  c h i l d r e n  o f  t h e  r o y a l  and a r i s t o c r a t i c
f a m i l i e s  f o r  ' h i g h e r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p o s t s '  i n  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e ,  w h i l e
t h e  SITC was a im ed  a t  t r a i n i n g  t e a c h e r s  f o r  v i l l a g e  p r i m a r y  s c h o o l s
w h e re  t h e  e m p h a s i s  was on a g r i c u l t u r e  an d  t h e  t h r e e  ' R s ' .  O t h e r  t h a n
t h e s e  two c o l l e g e s ,  t h e r e  was n o  Malay s e c o n d a r y  s c h o o l  s y s t e m  t o  s p e a k
o f ,  an d  t h e  i d e a  o f  a u n i v e r s i t y  was e v e n  more d i s t a n t .  I n  1913 a
Malay R e s e r v a t i o n s  E n a c t m e n t  was p a s s e d  by t h e  FMS F e d e r a l  C o u n c i l  t o
s e t  a s i d e  c e r t a i n  a r e a s  o f  l a n d  f o r  e x c l u s i v e  Malay o w n e r s h i p .  T h i s
was done i n  t h e  m i d s t  o f  a  c l a m o u r  among n o n - M a l a y s  a n x i o u s  t o  a c q u i r e
more Malay l a n d .  The e f f e c t  i n  g e n e r a l  o f  t h e s e  ' p r o - M a l a y '  p o l i c i e s
an d  p r a c t i c e s  w a s ,  a s  W i l l i a m  R o f f  p o i n t s  o u t ,  ' t o  r e d u c e  t h e  i m p a c t  and
r a t e  o f  s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  change  a t  t h e  v i l l a g e  l e v e l  and s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t o
16
p r e v e n t  any s e r i o u s  d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  r u r a l  Malay l i f e ' .
I m m i g r a t i o n  and t h e  C r e a t i o n  o f  a P l u r a l  S o c i e t y
By t h e  s e c o n d  d e c a d e  o f  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y  a p l u r a l  s o c i e t y  
h a d  em e r g e d  i n  M a la y a .  The f l o w  o f  C h i n e s e  i n t o  t h e  p e n i n s u l a  k e p t  
i n c r e a s i n g ,  f e d  by o v e r p o p u l a t i o n ,  f a m i n e ,  f l o o d s ,  and c h r o n i c  i n s t a b i l i t y  
i n  C h i n a  f r om  a b o u t  1890 o n w a r d s .  Most came as  c o o l i e s  t o  w ork  i n  t h e  
t i n ,  i r o n  an d  g o l d  m i n e s .  They d i d  n o t  come w i t h  t h e  i d e a  o f  s e t t l i n g  
down p e r m a n e n t l y  b u t  t o  g e t  a d e c e n t  l i v e l i h o o d  a n d ,  a f t e r  s e v e r a l  
y e a r s '  s o j o u r n  i n  M a l a y a ,  t o  r e t u r n  t o  C h i n a .  I n  1 8 8 1 ,  8 9 , 9 0 0  C h i n e s e
16 R o f f ,  o p . c i t . ,  124.
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a r r i v e d  a t  S in g a p o re  and Penang ,  i n  1901, 224,000  Chinese  and i n  1913 
t h e  number had r i s e n  to  278 ,000 .  Most o f  t h e s e  e m i g r a n t s  were s t i l l  
m i g r a t o r y  i n  c h a r a c t e r .  Tha t  t h e  t r e n d  to wards  pe rm anen t  r e s i d e n c e  
had a long  way to  go was i n d i c a t e d  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  even  d u r i n g  the 
peak y e a r  o f  1927, 303 ,497 C h inese  l e f t  Malaya as  a g a i n s t  t h e  435,708 
who came i n .  A f a c t o r  which soon  c o n t r i b u t e d  towards  s t a b i l i t y  of  t h e  
Chinese  i n  Malaya was the  marked i n c r e a s e  i n  the p r o p o r t i o n  o f  Chinese  
women a r r i v i n g  i n  Malaya.  In  1901 t h e r e  were i n  t h e  FMS j u s t  under  100 
Chinese  f em a les  to  e v e ry  1 ,000  m a l e s ;  i n  1911 the  f i g u r e  f o r  t h e  whole 
o f  Malaya was 247 t o  1 ,0 0 0 ;  i n  1921,  384;  i n  1931, 4 3 6 . 17
The m u l t i - r a c i a l  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  Malaya was made more complex 
d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  by t h e  m i g r a t i o n  o f  t h o u s a n d s  o f  Tamil  l a b o u r e r s  
f rom South I n d i a .  While  t h e  l i n k s  be tw een  t h e  Malay p e n i n s u l a  and 
I n d i a  e x t e n d e d  back  more t h a n  a t h o u s a n d  y e a r s ,  i t  was e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
o f  t h e  r u b b e r  i n d u s t r y  i n  t h e  f i r s t  decade  o f  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y  
t h a t  c aused  thousa nds  o f  Tamil  l a b o u r e r s  to  f l o o d  i n  from Madras .
From 1911 t o  1920 the  t o t a l  number  o f  im m ig ra n t s  f rom Madras was 
908 ,100  w h i l e  t h e  number r e t u r n i n g  to  I n d i a  d u r i n g  the  same p e r i o d  
was 5 6 1 ,9 1 3 .  The a f f a i r s  o f  the  I n d i a n  e s t a t e  w orke rs  were ve ry  c l o s e l y  
s u p e r v i s e d  by the I n d i a n  I m m ig r a t io n  Board ,  which was s e t  up t o  r e g u l a t e  
the  i m p o r t a t i o n  o f  l a b o u r  from Madras  f o r  a l l  e m p loye rs  i n  Malaya.
The B r i t i s h  i n i t i a l l y  d i d  n o t h i n g  to  r e s t r i c t  t h e  f low of
Chinese  and I n d i a n  i m m i g r a t i o n ,  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  the  im m ig ra n ts  were
m os t ly  t r a n s i e n t .  But an i n c r e a s i n g  number h a d ,  i n  f a c t ,  come t o  Malaya
to  s e t t l e  p e r m a n e n t l y .  Free  i m m i g r a t i o n  o f  a l l  r a c e s  was a l l o w e d  u n t i l
1929. W r i t e r s  i n  t h e  Malay p r e s s  i n  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  and t h e
FMS c r i t i c i s e d  the  B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s  f o r  n o t  r e s t r i c t i n g  C h inese  and
I n d ia n  i m m i g r a t i o n .  They f e a r e d  t h a t  t h i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  and growing
a l i e n  p r e s e n c e  would c r e a t e  f u r t h e r  s o c i a l  and economic  prob lems f o r
the  Malays .  In 1930 the  government  took  a d v a n ta g e  o f  the  G r e a t  D e p r e s s i o n
to  comply w i t h  Malay demands and i n t r o d u c e d  an I m m ig r a t io n  R e s t r i c t i o n
Ord inance  which imposed q u o t a s  on male im m ig ra n t  l a b o u r .  No r e s t r i c t i o n
18w a s , p l a c e d ,  however ,  on the  i m m i g r a t i o n  o f  women and c h i l d r e n .
17 C.A. V l i e l a n d ,  B r i t i s h  Malaya :  A R e p o r t  on the  1931 C e n s u s , London,
1932,  52.
18 V i c t o r  P u r c e l l ,  The Chinese  i n  M a l a y a , London,  1948, 203-05 .
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The i n c r e a s e d  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  M a l a y a n - b o r n  C h i n e s e  and I n d i a n s ,  r e c o r d e d  
i n  t h e  1921 and 1931 c e n s u s  r e p o r t s ,  i n d i c a t e d  t h e  t r e n d  t o w a r d  p e r m a n e n t  
s e t t l e m e n t  i n  M a l a y a ,  as  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t a b l e s  show:
TAB LE 1
THE TOTAL POPULATION OF MALAYA
1921 1931 1947
P e r c e n t a g e s  
1921 1931 1947
M al ay s  (a n d  
o t h e r
M a l a y s i a n )* 1 , 6 2 3 , 0 1 4
1 ,645 , 516  
2 8 4 , 5 2 8
2 , 2 3 4 , 1 8 5 )  
3 0 9 , 3 8 4 j 4 8 . 8
3 7 . 9
6 . 6
3 8 . 2 0
5 . 2 9
C h i n e s e 1 , 1 7 1 , 7 4 0 1 , 7 0 4 , 4 5 2 2 ,6 1 4 , . 6 6 7 3 5 . 2 3 9 .2 44.  70
I n d i a n s 4 7 1 , 5 1 4 6 2 1 , 8 4 7 5 9 9 , 6 1 6 1 4 .2 1 4 .3 1 0 .2 5
E u r o p e a n s 14 ,894 1 7 ,6 8 6 1 8 ,9 5 8 .4 .4 0.  32
E u r a s i a n s 12 ,629 1 5 ,9 9 9 19 ,1 7 1 . 4 .4 0.  33
Othe r
C o m m u n i t i e s 3 2 , 9 0 4 5 7 , 6 7 6 5 2 , 9 2 9 1.0 1 .3 0 . 9 1
TOTAL 3 , 2 6 2 , 6 9 5 4 , 3 4 7 , 7 0 4 5 , 8 4 8 , 9 1 0 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0  TOO.00
*
The t e r m  ' M a l a y s i a n ’ in t h e  c e n s u s r e p o r t s  means p e o p l e s o f  t h e
i n d i g e n o u s  r a c e s  i n c l u d i n g  I n d o n e s i a n  M a lay s  and t h e  a b o r i g i n e s .
TABLE I I
THE NUMBER OF CHINESE AND INDIANS BORN IN MALAYA
C h i n e s e
I n d i a n s
1921 1931 1947
P e r c e n t a g e s  o f  t h e  
t o t a l  C h i n e s e  and 
I n d i a n  p o p u l a t i o n s  
1921 1931 1947
2 5 8 ,1 8 9
5 8 , 6 7 6
5 3 3 , 2 0 5  1 , 6 3 3 , 3 3 2
1 3 1 , 4 7 4  2 9 8 , 6 7 4
2 2 . 0  3 1 .2  6 2 . 5
1 2 . 4  2 1 . 1  4 9 . 8
S o u r c e :  M.V. d e l  T u f o ,  M a lay a :  A R e p o r t  on t h e  1947 Census  o f
Popu.l a t i o n , Lon d o n ,  1949,  40 ,  8 4 - 8 5 .
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The p r e p o n d e r a n c e  o f  t h e  C h i n e s e  an d  I n d i a n  c o m m u n i t i e s  i n
t h e  e c o n o m i c  l i f e  o f  t h e  FMS was v i v i d l y  i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  o f f i c i a l  e s t i m a t e  o f  1 9 3 4 ,  t h e  M alays  n um bere d  o n l y
6 4 3 , 0 0 3  o u t  o f  a t o t a l  FMS p o p u l a t i o n  o f  1 , 7 7 7 , 4 2 1 ,  w h i l e  t h e  C h i n e s e
came t o  7 1 7 ,6 1 4  and t h e  I n d i a n s  t o  3 8 7 , 9 1 7 .  Of t h e  f o u r  S t a t e s  i n  t h e
FMS t h e  M a la y s  p r e d o m i n a t e d  o n l y  i n  u n d e r - d e v e l o p e d  P ah an g  w h e re  t h e
t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  1 8 6 ,4 6 5  c o n t a i n e d  1 1 7 ,2 6 5  M a l a y s .  I n  t h e  1931 c e n s u s ,
i t  h a d  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  i n  b o t h  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  and t h e  FMS
t h e  u r b a n  p o p u l a t i o n  was d o m i n a n t l y  C h i n e s e .  The same was t r u e  o f  J o h o r
(UFMS). Even i n  Kedah (UFMS) t h e  l a r g e s t  s i n g l e  com ponen t  o f  t h e  u r b a n
p o p u l a t i o n  c o n s i s t e d  o f  C h i n e s e ,  t h o u g h  t h e y  j u s t  f a i l e d  t o  e q u a l  i n
numbers  t h e  p e o p l e  o f  a l l  o t h e r  r a c e s  co m b in ed .  H ow ever ,  t h e  towns
o f  K e l a n t a n  an d  T r e n g g a n u  ( b o t h  UFMS) w e r e  s t i l l  e s s e n t i a l l y  M alay .  The
I n d i a n s  w e re  m o s t  nu m ero u s  i n  t h e  town s o f  t h e  FMS, w h e re  t h e y  w e r e  v e r y
e v e n l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  an d  f o r m e d  j u s t  o v e r  o n e - f i f t h  o f  t h e  t o t a l  u r b a n
19p o p u l a t i o n  i n  e a c h  S t a t e .  Race r e l a t i o n s  w e re  good as  f a r  as  t h e y  w e n t .  
T he re  h a d  b e e n  no i n t e r - r a c i a l  f r i c t i o n ,  a p a r t  f rom Malay n e w s p a p e r  
c r i t i c i s m s  o f  C h i n e s e  and I n d i a n  i m m i g r a t i o n .
The M a lay a n  Economy
A lon g  w i t h  t h e  e n t r e p o t  t r a d e  o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s
t h e  two g r e a t  i n d u s t r i e s  o f  M a lay a  w h i c h  h a d  b e e n  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  t h e
p r o s p e r i t y  o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  m e r c h a n t s  and B r i t i s h  i n v e s t o r s  i n  London w e r e
r u b b e r  and t i n .  I n  t h e s e  i n d u s t r i e s  o w n e r s h i p  was s h a r e d  p r i m a r i l y  b e t w e e n
t h e  B r i t i s h  and t h e  C h i n e s e ,  w i t h  t h e  f o r m e r  h o l d i n g  t h e  m a j o r  s h a r e .
Toward t h e  en d  o f  t h e  l a s t  c e n t u r y  t:he B r i t i s h  h ad  b r o k e n  i n t o  t h e  C h i n e s e
monopoly  o f  t i n  and t h e  t r e n d  i n  t h e  1930s  was i n c r e a s i n g l y  t o w a r d
g r e a t e r  d e g r e e  o f  B r i t i s h  c o n t r o l .  B e f o r e  t h e  F i r s t  Wor ld  War t h e  B r i t i s h
c o n t r o l l e d  o n l y  a q u a r t e r  o f  t h e  t i n ,  b u t  w i t h  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f
c o l o s s a l  m a c h in e  d r e d g e s  a f t e r  t h e  w a r  B r i t i s h  p r o d u c t i o n  moun ted  s h a r p l y ,
u n t i l  i n  1929 i t  came f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t ime  t o  r e p r e s e n t  more t h a n  h a l f
20o f  t h e  t o t a l .  By 1931 i t  h a d  r i s e n  t o  65 p e r  c e n t .  I n  r u b b e r  t h e r e  
was a s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n .  I n  t h e  1930s  t h e  l a r g e s t  r u b b e r  e s t a t e s  w e r e  i n
19 V l i e l a n d , 48.
20 R u p e r t  E m ers o n ,  M a l a y s i a :  A S t u d y  i n  D i r e c t  and I n d i r e c t  Ru le
( f i r s t  e d i t i o n  193 7 ,  r e p r i n t  1 9 6 4 ) ,  r e p r i n t ,  K u a la  Lumpur,  3 5 - 3 7 .
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t h e  hands  o f  the  E u r o p e a n s ,  t h o s e  i n  the  midd le  group i n  the  hands o f  
C h i n e s e ,  and t h e  s m a l l e s t  i n  t h e  hands  o f  C h i n e s e ,  Malays and I n d i a n s .
The m a jo r  economic  e f f e c t  o f  B r i t i s h  r u l e  i n  Malaya was t h e
growth o f  a d u a l  economy.  On t h e  one hand  t h e r e  was t h e  modern c o l o n i a l
s e c t o r  dom in a ted  by t h r e e  i n d u s t r i e s :  t r a d e ,  r u b b e r  and t i n .  On the
o t h e r  t h e r e  was t h e  more t r a d i t i o n a l  s e c t o r ,  most e a s i l y  c l a s s i f i e d  as
the  Malay p e a s a n t  s e c t o r  and c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  t h e  UFMS o f  the  n o r t h  and
e a s t .  The l a t t e r  was c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by s m a l l h o l d i n g s  -  r i c e ,  r u b b e r  o r
c o c o n u t .  As o f  1941 t h e r e  had been  l i t t l e  m o d e r n i s a t i o n  o f  p e a s a n t
a g r i c u l t u r e .  Malaya was s t i l l  a n e t  i m p o r t e r  o f  r i c e .  Under t h e  p r e s s u r e
o f  t h e  e x p a n d in g  r u b b e r  i n d u s t r y  r i c e  c u l t i v a t i o n  was g iven  a low p r i o r i t y .
In  1935 on ly  300 ,000 tons  o r  40 p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  r i c e  consumed i n  Malaya
was p roduce d  i n s i d e  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  t h e  b u l k  i n  the  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  UFMS
of  t h e  n o r t h .  The r e m a i n i n g  60 p e r  c e n t  was im p o r t e d  from Siam, Burma
and e l s e w h e r e .  The p e a s a n t  s e c t o r  h a s  a lw ays  be e n  n e a r l y  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t
21i n  r i c e ,  w h i l e  i m p o r t s  have  been  l a r g e l y  f o r  t h e  u rban  a r e a s .
By 1941 Malaya  was c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by an u rban  p r o l e t a r i a t  o f  
m a in ly  Chinese  and I n d i a n s  and a l a r g e l y  Malay p e a s a n t r y  i n  the  c o u n t r y s i d e .  
A l o c a l  m idd le  c l a s s ,  m a in ly  non -M a la y ,  was em erg ing  i n  t h e  u rban  c e n t r e s .  
Malay s o c i e t y  was i n  a t r a n s i t i o n a l  s t a g e .  M o d e r n i s a t i o n  had n o t  y e t  
begun t o  a f f e c t  t h e  Malay p e a s a n t s .  The Malay a r i s t o c r a c y  s t i l l  e n j o y e d  
h i g h  s o c i a l  s t a t u s  w i t h i n  t h e  s o c i e t y ,  and were d e p e n d en t  n o t  on t h e i r  
l an d s  o r  t h e i r  s u b j e c t s  f o r  t h e i r  income b u t  on the  f i x e d  a l l o w a n c e s  
and p e n s i o n s  they  drew from th e  c o l o n i a l  r eg im e.
E d u c a t i o n
M a in te nanc e  o f  e t h n i c  p l u r a l i t y  was b e s t  s e en  i n  the  s c h o o l s ,  
t h e  most i m p o r t a n t  s o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  f o r  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  of  m u l t i p l e  
c u l t u r a l  i d e n t i t i e s .  There  were f o u r  main and s e p a r a t e  s t r e a m s  o f  
e d u c a t i o n  p e r p e t u a t e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  t h e  governm ent ,  the  C h r i s t i a n  
m i s s i o n s  and t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  C h in e s e  s c h o o l  b o a r d s .  While t h e  m i s s i o n s  
de vo te d  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  l a r g e l y  t o  g i v i n g  e d u c a t i o n  i n  the  E n g l i s h  medium 
(and i n  t h i s  v e n t u r e  governm ent  a l s o  had  a p a r t ) , t he  government  more
21 For  d e t a i l s  on the  p e a s a n t  and modern s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  p r e - 1 9 4 1  Malayan 
economy I have drawn h e a v i l y  f rom Lim Teck G h e e ' s  ' P e a s a n t  A g r i c u l t u r e  
i n  C o l o n i a l  M a l a y a ' , 2 1 - 2 7 ;  Gayl  D. Ness '  B u r e a u c ra cy  and R u r a l  
Development  i n  M a l a y s i a , 28 -3 9 ;  and Emerson,  42.
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p a r t i c u l a r l y  s p o n s o r e d  Malay e d u c a t i o n .  However,  e x c e p t  f o r  t h e  MCKK 
which was to  p r e p a r e  h i g h - r a n k i n g  Malays f o r  e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
government  s e r v i c e ,  and t h e  SITC and t h e  Malay Women's T r a i n i n g  C o l l e g e  
i n  M a la c ca ,  which were b o th  opened f o r  t h e  t r a i n i n g  o f  Malay s c h o o l t e a c h e r s ,  
Malay e d u c a t i o n  d i d  n o t  de ve lop  much beyond t h e  p r im a ry  s c h o o l  l e v e l .
There  were a l s o  Malay v i l l a g e  s c h o o l s ,  such  as  the  s c k o l a h  ugama 
( r e l i g i o u s  s c h o o l  where t h e  Koran was t a u g h t ) , b u t  t h i s  was n o t  s u b s i d i s e d  
by t h e  c o l o n i a l  government .
I n d i a n  s c h o o l s  up t o  p r im a ry  l e v e l  were p r o v i d e d  on t h e  e s t a t e s  
unde r  a government  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  1912, most  o f  them u s i n g  Tamil  as  t h e  
medium o f  i n s t r u c t i o n .  The C h i n e s e ,  however ,  were l e f t  on t h e i r  own.
They b u i l t  and f i n a n c e d  t h e i r  own s c h o o l s  up t o  t h e  s e c o n d a r y  l e v e l  and 
i n t r o d u c e d  t h e i r  own c u r r i c u l a  i n  Mandarin (Kuo Yu, t h e  C h inese  n a t i o n a l  
l a n g u a g e ) .  The t e a c h e r s  were m o s t ly  r e c r u i t e d  from Ch ina .  I t  was i n  
1920,  when t h e  c o l o n i a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  d i s c o v e r e d  t h a t  C h inese  s c h o o l s  were 
i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c s  o f  t h e  C h inese  n a t i o n a l i s t  movement, and were b e i n g  
used  to  i n c u l c a t e  Chinese  p a t r i o t i s m  and a n t i - B r i t i s h  i d e a s ,  t h a t  l e g i s l a t i o n  
was i n t r o d u c e d  f o r  t h e  r e g i s t r a t i o n  and c o n t r o l  o f  Chinese  s c h o o l s  and 
t e a c h e r s .  Th is  move was s t r o n g l y  opposed  by C h inese  s c h o o l t e a c h e r s .
A g i t a t i o n  d i e d  down, however ,  when t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  was accompanied  by a 
scheme f o r  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  f o r  C h inese  s c h o o l s .  A l though  th e  government  was 
a b l e  to  c o n t r o l  t h e  t e a c h e r s  t h ro u g h  an i n s p e c t o r a t e  and d i s s u a d e  them from 
t e a c h i n g  o v e r t l y  p o l i t i c a l  s u b j e c t s ,  i t  d i d  n o t  y e t  c o n s i d e r  i t  n e c e s s a r y  
to  r e v i s e  t h e  sy s te m  o f  C h inese  e d u c a t i o n .  I t  f a i l e d  t o  change th e  
c u r r i c u l a  o r  t h e  t e x t b o o k s  used  in  t h e  C h inese  s c h o o l s .  The t e x t b o o k s  
were abou t  China e x c l u s i v e l y ;  t h e r e  was no m en t ion  i n  them of
22M a la y a ' s  h i s t o r y ,  geography  or  t h e  c u l t u r e s  o f  i t s  mixed p o p u l a t i o n .
The c o l o n i a l  r eg im e  was p r e o c c u p i e d  w i t h  e d u c a t i o n  i n  Malay and E n g l i s h .
The em phas i s  on E n g l i s h ,  w h i l e  m e e t in g  t h e  demand of  some C h inese  and 
I n d i a n  p a r e n t s  f o r  Western e d u c a t i o n ,  a l s o  s e r v e d  to  p r o v i d e  t h e  B r i t i s h  
b u s i n e s s  h ouse s  and t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s e r v i c e  w i t h  c l e r k s  and o f f i c e  w o rk e rs .
The on ly  r e a l l y  n a t i o n a l  s c h o o l s  up to  s e c o n d a r y  l e v e l  were the  
E n g l i s h  s c h o o l s  in  the s e n s e  t h a t  they  i n s t r u c t e d  c h i l d r e n  o f  a l l  e t h n i c  
g r o u p s ,  and gave them a common c u r r i c u l u m .
22 P u r c e l l ,  231-34 .
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' Ilicse s c h o o l s  w e r e ,  however ,  h e a v i l y  o r i e n t e d  t o  E n g l i s h  c u l t u r e  and
23
h i s t o r y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  the  h i s t o r y  o f  the  B r i t i s h  Empire .  More non-Malays  
than  Malays a t t e n d e d  E n g l i s h  s c h o o l s .  One r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  po o r  Malay 
a t t e n d a n c e  was t h a t  e a r l y  E n g l i s h  s c h o o l s  were run by C h r i s t i a n  m i s s i o n a r i e s ;  
the  s c h o o l s  were a J s o  i n  u rban  c e n t r e s  f a r  from the  v i l l a g e s  and were 
dep e n d en t  on f e e s  which most  Malay p e a s a n t s  c o u ld  i l l  a f f o r d .  I t  was 
on ly  i n  t h e  1930s when t h e  government  began  b u i l d i n g  E n g l i s h  s c h o o l s  i n  
t h e  FMS f o r  a l l  r a c e s  t h a t  Malay c h i l d r e n  were u rg ed  t o  a t t e n d .  Because  
o f  t h e  l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  Chinese  p u p i l s  i n  E n g l i s h  s c h o o l s  In  b o th  t h e  
MS and the  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s ,  Ch inese  began  to  push f o r  the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
of  an Eng l ish -med ium  u n i v e r s i t y .  In  1905 t h e y  s u c c e e d e d  i n  g e t t i n g  the  
government  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  King Edward VII M ed ica l  C o l l e g e  in  S i n g a p o r e ,  
and hoped t h a t  t h i s  would be the n u c l e u s  o f  a u n i v e r s i t y .  I n  1921 
R a f f l e s  C o l l e g e ,  which t a u g h t  s u b j e c t s  m a in ly  i n  t h e  h u m a n i t i e s ,  was 
opened.  S t u d e n t s  who e n r o l l e d  a t  b o t h  c o l l e g e s  were ove rw he lm ing ly  
C h inese  and I n d i a n s .  Th is  l e d  c e r t a i n  i n f l u e n t i a l  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  
such as  the  Malay s c h o l a r  and f i r s t  P r i n c i p a l  o f  R a f f l e s  C o l l e g e ,  R i c h a r d  
W i n s t e d t ,  t o  b e l i e v e  i t  was p r e m a tu r e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a Malayan u n i v e r s i t y ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  as  t h e  Malays would f i n d  no p l a c e  i n  i t .  C o n s e q u e n t ly  the  
government  r e s i s t e d  t h e  Chinese  p r e s s u r e  t o  combine b o t h  c o l l e g e s  i n t o  
a u n i v e r s i t y ,  d e s p i t e  a Chinese  u n d e r t a k i n g  to  r a i s e  funds  f o r  t h e  
p r o j e c t .  The U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Malaya was on ly  e s t a b l i s h e d ' a f t e r  t h e  
Second World War. ^
While  t h e  FMS g o v e r n m e n t ' s  p r e f e r e n t i a l  ' p r o - M a l a y '  p o l i c y  
e n a b l e d  Malays to  g e t  i n t o  the  low e r  and m idd le  rungs  o f  government  
s e r v i c e ,  t h e r e  were fewer  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  non-Malays  to  j o i n  t h e  c i v i l  
s e r v i c e .  S m a l l  numbers  o f  C h inese  were r e c r u i t e d  i n t o  t h e  government
23 For  a good summary o f  e d u c a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  Second 
World War, s ee  the  M a la y s ia n  G overnm en t ' s  R e p o r t  o f  the  Royal  
Commission on the .  T e a ch ing  S e r v i c e s , Kuala  Lumpur, 1969 , 15-16 , 
and Ho Seng Ong, E d u c a t i o n  f o r  U n i ty  in  M a la ya , Penang,  1952.
24 T r e g o n n in g ,  227-29 .  The unchanged  p o s i t i o n  o f  Malays i n  t e r t i a r y  
e d u c a t i o n  in  p o s tw a r  Malaya was i n d i c a t e d  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  Malays 
made up l e s s  t han  10 p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  e n r o l m e n t  a t  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  
o f  Malaya ( i . e . ,  90 o u t  o f  954 s t u d e n t s )  i n  1953 ( f o u r  y e a r s  a f t e r  
t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  was e s t a b l i s h e d ) .  See Nor ton  G in s b e rg  and C h e s t e r
F. R o b e r t s ,  J r ,  M a la y a , S e a t t l e  1958, 235.
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c l e r i c a l  s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  FMS, w h i l e  I n d i a n s  w e re  r e c r u i t e d  i n t o  t h e  
c l e r i c a l  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  R a i l w a y s  an d  H a r b o u r  D e p a r t m e n t s  w h i c h ,  l i k e  
t h e  r u b b e r  e s t a t e s ,  u s e d  a g r e a t e r  p o o l  o f  I n d i a n  l a b o u r .  I n  1934 t h e  
S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  was vformed w h ic h  was open  a t  t h e  
b o t t o m  to  C h i n e s e  o r  t o  an y o n e  e l s e  b o r n  i n  t h e  S t r a i t s  C o lo n y .
N a t i o n a l i s m
E t h n i c  d i v e r s i t y ,  c u l t u r a l  d i v e r s i t y  and d i v e r s i t y  i n  t h e  
e d u c a t i o n a l  s y s t e m  w e r e  boun d  t o  p r o d u c e  a d i v e r s i t y  o f  n a t i o n a l i s t  
movements  i n  M a l a y a .  The o r i g i n s  o f  e a c h  movement  w i l l  be  d i s c u s s e d  
u n d e r  e a c h  r a c i a l  g r o u p .
( a )  The M alays
As h a s  b e e n  shown e a r l i e r ,  t h e r e  was a  s u c c e s s i o n  o f  Malay u p r i s i n g s  
a g a i n s t  t h e  B r i t i s h  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  c o l o n i a l  r u l e ,  t h e  l a s t  b e i n g  i n  1928.  
Each had  b e e n  c r u s h e d  by t h e  B r i t i s h ,  r e m i n d i n g  some M alays  o f  t h e i r  
d e f e a t  a t  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h e  P o r t u g u e s e  i n  1511.  D e s p i t e  w h a t  many B r i t i s h  
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  h a v e  w r i t t e n  B r i t i s h  r u l e  was n e v e r  welcomed  by t h e  M a l a y s .
I t  was a l w a y s  s e e n  a s  i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s .
Once t h e  Malay r u l e r s  d e c i d e d  t h e y  h a d  t o  come t o  t e r m s  w i t h  B r i t i s h  
pow er  t h e y  e n t e r e d  i n t o  t r e a t i e s  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h ,  w h e r eb y  t h e  B r i t i s h  
u n d e r t o o k  t o  ' p r o t e c t '  t h e i r  S t a t e s ,  t a k e  o v e r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and l o o k  
a f t e r  Malay w e l f a r e ,  d e f e n c e  and f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s ,  l e a v i n g  o n l y  t h e  
I s l a m i c  r e l i g i o n  and Malay c u s t o m  i n  M alay  h a n d s .  I t  was on t h e  b a s i s  
o f  t h e s e  t r e a t i e s  t h a t  Malay l e a d e r s  s u b s e q u e n t l y  condemned t h e  B r i t i s h  
f o r  n e g l e c t i n g  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  an d  a l l o w i n g  i n c r e a s e d  e c o n o m ic  do m in an ce  
by t h e  C h i n e s e  i n  t h e  FMS. Malay e c o n o m ic  d i s c o n t e n t  l e d  t o  a g r e a t e r  
p o l i t i c a l  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  among t h e  M a l a y s  and  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a 
Malay n a t i o n a l i s t  movement .
F o r e i g n  i n f l u e n c e s  a l s o  h e l p e d  t o  f a n  n a t i o n a l i s t  f e e l i n g s  among 
t h e  M a l a y s .  The r e f o r m i s t  movement  i n  I s l a m  i n  t h e  M id d le  E a s t ,  d u r i n g  
t h e  f i r s t  two d e c a d e s  o f  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y ,  h a d  an  i m p a c t  on M a l a y a .  
T h e s e  i d e a s  w e re  b r o u g h t  b a c k  by M a lay a n  an d  S u m a t r a n  s t u d e n t s  who h ad  
s t u d i e d  e i t h e r  a t  Mecca o r  a t  A l - A z h a r .  T h i s  l e d  t o  t h e  d o c t r i n a l  d e b a t e  
b e t w e e n  t h e  Kaum Muda ( t h e  m o d e r n i s t s )  an d  Kaum Tua ( t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s ) , 
w h i c h  e x t e n d e d  t o  s o c i a l  and e c o n o m i c  q u e s t i o n s .  The Kaum T u a , b a c k e d  by 
t h e  Malay a r i s t o c r a c y  and t h e  B r i t i s h ,  and r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  o r t h o d o x  
r e l i g i o u s  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  M a j l i s  Ugama N e g e r i  ( S t a t e  R e l i g i o u s  C o u n c i l s ) ,
20
succeeded in curbing the activities of the Kaum Muda, whom they regarded
as subversive. Although the Islamic reformists did not aim at overthrow
of the British regime, the British regarded them as a threat to the
status quo. Reformists propagated new interpretations of Islamic
teachings in order to equip Malays for the modern world. They tended to
put the blame for Malay weakness and economic backwardness on ignorance
25of Malays themselves in following the commands of God.
In the period between the two World Wars incipient Malay nationalism
took on a secular form and lost its pan-Islamic flavour. Indonesian
nationalist leaders, especially Sukarno and Hatta, had a big impact on
a group of students at the STIC, which included Ibrahim Yaacob and Hassan
Manan. These students were also influenced by some Indonesian communist
emigres, such as Alimin, Musso and Tan Malaka, who took temporary refuge
in Malaya after the failure of attempts in 1926-27 to overthrow the Dutch
regime. The influence of Sukarno on the SITC students was greater,
and between 1928-30 some of the students, including Ibrahim Yaacob,
secretly enrolled as members of Sukarno's Partei Nasionalis Indonesia 
2 6(PNI) . In 1938 this group (by now ST.TC graduates) teamed up with Malay
graduates from agricultural and technical schools and the MCKK to found
the first radical Malay party, Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM, or the Young
Malay Union), whose aim was to achieve kemerdekaan Melayu (Malay
independence) through Melayu Raya or Indonesia Raya (Greater Malaysia
or Greater Indonesia), a political union of the Malay archipelago based
27on the Malay race.
25 Roff, 57-58.
26 I.K. Agastja (alias Ibrahim Yaacob), Sedjarah dan Perdjuangan di 
Malaya (History and Struggle in Malaya), Jogjakarta, 1951, 70-71.
27 It is difficult to establish when and where the terms Melayu Raya or 
Indonesia Raya, meaning an enlarged nation incorporating the Malay 
peninsula, the Borneo territories, Sumatra, Java and the other 
Indonesian islands, first actually appeared. The idea of a closer 
union had already been raised in the 1920s. See William R. Roff, 
'Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920s' in Indonesia,
9 (April 1970), 73-88. 'Melayu Raya' is a term more commonly used 
by Malays, and 'Indonesia Raya' by Indonesians, However, one does come 
across Indonesian-influenced Malays like Ibrahim Yaacob preferring 
the term 'Indonesia Raya' or using both terms interchangeably. See 
I.K. Agasta, op♦cit. , 53, where he states, '...Indonesia Raya itulah 
tudjuan Melayu Raya (the aim of Melayu Raya is Indonesia Raya)'.
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By 1941,  e x c e p t  f o r  t h e  KMM peinudas , no  g ro u p  o f  M al ay s  h a d ' b e g u n  
t o  t h i n k  s e r i o u s l y  a b o u t  t h e  p r o b l e m s  o f  a c h i e v i n g  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  What 
I b r a h i m  Yaacob an d  t h e  KMM pemudas c o n c e i v e d  a s  t h e i r  i d e a l ,  I n d o n e s i a  
R a y a , was a l l  t h e  M alays  i n  one  r e g i o n  coming  t o g e t h e r  an d  s e e i n g  
t h e m s e l v e s  a s  One R a c e ,  s p e a k i n g  One L anguage  and b e l o n g i n g  t o  One 
N a t i o n ,  v e r y  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  y o u t h  D e c l a r a t i o n  o f  1927.  I n  
o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e  KMM g r o u p  w a n te d  t o  c r e a t e  new and w i d e r  k i n d s  o f  
l o y a l t i e s  h i g h e r  and ab o v e  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  puak  ( e t h n i c  g r o u p )  and t h e  
n e g e r i  ( p r i n c i p a l i t y  o r  k i n g d o m ) , w h i c h  w e r e  t h e  s o u r c e s  o f  e t h n i c  and 
S t a t e  p a r o c h i a l i s m  f o s t e r e d  by t h e  a r i s t o c r a t i c  g r o u p s  t o  p e r p e t u a t e  
t h e  l a t t e r ’ s pow er  and a u t h o r i t y .
But  t h e s e  i d e a s  h ad  n o t  b e e n  f u r t h e r  d e v e l o p e d  by 1941.  I t  s h o u l d  
be  n o t e d  t h a t  a l l  t h e  Malay S t a t e s ,  e x c e p t  t h o s e  i n  t h e  FMS i n  a l i m i t e d  
way,  h a d  n o t  y e t  v o l u n t a r i l y  come t o g e t h e r  t o  fo r m  a l a r g e r  p o l i t i c a l  
e n t i t y  and s h e d  t h e i r  s e p a r a t e  p r o v i n c i a l i s m .  I n  1941,  t h e  m inds  o f  
t h e  r u l i n g  c l a s s  i n  t h e  Malay  S t a t e s  w e r e  n o t  p r e o c c u p i e d  w i t h  p a n -  
I n d o n e s i a  b u t  w i t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  S t a t e  au to n o m y .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  
a p p e a l  o f  t h e  KMM’ s p a n - I n d o n e s i a  i d e a  was c o n f i n e d  t o  a m i n o r i t y  o f  
M a l a y - e d u c a t e d  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  who w e r e  l a r g e l y  i n f l u e n c e d  by I n d o n e s i a n  
l i t e r a t u r e  an d  p o l i t i c a l  e v e n t s .  T h i s  f a c t ,  and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  p a n - I n d o n e s i a  
w o u ld  r e p r e s e n t  a h i g h e r  s t a g e  o f  i n t e r - r e g i o n a l  Malay u n i t y  o v e r r i d i n g  
t h e  f u r t h e r  o b s t a c l e  o f  s e p a r a t e  Malay  g e o g r a p h i c a l  a r e a s  u n d e r  d i f f e r e n t  
B r i t i s h  an d  D u tch  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s ,  c l e a r l y  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  p a n - I n d o n e s i a  
i d e a  r e q u i r e d  much more t h o u g h t ,  p l a n n i n g  and c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  M a l a y  p e o p l e s  o f  B r i t i s h  M alay a  and t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  
E a s t  I n d i e s  b e f o r e  i t  c o u l d  e v e r  h a v e  any c h a n c e  o f  s u c c e s s .  I t  was o n l y  
when b o t h  g e o g r a p h i c a l  a r e a s  came u n d e r  J a p a n e s e  o c c u p a t i o n  i n  1942 t h a t  
t h e  i d e a  h a d  any c h a n c e  o f  m a t e r i a l i s i n g .
B e i n g  o f  a n o n - a r i s t o c r a t i c  b a c k g r o u n d  and i n f l u e n c e d  by I n d o n e s i a n  
r e p u b l i c a n  i d e a s ,  t h e  KMM pemudas h a d  a l s o  become s t r o n g l y  a n t i - m o n a r c h i c a l .  
However ,  t h e y  d i d  n o t  commit  t h e m s e l v e s  t o  t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  t h e  S u l t a n  
o r  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  a r i s t o c r a c y  on t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e  Malay r a a y a t  
w e r e  n o t  y e t  r e a d y  t o  g e t  r i d  o f  t h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and t h e r e f o r e  s o u g h t  
i n s t e a d  t o  accommodate  them i n  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  s c h e m e s .  Be twee n  1938 
an d  1941,  t h e  KMM became g r e a t l y  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  p o l i c y  o f  ’ n o n -  
c o o p e r a t i o n ’ o f  S u k a r n o ' s  PNI and a d o p t e d  a s i m i l a r  p o l i c y .  I b r a h i m  
an d  o t h e r  KMM l e a d e r s  b e g a n  a p r o p a g a n d a  a t t a c k  on B r i t i s h  p o l i c i e s  and
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on the  ' c o o p e r a t o r s ’ , t h e  Malay b u r e a u c r a t s  and a r i s t o c r a t i c  g r o u p s ,  
i n  v a r i o u s  n e w spa pe rs  and p u b l i c a t i o n s .  By 1941, t h e  KMM's a n t i -  
B r i t i s h  a g i t a t i o n  had  been  s t e p p e d  up t o  t h e  p o i n t  where c o n t a c t s  were 
e s t a b l i s h e d  be tw een  KMM l e a d e r  I b r a h i m  Yaacob and J a p a n e s e  a g e n t s  w i t h  
t h e  i d e a  o f  o b t a i n i n g  J a p a n e s e  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s  i n  r e t u r n  
f o r  KMM s u p p o r t  f o r  J a p a n e s e  p l a n s  to  o v e r r u n  B r i t i s h - r u l e d  Malaya.
As f o r  t h e  i d e a  o f  un ion  w i t h  I n d o n e s i a ,  i t  was hoped t h a t  t h i s  c o u ld  
be a c h i e v e d  too  w i t h  J a p a n e s e  s u p p o r t .  Th is  e p i s o d e  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  
in  C h a p te r  IV.
One o t h e r  Malay movement o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  was t h e  P e r s a t u a n -
P e r s a t u a n  N e g e r i  ( S t a t e  A s s o c i a t i o n ) ,  l e d  by th e  a r i s t o c r a t s .  Some of
t h o s e  who formed the  KMM had  p r e v i o u s l y  been members o f  t h e s e  a s s o c i a t i o n s .
They came t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e s e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  ' f e u d a l i s t i c ' ,  too  a b s o r b e d
w i t h  S t a t e  r i g h t s ,  and w i t h  a l l e g i a n c e  to  t h e  R u l e r s  and to  t h e  B r i t i s h
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  L e a d e r s  were E n g l i s h - e d u c a t e d  l a w y e r s  and c i v i l
s e r v a n t s  h a v in g  c o n n e c t i o n s  w i t h  r o y a l t y ,  and o r g a n i s a t i o n s  c o n f i n e d
2 8t h e i r  membersh ips  t o  Malays o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  S t a t e .  S t a t e  p r o v i n c i a l i s m  
(k e n e g e r i a n ) was e x t r e m e l y  s t r o n g .  A l l  Malays w i t h i n  a S t a t e  owed 
t h e i r  l o y a l t y  to  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  S t a t e  (N e g e r i ) R u l e r .  A Malay t e n d e d  
t o  r e g a r d  h i m s e l f  a s  an Prang  P e rak  ( P e ra k  m a n ) , an P rang  K e l a n t a n  
( K e la n t a n  man),  o r  some o t h e r  such  a l l e g i a n c e .  The a r i s t o c r a c y  o f  t h e  
v a r i o u s  S t a t e s  e n c o u ra g e d  t h i s  s e n t i m e n t  b e c a u s e  t h e y  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  i f  
t h e  n e g e r i  d i s a p p e a r e d  so too  would t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  and a u t h o r i t y .  The 
i d e a  o f  a u n i t e d  Malay n a t i o n  d i d  n o t  a p p e a l  to  them. I t  was k e n e g e r i a n  
which d i s s u a d e d  the  r u l i n g  g r oups  i n  t h e  UFMS from j o i n i n g  the  B r i t i s h -  
s p o n s o r e d  FMS i n  1895 and s u b s e q u e n t l y .  The r u l i n g  groups  i n  t h e  FMS 
d id  so on ly  b e c a u s e  o f  p r e s s u r e  which  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  b r o u g h t  to  
b e a r  on them. K en e g e r i a n  meant t h a t  a u n i t e d  Malay n a t i o n  was s t i l l  a 
lo n g  way o f f .
(b)  The C h in e s e
S inc e  t h e  1890s most  C h inese  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  had r e g a r d e d  t h e m s e lv e s
28 W.R. Rof f ,  ’ The P e r s a t u a n  Melayu S e l a n g o r :  An E a r l y  Malay P o l i t i c a l
A s s o c i a t i o n ' ,  JSEAI1, 9 ,  March 1968. See a l s o  Ro f f ,  The P r i g i n s  
o f  Malay N a t i o n a l i s m , 235 -47 .
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as Hua Ch'iao (Overseas Chinese), owing allegiance to China. Chinese 
born in the Straits Settlements were British subjects, and of these a 
large proportion were 'Straits Chinese' who had lived in Malaya for 
centuries and assimilated a certain amount of Malay language and culture 
at the expense of Chinese language and dress (they were known as the 
Babas and Nonyas). Yet there were even some Straits Chinese leaders, 
such as Dr Lim Boon Keng, who became so aroused by the humiliation of 
China at the hands of Japan and the European imperialist powers that 
they took up Chinese patriotic activities.
In 1898 Overseas Chinese political consciousness had been awakened
through the liberal reform movement in China of K'ang Yu-wei, who succeeded
in influencing the Manchu Emperor to initiate the 'Hundred Days Reform'.
Stimulated by China's humiliating defeat by Japan in Korea, the Reform
movement was short-lived and K'ang Yu-weifled the country when the Empress
Dowager removed the Emperor and ushered in a period of conservative
reaction. Kang came to Singapore in 1900 to raise funds to finance a
revolt in Hankow, but the revolt proved abortive. After this Overseas
Chinese participation in Chinese political activities increased. Kang
continued to visit Malaya (he resided in Penang during 1900-01 and again
during 1908-10) to publicise his liberal reforms, to build up support
for his Royalist Party and to found several Chinese schools which
30emphasised both Confucianist teachings and Western science. He was 
able to win the support of Straits-born, English-educated Chinese like 
Dr Lim Boon Keng.
Another Chinese political leader, Sun Yat-sen, also fled China 
after failing in his attempts to raise a revolt in Canton. In 1900 
Sun briefly visited Singapore, where he broke with the party of K'ang 
Yu-wei, whom he regarded as too conservative. The Overseas Chinese thus 
became more conscious than ever of the political struggle in China.
During the first decade of the twentieth century Sun organised several
29 Wang Gungwu, 'A note on the origins of Hua-Ch'iao', unpublished 
paper presented at seminar in the Department of Far Eastern History, 
the A.N.U., 2 March 1976.
30 Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution:
With special reference to Singapore and Malaya, Kuala Lumpur,
1976, 154-56.
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u n s u c c e s s f u l  r e v o l t s ,  and when each  u p r i s i n g  f a i l e d  t h e  r e b e l  l e a d e r s
would t a k e  r e f u g e  i n  Penang o r  S i n g a p o r e .  However,  the  Wuchang R i s i n g
i n  1911, a l s o  f i n a n c e d  from Malaya ,  was s u c c e s s f u l .  Sun, who was t h e n
i n  the  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  was n o t  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  u p r i s i n g .  However,  i n
1912, when Sun ’ s Kuomintang (KMT) was formed,  b r a n c h e s  o f  t h e  p a r t y  
31opened i n  Malaya .  In  1925,  t h e  Malayan Kuomintang was s u p p r e s s e d
b e c a u s e  i t s  a n t i - B r i t i s h  a c t i v i t i e s  were c o n s i d e r e d  s u b v e r s i v e ,  and
th e  B r i t i s h  f e a r e d  t h e  Chinese  government  would r e g a r d  Malaya as  an
32imperium i n  i m p e r i o .
Throughout  1910-30 C h inese  e d u c a t i o n  and p o l i t i c s  i n  Malaya m i r r o r e d
de ve lopm en ts  i n  China .  However , i t  was n o t  u n t i l  1924 t h a t  communist
a c t i v i t i e s  became n o t i c e a b l e  i n  M alaya ,  f i v e  y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  f o r m a t i o n
o f  t h e  Chinese  Communist P a r t y  (CCP). Th i s  was b e c a u s e  t h e  Comin te rn
(Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l )  d id  n o t  g iv e  t h e  d i r e c t i v e  t o  e s t a b l i s h
communist  group's in  Malaya u n t i l  t h e n .  W i th in  t h e  same y e a r  t h e  t a s k
o f  r e c r u i t i n g  communist  c a d r e s  i n  Malaya was l e f t  to  I n d o n e s i a n  communists
l i k e  Tan Malaka and A l im in  and a few CCP a g e n t s .  In  1924 t h e  KMT-CCP
u n i t e d  f r o n t  had been  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  so t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  communist group i n
Malaya was formed i n  1925 w i t h i n  t h e  Malayan b r a n c h  o f  t h e  Kuomintang.
In 1927 th e  s p l i t  i n  t h e  u n i t e d  f r o n t  a l s o  l e d  t o  a s p l i t  i n  t h e  Malayan
Kuomintang.  A f t e r  e x i s t i n g  in  v a r i o u s  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  t h e  communists
f i n a l l y  formed th e  Malayan Communist P a r t y  (MCP) i n  1932, and up to
331941 t h e  membership o f  t h e  MCP was p r e d o m i n a n t l y  C h in e s e .
Between 1930 and 1941 the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  C h inese  i n  Malaya c o n t i n u e d  
to  f o l l o w  c l o s e l y  p o l i t i c a l  e v e n t s  i n  China .  The J a p a n e s e  a t t a c k  on 
China in  1937 a r o u s e d  s t r o n g  s y m p a t h i e s  f o r  China from th e  KMT and th e  
MCP, and from o t h e r  C h inese  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  i n  Malaya .  U n t i l  t h e  J a p a n e s e  
i n v a s i o n  o f  M alaya ,  t h e  China  N a t i o n a l  S a l v a t i o n  Movement, which b o t h
31 Wang Gungwu, 'Sun  Y a t - s e n  and S i n g a p o r e ’ , i n  t h e  J o u r n a l  o f  t h e  
South Seas Soc i e t y , S i n g a p o r e ,  XV, P a r t  Two, 55 -68 ;  s e e  a l s o  
Yen Ching Hwang, 95 -98 .
32 P u r c e l l ,  214-16 .
33 Gene Z. Hanrahan ,  The Communist S t r u g g l e  i n  M a la y a , Kuala  Lumpur 
( f i r s t  e d i t i o n  1954,  r e p r i n t  1971) ,  r e p r i n t ,  Kuala  Lumpur, 2 8 -2 9 ,  
31. A more d e t a i l e d  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  MCP i s  g iv e n  i n  C h a p t e r  H I ,  
b e l o w .
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parties sponsored, organised boycotts of Japanese goods in Malaya
and raised funds and other forms of relief for China. During the war
in Malaya it was to be the MCP which would lead the anti-Japanese movement
(c) The Indians
The nationalist movement in India did not have an impact on Malaya 
until the years just prior to the war. Before 1937, Indian associations 
had existed locally throughout Malaya but had remained non-political.
This was largely due to (i) the direct influence of the Indian Government 
Agent on Indian labourers in Malaya (which made the labourers feel that 
their welfare was being looked after), and (ii) the lack of Indian- 
language newspapers in Malaya until the 1930s. It was only when Nehru 
visited Malaya in 1937 that the Central Indian Association of Malaya 
(CIAM) was formed. The CIAM was oriented towards India, especially 
Congress Party politics, and sought to represent and safeguard the 
interests of Indians in Malaya. The two chief political activities of 
the CIAM before the war were the evidence that it gave before the Shastri 
Commission investigating conditions of Indian labour in 1937 and its 
support of the Klang strikes in 1941. Although the CIAM consisted 
mainly of professional men who were not recruited from the local workers, 
they sought to identify themselves with the interests of the Indian 
workers.
Conclusion
The British created a plural society in the interests of opening 
up Malaya. By allowing uncontrolled immigration of Chinese and Indians 
into the country, they were responsible for the situation in 1931 when 
the Malays were outnumbered in their own country. Legally, however, 
the British kept up the image of a ’Malay Malaya’ by following certain 
important principles in their prewar relations with the Malays. These 
principles (a) safeguarded the legal position of the Sultans, as laid
34 T.H. Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz, 'Nationalism in Malaya', in
William L. Holland (ed.) Asian Nationalism and the West, New York, 
1953, 287-88. See also Usha Mahajani, The Role of Indian Minorities 
in Burma and Malaya, New York, 1960, 122-28, and Sinnapah Arasaratnam 
Indians in Malaysia and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 1970, 96-102.
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down in the treaties, i.e., sovereignty in each Malay state resting 
with the Sultans and not with the British Crown; (b) preserved the 
distinctly Malay government in each state; (c) considered Malays as 
the indigenous people; and (d) accepted as a British responsibility 
the welfare and the preservation of rights of the Malays in each state. 
This privileged status of the Malays was not yet seriously challenged 
by the non-Malays by 1941.
Aside from principles, the British pursued a practical 
policy which kept the races apart as far as possible and minimized 
social and political change, particularly among the Malays. Clearly 
they hoped to reduce the potential for racial conflict. It is also 
possible they might have hoped as well to minimize prospects of a 
multi-racial anti-colonial alliance in Malaya. They were quite 
successful in the short run, but they were creating a situation ripe 
for long-term trouble.
Another explanation for the low intensity of communal conflict 
in prewar Malaya is that, with few exceptions, prewar polities were 
'dispersed and fragmented' in the sense that the early political 
associations tended to be oriented towards issues arising beyond Malaya's 
borders. Their activities in Malaya were somewhat incidental to their 
primary concern. The politics of the Chinese and Indians were oriented 
to those of their homelands, and even Malays who were more concerned 
with developments in Malaya became politically motivated, as a result 
of reactions to events in Egypt, Turkey and the Netherlands East Indies. 
Consequently, as Gordon Means observed, the prewar racial communities 
were 'not inclined to view each other as political protagonists, since 
their political enemies were being defined outside the- arena of domestic 
politics. '
Clearly, the ability of the different races to reach some 
accommodation of their diverse interests (e.g., for the sake of 
achieving common goals such as self-government and independence) seemed 
remote in 1941. If, for the purposes of discussion, we take the model 
of pan-ethnic cooperation among Malays, Chinese and Indians as that 
which existed in 1955, i.e., the Alliance of the United Malays National
35 Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics, London, 1970, 44.
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Organisation, the Malayan Chinese Association and the Malayan Indian 
Congress, which successfully negotiated with the British Government 
for national independence, then such a partnership was nowhere yet in 
sight in 1941. That mutual cooperation and multi-racial unity was 
more advantageous than inter-racial friction and conflict was a lesson 
not yet learned. It appears that a political deal, if not immediately 
then certainly some time in the remote future, would have to be hammered 
out between Malays and non-Malays. The Malays were bound to insist on 
non-Malay recognition of their privileged position as the indigenous 
people as the starting-point of negotiations, while the non-Malays 
would demand citizenship rights and equality in administration. How 
these problems were to be resolved was left to the future.
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CH Al1 *3 TER II
THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION 
OF MALAYA (1942-1945)
THE Japanese occupation of Malaya was important because the change of 
regime and the violence of war altered the pattern of race relations and 
raised the political stakes in the country. To the local population, 
politics in the broad sense became a life-and-death struggle, no longer 
the genteel, part-time occupation of the prewar days. Much of the 
interaction of Japanese policy and local responses, especially the 
changing Malay and Chinese perceptions of one another during the Japanese 
occupation, helped to determine the direction of Malaya's postwar political 
development.
The Japanese Invasion: initial reaction in Malaya
The Japanese attack on Malaya began at about the same time 
as their attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbour - on 
8 December 1941. One division of the 25th Army (whose commander-in-chief 
was Lt-General Yamashita) landed at Kota Bharu, on the northeast coast 
state of Kelantan. Another opened the beach-head at Songkla in southeast 
Thailand, north of Kota Bharu, and immediately struck across towards 
its objective - Changlun in northern Kedah state. In a campaign lasting 
68 days, the weight of the Japanese advance drove the British forces 
down the west coast of Malaya without meeting any effective check.
On 12 December, Japanese troops entered Alor Star, the capital of Kedah; 
on 16 December, Penang, and on 28 December, Ipoh, the capital of Perak 
state. Kuala Lumpur, the capital of the Federated Malay States, fell 
on 11 January and Johor Bharu, the southernmost tip of the peninsula, 
on 31 January. Singapore was finally captured on 15 February.^ By the 
end of March, the whole of the Netherlands East Indies was also in Japanese 
hands.
1 Key participants on both sides in the military campaign have
written their accounts to explain the reasons for the British defeat. 
Cf. Lt-General A.E. Percival, The War in Malaya, London, 1949, and 
Colonel Masanobu Tsuji (Chief of Operations and Planning Staff, 25th
Japanese Army), Singapore the Japanese Version, Sydney, 1960.
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Throughou t  7 and 8 December, t h e  B r i t i s h  had begun r o u n d in g  up
t h e  l e a d e r s  and members o f  the  Malay p r o - J a p a n e s e  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  t h e
K esa tu an  Melayu Muda (KMM), a f t e r  B r i t i s h  i n t e l l i g e n c e  had  uncove red
s e c r e t  l i n k s  be tw een  t h e  KMM and J a p a n e s e  m i l i t a r y  i n t e l l i g e n c e .  A f t e r
t h e  i n i t i a l  J a p a n e s e  a t t a c k  on 8 December,  t h e  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
a t t e m p t e d  to  s e c u r e  p o l i t i c a l  s u p p o r t  f rom t h e  c o l o n y ' s  communal l e a d e r s .
On 10 December they  p r e s s u r e d  th e  f o u r  S u l t a n s  o f  t h e  F e d e r a t e d  Malay
S t a t e s  -  S e l a n g o r ,  P e r a k ,  Pahang and N e g r i  Sembil an  -  t o  u rge  p u b l i c l y
t h e i r  s u b j e c t s  t o  rem a in  l o y a l  to  t h e  B r i t i s h  and t o  r e s i s t  t h e  i n v a d i n g  
2
J a p a n e s e  f o r c e s .  Most i m p o r t a n t l y ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  made a b e l a t e d  a t t e m p t  
to  make up w i t h  t h e i r  e r s t w h i l e  l o c a l  f o e ,  t h e  C h in e s e - d o m in a t e d  Malayan 
Communist P a r t y  (MCP). The two s i d e s  r e a c h e d  ag re e m e n t  t e n  days l a t e r  
on t h e  t r a i n i n g  of  communist  g u e r r i l l a s  t o  f i g h t  b e h i n d  enemy l i n e s  i n  
t h e  e v e n t  of  p e n i n s u l a  Malaya b e i n g  o v e r r u n  by t h e  J a p a n e s e ,  a p r o s p e c t  
which seemed im m in e n t . ^  On 23 December,  t o  h e l p  t h e  B r i t i s h  o b t a i n  
f u r t h e r  l o c a l  C h inese  s u p p o r t ,  P r e s i d e n t  Chiang K a i - s h e k  i n  Nanking i s s u e d  
an a p p e a l  to  a l l  C h in e se  n a t i o n a l s  i n  M alaya ,  e s p e c i a l l y  members o f  h i s  
Kuomintang (KMT) p a r t y ,  t o  r a l l y  b e h in d  t h e  B r i t i s h  i n  r e s i s t i n g  the  
J a p a n e s e .  A p p a r e n t l y  a p p r e c i a t i n g  t h e  v a l u e  o f  c o o p e r a t i o n  now e x te n d e d  
t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s  by b o th  t h e  MCP and th e  KMT, th e  Governor  of  
S i n g a p o r e ,  S i r  Shenton  Thomas, made a g e s t u r e  i n  r e t u r n .  He announced  
t h e  l i f t i n g  o f  t h e  ban  on th e  MCP, t h e  KMT and c e r t a i n  o t h e r  C h inese  
a s s o c i a t i o n s . ^
Both th e  MCP and the  KMT j o i n e d  w i t h  o t h e r  C h inese  a n t i - J a p a n e s e  
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and C h i n e s e  community l e a d e r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  Tan Kah Kee , i n  
s e t t i n g  up t h e  'O v e r s e a s  C h inese  M o b i l i s a t i o n  C o u n c i l ' .  Th is  body worked 
w i t h  J . D .  D a i l e y  o f  t h e  Malayan P o l i c e ,  S p e c i a l  B ranch ,  t o  r a i s e  C h inese  
V o l u n t e e r s  f o r  D a l f o r c e ,  an i n d e p e n d e n t  f o r c e  r a i s e d  a t  t h e  l a s t  m in u te  
and a t t a c h e d  to  t h e  B r i t i s h  Army's  3rd  I n d i a n  Corps .  The D a l f o r c e  was 
in  t h e  f r o n t l i n e  o f  B r i t i s h  p o s i t i o n s  i n  S in g a p o re  and p u t  up a f i e r c e  f i g h t .
2 The Malay M a i l , Kuala  Lumpur, 10 December 1941.
3 See C h a p t e r  I I I ,  be low ,  f o r  a f u l l e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  te rms  o f  a g re e m e n t .
4 For  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  l a s t - m i n u t e  p r e p a r a t i o n s  to  d e fe n d  S i n g a p o r e ,  
s e e  Png Poh Seng, 'The  Kuomintang in  M a l a y a ' 4, J o u r n a l  o f  Sou t h e a s t  
As lan  H i s t o r y , I I ,  1 (March 1961) ,  39. Cf .  V i r g i n i a  Thompson and 
R i c h a rd  A d l o f f ,  The L e f t  Wing i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a ,  New York,  1950,
130.
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I t  was r e p o r t e d  to  have  i n f l i c t e d  heavy c a s u a l t i e s  on th e  i n v a d i n g  
t r o o p s ,  so m e th in g  which  would be n e i t h e r  f o r g o t t e n  no r  f o r g i v e n  by th e  
J a p a n e s e . J
While  t h e s e  e v e n t s  were u n f o l d i n g  i n  S i n g a p o r e ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  
d e f e n c e s  on t h e  m a in la n d  were r a p i d l y  c ru m b l in g  as  s t a t e  a f t e r  s t a t e  was 
o v e r r u n  by t h e  J a p a n e s e  t r o o p s .  I t  was d u r i n g  t h e  B r i t i s h  r e t r e a t  down 
t h e  p e n i n s u l a  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  r e p o r t s  f i l t e r e d  th ro u g h  th e  r a n k s  o f  t h e  
B r i t i s h  Army t h a t  Malays were a c t i v e l y  c o l l a b o r a t i n g  w i t h  t h e  i n v a s i o n  
f o r c e s  -  as  g u i d e s  and i n t e r p r e t e r s .  These r e p o r t s  were i n i t i a l l y  
d i s c o u n t e d  by t h e  B r i t i s h  Command i n  view o f  t h e  p ronouncem en ts  o f  t h e  
f o u r  S u l t a n s  and t h e  l o y a l  s e r v i c e  o f  two b a t t a l i o n s  o f  t h e  Malay 
Regiment  which were  f i g h t i n g  a l o n g s i d e  t h e  B r i t i s h  t r o o p s  and c o n t i n u e d  
t o  do so r i g h t  t h r o u g h  t h e  r e t r e a t  to  S i n g a p o r e .  The Malay c o l l a b o r a t o r s  
w e r e ,  i n  f a c t ,  members o f  t h e  KMM movement,  and had  been  w ork ing  f o r  
F u j i w a r a  K i k a n , t h e  J a p a n e s e  m i l i t a r y  i n t e l l i g e n c e  agency  unde r  Major  
F u j i w a r a  I w a i c h i ,  o p e r a t i n g  i n  Bangkok and i n  s o u t h e r n  T h a i l a n d  p r i o r  to  
t h e  i n v a s i o n . ^  T h i s  r e a l i s a t i o n  marked t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  B r i t i s h  
d i s e n c h a n tm e n t  w i t h  t h e  Malays .  About t h i s  t im e  B r i t i s h  a t t e m p t s  to  
p e r s u a d e  th e  S u l t a n s  to  l e a v e  f o r  S i n g a p o r e ,  I n d i a  o r  A u s t r a l i a  were 
b e i n g  r e b u f f e d ,  and th e  B r i t i s h  became c o n c e r n e d  t h a t  t h e s e  i m p o r t a n t  
symbols  o f  a u t h o r i t y  m igh t  f a l l  i n t o  t h e  hands  o f  J a p a n e s e  and be u sed  by 
them f o r  p o l i t i c a l  p u r p o s e s .  But t h e  S u l t a n s  r e f u s e d  to  l e a v e  w i t h  t h e  
B r i t i s h  on th e  g rounds  t h a t  t h e i r  d u t i e s  r e q u i r e d  them to  remain  w i t h  
t h e i r  p e o p l e .  One s p e c t a c u l a r  example o f  the  S u l t a n s '  n o n - c o o p e r a t i o n  
o c c u r r e d  when Tunku Abdul  Rahman, l a t e r  M a la y s ia n  Prime M i n i s t e r ,  f o i l e d  
t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  a B r i t i s h  convoy t a k i n g  h i s  f a t h e r ,  the  S u l t a n  o f  Kedah,  
to  Penang ,  and removed t h e  R u l e r  t o  a p l a c e  o f  s a f e t y . ^  O th e r  S u l t a n s ,
5 See t h e  Memorandum on ' D a l f o r c e '  by B r i g a d i e r  P.A .B .  McKerron,  t h e  
Deputy C h ie f  C i v i l  . A f f a i r s  O f f i c e r  ( S i n g a p o r e ) ,  BMA, n . d .  (November/ 
December 1945?) i n  BMA MLF/261.
6 See t h e  B r i t i s h  Army's  i n t e l l i g e n c e  r e p o r t s  i n  the  f i l e  ' F i f t h  
Column' i n  CO 2 7 1 / 6 7 1 / 5 0 7 9 0 .
7 Har ry  M i l l e r ,  P r i n c e  and P r e m i e r , London, 1959,  57 -59 .  See a l s o  
t h e  T u nku 's  own w r i t t e n  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  ' k i d n a p p i n g ' ,  'Memories  of  
t h e  J a p a n e s e  O c c u p a t i o n '  i n  t h e  E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e  new spape r ,  The S t a r , 
Penang,  25 August 1975.
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among them the Sultan of Selangor and the Raja of Perils, were offered 
asylum in Singapore, but they refused to leave. The Sultan of Pahang 
left his palace and hid in the Pahang jungles until hostilities ended 
several weeks later.
As a result of the KMM's involvement in Japanese fifth column 
work and the reaction of the Sultans, British distrust of Malays persisted 
right through the war and up to the time of their reoccupation of Malaya. 
However, during the closing stages of the war the British did organise 
two Malay resistance groups. Until this rather late development 
the British worked largely with the Chinese, supplying, training and 
helping to organise Malayan Chinese communists in the MCP-controlled 
Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). As we shall see in Chapter 
VIII, British distrust of the Malays was later to take the form of a 
constitutional scheme to deprive the Malay rulers of their sovereignty.
The Massacre of the Chinese
Although the British had surrendered on 15 February and the 
military campaign was virtually over, the Malayan Military Administration 
(MMA) was not formed until about two weeks later. The 25th Army was 
preoccupied with the tasks of pacifying the population and establishing 
law and order. Looting and crime were widespread. The Japanese began to 
enforce order by means of summary executions: offenders were shot and
beheaded on the spot, their heads displayed on pikes at prominent points in 
the city, particularly marketplaces. The Kempeltai (Japanese military 
police), accompanied by local spies and informers, conducted house-to- 
house raids for stolen goods in selected areas. Anyone found hoarding 
goods for which he could not give a satisfactory explanation, was hauled 
away to be shot. The campaign spread fear and panic among the local 
population, but was extremely effective in stopping looting and lawlessness.
At the same time, the Army began mopping-up operations against 
’anti-Japanese elements’, as resistance was reported in many parts of 
the country. The primary targets were British personnel who had avoided 
being detained, Chinese Volunteers oL" Dail'orce, civil servants and others
8 Chin Kee Onn, Malaya Upside Down, Kuala Lumpur (first edition 
1946, reprint, 1976), reprint, 17-24.
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who h a d  w ork ed  f o r  t h e  B r i t i s h ,  members o f  t h e  KMT and t h e  MCP, members
o f  C h i n e s e  s e c r e t  s o c i e t i e s  ( e a s i l y  i d e n t i f i e d  f rom t h e  t a t o o e d  m arks  on
t h e i r  b o d i e s ) , a s  w e l l  a s  o t h e r  a n t i - J a p a n e s e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  s u c h  a s  t h e
C h in a  R e l i e f  Fund C o m m i t t ee .  C a l l e d  ' O p e r a t i o n  C l e a n - u p '  o r  sook  c h i n g
(m ean ing  ' p u r i f i c a t i o n  by e l i m i n a t i o n ' ) ,  t h e  ca mpa ign  f i r s t  b e g a n  i n
S i n g a p o r e ,  now renam ed Syonan ( ' B r i l l i a n t  S o u t h ' ) ,  an d  t h e n  e x t e n d e d  t o
9
t h e  m a i n l a n d  p e n i n s u l a .
The r e p r e s s i v e  cam pa ign  g a t h e r e d  momentum a f t e r  t h e  2 5 t h  Army 
H e a d q u a r t e r s  i s s u e d  a d r a c o n i a n  d e c r e e  on 17 F e b r u a r y  1942.  A l l  m a le  
C h i n e s e  i n  S i n g a p o r e  b e t w e e n  18 and 50 y e a r s  o f  ag e  were  o r d e r e d  t o  
c o n c e n t r a t e  a t  f i v e  a s s e m b l y  p o i n t s  a t  noon  on 21 F e b r u a r y ,  and  w e r e  
w a r n e d  o f  s e v e r e  p u n i s h m e n t  i f  t h e y  s h o u l d  d i s o b e y .  The ca mpa ign  was 
p l a n n e d  by L t - C o l o n e l  T s u j i  an d  c a r r i e d  o u t  by t h e  N o . 2 F i e l d  K e m p e i t a i  
Group u n d e r  t h e  command o f  C o l o n e l  O i i s h i .  I t  was C o l o n e l  T s u j i  who 
p r o p o s e d  t h e  i d e a  o f  t h e  so o k  c h i n g  a im ed  a t  t h e  ' s u p p r e s s i o n  o f  h o s t i l e  
C h i n e s e '  i n  r e t a l i a t i o n  f o r  t h e  t e n a c i t y  o f  t h e  C h i n e s e  V o l u n t e e r s  i n  
D a l f o r c e .  The 2 5 t h  Army was g o i n g  t o  move t o  S u m a t r a  i m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  
t h e  c a p t u r e  o f  S i n g a p o r e ,  b u t  C o l o n e l  T s u j i  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  b e f o r e  t h e y  
w e n t  t h e  Army s h o u l d  c a r r y  o u t  a s o o k  c h i n g  t o  e l i m i n a t e  a l l  ' C h i n e s e
9 The G e n e r a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  Nanyang O v e r s e a s  C h i n e s e ,  T a - c h a n - y u  
N a n - C h ' i a o  (Ma -  l a i - y a  c h i h  p u ) (The World  War an d  t h e  O v e r s e a s  
C h i n e s e  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  -  t h e  M a lay a  S e c t i o n ) ,  S i n g a p o r e ,  1974 ,  
6 8 - 6 9 ,  9 3 ,  97 ,  9 9 ,  1 0 2 - 0 7 ;  C h i n ,  o p . c i t . ,  9 8 - 9 9 ;  and Y o j i  A k a s h i ,  
' J a p a n e s e  p o l i c y  t o w a r d s  t h e  M alayan  C h i n e s e ,  1 9 4 1 - 4 5 ' ,  i n  J o u r n a l  
o f  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a n  S t u d i e s ,  I ,  2 ( S e p t e m b e r  1 9 7 0 ) ,  6 6 - 6 8 .
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anti-Japanese elements'.^'* One other explanation for the sook ching 
was that the 23th Army had come directly from the China campaign, where 
it had encountered great difficulty in fighting Chinese troops and 
guerrillas, and where the entire China countryside was hostile to the 
Japanese occupying forces.
As a result of the Army's decree five large 'concentration 
camps' were established within the Singapore city area, guarded by Japanese 
sentries. All Singapore Chinese were forced to assemble at these points. 
Japanese soldiers with Kempeitai armbands, accompanied by local informers, 
went around among groups of Chinese and dragged away any whose name 
appeared on their wanted lists. The rest of the detainees waited their 
turn to be checked, classified and given an identification stamp on 
their shirts, arms or singlets. The waiting varied from a few hours 
to six days, during which time no food or drink was allowed into the 
centres. There were also no toilets. Screening was done by making each
10 See Mamoru Shinozaki, Syonan - My Story, Singapore, 1975, 20-21.
After the war, the prominent Chinese leader, Tan Kah Kee, blamed 
both the British authorities and the Malayan communists for the 
sook ching which befell the Chinese population in Malaya. Tan 
claimed that on 27 December 1941, when it became clear that 
Singapore would come under siege, the Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas, 
requested him to mobilise the Chinese in defence measures. He was 
considered the only Chinese leader who could command the respect 
of the local Chinese community. Tan initially refused because he 
thought that it was not the duty of the Chinese to fight at the 
last minute, when the British had not considered it necessary to 
mobilise them earlier. He suggested that British reinforcements 
be requested from India. When he was told that his refusal displeased 
the Governor, he consented to give whatever help he could on 
condition that the mobilised Chinese would help in labour and police 
work. This was agreed to by the Governor. However, the communists 
on the 'Overseas Chinese Mobilisation Council' advocated last-minute 
armed resistance and got the Council to adopt the resolution, 
overriding Tan's objections. While he could do nothing to stop 
them and others from joining the independent Dalforce, he was of 
the opinion that 'the British government was malicious in despatching 
these untrained Chinese to the front, when the trained British troops 
were withdrawn behind the lines.' See Tan Kah Kee's lengthy report 
on events leading to the mobilisation of the 'Anti-Enemy Organisation', 
in Sin Chew Jit Poh, 30.0ctober 1945, and other Singapore Chinese 
newspapers of the same date. There was no official British reply 
to his comments.
11 Akashi, 'Japanese Policy towards the Malayan Chinese', 66-68.
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Chinese  walk  p a s t  a row o f  hooded s p i e s  and i n f o r m e r s ,  who were m o s t ly
prew ar  J a p a n e s e  a g e n t s  and some c a p t u r e d  communists  as  w e l l  as  Chinese
s e c r e t  s o c i e t y  members who had a g r e e d  to  g iv e  i n f o r m a t i o n  to  save  t h e i r
own l i v e s .  A nod a t  any p e r s o n  by t h e s e  ’hooded t e r r o r s '
s i g n i f i e d  r e c o g n i t i o n ,  and th e  v i c t i m  was h a u l e d  away to  a d e t e n t i o n  
12room. By 3 March,  a t o t a l  o f  70,699 ' a n t i - J a p a n e s e '  C h inese  had been
d e t a i n e d ,  and i t  was r e p o r t e d  t h a t  c o n t r o l  o f  ' a n t i - J a p a n e s e  C h inese
13and a n t i - A x i s  p e r s o n s  on Syonan '  was making good p r o g r e s s .  Among 
t h o s e  a r r e s t e d  were l e a d i n g  b a n k e r s ,  m e r c h a n t s ,  community and p o l i t i c a l  
l e a d e r s .  I n c l u d e d  were Dr Lim Boon Keng, t h e  S in g a p o re  C h inese  l e a d e r ,
Lim Chong Pang,  S i n g a p o re  KMT h e a d ,  and Wong Gim Geok, a l i a s  La i  Tek ,  t h e  
MCP's s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l . ^  D e t a i n e e s  were d i v i d e d  i n t o  s e v e r a l  g roups  
depend ing  on i m p o r t a n c e .  L e a d e r s h i p  g roups  were k e p t  d e t a i n e d  f o r  use  
l a t e r  as  J a p a n e s e  a g e n t s  of  s o c i a l  c o n t r o l .  The b u l k  o f  t h e  d e t a i n e e s  
were t r a n s p o r t e d  by l o r r i e s  to  r u r a l  a r e a s  t o  be e x e c u t e d . ^
By e a r l y  March the  sook c h in g  campaign had  been  e x t e n d e d  t o  
t h e  m a i n l a n d .  I n i t i a l l y  the  same p r o c e d u r e  o f  h e r d i n g  C h inese  p o p u l a t i o n s  
i n t o  ' c o n c e n t r a t i o n  camps'  was f o l l o w e d  i n  t h e  main towns i n  Malaya.
But a s  t h e  K e m p e i t a i  t r o o p s  moved f u r t h e r  i n t o  t h e  r u r a l  d i s t r i c t s  t hey  
became i n d i s c r i m i n a t e  and t en d e d  t o  r e g a r d  a l l  C h inese  as  h o s t i l e .
As a r e s u l t ,  l a r g e - s c a l e  m a s s a c re s  o f  C h inese  v i l l a g e s  and s e t t l e m e n t s  
took p l a c e .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  on 18 March,  a t  the  C h in e se  v i l l a g e  o f  
E-Lang-Lang ,  n o t  f a r  f rom t h e  town o f  T i t i  i n  N e g r i  Sembilan  s t a t e ,  
some tw e n ty  to  t h i r t y  s o l d i e r s  under  a K e m p e i t a i  commander, I w a h u z i ,  
rounded  up t h e  v i l l a g e r s ,  s a i d  to  be a few h u n d r e d ,  and k i l l e d  them.
12 S h i n o z a k i ,  20 -21 ;  s ee  a l s o  C h in ,  21.
13 See Domei newsagency  r e p o r t ,  3 March 1942, i n  O f f i c e  o f  S t r a t e g i c  
S t u d i e s  ( O S S ) , , S t a t e  D e p a r tm e n t ,  U . S . A . ,  Programs of  J a p an  i n  Malaya 
( I n t e r c e p t s  o f  sh o r tw a v e  b r o a d c a s t s  f rom Radio Tokyo and a f f i l i a t e d  
s t a t i o n s  from F e b r u a r y  1942 to  June  1943) ,  o r i g i n a l l y  c l a s s i f i e d  
' R e s t r i c t e d ' ,  p u b l i s h e d  i n  H o n o l u l u ,  10 O c to b e r  1945,  15.
14 S h i n o z a k i ,  22,  25.
15 N . l .  Low, i n  h i s  When S in g a p o re  Was S y o n a n - t o , S i n g a p o r e ,  1973, 22 -25 ,  
i n c l u d e s  an a c c o u n t  by a C h inese  s u r v i v o r  o f  a mass e x e c u t i o n  a t  
Changi  Beach. A b a t c h  o f  400 C h in e s e  had been  b r o u g h t  i n  l o r r i e s  from 
th e  ' c o n c e n t r a t i o n  camps ' i n  t h e  c i t y  c e n t r e  to  the  beach  s i t e .  The 
hands  o f  each  man were t i e d  w i t h  w i r e  b e h in d  h i s  ba c k .  They were 
th e n  mowed down by m ach ine-gun  f i r e .
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The f o l l o w i n g  a r e  some a c c o u n t s  o f  s u r v i v o r s  a t  E-Lang-Lang.  A l l  had 
s e e n  r e l a t i v e s  m a s s a c r e d :
(a)  . . . T h e  p r i s o n e r s  were t a k e n  one by one to  t h e  s p o t  
where t h e y  were to  d i e ,  and made t o  k n e e l  down w i t h  
a bandage  o v e r  t h e i r  e y e s .  The members o f  the  
t h i r d  t r o o p  s t e p p e d  o u t  o f  t h e  r a n k s  one by one as  
h i s  t u r n  came t o  behead  t h e  h e l p l e s s  v i c t i m s  w i t h
a sword o r  s t a b  him t h ro u g h  th e  b r e a s t  w i t h  a b a y o n e t .
A l l  t h e  c o r p s e s  were b u r n t  o r  b u r i e d  i n  t h e  w e l l s  
o r  i n  h o l e s  which  t h e  p r i s o n e r s  had dug e a r l i e r .
(b) . . . T h e  b a b i e s  were thrown up i n t o  m i d - a i r  and as  
t h e y  came down, t h e  s o l d i e r s  p i e r c e d  them w i t h  
b a y o n e t  and sword.
(c)  . . . a  g roup o f  i n n o c e n t  c h i l d r e n  s t o o d  a t  a t t e n t i o n  
when t h e  J a p a n e s e  s o l d i e r s  a p p ro a c h e d  them. With 
hands  r a i s e d  to  t h e i r  f o r e - h e a d s ,  t hey  sc reamed  ,
' Tabek! T.abek!’ [Malay word meaning S a l u t e ! ]  w i t h  
g r e a t  g l e e ,  on ly  to  be w h isked  away to  be k i l l e d . ^
The sook c h in g  b l o o d b a t h ,  wh ich  c o n t i n u e d  t h r o u g h o u t  March,
took  a r e p o r t e d  t o l l  o f  6 ,0 0 0  t o  40 ,000  C h inese  l i v e s . ^  The sook c h in g
s t r u c k  t e r r o r  i n  C h inese  communit ies  t h r o u g h o u t  Malaya a n d ,  i n  t h e  words
o f  fo rm er  G e n e r a l  M a n ak i , who s e r v e d  i n  Y a m a s h i t a ' s  Army, i t  was t h e
16 The s t o r y  o f  t h e  m a s s a c re  a t  E-Lang-Lang was c a r r i e d  i n  t h e  t w i c e -  
weekly n e w s p a p e r ,  New T h r i l l , Kuala  Lumpur, 23 O c to b e r  1976. I t  
was b a s ed  on i n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  t h r e e  s u r v i v o r s ,  (a)  Choong, aged
40; (b) Chow Kan, 62 ,  and (c)  Siow Kung J o o ,  a fo rm er  s c h o o l t e a c h e r ,
age n o t  g iv e n .  The r e p o r t  f o l l o w e d  t h e  d i s c o v e r y  by m ine r s  o f  mass 
g r a v e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  v i l l a g e  c o n t a i n i n g  th e  r e m a in s .  The new spape r  
p u b l i s h e d  s e v e r a l  p i c t u r e s  o f  t h e  s i t e .
17 J a p a n e s e  f i g u r e s  o f  the  t o t a l  number  of  C h inese  m a s s a c re d  t e n d
to  be l e s s  than  C h inese  f i g u r e s .  The f i g u r e  o f  6 ,0 0 0  i s  g i v e n  i n  
S h i n o z a k i ,  24,  b u t  Chinese  f i g u r e s  v a ry  be tw een  30 ,000  and 4 0 ,0 0 0 .
See T a - c h a n - y u  Nan Ch' i a o  (Ma -  l a i - y a  c h ih  p u ) , 68 ,  69 ,  93,  97,  98,  
99,  102-107.
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'biggest b]ot' on the Japanese administration of Malaya. This single 
act inevitably the bulk wf fchtt fvvhto the
Japanese administration. The Army continued to treat the Chinese 
population with the greatest severity for the duration of the war, 
although it did not repeat such large-scale punitive measures. The 
sook ching drove hundreds of Chinese youths and men into the jungles 
to join the communist-led resistance movement, most particularly the 
MPAJA.
A Cift of Atonement
On 2 March, while the sook ching was still under way, the 
Japanese Army organised the MMA. Significantly, its first task was 
to deal with the Chinese problem. Prominent Chinese - Dr Lim Boon Keng;
18 Akashi, 'Japanese policy towards the Malayan Chinese', 69. Manaki, 
now retired, made the statement to Akashi during an interview 
in 1966. The cruelty which "followed the purge of the Chinese 
community in Malaya surpassed any measures taken against the 
Chinese in Indonesia. The Japanese policy towards the Chinese 
in Sumatra stated: 'As in Malaya, an attitude of strict surveillance
should be adopted toward the Chinese, but goodwill of a slightly 
higher degree should be exerted toward the Chinese than toward those 
residing in Malaya'. The Japanese estimated that the Chinese in 
Malaya numbered 2.5 million, while those in Sumatra numbered only 
850,000. 'Yet in Sumatra', said the policy statement, 'no Chinese 
labourers were found, and all were in the rich classes.’ Trade 
between Sumatra and Malaya played an important role in the business 
activities of the Chinese in Malaya and Sumatra, and therefore should 
be encouraged by both Japanese administrations. Four or five key 
Chinese in Malaya who voluntarily cooperated with the Japanese 
authorities should be selected to persuade the Chinese in Sumatra 
to contribute '30 million yen' to the Japanese administration in 
Sumatra. It is not known whether this policy was carried out. See 
the Okuma Memorial Social Sciences Institute's Japanese Military 
Administration In Indonesia, published by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Washington, 23 March 1965, 152. This work is a 630-page 
translation of the Japanese edition Indonesia no okeru Nihon Gunsei 
no Kenyu published by Kinokuniya Shoten, Tokyo, 31 May 1959. It 
contains a summary and explanatory text for each of the major policies, 
especially shifts in policy, relating to Indonesia. I have found 
it extremely valuable in understanding the documents which appear in 
Benda, Irikura and Kishi, Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia 
Selected Documents, Yale University, 1965. See also the policy 
statements on the Chinese in Sumatra, Documents nos 45 and 47 in 
Benda, ct.al., 171-72, 178-83.
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Lee Choon Seng, the acting chairman of the Singapore China Relief
Fund; and the Shaw brothers, film magnates - were rounded up and ordered
to Kempeitai Headquarters. They were tortured, threatened with death
unless they cooperated, and forced to form the Overseas Chinese Association
(OCA) which was to raise $M50,000,000 as a 'gift* to the Administration
to atone for the prewar 'anti-Japanese activities of the Chinese in 
19Malaya. The communal leaders were divided into two group - the Malayan-
born or Straits Chinese, and the China-born Chinese. The former came under
the wing of Mamoru Shinozaki, an officer in the Singapore Municipality,
20and the latter under Wee Twee Kim, a Taiwanese official. Between 
March and June, the OCA leaders were coerced into raising the required 
sum from the Chinese population in Malaya, based on the adult individual's 
known sources of income. To ensure that no one cheated in paying his 
share, the MMA provided the OCA with property reports from the Land 
Office, Registrar of Companies and Income Tax Office. Although the MMA 
had not yet banned prewar British currency, the OCA found it difficult 
to raise the expected sum due to the disruption and hardships caused by 
the war. By 20 June the OCA had only raised $28,000,000 from the Chinese 
population in Malaya, after repeated extensions of the deadline by the MMA. 
Finally, Takase Toru, the self-styled 'expert' on 'Overseas Chinese 
affairs' in the MMA, devised a compromise. The Chinese could raise a loan 
to make up the remaining deficit of $22,000,000 from Yokohama Special 
Bank to be paid up within a year at six percent interest. On 25 June 
the $50,000,000 'gift' was presented to General Yamashita, who accepted
it as an act of atonement of the Chinese for their prewar anti-Japanese, 21 attitude.
19 Y.S. Tan, 'History of the Formation of the Overseas Chinese
Association and the extortion by the Japanese Military Administration 
of $50,000,000 military contribution from the Chinese in Malaya', 
in Journal of the South Seas Society, III, 1 (September 1946),
1-2 . See also Document No.47, 'Principles governing the implementation 
of measures relative to the Chinese', 25th Army Group, April 1942, in 
Benda et.al., 178-81.
20 Wee Twee Kim was a storekeeper in Singapore before the war. On this 
occasion he donned a Japanese military uniform and carried a pistol. 
During the Japanese occupation a number of Taiwanese and Koreans were 
employed as Kempeitai informers. Y.S. Tan, 2-3.
21 Tan, 7-10.
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P a t t e r n  of  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
T hroughou t  t h e i r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t h e  J a p a n e s e  r e g a r d e d  Malaya 
b o t h  as  a m i l i t a r y  s t r o n g h o l d  and a s  a co lo n y  w i t h i n  the  Empire .  There 
was c l o s e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  b o t h  p e r s o n n e l  and p o l i c y  i n  Malaya and 
J a p a n .  P l a n s  f o r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l  o f  Malaya ,  t h e  e x p l o i t a t i o n  and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  i t s  raw m a t e r i a l s  and t h e  use  o f  l o c a l  s h i p p i n g  were 
f o r m u l a t e d  as  p a r t  o f  t h e  l a r g e r  J a p a n e s e  p l a n s  f o r  t h e  S o u th e rn  R e g io n s .
An i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  p o l i c i e s  f o r  Malaya w i t h  t h o s e  o f  the  
Empire was i n d i c a t e d  i n  l a t e  1942 when Tokyo o r d e r e d  t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  
Army was supreme i n  t h e  a c t u a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  Malaya ,  i t  was r e q u i r e d  
to  c o n s u l t  w i th  c i v i l i a n  a g e n c i e s  i n  J a pan  i n  c h o o s in g  s u i t a b l e  t e c h n i c a l
22p e r s o n n e l  to  e m i g r a t e  t o  Malaya t o  work unde r  t h e  M i l i t a r y  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
Malaya and Sum atr a  were c o n s o l i d a t e d  i n t o  one p o l i t i c a l  u n i t
on 28 March when t h e  whole  o f  Sumatra  was p l a c e d  unde r  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f
t h e  2 5 th  Army, b a s e d  i n  S i n g a p o r e .  A s i n g l e  m i l i t a r y  command was
imposed on th e  two t e r r i t o r i e s  b e c a u s e  t h e y  were c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  n u c l e u s
f o r  t h e  J a p a n e s e  management  o f  t h e  S o u t h e r n  a r e a s .  Th i s  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
i n t e g r a t i o n  was c a r r i e d  t h r o u g h  d e s p i t e  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p rewar  economic
and p o l i t i c a l  s y s te m s  o f  t h e  two t e r r i t o r i e s  (Sumat ra  had been  unde r
Dutch r u l e ,  Malaya u n d e r  B r i t i s h ) .  A p p a r e n t l y  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s ,
23t h e y  were s e p a r a t e d  i n  A p r i l  1943. In  l i n e  w i t h  t h i s  l a t t e r  d e c i s i o n ,
t h e  H e a d q u a r t e r s  o f  the  2 5 th  Army moved to  B u k i t  T in g g i  i n  Sum at ra ,
w h i l e  t h e  29 th  Army took  c h a r g e  o f  Malaya and e s t a b l i s h e d  i t s  H e a d q u a r t e r s
24a t  T a i p i n g ,  P e rak  s t a t e .  I t  was a l s o  d e c id e d  t o  p l a c e  t h e  m a in la nd
22 OSS, S t a t e  D e p a r tm e n t ,  U .S .A . ,  ' J a p a n e s e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  M a la ya ’ , 
marked ’ R e s t r i c t e d ' ,  8 June  1944, i n  BMA/ADM 9 / 1 , 6.  In  t h i s  
c h a p t e r ,  I have drawn h e a v i l y  f rom t h i s  i n f o r m a t i v e  s t u d y  as  w e l l  
as  f rom a B r i t i s h  document f rom t h e  Fa r  E a s t e r n  B ureau ,  M i n i s t r y  of  
I n f o r m a t i o n ,  e n t i t l e d  'M alaya  Under t h e  J a p a n e s e ' ,  n . d .  (1944?)
in  BMA P S / 4 0 4 , marked ' S e c r e t ' .
23 The f a c t  t h a t  Sum at ra  was a s e p a r a t e  i s l a n d  n u l l i f i e d  t o  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  
e x t e n t  t h e  g a in  t o  p e n i n s u l a  Malaya  o f  i t s  added t e r r i t o r y  and 
p o p u l a t i o n .  There  was p r o b a b l y  no g r e a t e r  c o n t a c t  be tw een  th e  
r e s p e c t i v e  p o p u l a t i o n s  d u r i n g  t h e  1942-43 p e r i o d  (owing to  m i l i t a r y  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on movements o f  p o p u l a t i o n )  t h a n  t h e r e  was when th e  two 
were s e p a r a t e  B r i t i s h  and Dutch t e r r i t o r i e s .  There  were a l s o  few 
commodit ies  t h a t  Sum atra  and Miilaya cou ld  exchange  t o  m u tua l  b e n e f i t .
24 A k i r a  Oki ,  ' S o c i a l  Change in  t h e  West Sumatra  V i l l a g e ,  1 9 0 8 - 1 9 4 5 ' ,  Ph.D 
t h e s i s ,  A .N .U . ,  1977,  208.
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Malay state of Johor under the direct control of the Headquarters, 7th Army,
in Singapore under General Seishiro Itagaki. These delineations of command
25remained in force from mid-1943 until the surrender in August 1945.
Only a few months after the separation of Malaya and Sumatra
Malaya itself was partitioned in October when the four northern Malay
sultanates of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perils were ceded to Thailand.
The transfer was ostensibly to honour Thailand's friendship and support
in the Japanese military campaign on Malaya, but the real aim was to reduce
the area of command in northern Malaya in order to free more Japanese troops
for the Burma campaign. Malaya was reduced in area and also lost a significant
source of food, as the four States were all major rice growing areas.
For the four northern states, the cession to Thailand was of
extreme importance. The Thais set up a, military regime in each state.
Over them was a 'Chief Administrator' who had the rank of a Thai Army
major-general. A Thai administrator was placed in each state, but he was
not of high rank. The Administrator in Kedah was a police major, in
Kelantan he was a first lieutenant. Japanese liaison officers were
appointed to the four states and the Emperor of Japan conferred a minor
Japanese Order of Merit on the Sultans in recognition of their service
to the Japanese Military Administration.
In December 1943 the Thai authorities announced plans to turn over
the administration of the four States to their respective Sultans, in direct
variance from the Japanese practice in the rest of the peninsula. The
Thais declared that 'following the abolition of the Military Administration,
a State Government will be established with the Sultan at its head while the26present [Thai] military administrators will remain as advisers.' The 
Thais also declared their intention to establish similar municipal governments 
in each of the capitals subsequent to the organisation of the state 
governments. The proposed state administration resembled that formerly 
employed by the British, whereby the Sultan, as sovereign of the State, 
was assisted in his duties by a British Adviser. Most of the actual governing
25 See Yap Hong Kuan, 'Perak Under the Japanese, 1942-45', B.A. Hons 
thesis, University of Singapore, 1957, Chart D, 8-9.
26 OSS, 'Japanese Administration in Malaya', 4.
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was done by the Adviser, but the Sultan was not without authority and
prestige, especially in the northern States where a greater proportion of
natives was found in responsibile positions than was in the FMS.
The transfer of sovereignty was carried out smoothly on the
whole. But there remained two major sources of tension: (a) Thai-Japanese
disagreement over a financial settlement, and (b) special legislation
which was adverse to Malay interests, e.g., the banning of polygamy and
the imposition of a surtax for those between the ages of 20 and 45 unable
27to read and write the Thai language by the end of the year. The second 
problem became more serious just before the war ended and led to the 
emergence of an anti-Thai movement among the Malays in Kedah and Kelantan.
This movement continued until 1947 and was ended only through British
4 4 28intervention.
The transfer of these four States marked the beginning of Malay
disillusionment with the Japanese military administration, and placed the
Malays numerically behind the Chinese in Malaya for the first time in their
history. In 1931, although the total population of Chinese and Indians in
Malaya, including Singapore, outnumbered the Malays, the latter still formed
the largest single ethnic group in the country. Now, deprived of its northern
Malay States, Malaya, including Singapore, had more ethnic Chinese residents
than it had Malays. The Japanese MMA consequently began to give more
consideration towards Chinese communal interests. The following tables of
estimates of population statistics for 1936 and 1945 indicate the impact of
29the loss of territory in 1943 on Malaya's racial balance:“
27 The Islamic religion permits a Muslim man to have up to four wives.
Ibid.; sec also the British Far Eastern Bureau document, 'Malaya 
Under the Japanese', 2-3.
28 The present support given by Malaysian Malays to the Muslim irridentist
movement in Pattani, southern Thailand, is believed to be a continuation 
of the wartime struggle. See Baharuddin Abdul Majid, 'Saberkas: 
Pergeralcan dan Perjuangannya 1944-56' (Saberkas: The Movement and Its
Struggle), B.A. Hons thesis, University of Malaya 1975/76, 164-73.
Tunku Abdul Rahman, however, found the Ilia I admin istrat ion in Kedah 
tolerable. Among the Thai military officers sent to Kedah were friends
of his Bangkok and Cambridge days. He used their influence to get himsell 
appointed 'Superintendent of Education', Kedah. See Miller, Prince and 
Premier, 68.
29 Political Affairs Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 'Marai 
Dokuritsu mondai' (on the problems of the independence of Malaya),
20 February 1945, microfilm No.50 in Wason Collection, Cornell University. 
See Appendix A for English translation of full text.
TABLE I
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TOTAL PUPULATJ ON OF MALAY A? INC HID INC 
SINGAPORE, IN 1936 (ESTIMATES)
M alays 2 , 0 9 5 , 2 1 7 44.6%
C h i n e s e 1 , 8 2 1 , 7 5 0 38.8%
I n d i a n s  and o t h e r s 7 7 9 ,2 9 9 16.6%
TABLE I I
TOTAL POPULATION OF MALAYA, INCLUDING 
SINGAPORE, BUT EXCLUDING THE FOUR NORTHERN STATES 
CEDED TO THAILAND IN 1943 (1945 ESTIMATES)
M alay s 1 , 2 1 0 , 7 1 8 34.3%
C h i n e s e 1 , 6 9 9 , 5 9 4 47.7%
I n d i a n s  and o t h e r s 6 5 1 , 9 4 8 18.0%
S o u r c e :  Memorandum e n t i t l e d  ' M a r a i  d o k u r i t s u  m o n d a i '  (on t h e  p r o b l e m s
o f  M alayan  i n d e p e n d e n c e ) ,  P o l i t i c a l  A f f a i r s  S e c t i o n ,  M i n i s t r y  
o f  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s ,  -Tokyo, 20 F e b r u a r y  1945 ,  i n  t h e  Wason 
C o l l e c t i o n ,  C o r n e l l  U n i v e r s i t y .  See  A p p e n d ix  A, b e l o w .
J a p a n e s e  and B r i t i s h  S y s te m s  o f  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n :  c o n t i n u i t y  an d  ch a n g e
I n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h e  p r e w a r  B r i t i s h  p r a c t i c e  o f  h a v i n g  a
d u a l  fo r m  o f  g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h a t  o f  d i r e c t  an d  i n d i r e c t  r u l e ,  t h e  J a p a n e s e
g o v e r n e d  M alaya a s  a s i n g l e  i n t e g r a t e d  c o l o n y  u n d e r  one su p re m e  g o v e r n m e n t
29ah e a d e d  by t h e  MMA i n  S i n g a p o r e .  In  d o i n g  so  t h e  J a p a n e s e  r e d u c e d  t h e  
s t a t u s  o f  t h e  Malay S u l t a n s  t o  t h a t  o f  m i n o r  o f f i c i a l s ,  a s  h e a d s  o f  
I s l a m i c  a f f a i r s  b u r e a u s ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  u n d e r  t h e  B r i t i s h  
w he re  t h e  S u l t a n s  w e re  g i v e n  t h e  p r e s t i g e  o f  b e i n g ,  a t  l e a s t  n o m i n a l l y ,  
h e a d s  o f  t h e i r  own s t a t e s .  Wi th  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  S i n g a p o r e ,  w h i c h  became
29a The p o s t w a r  B r i t i s h  M i l i t a r y  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  (BMA) c o n t i n u e d  t o  u se  
t h e  s i n g l e  J a p a n e s e - t y p e  i n t e g r a t e d  g o v e r n m e n t  f o r  t h e  w h o le  o f  
M a l a y a ,  w i t h  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  b a s e d  i n  S i n g a p o r e ,  f rom S e p t e m b e r  
1945 t o  1 A p r i l  1946 when t h e  M a lay a n  U nion c i v i l  g o v e r n m e n t  was 
e s t a b l i s h e d .
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a S p e c i a l  M u n i c i p a l i t y  w i t h  a Mayor, a l l  Malay S t a t e s ,  p l u s  Malacca
and Penang and i n c l u d i n g  P r o v in c e  W e l l e s l e y ,  were c o n v e r t e d  i n t o  p r o v i n c e s
a d m i n i s t e r e d  by J a p a n e s e  G o v e rn o rs ,  who a l s o  took  o v e r  f rom t h e  S u l t a n s .
U n t i l  1943 and 1944 th e  S u l t a n s  l o s t  p a r t  of  t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  ove r  m a t t e r s
30c o n c e r n in g  th e  I s l a m i c  r e l i g i o n ,  u n l i k e  b e f o r e  t h e  war when t h e  B r i t i s h
l e f t  t h e s e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  e n t i r e l y  i n  t h e i r  h a n d s .  I n i t i a l l y  t h e
s t i p e n d s  of  t h e  S u l t a n s  were a l s o  c u t ,  somet imes  by t w o - t h i r d s  of  t h e
prew ar  amount ,  t h e  c u t s  d e c r e a s i n g  a c c o r d i n g  to  the  d e g r e e  of  c o o p e r a t i o n
31e x te n d e d  by each  S u l t a n .  The government  p o s t  o f  M e n t r i  B e s a r  ( C h ie f  
M i n i s t e r ) ,  h e l d  by a t i t l e d  a r i s t o c r a t ,  o r  a member o f  t h e  r o y a l  f a m i l y  
i n  c e r t a i n  s t a t e s  l i k e  J o h o r  and K e l a n t a n ,  was a l s o  i n i t i a l l y  a l l o w e d  
to  l a p s e .
With t h e s e  s i g n i f i c a n t  e x c e p t i o n s ,  t h e  J a p a n e s e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
i n  Malaya t e n d e d  t o  r e se m b le  t h e  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  sy s te m  i t
s u p e r s e d e d .  In  t h e  e a r l y  months o f  o c c u p a t i o n  t h e  J a p a n e s e  made r e l a t i v e l y
few changes  in  p rew a r  p e r s o n n e l  b u t  a f t e r  t h a t  t h e y  p u r s u e d  a p o l i c y
32which f a v o u r e d  Malay a p p o i n t e e s  o v e r  C h inese  and I n d i a n s .  The most  
i m p o r t a n t  changes  o c c u r r e d  a t  t h e  h i g h e r  l e v e l s ,  where t h e  J a p a n e s e  
r e p l a c e d  B r i t i s h  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s ,  w h i l e  t h e  p r o v i n c i a l  and l o c a l  government  
s t a f f s  r em a ined  much as  they  were b e f o r e  t h e  war .  In  b o t h  t h e  FMS 
and th e  UFMS, which had Malay a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  b e f o r e  t h e  w a r ,  ' t r u s t w o r t h y *  
Malay o f f i c i a l s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  occupy h i g h  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p o s i t i o n s ,  now 
under  J a p a n e s e  s u p e r v i s i o n .  In  t h e  s m a l l e r  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s ,  where 
a l a r g e r  number o f  non-Malays  had been  employed i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  c i v i l  
s e r v i c e ,  p rew ar  o f f i c i a l s  o f  a l l  r a c e s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  h o l d  o f f i c e  in  
1942 and 1943, b u t  Malay o f f i c i a l s  i n c r e a s e d  i n  numbers  and r o s e  more
30 The S t a t e  R e l i g i o u s  C o u n c i l s ,  o r  t h e  M a j l i s  Ugama I s l a m , were 
a b o l i s h e d ,  and n o t  r e i n t r o d u c e d  u n t i l  1943. The C h ie f  K a t h i ' s  
C o n s u l t a t i v e  Commit tees a l s o  d i s a p p e a r e d .  In  P e rak  th e  S u l t a n  l o s t  
to  t h e  J a p a n e s e  Governor  h i s  p r e r o g a t i v e  t o  a p p o i n t  K a t h i s and 
A s s i s t a n t  K a t h i s . See Y o j i  A k a s h i ,  ' J a p a n e s e  M i l i t a r y  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
i n  Malaya w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  t o  S u l t a n s ,  t h e  I s l a m i c  r e l i g i o n  and th e  
Muslim M alays ,  1 9 4 1 - 1 9 4 5 ' ,  i n  A s ia n  S t u d i e s , M a n i l a ,  V I I ,  1 ( A p r i l  
1969) ,  103-04.
31 A k a s h i ,  i b i d . , 95-96 .
32 'M a ra i  D o k u r i t s u  mondai '  (On t h e  prob lems o f  t h e  in d ep e n d e n c e  o f  
M a l a y a ) , s e e  Appendix A, be lo w .
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r a p i d l y  t h ro u g h  the  s e r v i c e .  One o f  t h e  main i n s t r u m e n t s  o f  t h e  
'p ro -M alay*  p o l i c y  were t h e  Koa Kunren jo  ( l e a d e r s h i p  t r a i n i n g  s c h o o l s )  which 
were e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  S i n g a p o r e ,  Malacca  and Penang.  Seven ty  p e r c e n t  o f
t h e  t r a i n e e s  were M alays ,  and g r a d u a t e s  were g iv en  r e l a t i v e l y  h ig h  
33a p p o i n t m e n t s .
J a p a n e s e  m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r s  o c c u p ie d  a few top  p o s i t i o n s  such 
as  G o v e r n o r s ,  w h i l e  J a p a n e s e  c i v i l i a n s ,  among them fo rm er  r e s i d e n t s  o f  
Malaya and t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t s  o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  l a r g e  J a p a n e s e  
com pan ies ,  were chosen  as  heads  o f  d e p a r t m e n t s ,  m ayors ,  g o v e r n o r s ,  and 
a p p o i n t e e s  f o r  i m p o r t a n t  s t a f f  p o s i t i o n s .  For  t h i s  s econd  group a r i c h  
s o u r c e  was t h e  Malayan A s s o c i a t i o n  (made up o f  fo rm er  r e s i d e n t s  o f
34
M a l a y a ) , which was formed i n  J a pan  soon a f t e r  c o n q u e s t  o f  t h e  p e n i n s u l a .  
About 500 o f  i t s  members were p e r s u a d e d  t o  r e t u r n  to  Malaya ,  many of  
them to  a c c e p t  p o s i t i o n s  unde r  t h e  MMA. The r e c r u i t m e n t  of  t h i s  l a r g e  
number o f  c i v i l i a n s  was r e p o r t e d  t o  have been  due t o  t h e  l a c k  of  t r a i n e d  
m i l i t a r y  p e r s o n n e l  f o r  government  s e r v i c e .  Due t o  i n s u f f i c i e n t  d a t a ,  
i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  s t a t e  w h e t h e r  t h e  number of  J a p a n e s e  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  
in  Malaya exc ee de d  the  p rew a r  number o f  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s .
The P r o v i n c i a l  Government  ( S e i c h o )
The Mayor o f  S in g a p o re  and each  of  t h e  g o v e r n o r s  of  t h e  t e n
p r o v i n c e s  was r e s p o n s i b l e  to  the  Somubucho ( d i r e c t o r - g e n e r a l )  of  t h e  MMA.
Each of  t h e i r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  had d i v i s i o n s  which c o r r e s p o n d e d  i n  g e n e r a l
to  t h o s e  of  t h e  MMA h e a d q u a r t e r s .  See c h a r t  on t h e  J a p a n e s e  M i l i t a r y
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  in  Malaya ,  p . 4 2 a .  Of t h e  t e n  J a p a n e s e  g o v e r n o r s ,  t h e
m a j o r i t y  were b u r e a u c r a t s  o f  t h e  p o w e r fu l  M i n i s t r y  of  I n t e r i o r  ( P o l i c e )
35or  r e t i r e d  g e n e r a l s  on t h e  r e s e r v e  l i s t .  As c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e s  they
33 Y o j i  A k a s h i ,  'E d u c a t i o n  and I n d o c t r i n a t i o n  P o l i c y  i n  Malaya and 
S in g a p o re  under  t h e  J a p a n e s e  r u l e ,  1 9 4 2 - 4 5 ' ,  i n  M a la ys ia n  J o u r n a l  
o f  E d u c a t i o n ,  13, 1/2 (December 1976) ,  18-20.
34 Be fo re  t h e  war t h e r e  were o n l y  5 ,0 0 0  J a p a n e s e  i n  a l l  o f  Malaya ,  4 ,000  
of  whom were on S in g a p o re  i s l a n d .  T h e i r  p r i n c i p a l  i n t e r e s t s  were 
m in ing  and e x p o r t i n g  o f  i r o n  o r e  and b a u x i t e ,  b a n k in g ,  f i s h i n g  and 
s m a l l  s c a l e  sh o p k e ep in g .  They h e l d  no p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n s ,  n o t  even 
o f  an a d v i s o r y  n a t u r e .  OSS, ' J a p a n e s e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  Malaya , 8. 
See a l s o  Yuen Choy Leng,  ' J a p a n e s e  Rubber and I r o n  I n v e s t m e n t s  in  
Malaya ,  1 9 0 0 - 1 9 4 1 ' ,  J o u r n a l  o f  S o u t h e a s t  As ian  S t u d i e s , 5 ,  1
(March 1974) ,  18-36.
35 Y o j i  A k a s h i ,  'E d u c a t i o n  and I n d o c t r i n a t i o n  P o l i c y  i n  M a l a y a ' ,  4;
Yap Hong Kuan, 17.
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r e p l a c e d  t h e  S u l t a n s  a s  h e a d s  o f  s t a t e  and t h u s  co m b in ed  most  o f  t h e  
d u t i e s  o f  b o t h  t h e  f o r m e r  B r i t i s h  A d v i s e r s  an d  t h e  S u l t a n s .  They p r e s i d e d  
o v e r  m e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  S t a t e  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  B u r e a u x .  I n  1943,  when t h e  
S t a t e  R e g i o n a l  A d v i s o r y  C o u n c i l s  w e re  s e t  u p ,  t h e y  s e r v e d  a s  c h a i r m e n ,  
t h e  S u l t a n s  a s  v i c e - c h a i r m e n .
However,  t h e r e  was no c l o s e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  b e t w e e n  e a c h  G o v e r n o r  
an d  t h e  l o c a l  g a r r i s o n  h e a d q u a r t e r s .  M i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s ,  s u c h  a s  t h o s e  
a g a i n s t  g u e r r i l l a s ,  w e r e  c a r r i e d  o u t  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  t h e  G o v e r n o r ,  who 
was o n l y  i n f o r m e d  i f  i t  was t h o u g h t  n e c e s s a r y .  The G o v e r n o r  o n l y  t o o k  
o r d e r s  o f  Army a r e a  commanders  r e l a y e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  s o m u b u ch o . Of a l l  
t h e  G o v e r n o r s ,  o n l y  t h e  G o v e r n o r  o f  l’e r a k ,  T. K u b o t a ,  a p p e a r e d  t o  hav e  
a d a p t e d  h i m s e l f  w e l l  t o  t h e  l o c a l  s i t u a t i o n  and e s t a b l i s h e d  good r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  t h e  Malay a r i s t o c r a c y .  He h a d  two Malay s e c r e t a r i e s  and was on 
good t e r m s  w i t h  S u l t a n  A bdu l  A z i z  o f  P e r a k .  On t h e  o c c a s i o n  o f  t h e  Mus l im 
f e s t i v a l ,  H a r i  Raya H a j i , on 19 December  1942 he  j o i n e d  i n  t h e  c e l e b r a t i o n s  
by w e a r i n g  r o y a l  Malay r o b e s  p r e s e n t e d  t o  him by t h e  R a j a  Muda (Crown 
P r i n c e ) . ^
I t  was a t  t h e  l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t  l e v e l  t h a t  t h e  J a p a n e s e  p r o m o t e d  
a l a r g e  number  o f  M a lay s  t o  t h e  p o s t  o f  D i s t r i c t  O f f i c e r  (DO),  f o r m e r l y  h e l d  
m a i n l y  by B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r s .  The p o s t  was t h u s  a c a r r y - o v e r  f rom  t h e  e a r l i e r  
B r i t i s h  s y s t e m  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  In  S e l a n g o r ,  o f  s i x  DOs, f i v e  w e re  
p r o m o te d  f rom p r e w a r  p o s t s  o f  A s s i s t a n t  DO, m a g i s t r a t e  o r  l a n d  o f f i c e r .
The J a p a n e s e  came t o  r e l y  on t h e  DOs and t h e i r  s u b o r d i n a t e s  t h e  p e n g h u l u  
( d i s t r i c t  headman)  and  t h e  k e t u a  kampung (headm an)  f a r  more t h a n  t h e  
B r i t i s h  had  done i n  o r d e r  t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e i r  demands  f o r  r e q u i s i t i o n  o f  
r i c e ,  l a b o u r  and v o l u n t e e r s  f o r  t h e  J a p a n e s e  w ar  e f f o r t s .
H a l i n a h  Bamadhaj h a s  s u g g e s t e d  i n  h e r  s t u d y  t h a t  t h e  s t e a d y
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  number  o f  J a p a n e s e  t o p  g o v e r n m e n t  o f f i c i a l s ,  t h e
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  an d  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  t h e  S h i d o k a n ,
o r  Im p ro v em en t  O f f i c e r s ,  who s u p e r v i s e d  t h e  DOs c l o s e l y  and a c c o m p a n i e d
them w h e n e v e r  an d  w h e r e v e r  t h e y  w e n t  on f i e l d  v i s i t s ,  made t h e  i m p o t e n c e
o f  t h e s e  Malay o f f i c e r s  a p p a r e n t  t o  a l l .  As a r e s u l t ,  s h e  c l a i m s ,  t h e
DOs w e re  n o t  h a t e d  p a r t i c u l a r l y  by t h e  M a l a y s ,  u n l i k e  t h e  m a t a - m a t a  p a d i
( r i c e  p o l i c e m e n )  who s u p e r v i s e d  t h e  r i c e  r e q u i s i t i o n ,  o r  t h e  Malay
37
i n f o r m e r s  o f  t h e  K e m p e i t a i .
36 Yap Hong Kuan,  i b i d .
37 H a l i n a h  B am ad h a j ,  'T h e  I m p a c t  o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  O c c u p a t i o n  o f  M a lay a  on 
Malay s o c i e t y  and p o l i t i c s ,  1 9 4 1 - 4 5 ' ,  MA t h e s i s ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
A u c k l a n d ,  1975,  152.
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What Bamadhaj i g n o r e s  i s  t h e  c o n s t a n t  c l a s h  o f  i n t e r e s t s
be tween  t h e  DO, t h e  p e nghu lu  and t h e  k e t u a  kampung on the  one hand and
t h e  Malay,  C h inese  and I n d i a n  masses  on th e  o t h e r .  While  i t  was the
DO who r e c e i v e d  t h e  o r d e r s  o f  h i s  S e icho  ( P r o v i n c i a l  government)  on
q u o t a s  o f  r i c e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  Army, o r  numbers  o f  l a b o u r e r s  f o r  J a p a n e s e
c o n s t r u c t i o n  p r o j e c t s ,  he a lways p a s s e d  them down to  the  pen g h u lu  and
th e  k e t u a  kampung t o  be c a r r i e d  o u t .  I n  Pahang ,  t h e  Governor  t o l d  t h e
DOs' c o n f e r e n c e  i n  O c to b e r  1942 t h a t  h i s  p r o v i n c e  was on ly  p r o d u c i n g
70 p e r c e n t  o f  i t s  p r e s e n t  r i c e  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  and t h a t  i t  s h o u ld  become
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  by 1944. The ’ r i c e  p o l i c e '  were a p p o i n t e d  i n  1943 to
e n s u r e  t h a t  a l l  f i e l d s  were c u l t i v a t e d  and to  c o l l e c t  t h e  s u r p l u s  f o r
t h e  governm en t .  T h r e a t s  o f  a r r e s t  were made t o  t h e  DOs f o r  any f a i l u r e
t o  f u l f i l  t h e i r  q u o t a s .  I t  has  been  c l a i m e d  t h a t  i t  was o n ly  a f t e r  t h e
DOs had t r i e d  to  r e s i s t  J a p a n e s e  demands t h a t  t h e  ' r i c e  p o l i c e '  were 
3 8a p p o i n t e d .  However , t h e  h a t e d  ' r i c e  p o l i c e '  s h o u ld  n o t  be s e e n  i n  
i s o l a t i o n  b u t  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  whole  c h a in  o f  l o c a l  government  m ach inery  
i n v o l v i n g  t h e  DO, t h e  p e nghu lu  and t h e  k e t u a  kampung.
On t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  f o r c e d  l a b o u r  o r  ro m u s h a , Bamadhaj b e l i e v e s
t h a t  t h e  DO t r i e d  t o  d e f l e c t  J a p a n e s e  o r d e r s  away from the  Malays by
i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  q u o t a s  o f  non-Malay l a b o u r .  Th i s  d i d  n o t  a lways work f o r ,
as  she  shows,  when t h e r e  were  n o t  enough non-Malays  a r o u n d ,  t h e  DOs had
39to  f a l l  back  on Malay r e c r u i t s .  Such r e c r u i t m e n t  was most unwelcome 
as  i t  was commonly f e a r e d  t h a t  t h e  l a b o u r e r s  m igh t  n e v e r  r e t u r n  a g a i n  a l i v e  
to  t h e i r  v i l l a g e s .  In  such  a s i t u a t i o n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  im po tence  was n o t  
l i k e l y  to  be a p p r e c i a t e d ,  b u t  r a t h e r  d e s p i s e d  as  a b e t r a y a l  o f  t r u s t  and 
r e s p e c t  h e l d  by t h e  v i l l a g e r s  f o r  t h e  DO. C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  c a u g h t  i n  t h i s  
s h a r p  c o n f l i c t  o f  i n t e r e s t s ,  t h e  DO f r e q u e n t l y  came o u t  t h e  l o s e r  -
38 I b i d . , 11-13.  Bamadhaj i s  t h e  main s o u r c e  on t h e  ' r i c e  p o l i c e ' .
39 Bamadhaj s t a t e s :  ' I t  i s  h i g h l y  l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  Malay
DOs managed t o  p r o t e c t  t h e i r  own community in  t h e  f i r s t  two y e a r s  
o f  t h e  o c c u p a t i o n  by r e c r u i t i n g  c o o l i e s  and Thai /Burma r a i l w a y  
r o ad  w o rk e rs  f rom among non-Malay  w o r k e r s  i n  t h e  towns and e s t a t e s ,  
w h i l e  e n c o u r a g i n g  Malays to  t a k e  a c c e p t a b l e  employment  w i t h  t h e  
p o l i c e  o r  Army. But once t h e  Rodo J imu Kyoku (Labour  O f f i c e )  
was e s t a b l i s h e d ,  t h e  demands f o r  l a b o u r  must  have f a l l e n  w i t h  
i n c r e a s i n g  s e v e r i t y  on kampong M a l a y s ' .  I b i d , 14.
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e i t h e r  w i t h  h i s  own communi ty  o r  w i t h  t h e  I n d i a n s  and  C h i n e s e .  He
and h i s  s u b o r d i n a t e s ,  t h e  p e n g h u l u  an d  l c e tu a  k a mpung, w e re  n a t u r a l
t a r g e t s  o f  r e p r i s a l s  by t h e  MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s ,  who i n  many l o c a l i t i e s
i n c l u d e d  members o f  t h e  t h r e e  r a c e s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  C h i n e s e  u s u a l l y
d o m i n a t e d / * *  In  f a c t ,  t h e  MPAJA and i t s  g r a s s - r o o t s  s u p p o r t  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,
t h e  M al ayan  P e o p l e ' s  A n t i - J a p a n e s e  Union  (MPAJU), o p e r a t e d  an e f f i c i e n t
i n t e l l i g e n c e  n e t w o r k  i n  t h e  v i l l a g e s  an d  s m a l l  t o w n s ,  and u s u a l l y  p i c k e d
t h e i r  t a r g e t s  f o r  e l i m i n a t i o n  w i t h  a c c u r a c y .  I n f o r m a t i o n  g i v e n  by Malay
i n f o r m a n t s  an d  s t o r i e s  fo u n d  i n  Malay n o v e l s  r e v e a l  c l e a r l y  t h a t  t h e
l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t  o f f i c i a l s  f rom t h e  DO downwards  w e re  u n p o p u l a r  w i t h
42b o t h  M a lay s  an d  n o n - M a l a y s .  The r e a s o n s  why t h e s e  d i v i s i o n s  a t  t h e  
l o w e r  l e v e l  o f  Malay s o c i e t y  d i d  n o t  f l a r e  up i n t o  v i o l e n t  i n t r a - M a l a y  
c l a s s  c o n f l i c t s  w i l l  be  d i s c u s s e d  when we come t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  i n t e r ­
r a c i a l  c o n f l i c t s .
J a p a n e s e  M i l i t a r i s a t i o n  P o l i c y
The J a p a n e s e  g o v e r n e d  M alaya  by t i g h t  m i l i t a r y  m e a s u r e s .
G r e a t  e m p h a s i s  was p l a c e d  on r e l i a n c e  on l o c a l  manpower in  i n t e r n a l
s e c u r i t y  c o n t r o l  and l o c a l  d e f e n c e  u n i t s .  As an  a d j u n c t  t o  t h e  s t a t e
and  m i l i t a r y  p o l i c e  f o r c e s ,  t h e  J a p a n e s e  e s t a b l i s h e d  J i k e i d a n  ( S e l f - D e f e n c e
40 I  am i n d e b t e d  t o  D a tu k  (Dr) Awang H a s s a n ,  t h e  M a l a y s i a n  High 
C o m m i s s i o n e r  t o  A u s t r a l i a ,  f o r  t h r o w i n g  much l i g h t  on t h e  d i f f i c u l t  
j o b  o f  t h e  DO d u r i n g  t h e  J a p a n e s e  o c c u p a t i o n .  I n t e r v i e w ,  C a n b e r r a ,  
15 J u n e  1978.  Dr Awang s e r v e d  a s  a m e d i c a l  o f f i c e r  i n  K luang  
( J o h o r )  d u r i n g  t h e  o c c u p a t i o n .
41 One o f  t h e  DOs k i l l e d  by t h e  MPAJA was t h a t  o f  K l u a n g ,  E sa  b i n  
A b d u l l a h .  lie was a b d u c t e d  and e x e c u t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n a l  
p e r i o d  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  J a p a n e s e  s u r r e n d e r  i n  A u g u s t  1945.  One o f  t h e  
r e a s o n s  g i v e n  f o r  t h e  MPAJA a c t i o n  was s a i d  t o  h av e  b ee n  h i s  
c o n s c r i p t i o n  o f  a l a r g e  number  o f  M a lay s  and n o n - M a la y s  a s  l a b o u r e r s  
f o r  t h e  J a p a n e s e .  I n t e r v i e w ,  Dr Awang. A n o t h e r  DO k i l l e d  was t h e  
DO o f  B a t u  P a h a t , I s m a i l  b i n  D a to  A b d u l l a h .  He was k i l l e d  i n  J u n e  
.1945. See Anwar A b d u l l a h ,  Da to  Onn , P e t a l i n g  J a y a ,  1971,  95 .
Datuk Onn s u c c e e d e d  him a s  DO.
42 See t h e  n o v e l s ,  Muhammad I l n j i  K i d i n ’ s Amrun, P e n a n g ,  1965,  and 
I b r a h i m  O m ar 's  Kmbun dan T a n a h , K u a la  Lumpur,  1965,  w h ich  d e a l  w i t h  
c l a s s  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  t h e  p e n g h u l u  and t h e  Malay r a a y a t  i n  
d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  J o h o r  d u r i n g  t h e  J a p a n e s e  p e r i o d .  See  my s h o r t  
e s s a y ,  'T he Malay l i t e r a r y  v i e w  o f  t h e  MPAJA', A p p e n d ix  F, b e l o w .
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Corps) with their companion tonarigumi (neighbourhood associations) 
throughout the country. Following takeover of Malaya, the Japanese found 
that crime and violence had increased in the less settled parts of the 
country. As the problem of maintaining peace and order became acute 
and existing measures were found to be inadequate, the Japanese instituted 
the Jikeidan system, under which a certain number of households were 
organised and made collectively responsible for any untoward happenings.
The chief function of the Jikeidan was to register all families in a 
neighbourhood and report on all strangers and suspicious events. In 
September 1943 Singapore was reported to have 80,000 members divided 
into 55 sections, with a leader for each section. As of 18 March 1944, 
Jikeidan organisations were reported from Perak, Penang, Malacca and
43Selangor, and the system is presumed to have existed throughout Malaya.
However, it was largely with police and volunteer forces 
that the Japanese carried out large-scale mobilisation and militarisation 
of young men, mostly Malays, who became a new elite - the military elite - 
exposed to a maximum degree of training and exhortation to patriotic 
sacrifice.
The civil police force was divided into two sections: regular
police and the Jikeidan. Except for a few changes, the Japanese carried on 
the same police organisation as under the British. Soon after the fall 
of Singapore, all prewar police personnel were ordered to report to 
their respective offices for work. Officers of the prewar Special Branch 
dealt with political affairs, especially anti-Japanese activities, and 
became known as the Tokko-ka (Political Police). Its defectives and 
informers were everywhere - in coffee shops, amusement parks, hotels and 
gambling farms. Every province was divided into the same number of 
police districts as before the war, and police district officers had 
vast powers. Malays and non-Malays served as police district officers, 
or Sho Cho, until the end of 1943, when they were replaced by Japanese 
officers. The Sho Cho were empowered to issue orders to shoot or behead 
anyone suspected of anti-Japanese activities, and even the DO, the local
43 OSS, ’Japanese Military Administration in Malaya', 13-14.
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civilian administrator, was subordinate to him. The police officers 
were thus feared by the local population. It was out of necessity that 
the Japanese had utilised the experienced staff of the former British 
police force, who consisted of Malays, Chinese, Sikhs and other Punjabis 
recruited from India. Later the Special Police, a para-military 
organisation, was formed specially to carry out operations against the 
communist guerrillas. It consisted of young and healthy recruits from
45the former police force who would swear loyalty to the Japanese Emperor.
The Japanese also laid emphasis on training Malay officer personnel 
at a Malay Police Ofifcers’ Training School which was established in 
Singapore. By February 1944 six classes, each averaging over 300 
recruits, had graduated.
The volunteer units such as the Heiho (Auxiliary servicemen),
Giyu Gun (Volunteer Army) and Giyu Tai (Volunteer Corps) were not meant to 
be sent outside Malaya for combat, but to relieve Japanese forces which 
could then be used against the Allies. Members of these units were 
frequently used by the Japanese to raid guerrilla bases and to cut off 
guerrilla food lines.
Recruitment for the Heiho began first in June 1943, and was 
open to all races, but eventually Malays formed the majority. The 
recruits were given military training like Japanese soldiers. In Perak 
the Heiho recruits began their day’s training with a six-mile run.
They also learned how to man anti-aircraft guns, artillery and to handle 
machinery. The Hcihos were attached to the Japanese forces to assist 
in labour services and were not required to carry arms, as they were not 
considered regulars like the Giyu Gun. Most Heihos were employed in the 
transport sections of the Army, or as guides in Japanese raids on guerrilla 
hideouts. The popularity of the Heihos is proven by the creation of a Malay 
women’s Auxiliary Corps in late 1944.^
44 Information on the Japanese police is drawn mainly from Yap Hong 
Kuan, 'Perak under the Japanese’, 12. For his study, Yap, a former 
officer in the British police, was allowed to consult police files 
and to refer to statements of former officers who had served in
the Japanese police force.
45 OSS, ’Japanese Military Administration in Malaya', 13.
46 ibid., 14; Joyce C. Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast 
Asia, New York, 1977, 118-194 Yap Hong Kuan, 17. Information on 
the women's Auxiliary Corps is given by A. Samad Ismail, editor of 
Berita Harian, Kuala Lumpur. Interview, April 1973.
47a
The Giyu Tai was organised for the defence of the coastline 
a,nd for the preservation of public peace and order. It was a nation­
wide unit organised at the city, town and village level. Again, Malays 
were the main recruits. Young Malays preferred to enter the Giyu Tai 
rather than the police because food and other material perquisites were 
more favourable in the Giyu Tai. Heiho had even more Malay volunteers 
because food and uniforms were supplied. The Giyu Tai was created in 
1943 and in March 1944 the total number of recruits was said to be about 
5,000. The recruits were given training in anti-aircraft and coastal
defence operations, but continued to live at home and perform defensive
46ameasures in their respective areas.
46a Lebra, 116-17.
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Unlike the Helho and the Giyu Tai, the Giyu Gun was organised 
and trained like the Japanese Army, with a central training camp and 
barracks at their headquarters in Johor Bahru. Despite a wide publicity 
campaign, response came mainly from Malays. The recruitment of large 
numbers of Malays into the Giyu Gun began after the appointment of a 
Malay political leader, Ibrahim Yaacob, as Army commander. After a six- 
month training course he was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel, believed to 
be one of the highest ranks ever given to a non-Japanese. In March 1944 
the Japanese tried to attract educated men to enlist by offering officer 
ranks to doctors, lawyers and teachers, but the appeal had limited success. 
Soldiers’ pay varied from $30 to $40, while officers’ pay from $130 
to $300. However, the main attraction was that food and clothing were 
given free. Candidates were required to have the following qualities:
1. a burning desire to serve their country.
2. be brave and physically fit.
3. be of good conduct and have a sense of
responsibility.
4. be single. ^
The first intake began in December 1943, and by April 1944 there 
were said to be 2,000 men in the Giyu Gun. The first passing-out ceremony 
was held on 11 February 1944, in Singapore. All the officers carried 
long black swords. The ceremony ended when Captain Zainal, on behalf 
of the officers, pledged 'to serve in the front line and to obey the Nippon 
forces'.^ All the officers were Malays except one Chinese, Lieutenant 
Lim Boh Siew, a former clerk in the Ipoh General Hospital. The recruits 
were trained in artillery and armed combat and were taught to admire 
strength, courage, bravado, and generally to acquire the Nippon Seishin 
(Japanese spirit). Five guiding principles were given to recruits to 
memorise:
1. We, the Malai Giyu-Gun are to be loyal to the 
Empire of Nippon above all.
2. We the Malai Giyu Gun are to assimilate and to 
display the spirit of Nippon soldiers.
3. We the Malai Giyu Gun are to undergo training 
after the model of Nippon soldiers.
47 Yap Hong Kuan, 15.
48 Syonan Shimbun, 13 January 1944.
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4.  We t h e  M a l a i  Giyu Gun a r e  t o  c o m p l e t e  t h e  d e f e n c e  
o f  t h e  p e n i n s u l a  w i t h  t h e  I m p e r i a l  F o r c e s  as  t h e  
n u c l e u s .
5 .  We t h e  M a l a i  Giyu  Gun a r e  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  
a t t a i n m e n t  o f  t h e  p r o s p e r i t y  o f  M a l a i  [Malaya]  
an d  t h e  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  Dai  Toa [ G r e a t e r  E a s t  
A s i a ] .49
A l t h o u g h  t r a i n i n g  was m ean t  t o  e q u i p  t h e  Giyu  Gun t o  a s s i s t  
t h e  J a p a n e s e  Army i n  d e f e n c e  o f  M alaya  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  an  A l l i e d  i n v a s i o n ,  
t h e  o n l y  combat  members saw was a g a i n s t  communis t  g u e r r i l l a s  i n  e a s t  
J o h o r .  I b r a h i m  Yaacob h a d  h o p e s  t h a t  t h e  Giyu Gun w o u ld  be  t h e  n u c l e u s  
o f  a Malay D e f e n c e  Army t o  f i g h t  a g a i n s t  t h e  B r i t i s h  f o r  t h e  c a u s e  o f  
Malay i n d e p e n d e n c e .  Ho we ve r ,  a s  we s h a l l  s e e ,  he  f a i l e d  t o  d e p l o y  t h e  
Giyu  Gun f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  s u r r e n d e r .
Economic  C o n d i t i o n s
P r e w a r  M alaya  e x p o r t e d  a s u r p l u s  o f  raw m a t e r i a l s  an d  i m p o r t e d  
m os t  o f  t i e r  f o o d  an d  c o n s u m e r  p r o d u c t s .  The J a p a n e s e  o c c u p a t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  
c u t  o f f  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  m a r k e t s  f o r  M a l a y a ’ s raw m a t e r i a l s ,  c r e a t e d  a 
s h i p p i n g  s h o r t a g e  w h ich  d r a s t i c a l l y  r e d u c e d  e s s e n t i a l  i m p o r t s ,  and 
c a u s e d  p r i c e s  t o  r i s e .  The o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  l a r g e - s c a l e  r u b b e r  and 
t i n  i n d u s t r i e s ,  on w h ich  M a l a y a ’ s p r e w a r  economy h a d  b e e n  e n t i r e l y  
d e p e n d e n t ,  w e r e  d r a s t i c a l l y  c u r t a i l e d .  D e s p i t e  e f f o r t s  o f  b i g  J a p a n e s e  
co m p an ie s  t o  r e v i v e  p r o d u c t i o n ,  t h e y  f a i l e d  t o  p r o d u c e  ev e n  h a l f  t h e  
p r e w a r  amount  o f  t i n  an d  r u b b e r .  The p r i c e  o f  b o t h  r u b b e r  and t i n  f e l l  
be lo w  t h e  b a r e  m a r g i n  o f  p r o f i t  and many l a b o u r e r s  i n  „ t h e s e  i n d u s t r i e s  
became i m p o v e r i s h e d .  As s h o r t a g e s  c a u s e d  fo o d  p r i c e s  t o  s o a r  t h e  l o c a l  
p o p u l a t i o n  t u r n e d  t o  t h e  c u l t i v a t i o n  o f  f o o d s t u f f s  a s  t h e i r  o n l y  h o p e  o f  
s u r v i v a l .  F o r t u n a t e l y  l a n d  was p l e n t i f u l ,  b u t  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  i n  t h i s  
d i r e c t i o n  w e re  o n l y  p a r t i a l l y  s u c c e s s f u l .  The l o s s  o f  l i f e  c a u s e d  by 
m a l n u t r i t i o n  an d  o t h e r  d e f i c i e n c i e s  w e r e  c o n s i d e r a b l e .
As t h e  eco n o m ic  s i t u a t i o n  w o r s e n e d ,  two b a s i c  t a s k s  c o n f r o n t e d  
t h e  MMA: t o  d e v e l o p  an d  e x p o r t  e s s e n t i a l  raw m a t e r i a l s  t o  J a p a n ;  and t o
49 Syonan  Sh imbun,  23 May 1944.
50 See C h a p t e r  IV,  b e l o w .
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produce and distribute consumer goods and foodstuffs within Malaya.
Branches of leading Japanese banks were established in order to extend 
Japanese financial power, and currency was issued directly by the military 
authorities. To curb inflation the Japanese initiated seversl schemes. 
Gambling farms were opened and regular lotteries held with tickets sold 
throughout the country at one dollar each.~^‘ Banks offered prizes and 
attractive interest rates in order to encourage savings. The Japanese 
also regulated business and industry in Malaya by a licensing system which 
led to large-scale corruption by Japanese and local officials. As economic 
conditions worsened stricter control of many aspects of business was 
instituted in addition to the licensing system. Prices were fixed for 
some 800 types of goods, including such necessities as clothing, drugs, 
petroleum, tyres and tubes. Rationing and other restrictions on sales of 
most consumer goods (rice, sugar, salt, flour, matches, soap, etc.) were 
started and this led to an important 'black market' where one could get 
anything at a price.
Adding to these hardships, Japanese big business exploited Malaya.
Japanese companies, big and small, took over most of the property and
businesses which had belonged to British, American and Dutch interests, now
all enemy aliens. Among local inhabitants the Chinese were the principal
sufferers. Chinese suspected of loyalty to the Chungking government had
their properties ruthlessly confiscated, but the majority of small producers,
retail dealers and suppliers were allowed to continue in these roles for 
52Japanese firms. Mitsui and Mitsubishi monopolised several principal
industries, driving the Chinese out of business. The rice monopoly went to
53Mitsubishi, the sugar and salt monopolies to Mitsui. These and other 
companies formed kumiai (syndicates), and with the help of military units 
acting as brokers or dealers the kumiais grabbed everything in the market.
The kumiai, described by one Malayan Chinese writer as government-protected 
departments of the 'black market' were in fact mainly responsible for creating
51 OSS, 'Japanese Administration in Malaya', 20.
52 Ibid., 22.
53 Chin Kee Onn, Malaya Upside Down, 82.
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shortages of goods:
Every kumiai was nothing but a monopoly to fleece the 
public. As soon as a kumiai for any particular 
commodity was formed, that commodity soon disappeared 
from the markets and became difficult to get,
In spite of widespread unemployment in Malaya the Japanese
found it necessary, on 20 December 1943, to form a Labour Service Corps 
to forcibly recruit labour throughout the country. An apparent cause for
the labour shortage was fear thatworkers would be sent to Thailand or Burma, 
where conditions were bad.~^ The Japanese had many defence projects of 
an urgent nature to complete, and for this the obvious method of acquiring 
sufficient labour immediately was a labour draft. From every 250 
inhabitants of the various provinces twenty, between the ages of 15 
and 45, were selected to serve in the Labour Corps. A leader was 
appointed for each unit of the Corps, under the direct control of the 
Auxiliary Police. Lists of names were submitted by the penghulu in 
the rural areas-, while those in the towns were handled by community 
control organisations such as the Overseas Chinese Association (OCA), 
the Malay Welfare Association, the Arab Welfare Association, and so on.
As a further step in their efforts to secure sufficient labour 
the authorities of the Singapore Special Municipality decided on 1 
January 1944 to register all workers on the island. They expected 
workers to number about 140,000 in the various fields of industry, 
commerce and agriculture. The Japanese even went further and imported
56labour from Java in spite of the acute food shortage afflicting Malaya.
The Japanese finally turned to agriculture to solve the food
problem in Malaya. Their ’Crow-More-Food’ programme was meant to make
Malaya self-supporting. The Japanese imported Japanese agricultural
experts and techniques, introduced new padi strains, such as Taiwan rice,
57opened up new lands and released restricted Malay lands to non-Malays.
54 Ibid., 63.
55 OSS, ’Japanese Administration in Malaya', 23. See also the 
British Far Eastern Bureau, Ministry of Information report,
'Malaya under the Japanese', 6, in BMA PS/404.
56 Ibid.
57 OSS, 'Japanese Administration in Malaya', 24. See also Bamadhaj, 
Chapter I, sub-section 'The requisition of rice and labour', 2-23.
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Much of the land developed at Endau in northeast Johor and Bahau in
Negri Sembilan had been restricted by prewar Malay Land Reservations
Enactments, to prevent immigrant non-Malays acquiring more and more
Malay land. The Japanese ignored this legislation and established
farming settlements for groups of Chinese, Indians, and Eurasians in
many of the provinces. Chinese who took part in this project came
mainly from Singapore and received land allotments from the Japanese- 
5 8sponsored OCA. Other colonies were established in Perak, Selangor,
Malacca and Province Wellesley. The Japanese provided loan equipment
and seeds, and helped to build schools, houses and roads. A similar
project for Malays was started in Geylang, Singapore, called Malay
Farm, and another at Pulau Bin tan, one of the Riau Islands.
These Japanese-sponsored agricultural settlements coincided
with migration of a substantial portion of the urban population, mostly
Chinese, to rural areas to grow food, and was a key factor in the
genesis of the ’Chinese squatter problem' in postwar Malaya. The
clustering of Chinese squatters outside the urban areas was a marked
feature of the Japanese occupation, and they became an important source
of food, supplies and intelligence for the communist-led resistance 
59movement.
Cultural and Military Values
From the very beginning of its regime the MMA set out to 
Nipponise the local population in Malaya through mass media and the 
educational system. Propaganda about Japan’s advocacy of llakko Ichiu 
(universal brotherhood), promotion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere and the declaration of the liberation of Asia from Anglo-American 
political and cultural influence were constantly reiterated by the
58 Mamoru Shinozaki, an official in the Singapore Special Municipality, 
was mainly involved in the establishment of the Endau and Bahau 
settlements. See his Syonan - My Story, 79-92.
59 During the Malayan Emergency, 1948-60, when the communist 
insurrection was under way, the British authorities forcibly 
evacuated and resettled these Chinese squatters from the jungle 
fringes of many States. Their settlements had been utilised
as bases by Lhe communist guerrillas. See Victor Purcell, Malaya - 
Communist or Free?, London, 1954, 73, and Kernial Singh Sandhu,
'The Saga of the Squatter in Malaya', in Journal of Southeast Asian 
History, 5 (1964), 143-77.
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military-controlled mass media, as were the slogans ’Asia for the Asians’ 
and ’Japan is the light of Asia'.^ The 'superior culture' of Japan was 
espoused as a model for progress for Malaya as well as other areas of 
Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia.
In the schools Emperor worship, the Japanese language and 
Japanese music, religion and history were stressed, and the Nippon 
Seishin (Japanese spirit) extolled. The English language was banned 
as a medium of instruction. In April 1942 only Malay and Tamil schools 
were reopened and only Japanese, Malay and Tamil languages were allowed 
to be used. Chinese schools were allowed to reopen in October, but 
were prohibited from using Mandarin as a medium of instruction. This 
discriminatory policy was to punish the Chinese for their prewar anti- 
Japanese activities, in which the Chinese schools had played a big role.
In July 1943 the Japanese relented and allowed the Chinese language to 
be taught for three hours a week, but a year later the ban against its 
teaching was reimposed, and only Japanese was allowed to be used.63- 
Courses in the Japanese language were also obligatory in technical, 
medical, marine and normal schools. A handful of promising Malay students 
were sent to Japan for further education.
Besides the schools, classes were conducted in all Government
and commercial offices to promote the study of Nippon-go, the Japanese
language. Proficiency in Japanese was the means to obtain quick
promotions and increases in salaries. ’Nippon-go Weeks' were proclaimed
in the major cities, and these occasions were characterised by contests
in essay .writing, public speaking and debating. However, the Japanese
failed to overcome the use of English as a common medium of communication,
especially in the civil service, where correspondence and announcements
6 2in English were still tolerated.
Apart from the Japanese language the authorities encouraged 
teaching of Nippon salutations, Nippon manners and customs and Nippon
60 Chin Kee Onn, 136-44.
61 Akashi, 'Education and Indoctrination Policy in Malaya', 6-8. 
See also Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, London, 
1951, 372.
62 Purcell, 371-72; Chin, 139. OSS, 'Japanese Administration in 
Malaya', 28.
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music and songs. Anglo-American films and music were banned. This
intensive Nipponisation in the three and a half years of Japanese rule
produced a generation imbued to some degree with Japanese cultural 
63values.
The Japanese Army was an agent of Japanese values and behaviour
codes, especially the bushido (warrior code). Thousands of local people
in defence and police units were given military training in the Japanese
style. Japanese instructors aimed at instilling them with the Japanese
spirit of the samurai warrior. Even women and schoolgirls were encouraged
to take part in mass drills, parades and gymnastics emphasising physical
64vigour and spartan discipline. The wartime situation and frequent 
Japanese use of violence created a generalised climate of brutality, 
which affected both the civil population and the resistance forces.
People adopted drastic measures to settle old scores, and communist 
guerrillas meted out the same cruel treatment as the Japanese to Kempeitai 
informers and collaborators whom they caught.^
The MMA tolerated different religions, although attempts 
were made to indoctrinate the local population with Shintoism. A large 
number of Shinto shrines were constructed in Malaya, and local people 
were urged to worship in them. Despite this policy, the MMA did not 
hesitate to mobilise Muslim, Christian and Buddhist religious leaders 
in support of its programmes. Much attention was also paid to various 
religious festivals. The Japanese granted holidays to mark the occasions 
and frequently participated in the celebrations as well.^
63 Chin, 139. Akashi, 'Education and indoctrination Policy in 
Malaya', 21-22.
64 In allowing the INA to establish a women's regiment, and in recruiting 
Malay women into the Auxiliary Corps in 1944, the Japanese certainly 
made a small contribution towards the political awakening of women
in Malaya.
65 See the account of MPAJA executions in Dorothy Thatcher and Robert 
Cross, Pai. Naa (The story of an Englishwoman who lived in an MPAJA 
camp), London, 1959, passim.
66 OSS, 'Japanese Administration in Malaya', 28.
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Knee R e l a t i o n s  an d  S o c i a l  Change
Race r e l a t i o n s  i n  M alaya b e f o r e  t h e  w ar  had  b e e n  r e l a t i v e l y  
p e a c e f u l .  D e s p i t e  t h e  B r i t i s h  ' p r o - M a l a y '  p o l i c y  and t h e  s e g r e g a t i o n  o f  
t h e  v a r i o u s  r a c e s ,  i n t e r - r a c i a l  a n i m o s i t i e s  h a d  n o t  b r o k e n  o u t .
J a p a n e s e  p o l i c y  t o w a r d s  t h e  C h i n e s e  was d i f f e r e n t ,  and  i t s  r a c i a l i s t  
i n c l i n a t i o n  m a n i f e s t e d  i t s e l f  i n  t h e  m a s s a c r e  o f  t h o u s a n d s  o f  C h i n e s e  
i m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  t h e  c o n q u e s t  o f  S i n g a p o r e .  As a c o r o l l a r y  t o  t h i s ,  
t h e  J a p a n e s e  c o n t i n u e d  t h e  p r e w a r  B r i t i s h  ' p r o - M a l a y '  p o l i c y ,  t h e r e b y  
h e l p i n g  t o  c r e a t e  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  w h ich  b r o u g h t  M alays  
and C h i n e s e  i n t o  c o n f l i c t .  The C h i n e s e  w e r e  d i s c r i m i n a t e d  a g a i n s t  i n  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  s e r v i c e ,  i n  s c h o o l s ,  and i n  b u s i n e s s ;  w h i l e  M al ay s  d o m i n a t e d  
t h e  b u r e a u c r a c y  an d  s e r v e d  i n  l a r g e r  nu m b ers  i n  t h e  P o l i c e  F o r c e  and t h e  
v a r i o u s  v o l u n t e e r  l o c a l  d e f e n c e  u n i t s .  T h i s  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  a r o u s e d  
r e s e n t m e n t  among m os t  C h i n e s e  t o w a r d s  t h e  M a l a y s .  The J a p a n e s e  r e l i a n c e  
on Malay s u p p o r t  was n a t u r a l ,  g i v e n  t h e i r  f e a r  an d  d i s t r u s t  o f  t h e  
C h i n e s e  p o p u l a t i o n  a s  p o t e n t i a l  e n e m i e s .  The C h i n e s e  r e c i p r o c a t e d  w i t h  
n o n - c o o p e r a t i o n  and r e s i s t a n c e .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  J a p a n e s e  a t t e m p t e d  t o  make 
amends  w i t h  t h e  C h i n e s e  f rom l a t e  1943 o nw ard s  -  by  i n t e g r a t i n g  them 
w i t h  o t h e r  r a c e s  i n  a d v i s o r y  c o u n c i l s ,  and i n  b u s i n e s s ,  e d u c a t i o n  and 
g o v e r n m e n t  -  t h e y  f a i l e d  t o  o v e rcom e  C h i n e s e  h o s t i l i t y ,  w h ic h  c o n t i n u e d  
u n t i l  t h e  end  o f  t h e  w a r .
T h e r e  i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  l i t t l e  e v i d e n c e  t o  show t h a t  t h e  J a p a n e s e  
d e l i b e r a t e l y  p r o m o t e d  r a c i a l  a n i m o s i t y  b e t w e e n  M alays  and C h i n e s e  a s  
a m a t t e r  o f  p o l i c y .  I t  was t h e  o v e r a l l  s o c i a l  t e n s i o n s  w h i c h  t h e i r  
p o l i c i e s  c r e a t e d ,  and t h e  l o c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  t h e s e  p o l i c i e s  by 
Malay and C h i n e s e  c o m m u n i t i e s  w h ic h  l e d  t o  b i t t e r  i n t e r - r a c i a l  c o n f l i c t s .  
Compared t o  t h e  C h i n e s e ,  t h e  I n d i a n s  w e r e  l e s s  d i s c r i m i n a t e d  a g a i n s t  
by t h e  J a p a n e s e .  They e n j o y e d  a  s p e c i a l  t r e a t m e n t  l a r g e l y  due t o  
J a p a n e s e  m i l i t a r y  p l a n s  f o r  I n d i a .
( a )  The Malays
A l t h o u g h  J a p a n e s e  r u l e  p r o d u c e d  g r e a t e r  s o c i a l  d i v i s i o n s  w i t h i n  
Malay s o c i e t y  t h a n  u n d e r  B r i t i s h  r u l e ,  t h e s e  d i v i s i o n s  d i d  n o t  m a n i f e s t  
t h e m s e l v e s  i n  v i o l e n t  i n t r a - e t h n i c  c o n f l i c t  when t h e  J a p a n e s e  o c c u p a t i o n  
e n d e d ,  a s  h a p p e n e d  i n  S u m a t r a  an d  J a v a .  Under  t h e  J a p a n e s e  t h e  S u l t a n  
was n o t  r e c o g n i s e d  by t h e  J a p a n e s e  a s  a r u l e r  b u t  o n l y  a s  a r e l i g i o u s  
l e a d e r .  T h i s  made no d i f f e r e n c e  t o  h i s  s u b j e c t s ,  who c o n t i n u e d  t o  pay 
o b e i s a n c e  t o  h im a s  b o t h  t h e i r  h e a d  o f  s t a t e  an d  a s  h ea d  o f  t h e i r
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Islamic religion. In January 1943 the MMA allowed the Sultans to use
the honorific title of Sultan, but still confined their authority to
religion.^ In 1944 the Sultans were given back a great deal of their
prewar allowances and powers, but not their status as sovereign rulers.
In the State Councils set up in 1944 the Sultans became vice-chairmen
and advisers to the Japanese Governors, the chairmen, a reversal of the
roles which existed before the war when the Sultan was chairman and the
6 8British Resident the adviser.
There were divisions within several ruling royal houses,
especially those of Selangor, Trengganu, Kelantan, Perlis and Kedah,
where Japanese appointees succeeded to the throne. However, the
rivalry between the Pro-Japanese and pro-British factions was kept very
69much in the background. The traditional Malay elite, especially 
those English-educated members to be found in the prewar government 
service, continued to maintain their traditional relationships with 
the rulers and the raayat (Malay subjects). Dealings between this 
administrative elite and the Japanese Governors were curtailed, as the 
Governors tended to maintain their titular office with some reserve. 
Administrative matters at the provincial level were in the hands of the 
provincial Somubucho, whose powers corresponded to those of the Somubucho 
in the central government of the MMA. The role of the provincial 
Somubucho was regarded by the Malay administrators as similar to the 
prewar British adviser. The provincial Somubucho and other Japanese 
officials who acted as administrative superiors seemed to have worked 
the Malay elite harder than the British did to meet both administrative 
and military demands.
67 Yoichi Itagaki, 'Some aspects of the Japanese policy for Malaya 
under the Occupation, with special reference to Nationalism’, in K.G. 
Tregonning, (cd.), Papers on Malayan History, Singapore, 1962, 257.
68 Ibid.
69 A . J . Stockwell, 'The development of the Malayan Union Experiment, 
1942-48’, Ph.D thesis, University of London, 1973, 15-17.
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Not much information is available on the relationship between 
the Malay bureaucratic elites and the Sultans, but if the scanty evidence 
available on the relationship between the Malay elite and Sultan Ibrahim 
of Johor is any indication, it was not cordial. Sultan Ibrahim had been 
accustomed to exerting some authority in his State before the war when 
he was considered the most independent and outspoken ruler in the country. 
But during the occupation the Japanese administration made it difficult 
for him to have any say in the running of the government. Apparently 
this was because the Malay elite chose to carry out the orders of the 
Japanese rather than those of Sultan Ibrahim. The Malay elite, more 
than the raayat, was aware that the Sultan had lost most of his prewar 
powers and could no longer protect them as in prewar days. The Malay 
elite feared the Japanese and, moreover, the Japanese, by promoting 
many Malay civil servants to top positions, gave them an incentive to 
become pliant and cooperative. After the war, Sultan Ibrahim refused 
to forgive the Johor Mentri Besar, UngkuAziz, and other top Malay
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civil servants for what he considered their ’traitorous' behaviour 
towards him.^
Socially and economically, the British trained bureaucratic elite 
fared extremely well throughout the occupation in comparison with other 
elite groups. They were generally trusted, well-paid and well-treated. 
The Japanese came to rely heavily on their services and advice. Because 
of their relatively comfortable position, this elite appears to have 
realised that they were being forced to tread a dangerous path between 
the 'onerous duties' of the Japanese and the hatred of the masses. Many 
apparently attempted to get closer to the people by joining in community
ibis has been given as the main reason for his signing the treaty 
with Sir Harold MacMichael, the British Government's plenipotentiary, 
on 18 October 1945 transferring his jurisdiction in the State of 
Johor to the British Crown. He did this although the Johor Constitution 
expressly forbade the Sultan from surrendering the State to any 
European power. Later in a telegram, dated 26 January 1946, explaining 
why he did so to one of his subjects, Captain Ahmad of Kluang,
Sultan Ibrahim said: ...I agree Malayan Union because you all know
from Ungku Aziz to rest of Malay government officials Johor liars 
cannot be trusted and not honest or loyal to me and Johor you cannot 
deny this and know well Sultan Johor'. See the Maxwell Papers,
National Malaysian Archives, I, 4. In his memorandum to MacMichael, 
dated 18 October 1945, Sultan Ibrahim touched on 'ranks and 
designations' for Johor Malays, and said:
'...It is regrettable that the reliability of the Malays at 
present has completely changed. They are no longer reliable.
This is due to the 3^ years under the Japanese rule and influence 
which has spoilt them, making them more unreliable, leaving 
only a few who can be trusted. They have become double-faced 
in order to please the Japanese. This came as a great surprise 
to me as I never expected them to do so. On the entry of the 
Japanese into Johor many of the Malays from the lower to the 
higher classes were only too ready to follow the whims of 
the Japanese, and only a very few kept away from so doing.
It was shameful to witness all this but what could be done?'
Sec his memorandum in CO 273/675/50823/2/3 Pt II. Although this 
memorandum implies that he had been more 'patriotic' than the 
Malay civil servants, it would seem that his anger at the civil 
servants was based on some deep conflict between them during the 
Japanese occupation which he did not care to reveal to the British.
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work projects. They grew food and did other manual work after office 
hours in their own backyards or farms, instead of always keeping their 
hands clean as in prewar days. There can be little doubt that the 
experience which this elite gained during the Japanese occupation 
strengthened their political self-confidence and enabled them to assert 
themselves forcefully when the British returned.
Islamic groups had always asserted an important social and political 
role among the Malays, but unlike in Java the Japanese did not have a 
special policy to utilise them. The Japanese did not seek to establish 
control over any Islamic movement, nor to use the alim-ulama, the 
religious scholars and teachers, for nationalist purposes. There was, 
in effect, no coherent Japanese policy towards Islam in Malaya.^
The Japanese endeavoured only to control the religious and political 
authority of the Sultans, who were also the spiritual heads of the 
Malays. The curtailment of the Sultan's religious authority, in fact, 
might have been welcomed by Islamic reformists, such as the Kaum Muda 
(modernist) group, and other non-conformist groups such as the Sufis 
whose activities were suppressed under British rule by the Sultan's 
Majlis Ugama (Religious Council), the bastion of orthodox religious 
authority.
During the initial months of their administration the Japanese 
first relied on a pro-Japanese non-aristocratic nationalist group, the 
Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM), led by Ibrahim Yaacob, as a source of 
knowledge and manpower. But the political dominance of the KMM was 
short-lived. It was banned only five months after the Japanese conquest
71 This is apparent despite the convening of the Malaya-Sumatra Islamic 
conference in Singapore, 5-6 April 1943. The purpose of that 
meeting was merely to win the confidence of the Muslim Malays in 
both territories, through the support of their Muslim leaders,
'to inject the Japanese view of the world into the people's minds 
and to unite all religious groups, including Mohammedans, Christians, 
Buddhists and Hindus'. Akashi, 'Japanese Military Administration - 
Its formation and evolution in reference to Sultans etc.', 100-01. 
Despite the presence of Islamic reformists such as Hamka (Haji Abdul 
Malek b. Karim Abdullah) from Sumatra at the conference, it does not 
appear that the Muslims achieved much for themselves except to get 
together for the first time. The conference was too concerned with 
discussing and adopting resolutions pledging Muslim support for 
Japan in the war.
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in line with the Tokyo policy that indigenous nationalist movements
should not be encouraged prematurely. The Japanese utilised the KMM
cadres as political agents and advisers, but relied on the British-
trained traditional Malay elite to help them run the administration.
Only in early 1945, when Japanese plans to grant independence to Indonesia
were advanced, was the KMM revived in the hope that Malaya might be
brought within an independent Indonesia in the form of Indonesia Raya
(or Greater Indonesia), which was the aspiration of the KMM leaders.
The KMM members gave themselves a new name, KRIS (Kesatuan Rakyat
Istimewa, or the Union of Special People). Before KRIS could be launched,
72however, its plans were aborted by the Japanese surrender.
Social tensions did exist between the KMM non-aristocratic elite and 
the traditional Malay elite. When the KMM was banned, its leaders became 
politically isolated, though they remained a part of the privileged 
elite of ’collaborators'. Thereafter, social divisions developed between 
the traditional Malay elite and the lower levels of Malay society. As 
has been mentioned earlier in the discussion of the role of the District 
Officer (DO), the conflict of interests between the DO and his subordinates, 
the penghulu and the ketua kampung, were accentuated by the increasing 
demands of the Japanese authorities. When the DOs received pressure from 
the top, they passed it along to those below them, and it was ordinary 
fo]ks, both Malays and non-Malays, who felt the full brunt of Japanese 
policy.
One might have expected such pressures to produce severe intra­
ethnic social conflicts in ethnic Malay communities. In a multi-ethnic 
environment such as Malaya, however, the full development of Malay 
intra-ethnic conflicts was checked by the presence of an alien group, 
the Chinese-dominated MPAJA. Although both Malays and non-Malays felt the 
full weight of oppression from the Japanese administration and the Malay 
DOs, it was the armed Chinese guerrillas in the MPAJA who pulled the 
trigger and took credit for execution of ’wicked’ Malay DO, penghulu and 
ketua kampung.
72 The KMM's relationship with the Japanese administration will be 
discussed more fully in Chapter IV', below.
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G iven t h e  ro u g h  s e g r e g a t i o n  o f  M a lay s  an d  C h i n e s e  a s  b e t w e e n
c o l l a b o r a t o r s  and r e s i s t o r s ,  i n t e r - e t h n i c  c l a s h e s  w e r e  v i r t u a l l y
i n e v i t a b l e .  I n  e a c h  a r e a  w h e r e  MPAJA u n i t s  e x a c t e d  t a x e s ,  s u p p l i e s ,  men
o r  i n f o r m a t i o n  f r om  a l r e a d y  d e p r e s s e d  v i l l a g e s  t h e y  w e re  i n  d i r e c t
c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h  Malay o f f i c i a l s  o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  r e g i m e .  Most  Malays
saw t h e  l a r g e r  c o n f l i c t  a s  one  b e t w e e n  t h e  J a p a n e s e  and  t h e  MPAJA/
C h i n e s e ,  w i t h  Malay v i l l a g e r s  c a u g h t  i n  t h e  m i d d l e ,  l i k e  t h e  p r o v e r b i a l
m o u s e d e c r  b e t w e e n  two f i g h t i n g  e l e p h a n t s .  The MPAJA p u r s u e d  c o l l a b o r a t o r s
o f  b o t h  Malay an d  n o n - M a la y  o r i g i n ,  b u t  a n u m e r i c a l  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  v i c t i m s
w ere  M a l a y s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  s e r v i n g  i n  t h e  P o l i c e  F o r c e  an d  t h e
v o l u n t e e r  d e f e n c e  u n i t s .  I n c r e a s i n g  C h i n e s e  a n g e r  t o w a r d s  Malays
e x a c e r b a t e d  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  MPAJA m u t i l a t i o n s  co m m i t t e d  on m u r d e r e d
Malay ' c o l l a b o r a t o r s '  r a n  c o u n t e r  t o  many I s l a m i c  p r e c e p t s  c o n c e r n i n g
t r e a t m e n t  o f  t h e  d e a d .  F i n a l l y ,  i t  seems p r o b a b l e  t h a t  t h e  MPAJA’ s
' i n t e r f e r e n c e '  i n  Malay s o c i a l  c o n f l i c t s  -  b e t w e e n  t h e  DOs and t h e i r
s u b o r d i n a t e s ,  on t h e  one  h a n d ,  and t h e  r a a y a t , on t h e  o t h e r  -  w e re
r e s e n t e d  by t h e  t o p  Malay e l i t e s  an d  l e d  t o  a u n i t e d  s t a n d  among
t h e m s e l v e s .  The DO, t h e  p e n g h u l u  an d  t h e  k e t u a  k am p u n g , a s  w e l l  a s  t h e
t r a d i t i o n a l  Malay a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  e l i t e  and  t h e  S u l t a n s ,  became ' o n e ’ i n
o p p o s i n g  t h e  C h i n e s e  l e d  by t h e  MI’AJA. As ' c o l l a b o r a t o r s ' ,  t h e y  a l l
73f e a r e d  t h e  MPAJA's h a r s h  r e t r i b u t i o n .  I n  t r a d i t i o n a l  Malay p o l i t i c s ,  
b a s e d  on p a t r o n - c l i e n t  r e l a t i o n s ,  t h i s  m ean t  t h a t  t h e  r a a y a t  l i s t e n e d  
t o  t h e  v i ew s  o f  t h e i r  ' p a t r o n s ' .  I n  any c a s e  t h e  C h i n e s e  i n  t h e  MPAJA 
h e l p e d  t o  make t h i n g s  e a s i e r  f o r  t h e  r a a y a t  t o  u n d e r s t a n d .  T h e i r  
g e n e r a l  d i s t r u s t  o f  M a l a y s ,  t h e i r  r e f u s a l  t o  g i v e  M al ay s  an  e q u a l  r o l e  
i n  t h e  movement  and t h e i r  f a i l u r e  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  r e p r i s a l s  a g a i n s t  Malay 
o f f i c i a l s  w e re  c a r r i e d  o u t  o n l y  by M alays  w e re  a l l  c o n s t r u e d  a s  e x a m p l e s  
o f  C h i n e s e  c h a u v i n i s m  an d  C h i n e s e  p o l i t i c a l  a t t e m p t s  t o  d o m i n a t e  t h e  
Malays  and t h e i r  c o u n t r y .  I n  o n l y  r e q u i r e d  some m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a t  t h e  
l o c a l  l e v e l  t o  s p a r k  o f f  an i n t e r - r a c i a l  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  M al ay s  and 
C h i n e s e .
73 I m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  t h e  b r i t i s h  r e o c c u p i e d  M alaya  i n  S e p t e m b e r  1945 
t h e  S u l t a n s  o f  J o h o r ,  T r e n g g a n u  and Pah an g  c o m p l a i n e d  t o  B r i t i s h  
m i l i t a r y  o f f i c i a l s  a b o u t  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  MPAJA d u r i n g  t h e  
w a r .  See B r i g a d i e r  H.C.  W i l l a n ' s  r e p o r t s ,  ' I n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  t h e  
Malay R u l e r s ' ,  b e t w e e n  1 4 -2 8  S e p t e m b e r  1945 i n  WO 2 0 3 / 5 6 4 2 .
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(b) The Chinese
The leaders of the prewar Chinese communities in Malaya consisted 
in the main of officials of clan or guild associations (whether merchants, 
petty traders or artisans), representatives of English-educated 
professional elements in the State Legislative Councils, and various 
voluntary organisations. These could be divided further into the China- 
born and Chinese-educated business group, and the Straits-born and English- 
educated business and professional components. The businessmen or 
towkays held high social status and influence within the Chinese communities, 
as they were men of wealth, while English-educated groups were influential 
politically in Chinese mediations with the British administration. Both 
groups of Chinese leaders were involved in the anti-Japanese movement 
that developed after the Japanese Army invaded northern China in 1937.
When the Japanese attack on Malaya began, they threw their whole weight 
behind the British war effort by mobilising the Chinese population for 
Dalforce and civil defence work to fight the common enemy of their 
fatherland.
When the fall of Singapore was imminent several of these leaders 
fled Malaya to seek refuge in India, Thailand and Indonesia. Their anti- 
Japanese record made them fear for their lives in the event of a 
Japanese victory. Most of those who remained behind in Malaya were 
arrested and tortured, yet escaped the Japanese massacre of the Chinese 
carried out after the fall of Singapore. The pardon extended to these 
leaders must be regarded as a carefully considered Japanese tactic for 
later these Chinese leaders were all to be found in the Japanese-sponsored 
Overseas Chinese Association (OCA) in Singapore and in similar associations 
in other states on the mainland. The Chinese in the resistance movement, 
while they stood for unity of all classes of Chinese against the Japanese, 
tended to regard the OCAs as 'arch collaborators' and enemies. While 
the aim of these associations was clearly to marshal Chinese support 
and cooperation behind the Japanese regime, the OCAs acted, too, as a 
'shield' for the protection of prewar Chinese leaders and their supporters 
who used them to promote their own interests. The OCAs never became 
political organisations like the IIL, nor did the MMA make any attempt 
to link the OCAs with the pro-Japanese government of Wang Ching-wei 
in Nanking until 1944 when financial remittances to families in Chinese 
territory under the control of his government were allowed to be made.
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Throughout the war, the political orientation of the Chinese in Malaya 
towards China, especially to the more popular government of Chiang 
Kai-shek in Nanking, was growing stronger as many Chinese hoped for 
deliverance from the Japanese regime by Chiang's Army.
In contrast to the towkays in the OCAs, a large number of young
Chinese refused to cooperate with the Japanese, joined the resistance
movement and came to regard the older leaders in the OCAs as 'traitors'
and 'collaborators'. The average age of youths who joined the MPAJA
was nineteen, but most matured politically due to the war. Gradually,
as the resistance movement gained strength within the Chinese community,
the towkays who had become identified as spokesmen and apologists of the
Japanese administration lost the prestige they enjoyed before the war.
While it was known that many of the OCA leaders were initially coerced
to join the OCAs, their continued cooperation with the Japanese in time
made them lose all credibility. Consequently, as they became more
closely identified with Japanese repressive measures, many OCA leaders
74were eliminated by the MPAJA. Only in a few exceptional cases at 
the local level was there any cooperation between the MPAJA and the OCA.
The MPAJA reason for killing the OCA officials does not appear to have 
been because of any OCA officials' prewar political affiliation to the 
KMT or that they were 'capitalists' but because they were 'collaborators' - 
one of the targets of its anti-Japanese struggle. Except with the KMT 
guerrillas at the Thai-Malay border whom they regarded as 'bandits' 
the MCP/MPAJA tended to avoid political party rivalry or pursue a class 
struggle among the Chinese, preferring instead to encourage Chinese 
unity since all classes of Chinese were suppressed by the Japanese.
74 Mamoru Shinozaki, in his Syonan - My Story, 83-84, cites two
instances of MPAJA assassination of OCA officials at the Japanese- 
sponsored settlement at Endau (Johor). Chin Kee Onn, Malaya 
Upside Down, 106-07, reveals how some OCA officials were caught in the 
conflict between the MPAJA and the Japanese authorities. Because 
the towkays in prewar Malaya were supporters of the Kuomintang 
government in China, the conflict between the MPAJA and the OCA 
could in a sense be regarded as one between property owners or 
capitalists and communists, or as one between the Kuomintang and 
the MCP. Although a 'united front' existed in both Malaya and in 
China between the communists and the Kuomintang for the purpose 
of fighting the Japanese, political differences between supporters 
of the two groups broke out into the open occasionally.
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D u r i n g  t h e  o c c u p a t i o n  r e g i o n a l  o r  d i a l e c t  d i v i s i o n s  among t h e  
C h i n e s e  w e r e  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r s  an d  a p p e a r  t o  h a v e  a b a t e d  
c o n s i d e r a b l y  s i n c e  a l l  g r o u p s  o f  C h i n e s e  v i e w e d  t h e  J a p a n e s e  a s  a 
common t h r e a t .  The r a i s i n g  o f  t h e  $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  m i l l i o n  ' g i f t ’ 
was an ex a m p le  o f  c l o s e  c o o p e r a t i o n  an d  o f  a t t e m p t s  t o  m e d i a t e  r e g i o n a l  
o r  d i a l e c t  d i f f e r e n c e s .  The c o l l e c t i o n  c o m m i t t e e  o f  e a c h  S t a t e  OCA 
c o m p r i s e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  e i g h t  m a j o r  r e g i o n a l  g r o u p s  i n  M al ay a -  
among t h e s e  w e r e  H o k k i e n s ,  C a n t o n e s e ,  H a k k a s , Hylams and T e o c h i u s  -  
an d  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  e a c h  member o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  g r o u p s  d i d  n o t  r e n e g e  
on t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  T e o c h i u s  w e re  ex a m in e d  
by Hy lam s ,  t h o s e  o f  t h e  Hylams by H o k k i e n s  and so  o n . ^  I n  l a t e  1944 
when t h e  J a p a n e s e  a t t e m p t e d  t o  im p r o v e  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  M al ay an  C h i n e s e  
i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  t h e i r  c o o p e r a t i o n  on e c o n o m i c  p r o b l e m s  c o n f r o n t i n g  
t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t h e  T e o c h i u  r i c e  t r a d e r s  i n  S i n g a p o r e  and P en an g  
p l a y e d  an i m p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n  k e e p i n g  open  t h e  r i c e  s u p p l y  f rom T h a i l a n d  
t o  M a l a y a .  I n i t i a l l y  t h i s  was done t h r o u g h  smuggl ing,  and r a c k e t e e r i n g ,  
i n  w h ic h  J a p a n e s e  o f f i c i a l s  w e r e  s u i t a b l y  b r i b e d .  L a t e r  t h e  s e r v i c e s  
o f  t h e s e  T e o c h i u  t r a d e r s  w e re  o f f i c i a l l y  m o b i l i s e d  w i t h i n  t h e  E ppos ho 
( r e a d i n g  c l u b s ) , an a g e n c y  t h r o u g h  w h ich  t h e  C h i n e s e  r e s i d e n t s  c o u l d  
v o i c e  t h e i r  g r i e v a n c e s  a n d  c o o p e r a t e  v o i u n t a r i l y  w i t h  t h e  J a p a n e s e  
a u t h o r i t i e s .  C h i n e s e  o f  a l l  r e g i o n a l  and d i a l e c t  g r o u p s  w e re  now 
i n d i s p e n s a b l e  f o r  s u p p l y i n g  r i c e ,  v e g e t a b l e s  and o t h e r  goods  t o  b o t h  t h e  
g e n e r a l  p u b l i c  and t h e  m i l i t a r y .  The v i t a l  n a t u r e  o f  t h e s e  c o n t a c t s  
was e x e m p l i f i e d  by t h e  T e o c h i u s  i n  Pen an g  and S i n g a p o r e  who had  l i n k s  
w i t h  T e o c h i u  r i c e  t r a d e r s  i n  T h a i l a n d ,  and who u s e d  them t o  o p e r a t e  a 
j u n k  t r a f f i c  i n  r i c e  f rom t h e  n o r t h .  T h i s  b r o u g h t  i n  more t h a n  3 , 0 0 0  t o n s  
o f  r i c e  m o n t h l y ,  a t  a t i m e  when J a p a n e s e  o v e r l a n d  and s e a b o r n e  t r a f f i c
was l a r g e l y  p a r a l y s e d .  The t r a d e  i n  T h a i  r i c e  h e l p e d  t h e  T e o c h i u  pang
7 6(g r o u p )  t o  r i s e  t o  a l e a d i n g  p o s i t i o n  i n  p o s t w a r  M a lay a .
75 Y .S .  T an ,  ’ H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  O v e r s e a s  C h i n e s e  
A s s o c i a t i o n ’ , 7 - 8 .
76 A k a s h i ,  ' J a p a n e s e  p o l i c y  t o w a r d s  t h e  M alayan C h i n e s e ' ,  8 7 - 8 8 .
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( c) The I n d i a n s
At  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  and t o w a r d s  t h e  en d  o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  o c c u p a t i o n ,  
t h e  I n d i a n s  s u f f e r e d  t h e  same h a r d s h i p s  c a u s e d  by t h e  o c c u p a t i o n  and 
t h e  w ar  a s  d i d  t h e  o t h e r  r a c e s .  T h o u s a n d s  o f  I n d i a n  e s t a t e  l a b o u r e r s  
w e r e  i n i t i a l l y  r e d u c e d  t o  p o v e r t y ,  b u t  s o o n  a c e n t r a l  I n d i a n  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  
t h e  I n d i a n  I n d e p e n d e n c e  L eague  ( I I L )  a p p e a r e d  on t h e  s c e n e  t o  h e l p  
r e d u c e  t h e i r  d i s t r e s s .  S i n c e  t h e  J a p a n e s e  p l a n n e d  t o  i n v a d e  I n d i a ,  t h e  
I I L  was t h e  o n l y  p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  a l l o w e d  t o  e x i s t  a f t e r  J u n e  1942 
when t h e  Malay KMM was b a n n e d .  I t  e s t a b l i s h e d  b r a n c h e s  t h r o u g h o u t  M a l a y a ,  
an d  t h e s e  b r a n c h e s  q u i c k l y  o r g a n i s e d  m e d i c a l  and f o o d  r e l i e f  f o r  I n d i a n s  
w h e r e v e r  p o s s i b l e . ^
I t  was n o t ,  h o w e v e r ,  u n t i l  t h e  P r o v i s i o n a l  Governmen t  o f  F r e e  I n d i a
was e s t a b l i s h e d  u n d e r  Subhas  C h an d ra  Bose  on 21 O c t o b e r  1943 t h a t  I n d i a n s
i n  M alaya  w e re  g i v e n  any e x e m p t i o n  f rom  l a b o u r  r e c r u i t m e n t .  U n t i l  t h e n
t h e  I I L  was i n e f f e c t i v e  i n  p r e v e n t i n g  t h e  i m p r e s s m e n t  o f  t h o u s a n d s  o f
T a m i l  e s t a t e  l a b o u r e r s  f o r  d e s p a t c h  t o  v a r i o u s  J a p a n e s e  w o r k - s i t e s ,
7 8i n c l u d i n g  t h e  T h a i - B u r m e s e  ’ d e a t h '  r a i l w a y .  A f t e r  Bose t o o k  o v e r
t h e  I I L  and e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  P r o v i s i o n a l  Gove rn m en t  he  e x e r c i s e d  enough  
p o l i t i c a l  i n f l u e n c e  t o  a m e l i o r a t e  t h e  p l i g h t  o f  t h e  I n d i a n  p o p u l a t i o n  
i n  M a lay a .  I n d i a n s  w e re  a l l o w e d  t o  s e r v e  t h e  I n d i a n  N a t i o n a l  Army (INA) 
and o t h e r  a l l i e d  s e r v i c e s  o f  t h e  P r o v i s i o n a l  G o v e r n m en t ,  and a b o u t  2 0 , 0 0 0  
men w e r e  r e c r u i t e d  i n t o  t h e  INA fr om  t h e  e x - I n d i a n  Army p r i s o n e r s  o f  w a r  
and 3 0 , 0 0 0  f r om  among t h e  T a m i l  l a b o u r e r s .  B o s e ,  a c h a r i s m a t i c  p e r s o n a l i t y  
and p e r s u a s i v e  o r a t o r ,  a r o u s e d  s t r o n g  n a t i o n a l  s e n t i m e n t ' s  among t h e  
I n d i a n s  and  e n c o u r a g e d  them t o  s e r v e  h i s  c a u s e  t o  l i b e r a t e  I n d i a  f rom 
B r i t i s h  r u l e .  I n d i a n s  o f  a l l  w a l k s  o f  l i f e ,  b o t h  H in d u s  and M u s l im s ,  
c o n t i n u e d  t o  j o i n  t h e  I I L / I N A  an d  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  l a r g e  sums o f  t h e i r  
s a v i n g s  a n d  j e w e l l e r y .  Bose a l s o  s u c c e e d e d  i n  f o r m i n g  a women’ s u n i t  
i n  t h e  INA, t h e  Ran i  o f  J h a n s i  R e g i m e n t ,  u n d e r  t h e  command o f  a woman
77 J o y c e  L e b r a ,  J u n g l e  A l l i a n c e  ( J a p a n  and t h e  I n d i a n  N a t i o n a l  A r m y ) , 
S i n g a p o r e ,  1971,  4 0 - 4 2 .
78 Nedyam R ag h av an ,  I n d i a  and M a l a y a , Bombay, 1954,  7 5 - 7 8 .  Raghavan  
was t h e  p r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  M alaya  I I L .
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doctor who had been practising in Singapore. This was a small but 
important contribution in the political awakening of Indian women, who 
took special pride in being trained to fight for Indian freedom. The 
leadership of most of the IIL and its branches throughoug Malaya came 
from the prewar Central Indian Association for Malaya (CIAM), and 
consequently there was continuity of Indian leadership in the IIL.
When the seat of the Provisional Government was transferred from 
Singapore to Rangoon in 1944 the Indians lost their protection from the 
worst abuses of Japanese administration. Despite the special treatment 
still given them, the local IIL branches were unable to prevent the 
Japanese authorities from resuming compulsory recruitment of Indian 
labour. After the disastrous campaign at Imphal in June 1944, in which 
INA-Japanese forces fought together against the British Army, the hopes 
of the IIL began to falter and the liberation of the Indian motherland 
seemed an unlikely prospect. Nevertheless, the Indians in Malaya had 
been accorded special treatment and many Indians had taken advantage 
of the security and protection which the IIL gave them. A small minority 
of Indians, including former Indian Army officers and soldiers and some
English-educated groups in the professional classes, stayed aloof from
. TTT 80 the IIL.
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Although most Indians were not involved in inter-racial conflicts 
with either Chinese or Malays, the Sikhs, who served in the regular 
police force, earned considerable animosity from both Malays and Chinese. 
Sikh policemen were regarded as efficiently ruthless and loyal to the 
Japanese authorities, and were among the MPAJA guerrillas' prime targets.
79 She was Captain Laxmi Swaminathan. The Rhani of Jhansi regiment 
was named after the heroine of the 1857 Mutiny in India who led 
her troops against the British. Lebra, Jungle Alliance, 121.
80 Usha Mahajani, Role of Indian Minorities 'in Burma and Malaya,
Bombay, 1960, 148.
81 See telegram from BMA (Malaya), Singapore to War Office, London,
6 September 1945: 'Sikhs have earned very bad reputation during
Japanese occupation... Sikh police confined to barracks.' See also 
Sultan of Johor's memorandum to Sir Harold MacMichael, 15 October 1945, 
in which he complained about the behaviour of the Sikh policemen during 
the Japanese occupation. See file 50823/2/3 Part II, in CO 273/675.
An escaped Indian POW in Singapore witnessed two Sikhs being attacked 
by Chinese in the city's Serangoon Road after the Japanese surrender.
One was beaten to.death, while the other was chased until he crawled into 
a big drain. See Lt-Colonel Mahmood Khan Durrani, The Sixth Column, 
London, 1955, 285.
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The (Question of Independence for Malaya
AlLhough the Japanese Army administered Malaya as a colony 
throughout the war Tokyo did consider the question of granting independence 
to Malaya. A study group- in the Political Affairs Bureau of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 1945 examined the possibilities 
of granting political independence to Malaya, and in a working paper 
suggested three forms of an independent Malaya:
(a) To incorporate the four Sultanates of Kelantan,
Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis into Thailand, and 
the rest into China.
(b) To grant autonomy through the creation of a 
political administration with Lhe cooperation of 
the Chinese, the main race in Malaya, and the 
Malays. (For instance, like Sino-Malay Mixed 
Adminis tration.)
(c) To make Malaya a state of a federated 
Indonesia.
The incorporation of the four northern sultanates into Thailand
had already occurred in October 1943. The idea of incorporating the
remaining states of Malaya into China was based on a change in the
demographic, picture of Malaya, following transfer of the four northern
States to Thailand. The Chinese population thereby constituted 47 percent,
the Malays 34 percent, and the Indians and others 18 percent. Based on
these estimated figures, the study -group concluded that the ’main race'
in Malaya was the Chinese.
Therefore, in granting independence to Malaya it is 
impossible lo ignore the Chinese on population grounds 
alone, even without taking into consideration their 
economic activities.... These days, the present Malayan 
Military Government is starting to show signs of changing 
the policy enforced in the early stages of military 
administration and which had been claimed to stand for 
principles emphasising the position of Malays, because it 
has become impossible to ignore the power of Overseas 
Chinese merchants in various areas such as commerce, 
industry and labour,63
62 Political Affairs Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 
’Marai no dokuritsu mandai' (Problems of Malayan independence), 
20 February 1945 in Wason Collection, Cornell University. See 
Appendix A, below. I am grateful to my ANU colleague Akira Oki 
for drawing my attention to this important document.
83 Ibid.
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However, in a reconsideration of the question, in another document,
the group concluded that it was not feasible to grant independence to
Malaya owing to the low level of political sophistication and condition
84of the indigenous people (i.e., the Malays).
The idea of granting independence to Malaya and other occupied 
territories in Southeast Asia had been secondary to the Japanese aim 
of using these areas to supply the vital resources Japan needed for her 
national needs and for waging the war effort. Tokyo began to consider 
the idea only when Japan suffered major reverses in the war, which 
began at the battle of Midway in June 1942 when the U.S.- Navy inflicted 
heavy losses on the Japanese naval fleet. Further defeats came for the 
Japanese armed forces at Guadalcanal and at Buna in Papua, both in
85January 1943. Japanese strategy for 1943 therefore became defensive.
The need now arose to justify to the Japanese people continuing to
fight and to endure further wartime difficulties in the cause of
86'the liberation of Asian peoples'. There was the hope, too, that if 
and when the Southeast Asian countries became battlegrounds, their 
inhabitants would tend to fight on the Japanese side rather than that 
of the Allies. This could only be the case if some major political 
concession such as independence was granted.
Once these considerations began to influence Tokyo the question 
arose: which of the occupied countries of Southeast Asia was ready
84 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 'Marai dokuritsu no kanosei
ni tsuite' (on the possibility of granting independence to Malaya),
20 February 1945 in Senryochi gyosei kankei (Documents relating 
to the Administration of Occupied Areas) file Daitoa senso kankei 
(Greater East Asian War). This document, cited only in Akashi, 
'Education and Indoctrination Policy in Malaya', 1-2, 40fn., appears 
to contain the actual decisions of the Ministry, while the other 
document 'Marai no dokuritsu mondai' (Problems of Malayan 
independence), the full text of which appears as Appendix A, below, 
outlines the main problems involved in resolving the issue.
85 See Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan, Vol.V 
of the United Kingdom military series, History of the Second World 
War, London, 1969, 396-97, 408.
86 Mitsuo Nakamura, 'General Imamura and the Early Period of Japanese 
Occupation', in Indonesia, Cornell Modern Indonesia project, X 
(October 1970), 3; see also Okuma Memorial Social Sciences Institute, 
Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia, 122-23.
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for independence? One criterion for determining this was the prewar 
record of the nationalist movements in each of the occupied territories 
of the region. Certain 'lobbies' within the Japanese armed forces and 
the Government, each having some prewar contacts with and commitment to 
certain nationalist groups, now began to assert themselves. Because 
of these various pressures, and also because they needed the front-line 
cooperation of the ruling oligarchy in the Philippines and the pro- 
Japanese Ba Maw and Aung San groups in Burma, Tokyo promised in January 
1943 to grant early independence to these two countries. Indochina 
was still under the Vichy French administration, but contacts with pro- 
Japanese local groups were stepped up as part of Japanese political 
manoeuvres to make an independent Indochina within the Greater East 
Asia sphere a reality at some future date. The IIL was also encouraged 
by permitting formation of the Indian National Army, aimed at liberating 
India from British rule. But in the Netherlands East Indies and in 
Malaya no moves were made early in 1943 to promote any movement towards 
independence. Forced by the deteriorating war situation to effect its 
promises within 1943 itself, Tokyo granted independence to Burma on 
1 August and the Philippines on 14 October. Nine days later Tokyo 
extended recognition to the Provisional Government of Free India, this 
act being prompted by Japan's desperate need to go on the counter-offensive 
in Burma. In November the heads of these governments, as well as those 
of Thailand and of the pro-Japanese government in Nanking, attended a 
Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo.
hi contrast to these countries, Japan's policy towards Malaya 
and Indonesia was to delay independence. The 31 May 1943 policy, 
labelled 'Major Principles of Political Guidance in Greater East Asia', 
s ta ted:
Efforts will be made for developing Malaya, Sumatra,
.Java, Borneo, and Celebes as the sources of supply for 
important resources and for winning their political 
support. The native populations shall be granted political 
participation according to their standards; however, the 
military administration will be continued for the time 
being.^ ^
87 Okuma Social Sciences Institute, ibid. , 371-87.
70
However, on 16 June 1943 Premier Tojo announced in the Imperial Diet 
that the local populations of Malaya and the former Netherlands East 
Indies would be allowed certain measures of 'political participation’ 
during the latter part of the. year, 'in conformity with the desire of 
the natives and in accordance with their various cultural levels'. These 
measures would be realised in Java first, 'as promptly as possible in view 
of its [Java's] cultural level and in response to the confidence of the 
people'.^
As the Allied forces mounted full-scale offensives in 1944, 
there were further shifts in policy in the direction of granting full 
independence to Lhe whole of the former Netherlands East Indies. In 
February 1945 the question of granting independence to Malaya was raised 
as part of this continuing discussion. Two considerations now seemed to 
assume great importance. The greater the geographical isolation of the 
occupied territory from Japan, due to the deteriorating war situation, the 
greater the need to accelerate the trend towards granting independence. 
Secondly, there was the hope that if and when the Southeast Asian countries 
became battlegrounds their inhabitants would tend to fight on the Japanese 
side rather than that of the Allies. This could only be the case if some 
major political concession was granted.
For Malaya there was still no hint of Japanese plans to grant
independence. Following the statements of Tojo in 1943, and of his successor
Koiso in September 1944, especially the latter's promise of independence
to Indonesia, the only positive sign for Malaya was the formation of
certain advisory bodies in which local participation was encouraged.
Councils of State and City were established, one after another, from
August 1943 to January 1944. On the whole, these Councils seemed to
parallel the former prewar British Executive Councils for the Straits
89Settlements Colony and the Malay States. Although the functions of these 
bodies were nominal and advisory, they had the potential to be developed
88 The full text of the speech of Tojo and the Japanese government 
draft statements discussing the policy on the Independence of 
Indonesia, are to be found in Benda, et.al., 49-52, 253-59. For a 
detailed discussion of the major implications of Tojo's declaration 
for Indonesia, see Okuma Social Sciences Institute, op.cit., 371-87.
89 Yoichi Itagaki, 'Some aspects of the Japanese policy for Malaya', 
in Tregonning, op.clt., 259-60.
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into a system of self-government. The abrupt Japanese surrender forestalled 
this possibility) however, unless some local organisation was willing 
and able quickly to pick up where the Japanese had left off.
Except for the idea of including Malaya within an enlarged 
independent Indonesian state, or Indonesia Raya, none of the other ideas 
within the Foreign Affairs Ministry document of 20 February 1945 had any 
known supporters within the MMA. Support for Indonesia Raya within 
certain sections of the MMA indicates that there were greater sympathies 
within the administration for the Malays than for the Chinese. The 
plan involved revival of the KMM group under Ibrahim Yaacob, and sending 
of an eight-man Malay delegation comprising KMM officials and Sultans 
(or their representatives) to attend the Indonesian independence ceremony 
in Jakarta. These initiatives can be traced to the efforts of Professor 
Yoichi Itagaki, of the research department of the MMA, in charge of 
Malay affairs. He convinced the Somubucho that the Malays should be 
prepared for self-government on the grounds that Japan had now decided 
to grant Indonesia independence. Whether Itagaki or the Somubucho was 
aware of the Foreign Affairs Ministry plan is not known, but it would seem 
likely that the Sumobucho had some inkling of it. It is not clear how 
this plan was to be reconciled with that of the creation of Advisory 
Councils in 1943 and 1944, in which representation had been given to 
Chinese, Indians and other groups in addition to Malays. Probably it 
was considered that these Councils could continue to function within 
Indonesia Raya, while the autonomous government of Malaya was in 
Malay hands. The story of how Itagaki and the KMM leader, Ibrahim 
Yaacob, got the full cooperation and support of the Somubucho and the 
Indonesian nationalist leaders, Hatta and Sukarno, for their scheme to 
include Malaya within an independent Indonesia will be discussed in 
Chapter IV. For the present we need only note that their plans, hurriedly 
started in August, were cut short by news of the Japanese surrender.
Conclusion
Under the Japanese the system of administering Malaya underwent 
several important changes. For the first time in the country's history 
an integrated government was imposed for the whole of Malaya, with a 
central authority based in Singapore. This contrasted with the prewar 
dual system of direct and indirect rule. The Japanese demoted the Sultans
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further by removing their nominal status as rulers, which the British 
had allowed them, thus turning them into minor officials. Like the 
British the Japanese pursued a ’pro-Malay' policy of appointing more 
Malays than Chinese and Indians in government service. In fact, however, 
they went further than the British in encouraging more Malays to rise to 
higher positions than was ever allowed by the British. These Japanese 
policies were to have important effects in postwar Malaya.
Japanese policies to 'Nipponise' the local population had 
limited success because the exposure to Japanese cultural, economic and 
military values lasted only three and a half years. Most of the effects 
rubbed off In the postwar period. However, mil I.Lary values Imparted during 
training to members of the Heiho, Giyu Gun and Giyu Tai probably had a 
more lasting impact. Most of the former trainees organised themselves 
in 1946 into a militant youth organisation, Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API, 
or Youth for Justice Corps) and agitated for Malay independence within 
Indonesia.
Japanese support provided a belated fillip to the KMM/KRIS 
cause of Indonesia Raya. Although the KRIS disintegrated as a political 
organisation as soon as the British returned to Malaya, its impact on 
Malay politics was considerable. It gave to early postwar Malay politics 
a radical pro-Indonesian hue. British attempts to suppress this pro- 
Indonesia movement failed and it continued to survive until 1948.
The Japanese occupation enabled the predominantly-Chinese MCI’ 
to increase its political influence in Malaya during the war and in the 
postwar period. Because it was the only political organisation prepared 
for an active anti-Japanese insurgency, it attracted widespread support 
among the Chinese, who suffered from the brutality of the Japanese. The 
MCP succeeded in establishing a strong politico-military resistance 
movement - the MPAJU/MPAJA - in the midst of the Chinese community.
There was, however, less support for the MCP from Malays and Indians because 
Malay and Indian cooperation with the Japanese was clearly greater than 
that of the Chinese. Nonetheless, because of its large guerrilla army, 
the MCP became a major political force in postwar Malaya.
The Japanese occupation helped to bring about certain changes 
in the structure of Chinese society in Malaya. The traditional leaders 
of Chinese society in Malaya had either fled the country or they had 
remained and were forced to cooperate with the Japanese. Consequently, 
the prewar elites of Chinese society were discredited and frequently
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despised. Their place tended to be filled by the communists who were 
mostly from a younger generation. On the whole, however, the Japanese 
occupation and the war experience strengthened Chinese nationalism and 
their sense of ethnic identity.
The major effect of the Japanese occupation on the Indians was 
to increase Indian nationalism. Indians became more conscious of the 
need to liberate India from British rule. Like most Chinese in Malaya, 
the Indians' major problem in postwar Malaya would be to divert their 
political orientation away from their homeland towards their immediate 
interests in Malaya.
The greatest change in the prewar period produced by the
Japanese administration was in race relations. Although the Japanese
did not deliberately foster racial conflict between Malays and Chinese,
their policies had this effect. Their repressive measures against the
Chinese led to a resistance movement dominated by Chinese; their 'pro-
Malay' policy created an undercurrent of resentment and distrust among
Chinese towards Malays. Malay cooperation made the Malays appear a chosen
instrument of the Japanese. The largely Malay units of the Heiho, Giyu Gun
and Giyu Tai were, in fact, as racially divisive as the Chinese MPAJA,
and since they were deployed by the Japanese in operations against the
predominantly Chinese resistance movement, this further contributed to
widening the racial cleavage in Malaya. As Willard Ellsbree later
observed, had there been equal proportions of Chinese and Malays in the
resistance as well as in collaboration, 'the bitterness which came in
the wake of the occupation would not have had such a pronounced racial 
,90tinge.
90 Willard H. Ellsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist 
Movements, 1940 to 1943, New York, 1953, 149.
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CHAPTER III
THE MCP AND THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT
THE resistance movement in Malaya during the Japanese occupation was 
dominated by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) which had the largest 
guerrilla force, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA).
Of all the Malayan guerrilla groups, the MPAJA created the greatest 
social impact during Japanese-occupied Malaya and in the interim period 
immediately following the Japanese surrender. The present chapter will 
discuss the origins, programmes and strategies of both the MCP and the 
MPAJA as well as those of the other groups in the resistance movement.
It is also intended to show how both the MCP and the MPAJA came to acquire 
a strong Chinese character.
The MCP from 1924 to 1941
The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) emerged as a separate 
entity witli its own Central Committee in 1932, but communist activities 
in Malaya began some years earlier. The first steps in setting up a 
communist movement in Malaya were taken by Indonesian and Chinese 
communists after a visit to Singapore in 1924 by the Indonesian communist 
leader, Aliinin.* In early 1925, Tan Malaka, another Indonesian and
chief representative in Southeast Asia of the Moscow-based Communist 
International (Comintern), persuaded Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
1 This information given by the Indonesian communist Alimin is quoted 
in Malayan government records. See the Malaysian Government [Malaya 
became Malaysia in 1963] White Paper, Communism in Malaysia and 
Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, 1971, 5. See also Charles B. McLane,
Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, Princeton, New Jersey, 1966, 
132-33. McLane and several students of Malayan communism have 
been given permission to consult the Malayan government records, 
which constitute the main evidence to date of the origins of the 
Malayan communist■movement. The others have been Rene H. Onraet, 
Singapore - A Police Background, London, 1946; Harry Miller, Menace 
in Malaya, London, 1954; J.H. Brimmell, Communism in Southeast Asia, 
London, 1959; and Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 
1948-1960, London, 1975. The main document in the Malayan government 
records is compiled by the Malayan Police, Special Branch, entitled 
'Basic Paper on the Malayan Communist Party' (four volumes).
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l e a d e r s  i n  Canton to  u n d e r t a k e  t h e  i n f i l t r a t i o n  o f  l e f t w i n g  g roups  i n
S i n g a p o r e .  A CCP r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  r e p o r t e d l y  named Fu T a - c h i n g ,  was
among the a g e n t s  s e n t  to  Malaya t o  c o n t a c t  l e f t w i n g  Chinese  and J a v a n e s e
b u t ,  e x c e p t  among the Ha i lams  ( o r i g i n a l l y  f rom the  Chinese  i s l a n d  o f
Hainan)  , the  CCP members were .less s u c c e s s f u l  than  t h e i r  r i v a l s  i n  the
2
Chinese  Kuomintang ( N a t i o n a l i s t  P a r t y )  i n  fo rm in g  a Malayan b r a n c h .
Soon a f t e r  CCP members began  to  j o i n  t h e  Malayan KMT b r a n c h  and formed
t h e  n u c l e u s  o f  a communist  group known as  t h e  Malayan R e v o l u t i o n a r y  
3
Commit tee .  Th is  was p o s s i b l e  unde r  t h e  Sov ie t -K u o m in ta n g  a g re e m e n t
s i g n e d  i n  1923 i n  China by which CCP members co u ld  become KMT members.
CCP members and t h e i r  l o c a l  communist  group c o n t i n u e d  t o  be  found  i n
t h e  Malayan KMT u n t i l  Chiang K a i - s h e k ’s b r e a k  w i t h  t h e  CCP i n  1927.
The CCP members a l s o  p a i d  a t t e n t i o n  to  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  Malayan
l a b o u r  and i n  1925 formed t h e  South Seas G e n e r a l  Labour  Union (SSGLU)
to  c a t e r  t o  t r a n s p o r t  and dock w o r k e r s .
Dur ing  t h e  same p e r i o d ,  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  communists  were a l s o
a c t i v e  in  Malaya and r an  a s e c r e t  o f f i c e  of  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  Communist
4P a r t y  (PKI)  in  S i n g a p o r e .  In  1926 and 1927 many I n d o n e s i a n  r e f u g e e  
communists  came to  S in g a p o re  a f t e r  t h e  P K I ' s  a b o r t i v e  a t t e m p t s  t o  
o v e r th r o w  the  Dutch reg im e .  Among e a r l y  I n d o n e s i a n  a r r i v a l s  were 
Al imin  and Musso and l a t e r  W in a t a ,  S o e b a k a t  and J a m a ludd in  Tamin.
2 White  P a p e r ,  i b i d . See a l s o  Gene Z. Hanrahan ,  The Communist 
S t r u g g l e  in  Malaya (New York,  1954,  r e p r i n t  Kuala  Lumpur 1 9 71 ) ,  
r e p r i n t ,  30.
3 C h i h i r o  T s u t s u i ,  Nampo g u n s e i - r o n  ( M i l i t a r y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  
the  S o u th e rn  R e g i o n s ) ,  Tokyo, 1944, 335. T s u t s u i ' s  a c c o u n t  i s  
b a s e d  on MCP documents  c a p t u r e d  by the  K e m pe i t a i  as w e l l  as  fo rm er  
B r i t i s h  p o l i c e  r e c o r d s  t a k e n  o v e r  by the  K e m p e i t a i . See a l s o  
Hanrahan ,  29.
4 Khoo Kay Kim, 'The B e g in n in g s  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Extremism i n  Malaya 
1915-1935’ , Ph.D t h e s i s ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Malaya ,  1973, 117-18.
Between 1921 and 1922 I n d o n e s i a n  and Dutch communists f r e q u e n t l y  
p a s s e d  th ro u g h  S i n g a p o r e .  D a r s o n o ,  Baars  and S n e e v l i e t  were  i n  
S in g a p o re  i n  May 1921 en r o u t e  t o  Shangha i .  Samoen, a p r o m i n e n t  
I n d o n e s i a n  r e v o l u t i o n a r y ,  p a s s e d  th ro u g h  S in g a p o re  on h i s  way to  
Moscow v i a  S h a n g h a i ,  w h i l e  e s c a p i n g  from th e  p o l i c e  i n  I n d o n e s i a .  
S n e e v l i e t  was a g a in  i n  S in g a p o re  i n  May 1922 on h i s  way to  H o l l a n d .  
See Ruth T. McVey, The Rise  o f  I n d o n e s i a n  Communism, I t h a c a ,  New 
York ,  1965, 129.
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Most of the Indonesians stayed only a while in Malaya, carrying out
anti-Dutch activities as well as recruitment of local Indonesians and
Malays, before moving to another destination. The available evidence
shows that when the Indonesian communists visited Malaya they were
usually assisted by Indonesian residents in the country.
in November 1925 Tan Malaka painted a dismal picture of
Malay attitudes towards communism. lie considered it would be more
profitable to work among the resident Chinese and Indian populations:
So far not the slightest advantage is to be seen from 
the work of our [propagandists] at Singapore or at 
Penang. You may say that they are quite incapable, 
but in criticising it must not be forgotten that the 
[Malay] inhabitants there, who form only a minority, 
are all conservative in their manner of living and 
thinking, and are petty bourgeois.... [In the] F.M.S.
... impressions... obtained everywhere did not differ 
from those gained in Singapore and Penang. The section 
of the people which understands economy and politics 
are the Chinese.... In brief, if one looks for a movement 
in the F.M.S., it is not to be sought on the side 
of the Malays. It will certainly come from the Chinese 
and Klings [Indians], whatever sort of movement it may 
be. 5
Following this, Tan Malaka appears to have handed over organisation of 
the Malayan communist movement to CCP members, while he continued his 
efforts at recruitment among Indonesians, especially Sumatrans, in the 
hope that they could in turn inf]uence the local Malays. In August 
1926 he was reported to have attended meetings at Batu Pahat, Johor and 
Singapore. The Singapore meeting was among Sumatrans and aimed at 
establishing an ’Indonesian Trading Association', which was to be based 
in Penang and was to have branches in Johor. Muar was another place 
where 'Alimin and Musso and their followers had established places of 
refuge.’ Muar, Batu Pahat and other towns on the west coast of Johor
5 Quoted from Tan Malabo's letter Lo Boedlsoejitro in Java, 6 November 
1925, intercepted by British police. Enclosure in Malayan Bulletin 
of Political Intelligence (MBPI), October 1926, No.44 in CO 273/535. 
Cited in Khoo Kay Kim, 119; and Alun Jones,'Internal Security in 
British Malaya', Pli.D thesis, Yale University, 1970, 202. Both Khoo 
and Jones have used the MBPI extensively in their dissertations. See 
also Onraet, 110, and Anthony Short, 'Communism and the Emergency', 
in Wang Gungwu (ed.), Malaysia , Melbourne, 1965, 150, for summarised 
versions of Tan Malaka's views.
6 Khoo, 114 fn.
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had a high proportion of Indonesians among their population. By the 
end of 1926, however, most of these leading Indonesians were arrested 
and ordered to leave Malayan territory for a destination of their own 
choosing. They all elected to go to China.^
Of the two streams of communist influence in Malaya, the 
Chinese and the Indonesian, the former appears to have had a more 
lasting effect. Despite Tan Malaka's expectations in regard to the 
Indians, there is little record of much Indian sympathy for communism 
in Malaya, despite Indian involvement in labour disputes in the 1930s.
Meanwhile, the KMT’s activities in both China and Malaya turned 
increasingly anti-imperialist and anti-British in orientation. This 
led to the Malayan KMT being declared illegal in 1925, forcing it 
underground. The MCP's official history states that in the same year 
CCP members formed a provisional committee for the ’South Seas [Nanyapg] 
Communist Party (SSCP)’ which was described as the 'overseas branch of
g
the CCP’. The organisation was said to have been ’very narrow’ but 
had established secret cells among Chinese shop assistants and plantation 
workers. In 1926 CCP members formed the Communist Youth League in
7 Onraet, 110. The Indonesians were not detained longer than police 
interrogations required because, as Onraet points out, ’Existing 
agreements ruled that political prisoners could not be extradited’. 
Onraet was a former Inspector-General of Police, Straits Settlements.
8 The Malayan Communist Party, Nan Tao Chih Ch’un (Spring in the 
Southern Islands), Singapore, January 1946, 8. This booklet 
contains both theories of communism as well as the party’s history 
up to 1940, and its programmes and strategies up to the end of the 
Second World War. It was intended as an introduction to new party 
recruits. I am indebted to Dr Louis Siegel of the Department of 
Far Eastern History, A.N.U., for his efforts in obtaining a copy 
•of this rare document. Apparently an English translation of some 
of its contents is to be found in the Malayan government records. 
Professor McLane is the only writer to have drawn heavily on a 
document entitled ’History of the Malayan Communist Party’ in the 
records. The details which he cites from this history in his 
Soviet Strategies in the Far East are in most respects identical 
to the MCP’s history given in Nan Tao Chih Ch’un, though there 
are a few discrepancies in facts. One discrepancy is that McLane 
refers to the date of the document as ’1945’ (cf. McLane, 132), 
while Nan Tao Chih Ch’un is dated 1946. Elsewhere in his book, 
especially on p.241, McLane calls it the ’1940 party history’.
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Singapore and reorganised the SSCLU to serve a wider area than Malaya
alone. Although its central headquarters was based in Singapore, the
federation's jurisdiction covered various communist-dominated labour
organisations of Sumatra, Borneo, New Guinea, Celebes, Burma, Siam
and Indochina as well. It affiliated with the Pan Pacific Trade Union
Secretariat, a Comintern agency which was established in Shanghai in 
91927. The SSCLU was allowed to operate freely in Malaya by the 
British authorities until 1928, when it was outlawed for organising 
anti-British demonstrations anu strikes. A serious incident occurred 
in Singapore on 12 March 1927, the anniversary of the death of Sun 
Yat-sen, when members of the Communist Youth League and police clashed. 
Communist demonstrators unsuccessfully attempted to storm a police 
station in Kreta Ayer district. As a result, six of those involved 
in the attack were killed, and several SSCP leaders detained in a series 
of police raids.^
In April 1927 the Chinese Nationalists carried out a ruthless 
campaign against the CCP and their labour unions in Shanghai, Hangchow, 
Nanking, Foochow and Canton, in which hundreds of communists and their 
sympathisers were executed. Following this event in China the Malayan 
KMT purged its leftist elements, and the KMT and the communists became 
rival political groups. CCP agents arrived in Singapore to transform 
the left KMT's 'Provisional Committee' into the 'South Seas Communist 
Party (SSCP)' and convened its First Representatives Council Meeting.
The SSCP was given full jurisdiction over Siam and a voice in party
9 McLane, 133.
1.0 Onrael, 111; Jones, 203.
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activities in Indochina, Indonesia and Burma as well as in Malaya.
The authority for the extension of the SSCP's activities could only have
come from Tan Malaka just before he ceased being the Comintern's area
representative. For the MCP's official history records that after this
event, due to the 'inadequate knowledge' possessed by SSCP members and
12to 'lack of leadership from the Comintern', little was accomplished.
In 1929 the SSCP received instructions from the CCP 'to find out the
revolutionary nature and basic tasks of the Malayan revolution'. The
11CCP set forth the 'basic lines of struggle' for the SSCP. It is
believed that after the Sixth Comintern Congress held in Moscow in
July 1928, Tan Malaka broke with the Comintern over the causes of
failure of the PKI's 1926/27 uprisings. He began to concentrate on
his own communist organisation Pari (Partai Repoeblik Indonesia) which
14he had organised in Bangkok even before the Sixth Congress. Hence, 
until 1930, when the Vietnamese revolutionary Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi 
Minh) was appointed Comintern representative to take over Tan Malaka's 
place, the MCP continued to rely on the CCP, which itself was in a 
disorganised state after the debacle suffered in 1927.
11 Nan Tao Chih Ch'un, 8; McLane, 132; Onraet, 112. All these 
three sources agree that it was the CCP, not the Far Eastern 
Bureau of the Comintern based in Shanghai, which was responsible 
for communist activities in Malaya, including the SSCP's, right up 
to 1930. Onraet, who is usually anxious to link up the 'evil 
machinations' of international communism, categorically states: 
'Between 1926 and 1930 the South Seas Communist group, controlled 
from China by the Chinese Communist Party, comprised the colonies 
of Great Britain, Holland and France, also Siam and Burma, the 
latter having contact with Burma.' Tsutsui is the only writer 
who implies that the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern was 
.involved when he states that several CCP agents arrived in Malaya
'under Comintern orders' to form the SSCP. See Hanrahan, 31-32. 
Apparently the Comintern authority which Tsutsui refers to was none 
other than that of Tan Malaka whose links with the Far Eastern Bureau 
in Shanghai were, however, rather tenuous.
12 Nan Tao Chih-Ch'un, 8; McLane, 132.
13 Ibid.
14 G.T.McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca,
New York, 1952, 85-86. See McLane, 97-101, for details of Tan 
Malaka's arguments in the Sixth Comintern Congress.
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I t  was p r o b a b l y  in  1929 o r  e a r l y  1930 t h a t  the  Fa r  E a s t e r n
Bureau  o f  t h e  Comintern i n  Shanghai  began  to  assume f u l l  c o n t r o l  o f
Malayan communist  a f f a i r s .  A cco rd ing  to  a J a p a n e s e  s o u r c e ,  w h i l e  t h e
Comin te rn  c o n t i n u e d  t o  u se  CCP a g e n t s ,  i t  made t h e  CCP aware o f  i t s
c r i t i c i s m s  o f  e a r l i e r  C C P - d i r e c t e d  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  Malaya .  CCP c a d re s
were a c c u s e d  o f  b e in g  ’o u t  o f  t ouch  w i t h  t h e  r e a l  mass e l e m e n t s ’ , and o f
n e g l e c t i n g  to  i n s t i t u t e  a ' b r o a d  w o r k e r s  and p e a s a n t s  movement ' .  In
a d d i t i o n  they  had f a i l e d  to  r e c r u i t  o t h e r  r a c e s  a s i d e  from Chinese
and had n e g l e c t e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  'much c l o s e r  c o o p e r a t i o n  and l i a i s o n  w i t h
the  C o m i n t e r n ' . ^  Although  t h e  CCP was c e r t a i n l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  what
happened  i n  Malaya ,  f a i l u r e  c o u ld  e q u a l l y  be a s c r i b e d  t o  e i t h e r  Tan
Malaka o r  t h e  Comin tern i t s e l f  f o r  i t s  e a r l i e r  l a c k  o f  i n t e r e s t  i n
S o u t h e a s t  A s i a n  a f f a i r s .  At any r a t e ,  one w r i t e r  has  c o n c lu d e d  t h a t
th e  C o m i n t e r n ' s  c r i t i c i s m s  marked ' t h e  f i r s t  s e r i o u s  c o n f l i c t  be tw een
16t h e  Comin te rn  and t h e  CCP o v e r  p a r t y  p o l i c i e s  i n  the  a r e a ' . Th is  
c o n f l i c t  i s  p u r e l y  s p e c u l a t i v e ,  a s  t h e r e  i s  no e v id e n c e  from Malayan ,  
S o v i e t  o r  Chinese  communist  s o u r c e s  to  c o n f i r m  i t . ^  What i s  n o t  
r e a l i s e d ,  however ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  CCP a t  t h a t  t ime was a f l e d g l i n g  p a r t y ,  
n o t  the  r u l i n g  p a r t y  in  China y e t ,  w h i l e  t h e  Com in te rn  was r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of  r e g i o n a l  and w o r l d - w id e  communist  o p e r a t i o n s .
The CCP was s u b o r d i n a t e  t o  t h e  Comin te rn  and b e s i d e s  s e r v i n g  Comin te rn  
i n t e r e s t s  was s t r u g g l i n g  to  make i t s  own r e v o l u t i o n  i n  China s u c c e e d .
Far  from b e i n g  l o c k e d  i n  a d i s p u t e  o v e r  hegemony w i t h  t h e  Com in te rn ,  
t h e  CCP was g r o p in g  a lo n g  and a t t e m p t i n g  to  app ly  i t s  own mode o f  
s t r u g g l e  t o  Malaya .  Given d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  h i s t o r y ,  l anguage  and r ac e  
i n  M alaya ,  i t  i s  n o t  to o  d i f f i c u l t  t o  im ag ine  t h a t  CCP c a d re s  e n c o u n t e r e d  
s e r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  when t r y i n g  to  t a c k l e  p roblems t h e r e .
The Com in te rn  Bureau took  c o g n i s a n c e  of  t h e s e  prob lems 
between  1928 and 1930. D e l e g a t e s  o f  t h e  SSGLU a t  t h e  P a n - P a c i f i c  
Trade Union C onfe rence  h e l d  i n  Shangha i  i n  August  1929 
r e p o r t e d  d i f f i c u l t i e s  e n c o u n t e r e d  i n  a t t e m p t i n g  to  o r g a n i s e  t h e  many
15 T s u t s u i ,  Nampo g u n s e i - r o n , 335 ,  a l s o  c i t e d  i n  f lanrahan ,  29.
16 Hanrahan ,  32. He r e f e r s  a g a i n  t o  the  ' c o n f l i c t '  a t  38-39 .
17 McLane, 136, a l t h o u g h  he a l s o  a r g u e s  t h a t  i t  i s  'no  more t h a n  a 
p l a u s i b l e  h y p o t h e s i s ' .
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nationalities living in Malaya, and called on the permanent secretariat
to arrange for competent union organisers from India and other countries
18to help in this matter. This appeal was made after criticisms had 
been levelled at the SSGLU for its inattention to Indian and Malay 
labour.
A thorough review of the Malayan situation was undertaken and
discussed at the Second Representatives Meeting of the SSCP which was
secretly convened in Singapore in April 1930. Present at the meeting
was the Comintern representative Nguyen Ai Quoc, who was reported to
have strongly criticised the poor record of the CCP cadres in Malaya,
especially their failure to make much headway in the recruitment of
Malays and Indians. He ascribed the failure of the SSCP to its inability
19to resolve the racial question. The outcome of the meeting was that
the SSCP was officially dissolved. In its place two new organisations
were to be set up - the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the Indochinese
Communist Party (ICP), both to come under the direct control of the Comintern’s
Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai. The parties of Siam, Dutch East Indies
and Burma were to be sub-departments of the MCP but this was reported to
be only a temporary arrangement. Once these sub-departments were strong
enough they would be given full party status. The takeover of direct
control of Malayan communist affairs by the Comintern Bureau was obviously
intended as a shift away from the CCP. To facilitate closer liaison
with these parties, the Bureau set up a 'Southern Section' in Hongkong,
which was also charged with direct handling of the communist movement
20in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan and Fukien provinces in South China.
Following similar Comintern orders, the SSGLU was 
reorganised into the Malayan Federation of Labour (MFL). A clear idea
18 Hanrahan, 37.
19 McLane, 135-36; Miller, Menace in Malaya, 23.
20 Information contained in Japanese Military Administration (Malaya) 
documents claims that the 'Southern Section or Bureau' was that
of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern in Shanghai. See 
Hanrahan, AO-41. Miller, 23, also attributes the Hong Kong bureau 
to the Comintern. However, McLane, 147, describes it as the 
'Southern Bureau' of the CCP. It appears to have been the Comintern's 
bureau because the arrest of Nguyen Ai Quoc, the Comintern representative, 
in 1931 was reported to have occurred in Hong Kong. Cf. Miller, 28.
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o f  Comin te rn  d e s i g n s  b e h in d  t h e  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  emerged a t  t h e  MFL's
c o n g r e s s  when p r i o r i t y  was p l a c e d  on th e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  o t h e r  r a c e s ,
e s p e c i a l l y  Malays ,  o v e r  t h e  C h i n e s e .  A c c o rd ing  to  one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,
'The mass o f  Malay w orke rs  a r e  y e t  to  be o r g a n i s e d  i n t o  t r a d e  un ions
and b r o u g h t  unde r  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  t h e  M F L . . . t h e  main p o i n t  to  b e a r  i n
21mind i s  t h a t  the  Malay w orker  must be r e a c h e d  and r e c r u i t e d . . . ' .
There  had  a p p a r e n t l y  been  some genu ine  e f f o r t s  on th e  p a r t  o f
CCP c a d r e s  to  r e c r u i t  Malays i n t o  t h e  communist  movement b e tw een  1928
and 1930. B r i t i s h  i n t e l l i g e n c e  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  i n  1928 t h r e e  Malay c a d r e s
had  been  r e c r u i t e d  i n  S i n g a p o r e .  I n  t h e  same y e a r  the  Malay s e c t i o n  o f
t h e  A n t i - I m p e r i a l i s t  League ,  a communist  body was formed and communist
p ro p ag a n d a  i n  Romanised Malay and Jawi  i s s u e d .  Three Malays a t t e n d e d
the  a n n u a l  m e e t in g  o f  the  P a n - P a c i f i c  Trade  Union S e c r e t a r i a t  i n  Shangha i
i n  June  1929. Towards t h e  end o f  t h e  y e a r ,  a s e r i e s  o f  pa m ph le t s  i n
Malay,  p u r p o r t i n g  to  be i s s u e d  by t h e  Malay Seamen's  Union,  were p r i n t e d
22and d i s t r i b u t e d  w i th  the h e l p  o f  t h e  l o c a l  Communist P a r t y .  Throughou t
t h e  f i r s t  q u a r t e r  o f  1930, i t  was r e p o r t e d  t h a t  n o n -C h in es e  b r a n c h e s
of  the  Communist P a r t y  were b e g i n n i n g  to  emerge i n  many p l a c e s ;  i n
23the  Batu P a h a t  and Muar a r e a s  'm ost  s e r i o u s  a dvances  were m ad e ' .
But  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  c a r r i e d  o u t  by the  p o l i c e  i n  1930 l e d  t o  the  a r r e s t  
o f  s i x  l e a d i n g  Malay communists who were o f  Sumatran  and J a v a n e s e  o r i g i n s .  
The a r r e s t s  t h w a r t e d  b u t  d i d  n o t  end  t h e  e f f o r t s  to  s p r e a d  communism 
among M alays ,  e s p e c i a l l y  s i n c e  t h e  C o m i n t e r n ' s  p ro p o se d  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  
o f  t h e  SSCP was i n t e n d e d  to  l e a d  t o  a s t e p p i n g  up o f  such  e f f o r t s .
However, b e f o r e  the C o m i n t e r n ' s  p l a n s  c o u ld  be f u l l y  c a r r i e d  
ou t  the  Comin te rn  b u r e a u  and i t s  S o u t h e a s t  A s ian  ne tw ork  was s h a t t e r e d  
i n  1931 by a s e r i e s  of  p o l i c e  r a i d s  and a r r e s t s .  A member o f  t h e  
French  Communist P a r t y ,  Jo seph  D uc ro ix  ( a l i a s  Se rge  L e f r a n c )  was 
a r r e s t e d  i n  S in g a p o re  i n  June  1931 as  an a g e n t  o f  t h e  P a n - P a c i f i c  
Trade Union S e c r e t a r i a t  i n  S h a n g h a i .  lie had been  a s s i g n e d  t o  c a r r y  o u t  
t h e  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  SSCP i n t o  t h e  MCP. His r e v e l a t i o n s  under  p o l i c e
21 Hanrahan ,  AO; McLane, 135.
22 MBPI, No.48 f o r  F e b r u a r y - A p r i l  1927 i n  CO 2 7 3 / 5 3 5 , c i t e d  i n  
Khoo Kay Kim, 127-28 .
23 Khoo Kay Kim, 128.
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interrogation led to the arrests of the Secretariat's secretary in 
Shanghai, Hilaire Noulens, and to Nguyen Ai Quoc in Hong Kong. Two 
leading CCP agents, one of whom was Fu Ta-ching, were arrested along 
with Ducroix.2^
Despite these setbacks, the MCP was formally established 
in 1932 at the SSCP’s Third and last Representatives’ Conference.
A 12-point ’revolutionary’ programme was adopted and included the 
following aims:
Military overthrow of British rule, the rajas,
Sultans, landlords and compradores;
. Establishment of a Malayan Workers and Peasants 
Soviet Republic;
Nationalisation of all imperialist banking 
enterprises and reactionary property and lands;
An eight-hour day, civil rights, and free 
education in the vernacular were to be 
guaranteed;
. Redistribution of lands to farmers, plantation 
workers, and revolutionary soldiers.25
But before the MCP could begin its work on the programme, it was plagued
by an internal crisis. The MCP’s history says that the party was betrayed
by a group which advocated the ’united front’ strategy in opposition
to the leadership's militant policy. The crisis was resolved by a
purge of the opposition elements by the end of 1932.26
The Great Depression of 1933 left many people in Malaya in
great poverty and made them accessible to the appeals of the MCP.
Membership figures were reported to be rising, and the MCP stepped up
its mass demonstrations and strikes against the British. For a brief
period in 1934 the MCP maintained intermittent contacts with the
Comintern agency in Shanghai following the latter’s revival in that
year. In general, however, the MCP suffered from lack of external
funds and guidance. The Malayan Chinese Seamen's Union was believed
to have supplied the couriers who travelled between the ports of
24 Tsutsui, 146-47. Tsutsui is the only source to mention Fu TaChing.
25 Nan Tao Chih Ch’un, 9; McLane, 200, cites identical details.
26 Nan Tao Chih Ch’un, 8. It is the only source so far to mention the 
party crisis of 1932.
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Shanghai and Singapore to maintain contact between the MCP and the 
27Comintern. On 6 March 1934 the MCP's Central Committee held its
Sixth Plenary Session which drew up a Constitution in which the MCP
was described as an ’affiliate' of the Comintern. The MCP also asked
the Comintern to effect liaison with both the Indian and British
parties and to send a Comintern representative to Malaya to inspect
operations. As Comintern policy was still pan-racial a Unification
Committee was set up by MCP's Central Committee, composed of one Indian,
2 8one Malay and one Chinese.
In 1935 the rise of Fascism in Germany and Italy, and the
new military power of Japan forced the Comintern to change strategy at
its Seventh World Congress in Moscow. The previous militant line of
all-out opposition to VJestern imperialism was to give way to the Popular
or United Front line. Communist parties in the advanced countries of
Europe and America were urged to seek alliances with all political groups
to fight Fascism which the Comintern, under Soviet influence, now
considered was a more immediate threat than Western imperialism. While
the policy made it clear that opposition to imperialism in the colonial
territories was not to be abandoned altogether, Stalin and the Soviet
party were believed to have calculated that if the communist parties
in the metropolitan countries had alliances with their rival ruling
29groups, parties in the colonies were bound to follow suit.
Since the MCP was still in a state of disarray and not in regular
contact with the Comintern in 1935, it apparently failed to receive an
invitation to attend the conference. As a result the MCP did not learn
of the Comintern's new policy until a year later, through contacts made
30with the CCP in Hong Kong. However, it was not until 1937 that the 
MCP actually carried out the new Comintern policy.
27 Onraet, 114.
28 Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, London, 1951, 364. 
A full English translation of the MCP's 1934 constitution is in 
Hanrahan, Appendix I, 151-62.
29 McLane, 207-14, gives a resume of the highlights of the Seventh 
Comintern Congress.
30 McLane, 237, 240.
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One reason for this delay probably was that in 1935 and 1936
the MCP suffered a second internal schism. The crisis appeared to have
been over party strategy: how far should the MCP pursue a militant line?
The opposition group was said to have attempted to alter the party line
in favour of a more militant, aggressive attack against the British.
A Malayan communist account described the opposition group as ’Left
Opportunists' who advocated the policy of ’educating the militant
workers secretly and striving for the establishment of soviet power'.31
A British intelligence report relates the party crisis to a series
of assassinations within the MCP during 1936, allegedly caused by
suspicion of opposition betrayals which had led to the arrests in quick
32succession (in December 1935 and March 1936) of two party chairmen.
The MCP's official history seen from the perspective of the triumphant 
leadership paints the’ opposition as being 'anti-workers' as well:
In 1935 re-emerged the group which had violated the 
resolutions of the party and betrayed the interests 
of the workers. They recruited young party members 
and made them carry out anti-party activities in an 
attempt to help the enemy and make the working class 
slaves of the capitalists.... The MCP's Central 
Committee and all the party's branches did not abandon 
the fight for people's rights and national liberation.
On the contrary, they kept resolutely to their Bolshevik 
fighting spirit.. .they organised and led the masses of 
workers in large-scale sympathy strikes. This gave a 
vigorous reply to the British imperialists and dealt 
a serious blow to the opposition within the party.33
The party crisis, which was described in the MCP's official
3 Ahistory as the host critical period of the party's career', led the 
CCP in Yenan and the Comintern in Hong Kong to send trained cadres to
31 Wu Tien Wang, 'The Communist Party of Malaya', 2, cited in Hanrahan, 
54. Wu was an official of the Singapore branch of the MCP in 
1945-46 and is believed to have written the account some time in 
1947. Hanrahan is the only writer to cite this source. 'Left 
Opportunism' in communist terminology means a tendency to take 
precipitate action or unnecessary risks before an anticipated 
situation has actually developed.
32 The Special Branch document, 'Basic Paper on the Malayan Communist 
Party' is the source cited in McLane, 139.
33 Nan Tao Chih Ch'un, 9.
34 Ibid.
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35Malaya to help the MCP leadership resolve the crisis. According to
a Japanese military source, a trouble-shooter named Lai Tek, who was the
Comintern liaison chief in hong Kong, was ordered to visit Malaya to
36deal with the internal rift. Wu Tien Wang records that Lai Tek directed
the major portion of the purge, restoring ’the ideological unity within
the party' and wiping out ’the last remnants of incorrect inclinations'.
37Following this, Lai Tek 'emerged the beloved leader of the party'.
It is now known from Malayan government sources that Lai Tek
was a police informant passed on to the British Special Branch from the
French Surete in Saigon, either in 1934 or 1935, who worked his way up
into the upper levels of the party hierarchy during the crisis of 1935 
3 8and 1936. Lai Tek appeared to have impressed everyone in the party 
with his alleged Comintern credentials and his great organising ability.
He was said to have resolved the party crisis during an intensive six- 
month offensive against the opportunists'. His appearance coincided 
with a scries of demonstrations and sympathy strikes which the MCP 
organised throughout the country to exploit genuine grievances.
35 Tsutsui, 152.
36 Ibid; McLane, 241.
37 Wu Tien Wang, 3, cited in llanrahan, 55.
38 The Special Branch document 'Basic Paper on the Malayan Communist 
Party' cited in McLane, 241. McLane notes that sources differ on 
the date of his arrival. Lai Tek himself claims to have joined the 
MCP in 1934 (this was stated in an interrogation with the Malayan 
Police, 16 March 1947). An official MCP document entitled 'Statement 
of the Incident of Wright (alias Lai Tek)', issued following
Lai Tek's removal in 1947, dates his entry in the party in 'late 
1934 or 1935'. Wu Tien Wang, as cited in llanrahan, 55, writes 
that Lai Tek was dispatched to Singapore by the Comintern in 1936 
specifically to resolve the party crisis of that year. It is 
most probable that the date of his arrival was some time in 
1934, soon after the first internal crisis. Surprisingly, Nan Tao 
Chih Ch'un written at the time of his leadership, fails to make 
any reference to his date of arrival or to him at all.
39 Wu Tien Wang, 3, cited in llanrahan, 55.
87
The most spectacular strike was tnat of the Batu Arang coal mines in 1937
in which a short-lived 'Soviet* government was established by communist- 
40led workers. Lai Tek was said to have played a prominent role in 
the formation of strike committees. His claim to leadership was 
subsequently to rest on his great organising ability. At the MCP's 
SixLh Enlarged Plenum in April 1938 lie was elected secretary-general.
In October 1936 CCP cadres were reported to have arrived in
Malaya to urge the MCP to step up its anti-Japanese campaign. Anti-
Japanese organisations under a central organisation known as 'Anti-
Enemy Backing-Up Society (AEBUS)' had emerged in Malaya after the
Japanese armed invasion of Manchuria in 1931, but their activities had
been curtailed by strong police action as the communists had used them
for anti-imperialist agitation against the British. Following the
CCP directive, some efforts were made to revive these anti-Japanese
organisations, but these did not make much headway until the outbreak
of the Sino-Japanese conflict in 1937. It was further facilitated
by the KMT-CCP united front against Japan which was extended to Malaya,
and which led to the emergence of the Chinese National Salvation
movement in which the MCP came together with the KMT and various Chinese
associations to organise boycotts of Japanese goods and businesses
and to raise donations and relief aid for China. This movement
subsequently came under MCP domination and led the Malayan KMT to break
away in July 1938. The latter group especially disagreed with the
MCP's aim of attempting to turn the anti-Japanese movement into an
41anti-imperialist and anti-British one as well.
Being predominantly Chinese in its membership, the MCP's 
stand on the National Savlation Movement was to betray a strong bias 
towards Chinese patriotic sentiments. Its strategy was to exploit 
these sentiments to the full in order to mobilise the 'Overseas Chinese' 
(llua Ch'iao)into supporting its anti-imperialist cause as well. The MCP 
therefore competed with the KMT for the support of the Overseas Chinese
40 Onraet, 116-17; Hanrahan, 52-53.
41 Stephen Leong, 'The Kuomintang-Communist United Front in Malaya 
during the National Salvation Period, 1937-1941', in Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, VIII, 1 (March 1977), 31-47.
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and in showing its patriotism towards China. An example of such a
display of Chinese patriotic sentiments is to be found in an MCP statement
published in a leading Chinese newspaper in Singapore in 1938 aimed at
explaining its struggle to the Chinese and the KMT:
The fact is that we have only one aim, and our attitude 
is the same as that aim: to consolidate and expand
the Malayan Chinese national salvation united front 
and also utilise all kinds of methods, so that every 
bit of Overseas Chinese strength can be used for 
remitting funds back to China for anti-enemy backing- 
up work, so that our nation will be able to attain 
early independence and liberation, and so that we 
will not become slaves in a vanquished nation. Our 
goal is sacred, our attitude pure and bright.... 2^
The expression ’our nation' clearly refers to China, and seems to
contradict the MCP's professed loyalty towards Malaya. Moreover, the
MCP seemed to be making a distinction between the 'Malayan Chinese'
(Ma Hua), apparently those bom in Malaya and intending to reside
permanently in Malaya, and the 'Overseas Chinese' (Hua Ch'iao), those
who were ardent nationals of China and who intended to return home after
a brief sojourn in Malaya in the near future. But the MCP was, in fact,
encouraging the former to show some patriotic sentiment and duty to
China. The MCP's failure to distinguish between a separate loyalty to
China and to Malaya became increasingly evident throughout its involvement
in the Chinese National Salvation Movement from 1937 right up to the
Japanese invasion of Malaya in December 1941.
Probably because of its successful appeals to the Chinese,
the MCP's strength increased during the period of the anti-Japanese
campaign. According to British records, it more than quadrupled from
1934 to 1940 to an overall total, including communist-affiliated
organisations, of more than 50,000. Membership for the same period in
the MCP proper, however, was to remain constantly at around 1,500 to ■
A31,700 due to the party's own stringent restrictions. The MCP was
42 Ibid., 40. Emphasis added. It should be pointed out that although 
the statement did not appear in the name of the MCP, the signatories 
were all known leftists or MCP members in the AEBUS.
43 McLane, 244, cites a Soviet source.
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still overwhelmingly Chinese. The ratio of Chinese to Malays in communist-
front organisations during 1930-1935 was said to have been approximately
4415 to 1 and as high as 50 to 1 in the party itself, and though no
figures are available for the remaining period of 1935-41, it is probable
that the same picture existed. This indicates that the shift in the
control of the MCP’s affairs from CCP to Comintern leadership had no
effect in pan-racial terms. A large proportion of the Chinese members
also probably retained an allegiance to the CCP. Even the scanty evidence
available suggests that most of the MCP's Central Committee during this
period were CCP members. Fu Ta Ching who was arrested with Comintern
agent Ducroix in 1932 was said to have been an official of both the
45Southern China Bureau of the CCP and the MCP. In addition to the CCP
agents of the Comintern Bureau there was a continuous flow of CCP members
to Malaya. Following the bloody massacre which the Chinese Nationalists
carried out against the CCP in the Canton Commune in 1927, a group of
Cantonese communists were reported to have fled to Malaya and to have
46bolstered the ranks of the MCP. Later, CCP agents who arrived in
Malaya to assist the MCP in its anti-Japanese campaign were said to
47be veterans of the Chinese Eighth Route Army in Yenan. A few remained
in Malaya throughout the Japanese occupation to assist in the training 
of guerrilla warfare for MCP recruits to the Malayan People's Anti- 
Japanese Army (MPAJA).
The gains in membership which the communists achieved among 
the Chinese during the anti-Japanese campaign appeared to have had an 
opposite effect among Malays and Indians. The MCP realised that the 
other races -could not be expected to share the same level of patriotic
44 McLane, 303.
45 Tsutsui, 146-47; also cited in Hanrahan, 41. Onraet, 113, claims 
that of the two MCP officials arrested with Ducroix, one was
a China banishee. None of them is identified.
46 Tsutsui, 146 .
47 United States Government, Department of State, The Role of the 
Communists in Malaya, Classified OIR Report No.3780, 16 March 1947 
(now unclassified), 7. It relies mainly on Malayan Police,
Special Branch records.
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enthusiasm of the Chinese in their support for China against Japan.
An effort was accordingly made at a meeting of the MCP's Central 
Committee in April 1939 to correct this situation by launching an 
'All-Races' united front against Fascism and 'to fight for a democratic 
system, safeguard peace and take action against the Japanese-Italian-
A O
German fascist bloc'. In other words, the 'anti-Fascist' united 
front was to be an extension of the MCP's anti-Japanese campaign to the 
other races. The meeting adopted a ten-point 'democratic' programme 
demanding an elected Parliament and State Councils, civil liberties, 
equality for women, free education, and the release of political 
detainees. it also called for the support and defence of China and 
the Soviet Union, for Indian independence as well ns for the Spanish 
people in ’defeating the rebellious troops of Franco'.^9 The ten points 
in the programme, to each of which was added five or eight more detailed 
demands, were aimed clearly at making the MCP unacceptable to the 
British, but was sufficiently wide to accommodate the interests 'of all 
races of Malaya irrespective of party, class, creed or religion.'
However, the MCP's call to Malaya and Indians to join in 
the 'anti-Japanese Fascist' struggle failed to get any response. 
Disappointed, the MCP's CEC reviewed its strategy in July 1939 and 
decided to revert to its strategy of laying stress on the Sino-Japanese
48 Nan Tao Chili Ch' un, 10. McLane, however, refers to the date of 
the Sixth Plenum as 'April 1939', dating it a year later than
Nan Tao Chih Ch'un. Cf. McLane, 240-41. His date is based on the 
MCP document, 'History of. the Malayan Communist Party' found in 
> the Malayan government records.
49 Nan Tao Chih Ch'un, 12, and McLane, 241, cite almost identical 
details.
50 Nan Tao Chih Ch'un, 13.
51 This lack of response was most noticeable in the labour field. 
Sec Stephen Leung, 'Sources, Agencies and Manifestations of 
Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937-1941', Ph.D thesis, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1976, Pt.2, 482-86, 499-500.
91
c o n f l i c t ,  u s i n g  t h e  C h i n e s e  as  i t s  m a in  p i l l a r  o f  s u p p o r t .  I t  d e c i d e d  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  an  a n t i - J a p a n e s e  u n i t e d  f r o n t  among t h e  C h i n e s e  by a d o p t i n g  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  m e a s u r e s :
. F o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  e x t e n d i n g  an d  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e  
common a n t i - J a p a n e s e  f r o n t ,  p r o b l e m s  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  
L a b o u r - C a p i t a l i s t  r e l a t i o n s  s h o u l d  be  p l a c e d  b e lo w  
t h e  p r i o r i t i e s  o f  t h e  a n t i - J a p a n e s e  s t r u g g l e .
D i s p u t e s  s h o u l d  b e  s e t t l e d  p l a c i n g  t h e  a n t i - J a p a n e s e  
o b j e c t  above  e v e r y t h i n g .
. At t h e  same t i m e ,  t o  s a f e g u a r d  a g a i n s t  t h e  a t t a c k  
o f  B r i t i s h  i m p e r i a l i s t s  on t h e  p a r t y ,  r e t a l i a t o r y  
m e a s u r e s  s u c h  a s  s t r i k e s  e t c .  s h o u l d  be  p l a n n e d .  5-3
The p a r t y  a l s o  a d o p t e d  a r e s o l u t i o n  u r g i n g  ' B r i t i s h  i m p e r i a l i s m  t o  go
54on t h e  p e a c e f u l  f r o n t ,  and a t  l e a s t  r e f r a i n  f rom a s s i s t i n g  t h e  F a s c i s t s ' .
T h i s  was e v i d e n t l y  a i m ed  a t  h e l p i n g  t h e  S o v i e t  Un ion  and n o t  a t  s e t t i n g
any p r e c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  c o o p e r a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  MCP and t h e  B r i t i s h
a u t h o r i t i e s .  The p a r t y ,  h o w e v e r ,  p l e d g e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  a
J a p a n e s e  a t t a c k  on M alay a  i t s  s t a n d  was one o f  p r o t e c t i o n  and  a s s i s t a n c e .
As a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  J u l y  1939 p o l i c y  r e v i s i o n ,  t h e  AEBUS a c t i v i t i e s
e s c a l a t e d  d u r i n g  l a t e  1939 t o  t h e  p o i n t  w h e r e  t h e  AEBUS was r e p o r t e d  t o
55h a v e  g a i n e d  3 0 , 0 0 0  members .
The MCP's ' U n i t e d  F r o n t '  programme t h r o w s  l i g h t  on t h e  d i l em ma i n  
w h ic h  t h e  p a r t y  was b e g i n n i n g  t o  f i n d  i t s e l f  i n  1938.  The s t r a t e g y  o f  
t h e  a n t i - J a p a n e s e  s t r u g g l e  h a d  now b e e n  a d d e d  t o  t h e  MCP' s a n t i - B r i t i s h  
i m p e r i a l i s t  s t r u g g l e .  The C o m i n t e r n ' s  new l i n e  i n  1935 h a d  n o t  r u l e d  o u t  
c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  B r i t i s h  i m p e r i a l i s m  i f  t h e  MCP t h o u g h t  i t  n e c e s s a r y .  
However ,  t h e  MCP h ad  d e c i d e d  t o  c o n t i n u e  w i t h  i t s  a n t i - B r i t i s h  i m p e r i a l i s t  
s t r a t e g y  b e c a u s e  i t  c o n s i d e r e d  i t s  p a r t y  s t r e n g t h  was i n a d e q u a t e  an d  t h e  
' B r i t i s h  i m p e r i a l i s t s '  t h e m s e l v e s  n o t  r e a d y  f o r  c o o p e r a t i o n :
52 I b i d .
53 U .S .  G o v e r n m e n t ,  The R o le  o f  t h e  Communis ts  i n  M a l a y a , A p p e n d ix  C, 
' P o l i c y  D e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  F o u r t h  E x e c u t i v e  C om m i t tee  M e e t i n g  o f  
t h e  MCP i n  J u l y  1939 '  , 119.
54 I b i d .
55 S t e p h e n  L e o n g ,  ' S o u r c e s ,  A g e n c i e s  and  M a n i f e s t a t i o n s  o f  O v e r s e a s  
C h i n e s e  N a t i o n a l i s m  i n  M a l a y a ' , 500 .
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In  M alay a  a t  p r e s e n t ,  on a c c o u n t  o f  i n t e n s i f i e d  B r i t i s h  
e x p l o i t a t i o n ,  t h e  n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s i e  a r e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
g o i n g  i n t o  b a n k r u p t c y  a n d  th e  p e o p l e ' s  l i v e l i h o o d  made 
d i f f i c u l t .  On t h e  one h a n d ,  t h e r e  i s  an u p s u r g e  o f  a n t i -  
B r i t i s h  s t r u g g l e  an d  on t h e  o t h e r  r i s i n g  a n t i - J a p a n e s e  
F a s c i s t  f e e l i n g s  owing t o  t h e  p e o p l e ' s  f e a r  o f  a t h r e a t  
o f  J a p a n e s e  i n v a s i o n .  Bu t  t h e  B r i t i s h  a r e  h e s i t a n t  and 
w a v e r i n g  i n  b u i l d i n g  up th e  d e f e n c e  o f  M a l a y a .
The U n i t e d  F r o n t  u n d e r  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  t h e  P a r t y  i s  s t i l l  
n o t  s t r o n g  enough  t o  t a l k  o f  c o o p e r a t i n g  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h  
b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  d i s p a r i t y  o f  s t r e n g t h  b e t w e e n  t h e  B r i t i s h  
an d  t h e  P a r t y .  I k e  B r i t i s h  s t i l l  r e l y  on t h e i r  own pow ers  
i n s t e a d  o f  t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  p e o p l e .  At  t h i s  moment ,  we 
m us t  c o n c e n t r a t e  o u r s e l v e s  on u n i t i n g  a l l  r a c e s  u n d e r  t h e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  n a t i o n a l  u n i t y .  We m u s t  u s e  dem ocracy  as  a 
we apon i n  o r d e r  t o  o r g a n i s e  t h e  d i s o r g a n i s e d  m a s s e s .
' ike above  a r g u m e n t s  im p ly  t h a t  t h e  MCP h a d  n o t  y e t  e s t a b l i s h e d  s u f f i c i e n t
s u p p o r t  among M alays  and I n d i a n s  n o r  c r e a t e d  a so u n d  b a s i s  f o r  t h e
n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  movement i n  M a l a y a ' s  p l u r a l  s o c i e t y .  H e n c e ,  t h e
n e e d  f o r  b u i l d i n g  up ' n a t i o n a l  u n i t y '  f i r s t .  The MCP f u r t h e r  a d m i t t e d
t h a t ,  d u r i n g  t h e  1 930-1 938  p e r i o d ,  a l t h o u g h  i t s  a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t
s t r u g g l e s  h a d  c o n t i n u e d  t o  d e v e l o p ,  an d  t h e  number  o f  s t r i k e s  had
i n c r e a s e d ,  i n c l u d i n g  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  p r e s s i n g  demands  t o  r a i s e  l i v i n g
s t a n d a r d s ,  ' o u r  mass o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and p o l i t i c s  h a v e  n o t  r e a c h e d  t h e
5 7s t a g e  s t r o n g  en o u g h  to  o v e r t h r o w  B r i t i s h  i m p e r i a l i s m ' .
In  a d o p t i n g  t h e  ' A l l  R aces  U n i t e d  F r o n t  A g a i n s t  
F a s c i s m '  t h e  MCP was h o p i n g  t o  b e n e f i t  f r om  t h e  a d v i c e  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
o f  t h e  C o m i n t e r n ' s  S e v e n t h  C o n g r e s s  i n  1935 w h i c h ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  MCP, 
h a d  d e c l a r e d :
The m o s t  u r g e n t  t a s k  o f  com m unis t  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  c o l o n i e s  
and s e m i - c o l o n i e s  i s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a n  a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t  
f r o n t .  F o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e ,  a b s o r b  a s  much a s  p o s s i b l e  o f  
t h e  m a s s e s  i n t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  movem ent .  They 
s h o u l d  b e  m o b i l i s e d  n o t  j u s t  o n l y  a g a i n s t  i m p e r i a l i s t  
e x p l o i t a t i o n  and o p p r e s s i o n  b u t  i n  a c t u a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
. i n  n a t i o n a l i s t  an d  r e f o r m i s t - l e d  m o v e m e n t s . ^
Th us ,  t h e  a n t i - B r i t i s h  i m p e r i a l i s t  s t r u g g l e  was p e r m i s s i b l e  w i t h i n  a
b r o a d  u n i t e d  f r o n t  and c o u l d  be  c o n d u c t e d  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  w i t h  t h e
56 Nan Tao Chih  C h ' u n , 1 3 - 1 4 .  See a l s o  McLane, 242 .
57 I b i d . ,  15.
58 I b i d .
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a n t i - J a p a n e s e  F a s c i s t  s t r u g g l e .  But  t h e  MCP was aware t h a t  t h e  a n t i -  
J a p a n e s e  F a s c i s t  s t r u g g l e  had  a g r e a t e r  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  C h inese  i n  Malaya 
t h a n  to  t h e  o t h e r  r a c e s ,  and t h e r e f o r e  i t  hoped  t h a t  i t  c o u ld  e s t a b l i s h  
the  w i d e s t  ’u n i t e d  f r o n t '  p o s s i b l e  t o  i n c l u d e  th e  o t h e r  r a c e s  on the  
b a s i s  o f  ’ f i g h t i n g  f o r  d e m o c r a t i c  r i g h t s ' .
With the  ' U n i t e d  F r o n t '  programme t h e  MCP a p p e a r s  n o t  t o  have
a l t e r e d  i t s  a n t i - B r i t i s h  p o s i t i o n  by the t im e  the  S o v i e t - N a z i  P a c t  was
s i g n e d  in  August  1939. The p a c t  a l l o w e d  them, w i t h  f u l l  a p p r o v a l  o f
t h e  C o m in te rn ,  t o  c o n t i n u e  w i t h  t h e i r  a n t i - B r i t i s h  p o l i c i e s .  F o l lo w in g
th e  p a c t  and the  o u t b r e a k  o f  t h e  war  i n  E u rope ,  c om m un is t - l e d  work
s t o p p a g e s  a t  the B r i t i s h  n a v a l  b a s e  and i n  o t h e r  a r e a s  e s c a l a t e d .  Th is
e s c a l a t i o n  was p a r t  o f  an a n t i - w a r  movement ' t o  smash the  g e n e r a l  o f f e n s i v e
59lau n c h e d  by B r i t i s h  i m p e r i a l i s m ' .  S i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,  t h e  AEBUS a c t i v i t i e s  
were s t e p p e d  up i n  o r d e r  t o  draw t h e  B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n t o  an 
a p p e a r a n c e  o f  h o s t i l i t y  to  t h e  N a t i o n a l  (Chungking)  Government  o f  China .
S p u r re d  by th e  s u c c e s s e s  o f  the s t r i k e  movement and t h e  AEBUS
a c t i v i t i e s ,  be tw een  November 1939 and J a n u a r y  1940, t h e  MCP' s CEC a t
i t s  S i x t h  E n l a r g e d  Plenum a d o p te d  a s h o r t e r  t e n - p o i n t  ' A l l - R a c e s
D e m o c ra t i c  U n i t e d  F r o n t '  programme which was a lm o s t  i d e n t i c a l  to  i t s
A p r i l  1939 t e n - p o i n t  programme e x c e p t  t h a t  i t  was s ho rn  o f  a l l  t h e
6 0s u b - s e c t i o n s  which  were now c o n s i d e r e d  ' o u t  o f  d a t e ' .  The MCP, i n  
f a c t ,  had d e c id e d  t o  r e t u r n  i t s  s t r u g g l e  t o  a p a n - r a c i a l  b a s i s .  In  
t h e  hope t h a t  Malays and I n d i a n s  would s u p p o r t  i t ,  t h e  p a r t y  r e i t e r a t e d  
i t s  demands f o r  d e m o c r a t i c  r i g h t s .  The p a r t y  e l a b o r a t e d  on i t s  
p o l i c i e s .  Under the  'A l l - R a c e s  U n i t e d  F r o n t '  (now c a l l e d  t h e  ' A n t i -  
I m p e r i a l i s t  R a c i a l  U n i t e d  F r o n t ' ) ,  C h inese  i n  Malaya were t o l d  t h a t  they  
s h o u ld  s t i l l  c o n s i d e r  t h e i r  main t a s k  was ' t o  a s s i s t  the  M o th e r l a n d '
( i . e .  C h i n a ) ;  Malays s h o u l d  ' c a r r y  on t h e  R a c i a l  Independence  Movement ' ;  
and I n d i a n s  s h o u l d  s t r u g g l e  f o r  t h e  in d ep e n d e n c e  o f  I n d i a  f rom B r i t i s h  
i m p e r i a l i s m .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  e ach  o f  t h e s e  r a c e s  s h o u l d  a l s o  c o n s i d e r  
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  t h e  a n t i - B r i t i s h  i m p e r i a l i s t  and a n t i - J a p a n e s e  s t r u g g l e s  
in  Malaya ,  so t h a t  t h e y  c o u ld  c o o r d i n a t e  t h e i r  s t r u g g l e s  w i t h i n  t h e
59 I b i d . ,  10; McLane, 242
60 Nan Tao Ghih C h 'u n , 18.
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main s t r u g g l e  f o r  ' n a t i o n a l  i n d e p e n d e n c e '  a g a i n s t  t h e  B r i t i s h  
i m p e r i a l i s  t s . ^
The F e b r u a r y  1940 ' U n i t e d  F r o n t '  programme o f  t h e  S i x t h  E n l a r g e d
Plenum was a l s o  s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  i t s  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  MCP's p h a s e  o f
6 2s t r u g g l e  a s  t h e  ' b o u r g e o i s - d e m o c r a t i c  r e v o l u t i o n ' .  The f e a t u r e s  o f
t h i s  s t r u g g l e  w e re  a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m  an d  a g i t a t i o n  f o r  d e m o c r a t i c  r i g h t s
u n d e r  a b r o a d  a l l i a n c e  o f  w o r k e r s ,  p e a s a n t s ,  ' p r o g r e s s i v e  i n t e l l e c t u a l s ' ,
6 3
and t h e  ' n a t i o n a l  b o u r g e o i s i e '  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  ' n a t i o n a l  c a p i t a l i s t s ' ,  
t h e  w h o le  c o a l i t i o n  com ing  u n d e r  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  p r o l e t a r i a t  and  
t h e  Communis t  P a r t y .  The MCP's t e n - p o i n t  ' d e m o c r a t i c '  programme was 
a im ed  a t  c r e a t i n g  b e t t e r  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  MCP i n  w h ic h  to  o p e r a t e .
The programme i m p l i e d  t h a t  t h e  MCP d e s i r e d  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t  f o r  M alay a  
(by I t s  demands  f o r  v o t i n g  r i g h t s  an d  e l e c t e d  l e g i s l a t u r e s ) .  The a i m  o f  
a 'W o r k e r s  an d  P e a s a n t s  S o v i e t  R e p u b l i c '  a d o p t e d  i n  i t s  1932 programme 
had b e e n  d o w n g ra d ed ,  so  h a d  o t h e r  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  a s p e c t s  o f  t h a t  programme -  
t h e  r e m o v a l  o f  t h e  Malay r a j a s  and S u l t a n s ,  n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  
b a n k i n g  e n t e r p r i s e s  and t h e  c o n f i s c a t i o n  and r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  
l a n d s  o f  r a j a s  and c a p i t a l i s t s  t o  t h e  f a r m e r s  and w o r k e r s .  A p p a r e n t l y  
t h e  MCP c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  t h e  1932 demands  w e re  t o o  a d v a n c e d ,  o r  
p e r h a p s  t h e s e  demands  had  l o s t  t h e i r  e x p o n e n t s  i n  t h e  p a r t y ' s  f a c t i o n a l
61 I b i d .
62 I b i d . ,  2 1 ,  i s  t h e  o n l y  known s o u r c e  f o r  t h i s .
63 The CCP's  s t r a t e g y  was t o  c o n s i d e r  ' n a t i o n a l  c a p i t a l i s t s '  i n  a 
c o l o n i a l  s o c i e t y  as  an  ' o p p r e s s e d  g r o u p '  b e c a u s e  i t  was t h o u g h t  t h e y  
s u f f e r e d  f rom d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  p o l i c i e s  p r a c t i s e d  by t h e  c o l o n i a l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  who f a v o u r e d  t h e  c a p i t a l i s t s  o f  t h e i r  own n a t i o n a l i t y .  
Mao T s e - t u n g ' s  'New D e m o c r a c y ' ,  d r a f t e d  i n  1939,  and  a d o p t e d  as
CCP p o l i c y ,  s p e l t  o u t  t h e  g u i d e l i n e s  o f  t h e  ' b o u r g e o i s - d e m o c r a t i c  
r e v o l u t i o n '  w i t h i n  t h e  'Now D em o c rac y '  p h a s e  o f  s t r u g g l e .  Mao makes  
room f o r  t h e  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  and t h e  m i d d l e  c l a s s  i n  c o l o n i a l  s o c i e t y  
o r  s e m i - c o l o n i a l  s o c i e t y  l i k e  C h in a  b e c a u s e  t h e y  ' s u f f e r  and a r e  
o p p r e s s e d  by t h e  c o l o n i a l  s y s t e m '  an d  p o s s e s s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  
m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  p o o r ,  t h e  w o r k e r s ,  and t h e  p e a s a n t s ,  t h a t  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
d y n a m i c ,  ' a t  c e r t a i n  p e r i o d s  an d  t o  a c e r t a i n  d e g r e e '  and c o u l d  
t h e r e f o r e  a c t  a s  a l l i e s  o f  t h e  w o r k i n g  c l a s s  and t h e  p e t i t  b o u r g e o i s i e .  
See S e l e c t e d  Works o f  Ma o T s e - t u n g , P e k i n g ,  1954 ,  I I I ,  7 2 - 1 0 1 .
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disputes of 1932 and 1935-36. In any case, the MCP believed that the 
prerequisite ’national unity' had to be established beforehand. It 
was hoped that the 'All Races United Front' against imperialism and 
Fascism would bring this about.
Although 'national independence' was now mentioned for the 
first time, it is apparent that the MCP had worked out a potentially 
hopeless formula, extremely confusing and ambiguous, involving a diversity 
of goals and a diffusion of energies. The MCP could not possibly 
link and coordinate these different strategies together successfully.
As far as priorities were concerned, it was not clear whether the anti- 
Japanese struggle was to supersede the anti-British imperialist struggle 
or not, as both seemed to be running along parallel lines. The reason 
for this was that communists and workers involved in anti-Japanese 
strikes and demonstrations clashed with British police, and this in 
turn escalated anti-British agitation.
Paying special attention to the Chinese, the MCP reiterated 
that it saw the Chinese in Malaya as consisting of two groups - the 'Overseas 
Chinese' (Hua ch'iao) and the 'Malayan Chinese' (Ma Hua).^  As all classes 
of 'Overseas Chinese' in Malaya had become increasingly involved in the 
anti-Japanese struggle and in the China National Salvation Movement, the 
party decided to give its ful] support to their struggles. On the other 
hand, the 'Malayan Chinese' had not yet developed their anti-imperialist 
struggle against the British to a point where they and the other races 
could coordinate all their struggles to achieve the 'high tide' of 
National liberation in Malaya. Until each of these races stepped up 
their anti-imperialist struggle, the fight for national independence 
could not become the principal struggle. Meanwhile, the party considered 
it necessary to involve the 'Malayan Chinese bourgeoisie' in the anti- 
Japanese movement of the 'Overseas Chinese'. In order for the party 
to achieve such support, 'Malayan Chinese workers' were required to 
cease their strikes against the 'Malayan Chinese bourgeoisie'. Strikes 
were to be carried out only against 'traitor capitalists' (i.e., those 
who traded with the Japanese) and against British capitalists.^0
64 Nan lao Chih Ch'un, 18, is the only source for this.
65 Ibid.
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Some t im e  i n  Sep tem ber  1940, t h e  MCP i s  s a i d  t o  have r e c e i v e d
i n s t r u c t i o n s  from t h e  CCP t o  c a l l  o f f  a l l  s t r i k e s  and o t h e r  a n t i - B r i t i s h
a g i t a t i o n .  The r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  was r e p o r t e d l y  a new ag re e m e n t  c o nc lude d
be tw een  t h e  CCP and t h e  Kuomintang Government (Chungking)  in  J u l y  1940,
6 6
which  was r a t i f i e d  a t  Yenan a b o u t  t h e  m idd le  o f  Augus t .  A p p a r e n t l y
the  CCP u n d e r t o o k  t o  su s p en d  i t s  a n t i - B r i t i s h  and a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t
p o l i c y ,  a d e c i s i o n  which was communicated t o  t h e  MCP. Al though
the  MCP a g r e e d  n o t  t o  o f f e r  any o p p o s i t i o n  t o  any campaign i n i t i a t e d
by the  C h in e se  community i n  Malaya t o  a i d  B r i t a i n ' s  war  e f f o r t ,  such  as
the  p u r c h a s e  o f  I m p e r i a l  War Bonds, n o r  t o  c o n t i n u e  a n t i - B r i t i s h  s t r i k e
a g i t a t i o n ,  t h i s  u n d e r t a k i n g  a p p l i e d  on ly  t o  S in g a p o re  where t h e  MCP' s
6 8c o n t r o l  was f i r m  and no t  on the  Malayan m a in la n d .
Long b e f o r e  B r i t a i n  became C h i n a ' s  a l l y  i n  t h e  war  i n  December 
1941 the communists were c o n d u c t i n g  a n t i - J a p a n e s e  a g i t a t i o n  i n  Malaya 
n o t  o n ly  a g a i n s t  the l o c a l  J a p a n e s e ,  b u t  a l s o  a g a i n s t  t h e  Chinese  
s h o p k e e p e r s  and f i r m s  h a v in g  d e a l i n g s  w i t h  J a p a n e s e .  C on s e q u e n t ly  they  
came i n t o  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  whose p o l i c y  was to  
e n s u r e  t h a t  B r i t i s h  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  Japan  were n o t  compromised.
66 See S.W. J o n e s ,  O f f i c e r  A d m i n i s t e r i n g  the Government ( A c t i n g  
G o v e r n o r ) , S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s ,  t o  the  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  
C o l o n i e s ,  2 7 November 1940, i n  CO 2 7 3 / 6 6 6 / 5 0 3 3 6 . The r e a s o n  g iv en  
f o r  t h i s  l a t e s t  change o f  p o l i c y  of  t h e  CCP was the  o p i n i o n  t h a t  
B r i t a i n  and t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  were now i r r e v o c a b l y  on t h e  s i d e  of  
China  i n  h e r  s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  J a p a n .  McLane, 243,  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
t h e  Chungking Government  was h o p in g  t h a t  the e n d in g  o f  a n t i - B r i t i s h  
a g i t a t i o n  might  ga in  B r i t i s h  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  the  ope n in g  o f  t h e  
Burma Road f o r  m i l i t a r y  and economic  a i d  to  r e a c h  Chungking.
67 I b i d . S tephen  Leong,  however ,  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  MCP i n d e p e n d e n t l y  
r e a c h e d  i t s  d e c i s i o n  to r e d u c e  o r  s t o p  a n t i - B r i t i s h  a g i t a t i o n ,  
and n o t  as  a r e s u l t  o f  CCP d i r e c t i v e s  as c l a im e d  by B r i t i s h  
i n t e l l i g e n c e .  His whole a rgum en t  r e s t s  on a t h e o r y  t h a t  the  MCP 
had l i t t l e  o r  no c o n n e c t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  CCP. However , t h e r e  i s  no 
e v id e n c e  from MCP documents  to  s u p p o r t  t h i s  t h e o r y .  Cf.
S tephen  Leong,  'S o u r c e s ,  A genc ies  and M a n i f e s t a t i o n s  o f  O verseas  
N a t i o n a l i s m  i n  M a l a y a ' ,  549 -73 .
68 A cco rd ing  to  O ' B a l l a n c e ,  32 ,  ' L a i  Tek, d id  n o t  c o m p l e t e l y
a c c e p t  t h e s e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  [which O ' B a l l a n c e  c la im s  came from th e  
Hong Kong b ra n c h  o f  t h e  CCP] o r  obey them too l i t e r a l l y ;  b u t  he 
d i d  o r d e r  some r e l a x a t i o n . . . ' .
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British action made it difficult for the MCP to reduce or call off its
anti-British agitation. Following the break-up of its united front with
the Malayan KMT in 1938, the MCP also resumed its activities against
KMT elements which, according to one source, ’occasionally reached the
69extreme of assassination.’ These activities against the Japanese, 
British, Chinese shopkeepers and Chinese Nationalists continued to be 
repressed by the police, who were able to arrest many communist leaders 
and to deport them to Chiang Kai-shek's China, where most of them were 
executed.
As far as the MCP's 'Anti-Imperialist Racial United Front’ was
concerned, the policy was a complete failure. Between March and May
1941 a series of strikes by some 5,000 Indian estate workers occurred
in the Klang area of Selangor.^ But surprisingly there was no evidence
that they had come under the influence of the MCP. The Central Indian
Association of Malaya (CIAM) was responsible for the strikes because
of its concern for the welfare of the Indian labourers. The strikes
led to some improvements in wages and working conditions. In fact,
the British authorities were as astounded as the MCP that communists
72were not behind the strikes. In addition, the CIAM had its own 
programme and did not offer any support for the MCP's ten-point programme 
at all. However, three Indian labour leaders were arrested and banished 
to India for their part in the strikes. Thus, by concentrating its 
political activities among the Chinese, and neglecting not only Malay 
but Indian labour as well, the MCP lost its chance to organise a pan- 
racial united front.
69 O'Ballance, ibid.
70 See R. Bagot, Inspector-General of Police, FMS, 'Report on Strikes 
in Selangor', Kuala Lumpur, 13 June 1941, Pt.l, in CO 717/145/
51574/1, Pt.l.
71 Ibid. The Inspector-General of Police describes the political views 
of the CIAM as 'essentially those of the Indian Congress Party’ and 
controlled by 'a group of Malayalees [Indians originally from Kerala], 
of whom Raghavan of Penang, Neelakandha Aiyer of Kuala Lumpur and 
M.R. Menon of Singapore are the most prominent and who maintain 
touch with Congress leaders in India whose advice is occasionally 
sought.'
72 Ibid.
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The MCP’ s CEC a d o p te d  a more m odera te  l i n e  a t  i t s  Seven th  
E n l a r g e d  Plenum h e l d  i n  S in g a p o re  i n  J u l y  1941, a month a f t e r  Germany 
had a t t a c k e d  the  S o v i e t  Union. B r i t a i n  was now a i d i n g  b o th  the  S o v i e t  
Union and China .  I t  was t hen  t h a t  t h e  MCP began  to  make o v e r t u r e s  to  
t h e  B r i t i s h  f o r  m u tu a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  a g a i n s t  the  r i s i n g  t h r e a t  o f  J a p an .  
The MCP's o f f e r  was c o n d i t i o n a l  on the  B r i t i s h  a c c e p t i n g  i t s  minimum 
demand -  t h a t  they  s h o u ld  g r a n t  ’ d e m o c r a t i c  r i g h t s ’ to  the  p e o p l e .
In  r e t u r n ,  t h e  p a r t y  would s u s p e n d  i t s  s l o g a n  o f  ’ a n t i  B r i t i s h
73i m p e r i a l i s m ’ and r a l l y  i t s  f o r c e s  b e h in d  t h e  de fe nc e  o f  Malaya.
S e c r e t l y ,  however ,  t h e  p a r t y  a d v o c a t e d  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  s l o g a n  
of  ’E s t a b l i s h  the Malayan D e m o c ra t i c  R e p u b l i c ’ , which r e f l e c t e d  the
74c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  p a r t y ’ s ’b o u r g e o i s  d e m o c r a t i c  r e v o l u t i o n ’ . The 
d e c i s i o n  was to  e n a b l e  t h e  MCP t o  m a i n t a i n  f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  a c t i o n  i n  
ca se  t h e  B r i t i s h  a c c e p t e d  i t s  o f f e r .  Th is  r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  was s p e l t  
o u t  c a r e f u l l y  as f o l l o w s :
The p a r t y  i s  n o t  unde r  t h e  i l l u s i o n  t h a t  the  B r i t i s h  
Government  would r e a l i s e  t h a t  the  most  u r g e n t  demand 
o f  t h e  p e o p le  i s  f o r  n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
i t  i s  a s k i n g  them to  a c c e p t  t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  p a r t y  
and the  pe o p le  f o r  d e m o c r a t i c  r i g h t s  i n  an a t t e m p t  to 
come h a l f  way and b r i d g e  th e  demand f o r  n a t i o n a l  
l i b e r a t i o n . . . .
i n  the  a n t i - F a s c i s t  s t r u g g l e ,  the p a r t y  must m a i n t a i n  
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  and p o l i t i c a l  i n d e p e n d e n c e  and be f r e e  
to  c r i t i c i s e  the B r i t i s h  Government .  The u r g e n t  t a s k s  
o f  t h e  P a r t y  a r e  t h e r e f o r e :
(1) E s t a b l i s h  an n n t l . - F n s c . i s t  f r o n t  o f  a l l  r a c e s ;
(2) Expand the  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  the  P a r t y ,  mass
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and the  w ork ing  c l a s s  movement; and ^
(3) M o b i l i s e  e v e ry  p rop ag a n d a  m ach inery  i n  r e a d i n e s s . . . .
The d e c i s i o n  meant t h a t  t h e  MCP was ready  t o  t ake  a d v a n ta g e  o f  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  L o  e x p e l  L h o  B r i t i s h  from Malaya as soon as p r a c t i c a b l e .
I f  Japan  s h o u l d  invade Malaya th e  communists  would c o n t i n u e  t o  s u p p o r t  
an a n t i - J a p a n e s e  f r o n t ,  b u t  o n ly  as  a means of  e x t e n d i n g  communist  
i n f l u e n c e .  T h i s  s e c r e t  d e c i s i o n  was r e p o r t e d  t o  have  been  known on ly
73 Nan Tao Chili Ch’ u n , 22.
74 I b i d .
75 I b i d .
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to  p a r t y  l e a d e r s . ^  Whether t h e  B r i t i s h  knew o f  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  a t  t h a t  
t im e  i s  n o t  known, b u t  t h e  MCP’s o f f e r  o f  c o o p e r a t i o n  was r e p e a t e d l y  
r e j e c t e d .
The Format ion  o f  t h e  MPAJA
F o l lo w in g  the  J a p a n e s e  a t t a c k  on Malaya on 8 December 1941,
t h e  MCP a g a i n  v o l u n t e e r e d  i t s  s e r v i c e s  f o r  l o c a l  d e fe n c e  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h
a u t h o r i t i e s .  Ch’en C h i a -k e n g ,  t h e n  i n  c h a rg e  o f  t h e  p a r t y ’s a n t i -
J a p a n e s e  movement,  was r e p o r t e d  t o  have  recommended immedia te  armed
r e s i s t a n c e  t o  the  J a p a n e s e  i n v a d e r  and e x h o r t e d  h i s  fe l low-members  to
renew t h e i r  p l e d g e s  of  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  the  B r i t i s h . ^  Communists j o i n e d
w i t h  o t h e r  C h inese  groups  p u b l i c l y  to  c a l l  on t h e  government  t o  r a i s e
a C h inese  m i l i t i a  t o  a s s i s t  i n  the  d e fe n c e  o f  S i n g a p o r e .  As B r i t i s h
m i l i t a r y  r e v e r s e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  the  s i n k i n g  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  w a r s h i p s
P r i n c e  o f  Wales and R e p u l s e ,  were r e p o r t e d  W h i t e h a l l  and t h e  War O f f i c e
78i n  London gave t h e i r  a p p r o v a l  t o  t h e  MCP o f f e r .  On 15 December some
l e f t i s t  p o l i t i c a l  p r i s o n e r s  were r e l e a s e d  from d e t e n t i o n .  The f o l l o w i n g
day the  C h inese  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  P o l i c e  S p e c i a l  B ranch ,  S i n g a p o r e ,  p u t
o u t  ' f e e l e r s ’ f o r  the  f o r m a t i o n  o f  a u n i t e d  o r g a n i s a t i o n  to  m o b i l i s e
C h inese  a c t i v i t i e s  to  d e a l  w i t h  the  e f f e c t s  o f  bombing and t o  p r o f i t
79from the l e s s o n  o f  Penang ,  where c a s u a l t i e s  had been  h i g h .
On 18 December,  when the  MCP had s t i l l  n o t  h e a r d  from the  
B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  t h e  C e n t r a l  E x e c u t i v e  Commit tee h e l d  a m e e t in g  
i n  S in g a p o re  and d e c id e d  t o  ' go  ahead  and r e l y  on the  p e o p l e ’s e f f o r t s
76 McLane, 243.
77 H anrahan ,  61.
78 Yap Hong Kuan, ' P e r a k  u n d e r  t h e  J a p a n e s e ’ , B.A. Hons t h e s i s ,
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Malaya ,  1957, 26. Yap’ s t h e s i s  i s  b a s e d  on c o n f i d e n t i a l  
and, s e c r e t  f i l e s  o f  t h e  Malayan P o l i c e ,  S p e c i a l  Branch, which he
was a l l o w e d  to  c o n s u l t  a s  a fo rm er  member o f  t h e  P o l i c e  F o r c e .
Because  most  o f  the  i n f o r m a t i o n  he used  was s t i l l  c l a s s i f i e d  t h e  
S p e c i a l  Branch r e q u e s t e d  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  t o  p l a c e  an embargo on t h e  
t h e s i s .  The ban was l i f t e d  on ly  r e c e n t l y .
79 I b i d .
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80alone' in mobilising a local defence force. That very day the British
contacted the MCP and accepted its offer. A secret meeting was held
in Singapore between British officers and two MCP representatives, one
of whom was Lai Tek, the party's secretary-general. It was agreed
that the MCP would raise, and the British train, resistance groups to
be left behind enemy lines in the event of the whole of Malaya being
overrun by the Japanese. The MCP agreed that the trained MCP recruits
81would be used as the British Military Command saw fit. The recruits
were to undergo training in sabotage and guerrilla warfare at 101 Special
Training School in Singapore, run by the Malayan wing of the London-
based Special Operations Executive (SOE).
On 19 December the MCP inaugurated its own 'Malayan Overseas Chinese
Anti-Japanese Mobilisation Society' which became a broad front comprising
groups like the KMT, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and other Chinese
organisations as well as the MCP to raise Chinese volunteers for an
82independent force, later known as Dalforce. A week later a meeting
of this Society was held at the Singapore Special Branch headquarters.
The participants agreed to set aside their party and clique differences
and picked Tan Kah Kee, a prominent Chinese leader, to be leader of the
83newly formed 'Mobilisation Council'.
80 Lai T*e (Lai Tek) , Wei-min-tsu t'uan-chieh min-chu tzu-yu min-sheng 
kal shan erh t'ou-cheng (Struggle for National Unity, Democracy 
and Liberty, and Improvement of People's Livelihood), A Report to 
the Eighth Central Committee conference, 22-27 January 1946, 
Singapore, 1946, 4 (mimeographed). This report devotes a section 
to the MCP's activities during the Japanese occupation.
81 Details of this agreement are given in F. Spencer Chapman, The 
Jungle is Neutral, London, 1949, 16-17. 'This conference', recalled 
.Chapman, 'took place in a small upstairs room in a back street
of Singapore, and, to complete the air of conspiracy, both Chinese 
wore dark glasses'.
82 Yap Hong Kuan, 26. The non-local frame of reference as suggested 
by the expression 'Overseas Chinese' in the title of the MCP body 
should be noted. It was certainly a concession to the 'Overseas 
Chinese' group as distinct from the 'Malayan Chinese' group of 
which the MCP was in favour.
83 Ibid. For the formation of Dalforce, see Chapter II, above.
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On 21 December the training of MCP recruits at 101 STS began. 
Individual courses lasted ten days and a total of seven classes, 
consisting of 165 enthusiastic party members selected by the MCP, was 
rushed through the training programme. These graduates became the 
nucleus of the MPAJA.
The original British plan was that each MCP ’stay-behind' 
party would be led by a British officer to ensure that British instructions 
and policy were carried out. However, due to the rapid advance of the 
Japanese,this was not possible and the first class of MCP graduates of 
101 STS was hurriedly sent out to Selangor in early January to work on 
its own. The second class went to Negri Sembilan and the third to north 
Johor. The fourth and final class infiltrated through Japanese lines 
into south Johor on 30 January 1942. Each group eventually established 
liaison with the State Committee of the MCP in the area where it operated. 
From March onwards the groups were recognised by the MCP's CEC as the 
First, Second, Third and Fourth Independent Regiments of the MPAJA 
respectively.^ *
In Singapore, the communists formed the largest group of
volunteers in Dalforce, though a number of Kuomintang members and
independents were in it too. It was the tenacity with which the
Dalforce Volunteers fought the Japanese troops in the defence of
Singapore which caused the Japanese to carry out a purge of the island's
Chinese population immediately they captured Singapore on 15 February 1942.
In the search for communists and other anti-Japanese elements, the
Japanese captured several MCP officials, including Lai Tek, and forced
85them to become spies and informers. The rest were put to death.
84 Mai Shang-ou, Ma-lai-ya jen-min k'ang-jih chun (The Malayan People's 
Anti-Japanese Army), Singapore, December 1945, 34-39, 40-41,
58. This is an independent account by a newspaperman, based on 
interviews with several MPAJA leaders including the chairman of 
the Central Military Committee, Liu Yau.
85 Lai Tek's role as a Kempeitai agent is discussed, in d d . 54-70. 
below.
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The MPAJA O r g a n i s a t i o n
S i n c e  much h a s  b e e n  w r i t t e n  a l r e a d y  a b o u t  t h e  MPAJA's h i s t o r y
O r
an d  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  5 o n l y  a b r i e f  o u t l i n e  o f  i t s  d e v e l o p m e n t  n e e d s  t o
be  g i v e n  h e r e .  D u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r  and a  h a l f  o f  i t s  e x i s t e n c e  t h e
MPAJA f a r e d  b a d l y ,  l a c k i n g  f o o d ,  c a p a b l e  l e a d e r s h i p ,  and s u f f i c i e n t
t r a i n i n g  an d  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  g u e r r i l l a  w a r f a r e .  J a p a n e s e  t e r r o r i s m
p r e v e n t e d  p e o p l e  o f  a l l  r a c e s  f rom h e l p i n g  t h e  g u e r r i l l a s .  O n e - t h i r d  o f
t h e  g u e r r i l l a  f o r c e  was s a i d  t o  h a v e  d i e d  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d .  The s e c o n d
p e r i o d ,  f rom m id -1 9 4 3  t o  m i d - 1 9 4 4 ,  saw t h e  MPAJA im p r o v e  i t s  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,
fo o d  s u p p l i e s ,  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  s y s t e m  and m i l i t a r y  t r a i n i n g ;  c o n s e q u e n t l y
i t  was s a i d  t o  h a v e  i n c r e a s e d  f o u r  t i m e s  i n  s i z e .  The t h i r d  p e r i o d ,
f rom m i d - 1944 u n t i l  t h e  en d  o f  t h e  w a r ,  was one o f  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  an d
grow th  an d  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  c l o s e  MPA JA -A l l i ed  c o o p e r a t i o n .  The
MPAJA h e n c e f o r t h  r e c e i v e d  s u p p l i e s  o f  a r m s ,  m e d i c i n e s  and money f rom
th e  h e a d q u a r t e r s  o f  S o u th  E a s t  A s i a  Command (SEAC) u n d e r  A d m i r a l
8 7M o u n t b a t t e n  b a s e d  i n  Colombo.
Up t o  November 1942 th e  MPAJA c o m p r i s e d  o n l y  t h e  f i r s t  f o u r  
I n d e p e n d e n t  R e g i m e n t s  made up o f  10] STS g r a d u a t e s  an d  o t h e r  r e c r u i t s .
T h ese  w e re  l o c a t e d  i n  S e l a n g o r ,  N e g r i  S e m b i l a n  and n o r t h  and s o u t h  J o h o r .  
L a t e r  t h e  MPAJA e s t a b l i s h e d  f o u r  more r e g i m e n t s  due t o  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  
t h e  number  o f  r e c r u i t s  an d  t o  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  o t h e r  
p a r t s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y .  The a d d i t i o n a l  r e g i m e n t s  and t h e  d a t e s  when t h e y  
were  fo rmed  a r e  a s  f o l l o w s :  5 t h  I n d e p e n d e n t  R eg im en t  ( P e r a k )  was e s t a b l i s h e d
on 1 December  1942;  6 t h  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e g i m e n t  (West  P a h a n g ) ,  13 A u g u s t  
1943;  7 th  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e g i m e n t  ( E a s t  P a h a n g ,  w h i c h  a l s o  c o v e r e d
T r c n g g a n u  and K eIan  t a n ) ,  1 S e p t e m b e r  1944 , and t h e  8 t h  I n d e p e n d e n t
8 8R eg im en t  (Kedah)  i n  e a r l y  A u g u s t  1945.  The 5 t h  I n d e p e n d e n t  R e g im e n t
86 A f a i r l y  d e t a i l e d  b a c k g r o u n d  o f  t h e  MPAJA i s  found  i n  H a n r a h a n ;
E d g a r  O ' B a l l a n c e ,  The Communis t  I n s u r g e n t  War,  1 9 4 8 - 6 0 , Lo ndon ,
1966; and R i c h a r d  C l u t t e  r b t i c k , Th e  Long Long War,  London ,  1967.
87 The MPAJA E x - S e r v i c e m e n ' s  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  Ma- l a i - y a .  J e n  min k ' a n g - j l h  
chun c h a n - c h i  (The w a r  d i a r y  o f  t h e  MPAJA), i n  L i  T i e h  Min,  e t . a l . ,  
T a - c h a n  vu Nan C h ' i a o  ( M a - l a i - y a  c h l h  p u ) ( T h e  World  War and t h e  
O v e r s e a s  C h i n e s e  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  (The M alaya  s e c t i o n ) ) ,  S i n g a p o r e ,  
1947,  2 8 - 2 9 ;  s e e  a l s o  Mai S hang  Ou, 14.
88 The War D i a r y  o f  t h e  MPAJA, 28.
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was formed from a ' t r a i t o r  k i l l i n g '  u n i t  s e t  up i n  mid-1942.  The
6 t h  Regiment  was o r i g i n a l l y  a t r a i n i n g  and p r opaga nda  u n i t  which
s p o n s o r e d  th e  P e o p l e ' s  Academy s a i d  t o  have  been  s e t  up by La i  Tek.
The commander o f  t h e  P e o p l e ' s  Academy, C h 'e n  Kuang, was r e p u t e d  t o  have
been  a g r a d u a t e  o f  Mao's 8 th  Route  Army g u e r r i l l a  s c h o o l  (K' a n g - t a )
i n  Yenan. lie was r e p o r t e d  to  have p a t t e r n e d  h i s  t r a i n i n g  on t h a t
u t i l i s e d  by communist a rm ie s  i n  Ch ina .  Some o f  the  t e x t s  used  were
s a i d  t o  have been  b r o u g h t  down from China by fo rm er  members o f  the
89Communist 8 th  Route  and New 4 th  Armies .
A f t e r  i t  was formed i n  June  o r  J u l y  1942 t h e  C e n t r a l  M i l i t a r y
Commit tee of  t h e  MCP a c t e d  as  supreme command of  t h e  MPAJA. L iu  Yau
90was cha i rm an  o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  M i l i t a r y  Commit tee .  I n i t i a l l y  each
S t a t e  had a M i l i t a r y  A f f a i r s  Committee  whose members were e l e c t e d  from
v a r i o u s  S t a t e  a r e a  u n i t s  o f  t h e  MPAJA. In  a d d i t i o n ,  each  MPAJA r e g i m e n t
had  a ' P o l i t i c a l  C om m issa r ' .  At t h e  end o f  1942 the  ' P o l i t i c a l  Commissar '
sy s te m  was a b o l i s h e d  and r e p l a c e d  by a t h r e e - m a n  C e n t r a l  M i l i t a r y
Commit tee whose o t h e r  members b e s i d e s  L iu  Yau were Lai  Tek and Chin 
9 1Peng. The a b o l i t i o n  o f  t h e  ' P o l i t i c a l  Commissar '  sy s tem  i s  b e l i e v e d  
t o  have  been  c aused  by the  l o s s  o f  most  o f  t h e  ' P o l i t i c a l  Commissars '  
i n ' a  J a p a n e s e  ambush o f  a C e n t r a l  E x e c u t i v e  Commit tee m e e t in g  a t  the  
Ba tu  Caves i n  S e l a n g o r  on 1 Sep tem ber  1942. H e n c e f o r t h  the  t h r e e -m a n  
C e n t r a l  M i l i t a r y  Committee  d i r e c t e d  t h e  MPAJA n o t  on ly  f o r  the  r e s t  
of  t h e  J a p a n e s e  O c c u p a t io n  b u t  u n t i l  t h e  MPAJA was d e m o b i l i s e d  by t h e
89 Chapman i s  the  key s o u r c e  o f  the i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  8 t h  Route  Army
on the  6 th  In d e p e n d e n t  Regiment  i n  Pahang .  He c i t e s  a number o f  
i n s t a n c e s  where the  t r a d i t i o n  o f  t h e  8 th  Route Army was s c r u p u l o u s l y  
f o l l o w e d :  such as  15 m i n u t e s '  n o - t a l k i n g  r u l e  d u r i n g  m e a l t i m e ,
s i n g i n g  as  a v e h i c l e  o f  p r o p a g a n d a ,  and g i r l  r e c r u i t s .  Chapman 
a l s o  g i v e s  d e t a i l s  o f  8 th  Route Army p e r s o n n e l  i n  the  camp, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  a bou t  a p a t r o l  l e a d e r ,  Ah Loy . Based on h i s  Yenan 
e x p e r i e n c e s ,  Ah Loy l e d  a  r e s c u e  p a r t y  which a t t e m p t e d  t o  b r e a k  down 
the  door  of  a d i s t r i c t  g a o l  where MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  were k e p t .  But  
the  a t t e m p t  was a d i s a s t e r .  The J a p a n e s e  pu t  a l l  t h e i r  g u e r r i l l a  
p r i s o n e r s  to  d e a t h .  Cf .  Chapman, 153,  163-74 .
90 Hanrahan ,  72; Yap Hong Kuan, 40 ,  47.
91 Yap Hong Kuan, i b i d .
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B r i t i s h  i n  December 1945. A l though  the  Committee  was i n  s t r a t e g i c  
command, i n d i v i d u a l  l o c a l  commanders were g iv en  f reedom to  conduc t  
o p e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e i r  a r e a s  as  t hey  saw f i t .  Due t o  f r e q u e n t  b e t r a y a l s  
by t r a i t o r s  i n  the  MPAJA and i n  t h e  MCP, l i a i s o n  be tw een  r e g i m e n t s  was 
f o r b i d d e n ;  e v e r y  communica t ion be tw een  r e g i m e n t s  had to  p a s s  t h ro u g h  
' C e n t r a l ' .  Even a p a t r o l  l e a d e r  c o u ld  n o t  v i s i t  a n o t h e r  camp i n  h i s  group 
w i t h o u t  p e r m i s s i o n  from group h e a d q u a r t e r s .  Communication was n o t  c a r r i e d  
ou t  by w i r e l e s s  t r a n s m i s s i o n  b u t  by means o f  c o u r i e r s  who had  t o  move 
i n c r e d i b l y  s lo w ly  th rough  the  j u n g l e  f rom one a r e a  t o  a n o t h e r ,  sometim es 
o v e r  long  d i s t a n c e s . 92
The t o t a l  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  MPAJA a t  the t ime  of  the  J a p a n e s e
s u r r e n d e r  was r e p o r t e d  t o  be be tw e en  3 ,000 and 4 ,000  b u t  a t  t h e  t im e  of
93d e m o b i l i s a t i o n  i t  was s a i d  t o  be be tw een  6 ,0 0 0  and 7 ,000 .  The i n c r e a s e
a t  t h e  t im e  o f  d e m o b i l i s a t i o n  was due t o  i n c l u s i o n  o f  a s i z e a b l e  f o r c e
of  MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  in  many a r e a s  who, f o r  one r e a s o n  o r  a n o t h e r ,  had
n o t  come i n t o  c o n t a c t  w i t h  Force  136 o f f i c e r s  d u r i n g  the war .  Appearance
o f  t h e s e  a d d i t i o n a l  g u e r r i l l a s  r a i s e d  B r i t i s h  s u s p i c i o n s  t h a t  they  had
been p a r t  o f  an MCP ' s e c r e t  a r m y ' .  B r i t i s h  i n t e l l i g e n c e  s u b s e q u e n t l y
c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  such  a ' s e c r e t  army'  had been  formed as t h e  r e s u l t  o f
an MCP d i r e c t i v e  i s s u e d  a f t e r  A p r i l  1945,  when t h e  MPAJA was b e i n g
e q u ip p e d  w i t h  new weapons by SEAC t o  implem ent  the  ag reem en t  r e a c h e d
94between La i  Tek and Force 136. The d i r e c t i v e  o r d e r e d  f o r m a t i o n  o f
s e c r e t  as  w e l l  as  open u n i t s  o f  t h e  MPAJA. S e c r e t  u n i t s  were to  c o n s i s t
o f  l o n g - t e s t e d  members and most  o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  MCP l e a d e r s .  They
were t o  remain  i n c o g n i t o  and t o  s t a y  i n  the  j u n g l e .  To arm i t s e l f  t h e
s e c r e t  f o r c e  was g iven  t h e  job  o f  c o l l e c t i n g  and c o n f i s c a t i n g  as  many
arms as  p o s s i b l e .  The f o r c e  was to  be used  n o t  on ly  a g a i n s t  the  J a p a n e s e
b u t  a l s o  i n  an armed s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  t h e  B r i t i s h  ' i f  a P e o p l e ' s  R e p u b l i c
95was n o t  s e t  up a f t e r  t h e  war  t o  t h e  l i k i n g  o f  t h e  MCP'. The ' o p e n '
92 I n t e r v i e w ,  John Davis  ( F o rc e  136) ,  K e n t ,  A p r i l  1976. See Chapman, 158.
93 The f i g u r e s  3 , 0 0 0 - 4 ,0 0 0  a r e  g i v e n  i n  M o u n tb a t t e n  o f  Burma, P o s t -  
S u r r e n d e r  Tasks :  S e c t i o n  E o f  the  R e p o r t  to  t h e  Combined C h i e f s
of  S t a f f , London, 1969, 301;  t h e  f i g u r e s  6 , 0 0 0 - 7 , 0 0 0  a r e  i n  V i c t o r  
P u r c e l l ,  The Chinese  i n  M a la y a , London, 1949, 262.
94 Yap Hong Kuan, 45,  5 2 - 5 3 ;  M i l l e r ,  48.
95 M i l l e r ,  i b i d .
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u n i t s ,  however ,  were formed from those  u n i t s  which had come i n t o  
c o n t a c t  w i t h  Force  136 and were armed w i t h  B r i t i s h  weapons to  a s s i s t  
i n  t h e  A l l i e d  l a n d i n g .
I t  i s  most  p r o b a b l e  t h a t  such  a ' s e c r e t  army'  e x i s t e d ,  b u t
w h e t h e r  i t  was the  i d e a  of  La i  Tek o r  L iu  Yau, cha irman o f  t h e  MCP's
C e n t r a l  M i l i t a r y  Commit tee ,  i s  n o t  known. When the te rms  o f  d e m o b i l i s a t i o n
were worked o u t  be tw een  La i  Tek and Force  136 i n  S e p te m b e r - O c to b e r  1945,
La i  Tek a g r e e d  t o  c a l l  i n  a l l  MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  who had n o t  been  i n
l i a i s o n  w i t h  Fo rce  136 d u r i n g  the  war .  The B r i t i s h ,  however ,  b e l i e v e d
t h a t  on ly  a p a r t  o f  t h i s  ' s e c r e t  army'  l a i d  down t h e i r  arms d u r in g
the  d e m o b i l i s a t i o n ,  t h e  o t h e r  h a v i n g  h i d d e n  t h e i r  weapons i n  t h e  j u n g l e .
In  f a c t ,  many s e c r e t  MPAJA t r a i n i n g  camps and caches  o f  arms were r e p o r t e d
t o  be found by B r i t i s h  t r o o p s  a f t e r w a r d s  i n  a number o f  a r e a s  o f  which
Force  136 o f f i c e r s  had no p r e v i o u s  know ledge .  Although  La i  Tek was to
deny th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h i s  ' s e c r e t  army'  d u r i n g  p o l i c e  i n t e r r o g a t i o n s  
96i n  1946,  B r i t i s h  i n t e l l i g e n c e  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  i t  e x i s t e d  and t h a t  i t  
was r e a c t i v a t e d  when t h e  MCP l a u n c h e d  i t s  armed s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  t h e  
B r i t i s h  i n  June 1948.
Each 'o p e n '  MPAJA r e g i m e n t  com pr i sed  f i v e  o r  s i x  p a t r o l s ,  
and t h e  a v e ra g e  r e g i m e n t a l  s t r e n g t h  was a b o u t  400 to  500 members. The 
h e a d q u a r t e r s  o f  t h e  5 t h  I n d e p e n d e n t  Regiment  ( P e r a k ) , t o  which C o l o n e l  
J . P .  Hannah o f  Force  136 was a t t a c h e d  i n  March 1945, was r e p o r t e d  t o  
have  c o n s i s t e d  o f  23 men d i s t r i b u t e d  as  f o l l o w s :
Commande r
Se cond-in-command
S e c r e t a r y
I t u  (L ia o  Wei-chung)
Wong Lup
Lau Mah a l i a s  All Chung a l i a s  
Chin Wei Seong 
Chin TseQ u a r t e r m a s t e r  
4 c o u r i e r s
1 bodyguard  s e c t i o n  (15 men)^^
The F i f t h  Regiment  became the  s t r o n g e s t  MPAJA r e g i m e n t  under  t h e  a b l e  
j o i n t  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  Chin Peng,  t h e  P e r a k  S t a t e  S e c r e t a r y ,  I t u  and 
Lau Mah. I t  was the  r e g i m e n t  which  e s t a b l i s h e d  th e  f i r s t  c o n t a c t s  w i t h  
the  p r i n c i p a l  Force  136 o f f i c e r s  such  as  C o lo n e l  Davis  and Major  R i c h a rd  
Broome.
96 McLane, 307.
97 Yap Hong Kuan, 4 3 -44 .
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There was no class distinction in the MPAJA. The common
form of address was comrade. Even the chairman of the Central Military
Committee was addressed as comrade, but discipline was tight. Though
the MPAJA was organised by the MCP, many members were not communists.
The link between the MCP and the MPAJA was through political education.
An MPAJA camp usually placed emphasis on military practice
and drilling, political education, cooking, propaganda, collection of
food supplies, and cultural affairs. Mandarin, the Chinese national
language, was the lingua franca of the MPAJA and was used in all
correspondence and official statements. Concessions to the Malay, Tamil
and English languages were made in some of the propaganda news-sheets
published by the MPAJA’s propaganda bureau.
Finally, some assessment of the MPAJA’s military operations
should be made. British accounts have reported that the guerrillas
carried out a limited number of military engagements with Japanese
98troops and sabotage operations against Japanese installations. The
MPAJA's own account claims its guerrillas undertook 340 individual
operations against the Japanese during the occupation, of which 230
were considered ’major’ efforts - ’major’ meaning involving an entire 
99regiment. There is no report of any operation involving two or 
more regiments. For the entire occupation period the MPAJA claimed to 
have eliminated 5,500 Japanese troops (it is not clear whether this 
includes local police and Volunteers) and about 2,500 'traitors’, while 
the MPAJA itself lost only 1,000 m e n . O n  the other hand, Japanese 
records indicate they lost 600 killed or wounded and the local police 
2,000, while inflicting 2,900 casualties on the M P A J A . T h e  Japanese
98 Chapman, 129; see also Dorothy Thatcher and Robert Cross, Pai Naa 
(The Story of Nona Baker, an Englishwoman who lived with the MPAJA 
in Pahang), London, 1959, 164.
99 The War Diary of the MPAJA, 30.
100 Ibid.
101 See Appendices B and C below.
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figures appear more reliable, although probably only approximate.
It should be noted further that the Japanese and guerrilla 
casualty figures from the time of the Japanese surrender to 31 August 
1945 (a period of two weeks) again almost equalled each other - 506 
(Japanese and local police) to 550 (guerillas). But the number of 
Japanese casualties was high, for such a short period, in contrast to 
the period from February 1944 to 14 August 1945, when only 523 Japanese 
and local police casualties were reported. Two reasons may be given 
for both the increase in guerrilla actions and in the high Japanese 
casualty figures. Until March/April 1945 the guerrillas were too 
badly armed to carry out any major operations. Later, equipped with 
new weapons supplied by SEAC, the guerrillas found the surrender an 
opportunity to settle accounts with the Japanese.
The MPAJA and the People
Good relationships between the MPAJA and the people were
regarded as extremely important by its Central Military Committee.
Initially the MPAJA attempted to live near the Chinese squatter areas
which had formed outside most towns near the jungle fringes. However,
as the initial Japanese method of retaliation against the guerrillas
was to burn down most of these villages, the MPAJA patrols were forced
to retreat further to the slopes of the Main Range. Many Chinese
farmers followed them and cleared large fields where they planted
vegetables, sweet potatoes and tapioca to feed themselves and the
guerrillas. The MPAJA areas in Perak and Pahang included the Senoi
103(aborigine) territory of Cameron Highlands and the Jalong Valley.
At first the guerrillas were careful in their relationships 
with the local population - extending whatever cooperation and assistance 
the people needed, always paying for foodstuffs and never using coercion.
102 A senior Force 136 officer regarded the Japanese casualty figures 
as fairly accurate. However, he noted that the Japanese figures 
of guerrilla casualties did not include 'many thousands of men, 
women and children living beneath the hills who were brutally 
massacred in reprisals'. In Weekly Intelligence Review, 25 
Indian Division, 12 December 1945, in MU Secret 335/46.
103 Yap Hong Kuan, 49 fn.
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But a s  t h e  w a r  wore  on an d  J a p a n e s e  r e p r i s a l s  became  more c r u e l  and
t o u g h ,  t h e  g u e r r i l l a s  became more i n d i s c r i m i n a t e .  They w o u ld  a t t a c k
n o t  o n l y  J a p a n e s e  and t h e i r  i n f o r m e r s  b u t  a l s o  any h o s t i l e  o r
u n c o o p e r a t i v e  l o c a l  p e o p l e .  Whenever  MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  knew t h a t  a
p a r t i c u l a r  v i l l a g e  o r  town was c o l l a b o r a t i n g  w i t h  t h e  J a p a n e s e  t h e y  w o u ld
r a i d  t h e  v i l l a g e ,  a s s a u l t  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  and e x a c t  t a x e s  and f o o d s t u f f s .
Many Malay v i l l a g e s  w e re  t a r g e t s  f o r  s u c h  m e a s u r e s  b e c a u s e  t h e y  w e re
104h o s t i l e  t o  t h e  MPAJA. J a p a n e s e - s p o n s o r e d  s e t t l e m e n t s ,  s u c h  a s  t h o s e  
o f  Endau and B ah au ,  w e re  a l s o  a t t a c k e d  and t h e  o f f i c i a l s  o f  t h e  
' c o l l a b o r a t i v e '  O v e r s e a s  C h i n e s e  A s s o c i a t i o n  a b d u c t e d  o r  k i l l e d .
The MPAJA's main  l i n k  w i t h  t h e  l o c a l  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  t h e  a r e a s  
wh ere  i t  o p e r a t e d  was t h e  M a lay a n  P e o p l e ' s  A n t i - J a p a n e s e  Union  (MPAJU). 
The MPAJU f e d  t h e  g u e r r i l l a s ,  r a i s e d  f u n d s ,  c o l l e c t e d  c l o t h e s ,  f i g h t i n g  
m a t e r i a l s ,  f o o d  and g a t h e r e d  i n t e l l i g e n c e .  I t  a l s o  a r r a n g e d  g u i d e s  t o  
t a k e  MPAJA p a t r o l s  t h r o u g h  unknown t e r r i t o r y  an d  fo r m ed  c o r p s  o f  
c o u r i e r s .  The MPAJU p u r s u e d  an ' o p e n '  p o l i c y  o f  r e c r u i t i n g  p e o p l e  o f  
a l l  r a c e s ,  c l a s s e s ,  r e l i g i o n s  and p o l i t i c a l  c r e e d s  who w ere  o p p o s e d  t o  
t h e  J a p a n e s e  r e g i m e .  I t  t h e r e f o r e  a b s o r b e d  n o t  o n l y  C h i n e s e  (who 
c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  i t s  s u p p o r t e r s ) ,  b u t  a l s o  a b o r i g i n e s ,
M a l a y s ,  I n d i a n s  an d  o t h e r s . I t  a l s o  we lc omed  w i t h i n  i t s  r a n k s  
b u s i n e s s m e n ,  members o f  t h e  K u o m i n t a n g ,  C h i n e s e  s e c r e t  s o c i e t i e s  and 
e v e n  g o v e r n m e n t  o f f i c i a l s .  The MPAJU o p e r a t e d  a f a i r l y  e f f i c i e n t  sp y
104 Chapman,  1 3 7 - 3 8 ,  n a r r a t e s  s e v e r a l  i n c i d e n t s  i n  w h ic h  M al ay s  
a t t a c k e d  t h e  B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r s  and MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s .  S e v e r a l  
i n s t a n c e s  o f  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  M a lay s  and MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  a r e  
a l s o  c i t e d  i n  John  C r o s s ,  Red J u n g l e , Lo ndon ,  1957,  7 3 - 7 7 ,  82,
119, 132.  Jo h n  C r o s s  was a  member o f  one o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  B r i t i s h
' s t a y - b e h i n d ' p a r t i e s  who r e m a i n e d  i n  s o u t h  J o h o r .  I n  one i n c i d e n t  
i n  J o h o r  t h e  p e n g h u l u  o f  a v i l l a g e  n e a r  Lay ang  L ay a n g  i n f o r m e d  t h e  
. J a p a n e s e  o f  t h e  g u e r r i l l a s '  p r e s e n c e  and s o o n  a f t e r  a  r a i d i n g  p a r t y  
came t o  t h e  v i l l a g e .  The MPAJA p a t r o l  l e a d e r  w a y l a i d  two M al ay s  
s p y i n g  on t h e  camp. W h i l e  one e s c a p e d ,  t h e  o t h e r  -  a woman -  was 
k i l l e d .
105 Mamoru S h i n o z a k i ,  Syonan  -  My S t o r y , S i n g a p o r e ,  1975 ,  8 3 - 8 4 .  
S h i n o z a k i  h e l p e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  b o t h  t h e  Endau and Bahau s e t t l e m e n t s .
106 B e s i d e s  the  C h i n e s e  s q u a t t e r s ,  good r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s a i d  t o  h a v e  
b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d  b e t w e e n  t h e  a b o r i g i n e s  an d  t h e  C h i n e s e  g u e r r i l l a s .  
Cf .  Anthony S h o r t ,  The Communis t  I n s u r r e c t i o n  i n  M a l a y a ,  4 4 1 ,  4 4 7 .
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network and did not hesitate to put out feelers for some understanding 
and cooperation with Malay, Chinese and Indian government officials 
and policemen, as well as local defence volunteer units. Such efforts, 
however, met with only limited success. Fear of the Japanese administration's 
terror tactics made those in government service keep away from the MPAJU.
Only a few individuals might occasionally cooperate with the MPAJU.
Generally, Malay policemen and Malay government personnel, 
such as district officers and village chiefs, kept aloof from both the 
MPAJA and the MPAJU. In Chapter II, it was shown that the Japanese 
treated Malays more favourably than Chinese in the first two years of 
their rule, hence Malays found little cause to dislike the Japanese or 
to support the MPAJA or MPAJU, which they considered a Chinese resistance 
movement. However, by the end of 1943, there was a change of attitude 
among Malays as the Japanese began to neglect Malay interests and to 
create more economic hardships affecting Malays as well as the other 
races. Relations between the MPAJU and MPAJA and the Malay population 
became more cordial. On the other hand, relations between the MPAJA 
and local government officials, such as the District Officer and the 
penghulu and ketua kampung deteriorated, mainly because the latter were 
used to requisition labour for Japanese government and military projects, 
as well as to collect rice and other commodities in their areas for the 
Japanese Army. These officials became the targets of MPAJA killings.
In some Malay areas such MPAJA killings, exactions and lack of tact 
combined with local misunderstandings to spark off inter-racial clashes 
between Malays and Chinese.
107 Refusal to cooperate on the part of an individual found within 
an MPAJA camp area meant that the person would be put to death. 
This was what happened to an Indian medical dresser who wandered 
into the area of headquarters, 7th Independent Regiment, in 
Pahang. He continued to assert that he would never cooperate with 
communists, even when he was told that unless he did he would be 
executed. Cf. Thatcher and Cross, Pai Naa, 166-67.
108 The inter-racial clashes will be discussed further in Chapter 
VII.
110
The MCP and the MPAJU/MPAJA
Something should be said about the MCP's policies towards 
the MPAJU/MPAJA, before it is possible to discuss the reasons for 
the lack of tact or circumspection shown by the MPAJU/MPAJA towards 
some sections of the Malay population. The MCP was the controlling 
authority for both organisations. It had party representatives in 
every unit of the MPAJA but not in every area of the MPAJU. The 
MPAJU was loosely established at a village, town or district on the 
basis of anti-Japanese feelings. Each area section would have its 
own committee, including a president and a secretary. Members of the 
MPAJU need not be communists. They included a cross-section of the 
people, but once they had been recruited they maintained contacts 
with the MCP and the MPAJA. through certain intermediaries in their 
area. MCP cadres might, however, try to proselytise some MPAJU members 
and officials in order to recruit them into the party.
Unlike the MPAJU, the MPAJA received political education
from the party. The content of political courses given to MPAJA
guerrillas related to theories of communism, discussions of international
affairs, explanations of MCP policies and 'self-criticism' sessions.
However, since the MCP's CEC had not spelt out the nature of the
'Malayan revolution' fully nor how the main goal of its anti-Japanese
programme, a 'Malayan Democratic Republic', was to be achieved, political
109discussions at the MPAJA level were rather rudimentary.
More importantly, the MCP was either unaware of, or indifferent 
to, a number of very sensitive human and racial issues which were 
developing within the MPAJU and MPAJA. Firstly, the membership of the 
MPAJU/MPAJA was overwhelmingly Chinese - about 95 per cent. Although 
both organisations subsequently acquired a small number of Malay and 
Indian members (the MPAJU more than the MPAJA) their Chinese character 
was never lost. Leaders were mostly Chinese, who spoke and wrote 
mainly Chinese. Very few of them could speak any Malay. MCP and MPAJA 
statements were mainly in Chinese. Three-fifths of all MPAJA broadsheets 
were in Chinese, while only one-seventh were in M a l a y . ^
109 Chapman, 158.
110 The War Diary of the MPAJA, 27-30.
I l l
N e i t h e r  the  MCP n o r  t h e  MPAJU/MPAJA meant to  f o s t e r  r a c i a l  
a n t a g o n i s m  o r  a p o l i c y  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  as  be tween  C h i n e s e ,  I n d i a n s  
and Malays .  In  f a c t  t h e i r  p o l i c i e s  were aimed a t  t r y i n g  t o  r a l l y  
pe o p le  o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  m ajo r  r a c e s  i n  Malaya t o  t h e i r  b a n n e r  and t o  
t h e i r  cause  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a 'M alayan  D e m o c ra t i c  R e p u b l i c * .  The 
MPAJA a d v o c a t e d  m u l t i - r a c i a l  u n i t y ,  as  s y m b o l i s e d  by the t h r e e  y e l l o w  
s t a r s  on i t s  r ed  f l a g .  Yet  t h i n g s  d i d  n o t  work o u t  as they i n t e n d e d .
The MPAJU/MPAJA f a r e d  much b e t t e r  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  c o r d i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
w i t h  the  l o c a l  C h inese  p o p u l a t i o n  than  w i t h  Malays and I n d i a n s .  And 
th e  c l o s e r  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  C h inese  groups  the  more d i f f i c u l t  became 
the  job  o f  w in n in g  ove r  t h e  o t h e r s .
J a p a n e s e  p o l i c i e s  may be s a i d  t o  have c r e a t e d  c e r t a i n  p rob lem s  
f o r  t h e  C h i n e s e - l e d  r e s i s t a n c e  movement. While t h e  J a p a n e s e  d i d  n o t  
foment r a c i a l  d i s c o r d ,  t h e i r  p ro p a g a n d a  f r e q u e n t l y  i d e n t i f i e d  C h inese  
r e s i s t a n c e  e l e m e n t s  as ' c o m m u n i s t s '  and ' t r o u b l e - m a k e r s ’ . The MCP 
f a i l e d  t o  c o u n t e r  such p ro p a g a n d a  e f f e c t i v e l y  and d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  
b e s i d e s  Chinese  i t  a l s o  had  o t h e r  r a c e s  w i t h i n  the  MPAJU/MPAJA. There 
was no e v i d e n c e  t o  show t h a t  MCP p o l i c i e s  took a c c o u n t  of  Malay 
s e n s i t i v i t i e s  and f e a r  o f  communism, o r  made any a t t e m p t s  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  
Malay customs and t h e  I s l a m i c  r e l i g i o n .
Such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  on ly  became e v i d e n t  in  t h e  MCP l e a d e r s h i p  
a f t e r  the  l e s s o n s  o f  t h e  M a la y -C h in es e  c l a s h e s  i n  1945 were a s s i m i l a t e d .  
Only a f t e r  t h e  war  d id  t h e  MCP' s CEC a d o p t  i n  Sep tember  1946 a w o r k in g  
p l a n  which  took co g n iz a n c e  o f  t h e  p a r t y ' s  ' i n a d e q u a t e  l e a d e r s h i p '  o f  
the  Malays and which c a l l e d  f o r  a ' M a l a y a n i s a t i o n ' o f  the  p a r t y  and 
deve lopmen t  o f  a 'Malay n a t i o n a l  m ovem ent ' .  Th is  work ing  p l a n  embodied 
the  f o l l o w i n g  aims:
To i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  i n t e r e s t s ,  r a c i a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  cus toms and r e l i g i o n  o f  t h e  Malay 
r a c e .
. To i n t e n s i f y  the P a r t y ' s  p r opaga nda  campaign among 
the  Malays f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  making them f u l l y  
u n d e r s t a n d  the  P a r t y ' s  o u t l i n e ,  and w i n n in g  them 
o v e r  t o  the P a r t y .
To overcome a l l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  t r a i n i n g  Working 
Commit tee members and p e r s o n n e l  f o r  work among the 
M a la y s .
. To t r a i n  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  t h o s e  Chinese  who a r e  w e l l  
v e r s e d  i n  Malay a f f a i r s ,  and who may have t o  adop t  
t h e i r  r e l i g i o n  and n a t i o n a l i t y  [ a p p a r e n t l y  t h i s  means 
r a c e ] ,  i f  n e c e s s a r y ,  f o r  o r g a n i s i n g  t h e  Malay p e o p l e .
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To e s t a b l i s h  a C e n t r a l  R a c i a l  Commit tee  f o r  
d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  v a r i o u s  r a c i a l  p r o b l e m s  and 
t h e  work c o n n e c t e d  t h e r e w i t h .
. To g e t  t h e  members o f  t h e  P a r t y  more i n t e r e s t e d
i n  work among t h e  Malay p e o p l e .
t o  s u b m i t  r e g u l a r  r e p o r t s  t o  C e n t r a l  r e g a r d i n g  
t h e  M a l a y s . ^
The w o r k i n g  p l a n  on ' M a l a y a n i s a t i o n '  o f  t h e  p a r t y  a l s o  recommended
d i s c u s s i o n  and  s t u d y  among members t o  show t h a t  t h e  p a r t y  was c h a r g e d
w i t h  t h e  ’ d u t y  o f  e m a n c i p a t i n g  M al ay a f rom  t h e  i m p e r i a l i s t s ’ . P a r t y
members w e r e  t o l d  t o  become ' M a l a y a n  c i t i z e n s ' .  W h i l e  i n t e r e s t  i n
C h i n e s e  p o l i t i c s  was t o  be  a l l o w e d ,  C h i n e s e  members s h o u l d  ’ pay more
112a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  p a r t y ' s  own n e e d s  an d  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  M a l a y a ' .
T h u s ,  t h e  MCP' s o r i e n t a t i o n  b e f o r e  1946 h a d  b e e n  C h i n e s e  r a t h e r  t h a n  
M alayan  i n  c h a r a c t e r .  I t  o n l y  b e g a n  t o  t h i n k  i n  t r u l y  M alay an  t e rm s  
a f t e r  t h e  w a r .
L a c k i n g  a  ' M a l a y a n i s a t i o n '  p o l i c y  e i t h e r  b e f o r e  o r  d u r i n g  
t h e  w a r ,  t h e  MCP a l l o w e d  C h i n e s e  members w i t h i n  t h e  p a r t y  an d  w i t h i n  
t h e  MPAJU/MPAJA t o  g i v e  a f r e e  p l a y  t o  t h e i r  ' c h a u v i n i s t i c '  f e e l i n g s .
I t  was n o t e d  e a r l i e r  t h a t  i n  i t s  1940 programme t h e  MCP h a d  made a 
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  ' M a l a y a n  C h i n e s e '  (Ma H u a , o r  M a l a y a - o r i e n t e d  
C h i n e s e ) ,  and t h e  ' O v e r s e a s  C h i n e s e '  ( Hua C h ' i a o , o r  C h i n a - o r i e n t e d  
C h i n e s e ) .  I t  h a d  g i v e n  th e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  t h e  f o r m e r  h a d  t h e  c o r r e c t  
' M a l a y a n '  o r i e n t a t i o n  t o  j o i n  t h e  MCP' s a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t  s t r u g g l e ,  
w h i l e  t h e  ' O v e r s e a s  C h i n e s e '  w e r e  m a i n l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  C h i n a .  But  
t h i s  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  o f  a d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  two g r o u p s  was a 
n a s c e n t  one  and t h e  i d e a  does  n o t  a p p e a r  t o  h a v e  b e e n  d e v e l o p e d  f u r t h e r .  
A l t h o u g h  t h e  MCP may b e  c r e d i t e d  w i t h  b e i n g  t h e  f i r s t  t o  p u t  i t s  
f i n g e r  on t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  1940 ,  i t  d i d  n o t  become i m p o r t a n t  t o  
t h e  C h i n e s e  u n t i l  t h e  p o s t w a r  p e r i o d .  I n  O c t o b e r  1945 t h e  i s s u e  o f  
w h ich  g ro u p  o f  C h i n e s e  w e r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  G o v e r n m e n t ' s  o f f e r  
o f  M a lay a n  Union  c i t i z e n s h i p  bec am e c o n t r o v e r s i a l .  The B r i t i s h  G ov e rn m en t  
s p e c i f i e d  t h a t  t h o s e  C h i n e s e  b o r n  i n  Malaya ,  o r  who h a d  r e s i d e d  t h e r e  
a t  l e a s t  15 y e a r s ,  w e r e  e l i g i b l e  f o r  M a lay a n  Un ion  c i t i z e n s h i p .  T h i s  f o r c e d
111 See ' D e c i s i o n  o f  C e n t r a l  f o r  a W o rk in g  P l a n ,  2 2 . 8 . 4 6 ' ,  i n  
P o l i t i c a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e  J o u r n a l , M a lay a n  S e c u r i t y  S e r v i c e ,  
S i n g a p o r e ,  30 S e p t e m b e r  1946.
112 I b i d .
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f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  among the C h inese  as to  what  i t  meant  to  be Ma llua 
and llua C h ' i a o . Both g e o g r a p h i c a l / p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  and n a t i o n a l i t y  
became i m p o r t a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  from 1946 onwards.
An i n h e r e n t  weakness  o f  t h e  MCP d u r i n g  the war  was t h a t  
a s i g n i f i c a n t  p o r t i o n  o f  i t s  l e a d e r s  and members were made up o f  
'O v e r s e a s  C h i n e s e '  i n c l u d i n g  CCP e l e m e n t s .  The J a p a n e s e  o c c u p a t i o n
a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  e t h n i c  C h inese  u n i t y .  The J a p a n e s e  r e g a r d e d  a l l  Ch inese  
i n  Malaya as  'O v e r s e a s  C h i n e s e '  owing a l l e g i a n c e  t o  e i t h e r  t h e  Chiang 
K a i - s h e k  gove rnment  o r  t h a t  o f  Wang C h in g -w e i .  P a r t l y  b e c a u s e  of  
J a p a n e s e  o p p r e s s i o n  o f  t h e  C h inese  i n  Malaya ,  t h e  MCP m igh t  have 
th o u g h t  i t  unwise t o  r e - e m p h a s i s e  I t s  e a r l i e r  d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  t h e  
two g r o u p s .  However,  i f  t h e  MCP's ' i d e o l o g i c a l  l i n e '  had  been  f i r m  and 
w e l l  known i t  m igh t  have  been  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  'O v e r s e a s  C h i n e s e '  t o  
r e o r i e n t  t h e m s e lv e s  towards  a Malayan n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  s t r u g g l e .
The e v id e n c e  a l s o  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e r e  was a c e r t a i n
r e l u c t a n c e  t o  a c c e p t  Malays as  f u l l  p a r t n e r s  o r  c o m r a d e s - in - a rm s
w i t h  C h inese  i n  the a n t i - J a p a n e s e  movement. The emergence  o f  m u tua l
d i s t r u s t  be tw een  Malays and C h in e se  began  i n  the  f i r s t  y e a r  o f  J a p a n e s e
r u l e ,  and numerous B r i t i s h  a c c o u n t s  have shown how f r e q u e n t l y  Malay
v i l l a g e r s  b e t r a y e d  t h e  MPAJA camps to  t h e  J a p a n e s e .  Thus the  a t t i t u d e
of  t h e  MCP and t h e  MPAJU/MPAJA l e a d e r s  was t h a t  Malays were ' u n r e l i a b l e ' ,
i f  n o t  dow nr igh t  ' t r e a c h e r o u s ' .  I n  t h i s  c o n n e c t i o n ,  Chinese  a c c o u n t s
always used  the  d e r o g a t o r y  te rm  chou kou ( ' r u n n i n g  d o g s ' )  t o  r e f e r  t o
114Malays as  i n f o r m e r s  and l a c k e y s  o f  the  J a p a n e s e .  In  e v e ry  J a p a n e s e
r a i d  on MPAJA h i d e o u t s ,  J a p a n e s e  t r o o p s  were r e p o r t e d  t o  be l e d  by 
Malay gu id es  and i n f o r m e r s  (and i n  some i n s t a n c e s  by b o th  Malay and 
I n d i a n  g u i d e s ) .  These Malay g u i d e s  and i n f o r m e r s  would o f t e n  h e l p  t h e  
J a p a n e s e  t o  e x e c u t e  o r  t o r t u r e  Chinese  v i c t i m s .  They would a l s o  be
113 Chapman, 163-74.
\
114 See the  a r t i c l e  'Lenggong ;  An a c c o u n t  o f  a c a t a s t r o p h e ' ,  ( i n  
Ch inese )  i n  Li  Tieh Min,  e t . a l . ,  Ta -chan  yu Nan C h ' i a o  ( M a - l a i -  
y a - c h i h  pu ) (The World War and t h e  O verseas  Chinese  i n  S o u t h e a s t  
A s ia )  ( t h e  Malaya s e c t i o n ) ,  S i n g a p o r e ,  1947, 169-70 ,  211.
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a l lo w e d  t o  c a r t  away w h a t e v e r  b o o ty  they  c o u ld  c o l l e c t  f rom the  r a i d s .
S e v e r a l  B r i t i s h  Force  136 o f f i c e r s  have  c o n f i rm e d  the
p r e s e n c e  o f  armed Malays i n  J a p a n e s e  r a i d i n g  p a r t i e s  on MPAJA camps and
r e p o r t e d  t h a t  Malay v i l l a g e r s  o f t e n  r e a c t e d  w i t h  f e a r  and h o s t i l i t y
towards  bo th  the  B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r s  and th e  g u e r r i l l a s .  Chapman has
d e s c r i b e d  t h e  i n s t a n c e s  when MPAJA p a t r o l s  had t o  move camp e v e r y  t ime
th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  Chinese  g u e r r i l l a s  was d i s c o v e r e d  by Malays e i t h e r
o u t  h u n t i n g  d e e r  o r  g a t h e r i n g  f r u i t s .  Such d i s c o v e r y  a lways meant  the
a r r i v a l  o f  J a p a n e s e  t r o o p s  and t h e  g u e r r i l l a s  were f o r c e d  t o  f l e e  f u r t h e r  
116i n t o  the  j u n g l e .  While  n e i t h e r  Chapman n o r  o t h e r  Fo rce  136 p e r s o n n e l
r e c o r d e d  any i n s t a n c e  of  MPAJA r e t a l i a t i o n  on t h e  Malays f o r  such
t r e a c h e r y ,  i t  would  n o t  be s u r p r i s i n g  i f  i t  o c c u r r e d  w i t h o u t  t h e i r
knowledge ,  e i t h e r  l o c a l l y  o r  a t  more d i s t a n c e .  Such r e t a l i a t i o n  might
b e s t  be d e s c r i b e d ,  i n  the  words o f  a C h inese  i n f o r m a n t  as  ' t h e  po t
b o i l i n g  o v e r ' . Th is  was what  p r o b a b l y  happened  i n  s o u t h w e s t  J o h o r
i n  May 1945 which  l e d  t o  Malays a t t a c k i n g  the  MPAJA and Chinese
r e t a l i a t i n g  (See C h a p te r  V I I ) .
N o n e t h e l e s s ,  t h i s  s h o u l d  n o t  o b s c u r e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e
MCP and t h e  MPAJU/MPAJA d i d  a c c e p t  a s m a l l  number  o f  Malays w i t h i n
t h e i r  r a n k s . B u t  t h e s e  Malays p r o b a b l y  had  t o  overcome some C h inese
p o l i t i c a l  d i s t r u s t  o f  Malays i n  the  MPAJU/MPAJA. I n  e a r l y  1945 a
few i n s t a n c e s  were r e p o r t e d  o f  M a la ys ,  e s p e c i a l l y  Malay p o l i c e m e n ,
118go ing  o v e r  t o  t h e  MPAJA w i t h  t h e i r  arms.  I n  one i n s t a n c e ,  i n  Pahang ,
115 Some t im e i n  1943, J a p a n e s e  t r o o p s  accompanied  by Malays ,  
r a i d e d  t h e  C h inese  s e t t l e m e n t  a t  Lenggong (Pe ra k )  and b u r n t  down 
20 to  30 h o u s e s  i n  a h u n t  f o r  g u e r r i l l a s .  The s e t t l e r s '  r i c e  
h a r v e s t s  were removed by the  Malays .  Twenty C h inese  were t a k e n  
to  t h e  l o c a l  p o l i c e  s t a t i o n  where  t h e y  were i n t e r r o g a t e d  and
■ some were a l l e g e d l y  b e a t e n  t o  d e a th  by Malay p o l i c e m e n .  I b i d .
116 Chapman, 105, 118,  127-28 ,  164, 213.
117 R. B a la n ,  i n t e r v i e w ,  K ua la  Lumpur, A p r i l  1975. C h i n e s e - s p e a k i n g  
Ba lan  was i n  the  MPAJA's p r o p a g a n d a  b u r e a u  i n  P e r a k  and c la im s  
t h a t  A bdu l l ah  C.D. and o t h e r  Malays were t h e n  members o f  t h e  MCP.
118 The War D ia ry  o f  the  MPAJA, 28;  t h e  MPAJA 4 th  I n d e p e n d e n t  
Reg iment ,  K a n g - J ih  y i n g  h s i u n g  x a i  J o u - n a n  (The a n t i - J a p a n e s e  
h e r o e s  i n  S o u th e rn  J o h o r ) ,  S i n g a p o r e ,  1946, 45.
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t h e  MPAJA t r e a t m e n t  of  t h e s e  po l ic e m e n  was shabby .  I n s t e a d  o f  i n c o r p o r a t i n g
them i n t o  the  g u e r r i l l a  f o r c e s  t h e  MPAJA l e a d e r s  took  t h e i r  arms away,
119gave them t o  C h in e se  g u e r r i l l a s  and s e n t  t h e  Malays to  work on fa rms.
The i n t e r - r a c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  was made worse  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t
Malays formed the  b u l k  o f  t h e  P o l i c e  Force  as  w e l l  as  t h e  V o l u n t e e r
F o rc es  used  by th e  J a p a n e s e  i n  a n t i - g u e r r i l l a  o p e r a t i o n s .  The l i n e s  o f
b a t t l e  were  t h u s  n e a t l y  drawn a lo n g  r a c i a l  l i n e s .  A p p a r e n t l y  some
a t t e m p t s  were made to  e s t a b l i s h  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  and c o o p e r a t i o n  be tween
t h e  MCP/MPAJA and th e  Malay Giyu Gun ( V o l u n t e e r  Army). L t - C o l o n e l
I b ra h im  Yaacob,  commander o f  t h e  Malay Giyu Gun, c l a i m s  t h a t  c o n t a c t s
i n  1944 e v e n t u a l l y  l e d  b o t h  s i d e s  t o  a g r e e  to  c o o p e r a t e  to  f i g h t  b o t h
t h e  J a p a n e s e  and t h e  B r i t i s h  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  a c h i e v i n g  Malayan 
120i n d e p e n d e n c e .  I b ra h im  p ro m is ed  t o  b r i n g  h i s  V o l u n t e e r  Army ove r  to
t h e  MPAJA's s i d e  a t  a l a t e r  d a t e  to  be a g r e e d  upon,  and i n  t h e  meantime
would t r y  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  h i s  Army a v o id  any f u r t h e r  m i l i t a r y  engagements
12 1w i t h  t h e  MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s .  The a g re e m e n t  was pu t  t o  t h e  t e s t  i n  J u l y
119 Nona Baker  n a r r a t e s  t h e  i n c i d e n t  i n  1945 i n  which a group o f  Malay 
p o l ic e m e n  a t  C h e r a t i n g ,  Pahang ,  a f t e r  r e a d i n g  an MPAJA l e a f l e t  i n  
J awi  a g re e d  to  d e s e r t  to  t h e  g u e r r i l l a s  on a g iv e n  n i g h t .  True to  
t h e i r  p r o m i s e ,  t h e  Malays s e t  f i r e  to- t h e  p o l i c e  s t a t i o n  and 
decamped, com ple te  w i t h  r i f l e s ,  b u t  t h e  MPAJA commander t r e a t e d  them 
s h a b b i l y .  She comments:
’They [ the Malays]  v e r y  much r e s e n t e d  what  they  c o n s i d e r e d  
to  be t h e i r  d e g r a d a t i o n ,  and when I  saw one o f  them a t  t h e  
p l a n t a t i o n  they  com pla ined  b i t t e r l y  a b o u t  t h e i r  t r e a t m e n t ,  
and c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  t h e y  had been  ro b b ed ,  i n s t e a d  of  r e w a rd e d ,  
f o r  t h e i r  g a l l a n t r y . '
Cf . T h a t c h e r  and C r o s s ,  P a i  N aa , 165-66.
120 The c o n t a c t s  were s a i d  t o  have  been e s t a b l i s h e d  th ro u g h  Su tan  
D j e n a i n ,  an I n d o n e s i a n  communist  r e s i d e n t  i n  Malaya ,  on b e h a l f
o f  t h e  KMM. L i a i s o n  was m a i n t a i n e d  w i t h  Tan Mai Sang,  s a i d  t o  be 
a commander o f  an MPAJA u n i t  i n  J o h o r  who i n  t u r n  was i n  touch  
w i t h  MCP s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l  La i  Tek ,  and w i t h  ' t h e  S in g a p o re  b r a n c h  
h e a d q u a r t e r s  o f  t h e  MPAJA' ( though  no such  b r a n c h  i s  known to  have 
e x i s t e d )  t h rough  ' Lo Thiam Po and h i s  f r i e n d s '  ( i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  who 
t h i s  Chinese  was ) .  See I b ra h i m  Yaacob,  S e k i t a r  Malaya Merdeka 
( c o n c e r n i n g  Malayan I n d e p e n d e n c e ) ,  J a k a r t a ,  1957, 32.
121 See Ib ra h im  Yaacob, S e k i t a r  Malaya M erdeka , 32; and a l s o  I .K .  
A g a s t j a  ( ad o p te d  I n d o n e s i a n  name o f  Ib ra h im  Y a a c o b ) , S e d j a r a h  dan 
P e r ju a n g a n  d i  Malaya ( H i s t o r y  and S t r u g g l e  i n  M a la y a ) ,  J o g j a k a r t a ,  
1951,  106.
116
1944 when the Japanese moved the Volunteer Army for operations in the
Ipoh area where the MPAJA's 5th Independent Regiment was known to be
active. Because no skirmishes occurred between the Malay Volunteers
and the MPAJA in the area the Japanese became suspicious. The Army
was recalled to its headquarters in Singapore, its components broken up
and attached to various Japanese units. Ibrahim became general adviser
to the Army in October and then was made a Colonel, but his power was 
122taken away. No MCP account confirms such contacts or agreement ever
having been made between the MCP/MPAJA and the Malay Giyu Gun.
However, if Ibrahim's story is true, there is other evidence
which suggests that the understanding between the two sides was
ineffective. Probably some time after the understanding was reached,
a serious military engagement occurred between the two forces in the
Kota Tinggi area of Johor in which 25 MPAJA guerrillas were killed.
Soon after in another operation in the Mersing area (also in Johor) the
Malay Giyu Gun clashed again with the MPAJA. In both operations the
123Malay Volunteers were under Japanese command. Two Malay Volunteers
who took part in both operations said they discovered subsequently 
from one of their senior officers that there had been an agreement with 
the MCP/MPAJA but apparently it had been difficult for Lt-Colonel Ibrahim 
to observe it strictly in defiance of instructions of the Japanese 
commanders. If the Japanese had found out about their secret understanding, 
Ibrahim would have lost his life and the Malay Giyu Gun would have been 
disbanded. It was also revealed by the two Malay Volunteers that the 
shift to Ipoh, reported by Ibrahim, in fact led to the so-called 
'understanding' finally breaking down. The MCP/MPAJA contacts in Ipoh 
were reported to have asked the Malay Giyu Gun for information on its 
future movements and the disposition of certain Japanese forces, but 
the Malay Giyu Gun officers were afraid to give the information in case
122 Agastja, 106.
123 Abdullah Malek Haji Md. Hanafiah, 'Sejarah Perjuangan Kesatuan 
Melayu Muda [History of the Struggle of the Young Malay Union] , 
1937-1945', B.A. Hons thesis, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1975, 299-300. The Kesatuan Melayu Muda, or KMM, 
was Ibrahim Yaacob's prewar political organisation.
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the Japanese found out.
These incidents may have helped to increase the MCP/MPAJA's 
distrust of Malays. By the closing stages of the war, it may be said 
that the MPAJA had disguised its distrust of Malays by advocating the 
theme of multi-racial unity, but without actually putting much faith 
in real mutual cooperation with Malays. Its attitude and the attitude of 
most Chinese might be paraphrased as, 'We can be victorious in our 
resistance struggle without the support of the Malays. We have done 
without them so far, we can continue to do without them.' But if the 
long-term interests of the MCP were to establish a communist government 
and the 'Malayan Democratic Republic', such an attitude was fatal to the 
party. Without multi-racial unity a communist future could only serve 
Chinese interests. As far as is known the MCP did not issue any statement 
on ethnic policy to assure Malays and Indians that they would have
125representation in any future communist government equal to the Chinese.
The MPAJA and Force 136
it was on 24 May 1943 that the first Force 136 reconnaissance 
party,consisting of Colonel John Davis and five Chinese agents, arrived 
in a submarine off the Perak coast and landed in Malaya. This operation 
was code named Gustavus I. Other groups were introduced in the same 
manner, in operations Gustavus II, III and IV, the last taking place
v 126on 12 September 1943. Besides Davis, the other officers were
124 Interviews with Mohd. Shahid and Zakaria Tais, former members of 
the Malay Giyu Gun, 28 May and 24 August 1974 respectively, by Abdul 
Malek, op.cit., 300. Both individuals claimed to have obtained the 
information regarding Ibrahim's agreement with the MCP/MPAJA from 
their Malay officer, Colonel Osman Daim.
125 Lt-Colonel Ibrahim Yaacob, commander of the Malay Giyu Gun, has 
described the objective of the MCP/MPAJA programme as 'the establishment 
of a Malayan Democratic Government under a leadership comprising
seven Malays, five Chinese, three Indians, and one representative 
of other races.' See his Sekitar Malaya Merdeka, 32. Ibrahim cites 
no MCP source. No indication of what the racial composition of a 
communist government would be is known to have appeared in any MCP 
document. It can only be surmised that it had been given to him by 
an MCP supporter as one possible way in which the MCP would form a 
government. It is likely that such a detailed and important aspect in 
the MCP's programme, if official, would have been spelled out and 
publicised in MCP statements.
126 Chapman, 232-40.
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Captain Richard Broome and Major Lira Bo Seng, a Malayan KMT member and 
agent of llie Chinese government in Chungking. Their subordinate staff 
were all KMT Chinese trained in wireless operations and intelligence 
work. It appears that Force 136 was attempting to set up its own 
intelligence service by utilising KMT agents. This is evident because 
only after the KMT agents had been established in cover jobs in Ipoh was 
contact made on 30 September with Chin Peng, representative of the
Perak MPAJA headquarters.127
On 1 January 1944 Lai Tek and Chin Peng, both representing
the MCP, MPAJU and MPAJA, arrived at the Force 136 camp and held talks
with the three Force 136 officers, who had now been joined by Major
F.S. Chapman, a member of one of the original 'stay-behind' teams left
in Malaya after the fall of Singapore and who was co-opted into the
Force 136 team. The three Force 136 officers described themselves as
representatives of Admiral Mountbatten, the British Supreme Allied
Commander for Southeast Asia. It was agreed that in return for arms,
money, training and supplies'the MPAJA would cooperate with and accept
the British Army's orders during the war with Japan and in the period
of military occupation thereafter. The British also agreed to finance
the MPAJA with 150 taels of gold (about L3,000 sterling a month) and
instructed that all arms would have to be handed back after the Japanese 
128defeat. The policy of South East Asia Command (SEAC) which controlled
Force 136 was to arm the guerrillas, place them under the control of
British officers, and prepare them for the time of an Allied invasion.
Political matters were excluded from the agreement. Both sides agreed
that no question of post-war policy would be discussed.
News of the agreement, however, did not reach SEAC until a
year later. This was due to the loss of wireless sets and inability of
the Force 136 officers to keep several rendezvous dates with British 
129submarines. It was not until 1 February 1945 that the terms of the
127 Ibid., 241.
128 See the detailed 'Memorandum by Head of the Malayan Country 
Section, Force 136 on Resistance Forces on the eve of the Japanese 
Capitulation', Top Secret, 15 August 1945, in WO 203/5642/X/L01782. 
See also F.S.V. Donnison, British Military Administration in the 
Far East, 1943-46, London, 1956, 1956, 380-81.
129 Chapman, 254-58; Donnison, 381.
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agreement were transmitted to SEAC, and on 26 February another Force 136 
party was parachuted in to join Davis. On 17 March a second meeting was 
held with two MCP representatives, at which the terms of the agreement 
were reaffirmed.
Once the MCP had committed itself to place the MPAJA under
SEAC, SEAC decided to ensure that the MCP did not repudiate the agreement.
This meant that SEAC had to retain some control of the MPAJA guerrillas
through Force 136 officers, a difficult but not impossible task, while
keeping its part of the bargain to supply funds, arms and stores to the
MPAJA. From February 1945 SEAC was kept informed on the MPAJA's activities
] 30by the Force 136 officers. An over-generous Force 136 estimate in
May 1945 gave the MPAJA strength as being not less than ten thousand and
that they were organised into eight semi-independent groups, of which only
five had contact with Force 136. SEAC therefore decided to send in more
Force 136 personnel and devised four additional means of contact and
control: (a) a British liaison team under Davis would be attached to
Central MPAJA Headquarters in Perak; (b) Group Liaison Officers (GLOs),
each a lieutenant-colonel, was to be attached to each regimental Headquarters
of the MPAJA (except Pahang which had no contact with Force 136 at all and
it was decided, for strategic reasons, to leave it alone); (c) each GLO
would have five Patrol Liaison Officers (PLOs), with major's rank, under
him attached to each of the five MPAJA patrols; (d) 13 Gurkha support
groups (each of 19 men) would be infiltrated to stiffen up the MPAJA and
131other guerrilla forces in each of the strategic areas.
But the MCP was not unaware of British motives. SEAC was told 
that MPAJA Central Headquarters in Perak was unwilling to have any 
British officer in their camp. Central was determined to preserve the 
secrecy of its whereabouts and the composition of its staff. It also 
wanted to guard against any possible British retaliation in the event 
of an outbreak of hostilities with the British after the war. However, 
Central did agree to allow Force 136 personnel into the other MPAJA 
camps and appointed a CEC member of the MCP to stay with Davis and
130 'Memorandum by Head of the Malayan Country Section, Force 136', 
in WO 203/5642/XL01782.
131 Ibid. , Paragraph 11. In the end only six Gurkha support groups were 
parachuted into Malaya before the Japanese surrender.
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his group. He was Chin Peng, who had organised the meeting which led to
the SEAC-MCP agreement. Davis was agreeable to the arrangement because
he had been able to work well with Chin Peng. Force 136 officers did not
command the MPAJA patrols but it was agreed they should have ’tactical
command’ during operations. Their influence over the MPAJA was strong
in military matters but weak where political matters were concerned.
by 13 August 1945 there were at least 80 Force 136 senior and subordinate
officers liaising with the MPAJA and other resistance movements and
communicating with SEAC Headquarters in Ceylon through about 40 wireless
132telecommunications sets.
Opposing Resistance Movements
Until shortly before Mountbatten’s troops landed in Malaya
all the guerrilla groups, including the MPAJA, wore no Allied uniforms
and not all carried weapons. The only readily available source of
new arms during the latter part of the Japanese occupation was Force
133136 and it only supplied 2,000 weapons. If they required additional
arms the resistance movements had to raid Lhe police stations or 
Japanese military installations.
The Japanese saw the MPAJA and the KMT movements as one and
the same army, the Chinese Resistance Forces, and regarded them all as
13 A’communist bandits’. Because the guerrillas operated very locally it
is doubtful if there was much confusion amongst the local population as
132 .Ibid. , paragraph 12.
133 A Force 136 memorandum by Lt-Colonel D.G. Gill-Davies, dated 
13 September 1945, Singapore, says that only '2,000 arms' were 
supplied to the MPAJA up to 13 August 1945 when all arms sorties 
were cancelled. The earlier target had been ’3,500 armed MPAJA 
guerrillas', but the Japanese surrender made further arming unnecessary. 
See the memorandum in BMA PSD/39. However, O’Ballance, 56, mentions 
'3,500 arms’ as having been parachuted to the MPAJA, while Clutterbuck, 
40, gives the figure of '4,765 arms’ as having been supplied to the 
MPAJA. Apparently neither O'Ballance’s nor Clutterbuck's figures is 
accurate. Though they have not indicated their sources, O'Ballance’s 
figure seems to be based on the original Force 136 target, while 
Clutterbuck's figure appears to be based on the number of weapons 
handed in by the guerrillas at the time of demobilisation.
134 See the report, 'The Chinese Resistance Forces’, in Secret Weekly 
Intelligence Review No.11, 25 Indian Division, H.Q. Malaya Command 
Papers, Kuala Lumpur, 28 November 1945, 4-5.
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to their political affiliations. At the end of the war, when the Force
136 ’controlled' guerrillas were supplied with Allied green uniforms, the
MPAJA and KMT resistance forces distinguished themselves from one another
by the number of stars worn on their five-cornered service caps. Chungking
KMT agents and the KMT 'Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army' (OCAJA) in
Perak and Kelantan wore 'one-blue star' caps; the OCAJA was called the
One-Star Army, or Bin tang Satu, in Malay. Some KMT guerrillas were
known to wear two stars on their caps but what these two stars represented
is not clear. The MPAJA was known as the Three-Star Army, or Bintang Tiga,
the three stars signifying the three major races in Malaya - the Malays,
Chinese and Indians. A Japanese report gave what seemed to be a confusing
picture to the Japanese, but actually revealed a diversity of factions
135among the guerrillas. Their observations show that, first, there was
a mushrooming of armed guerrilla units under the title of 'AJA' (Anti- 
Japanese Armies); second, that the MPAJA troops were identified with 
'the Chinese Resistance Army'; and third, that there were clashes among 
the 'Chinese Resistance Army' as well as between the various AJAs and 
the MPAJA.
In a few cases the resistance forces were bound together by the
common cause of fighting the Japanese and their collaborators; in most
cases, they did not cease to make clear their differences by fighting one
another. Rivalry between the MPAJA and KMT troops was one instance
of opposing guerriila groups. Chin Kee Onn made out the various
guerrilla groups as follows:
the 'Malayan Communists' (more often referred to as 
'hill-people') were composed of four parties: (1)
Communists proper, who believed in the ideology of 
Communism; (2) Kuomintang members who were just anti- 
Japanese; (3) outraged farmers and townsfolk, who 
desired nothing but revenge; and (4) bandits who 
enlisted to see what could be got out of the adventure.^ 6^
Giving the best overview of the diversity of the guerrilla forces during
the Japanese Occupation, pro-KMT writers N.I. Low and H.M. Cheng
observed that 'many thousands of guerrillas remained outside the ranks
of Force 136; in other words, that the resistance movement was a large
135 Ibid.
136 See his Malaya Upside Down, Singapore, 1946, 109.
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circle which included in it a much smaller circle - Force 136 - and that
137the two were not exactly coincident.’
(a) The KMT Guerrillas
Three armed groups of KMT guerrillas, totalling about 400,
operated loosely in north Malaya under the name of the Overseas Chinese
Anti-Japanese Army (OCAJA). Their leader was Lee Fong Sam, a reputed
bandit who operated on either side of the Malay-Thai border. The
respective strengths and locations of the groups were reported to be as
follows: (a) about 100 armed men encamped in the jungle on the Thai-
Kelantan border; (b) another group of 100 armed men on the Thai-Perak
border; and (c) 200 scattered guerrillas along the line of the East
138Coast railway between Krai and Merapoh in Kelantan.
These guerrillas had assumed a connection with the KMT more 
as a fiery cross than for ideological reasons. They had not been formed 
by the KMT party in Malaya or by the KMT Government in China, nor did they 
have connections with KMT members in Force 136. They were Chinese, 
mainly Kwongsais (from Kwangsi province in China), who wished to resist 
the Japanese invader and who had independently organised themselves into 
several guerrilla bands under the leadership of Lee Fong Sam and his 
assistants who swore allegiance to Chungking. They were referred to 
as KMT guerrillas by Force 136, which had contacts with the two groups 
at the Thai-Kelantan and Thai-Perak borders, hoping to exercise some 
influence over them and to prevent any premature flare-up with Japanese 
forces in Thai territory before the Allied landing. None of the three
139groups of KMT was armed by Force 136, though they did receive supplies.
Hostility developed between MPAJA groups and these KMT’ 
guerrillas. The former regarded the KMT guerrillas as 'bandits' who 
resorted to looting, extortion and intimidation of the local population, 
while the KMT guerrillas considered the MPAJA as 'communists' to whom they 
were politically opposed. The KMT groups in Upper Perak under Lee's
137 See N.I. Low and H.M. Cheng, 67.
138 See paragraphs 37-39 in 'Memorandum by Head of Malayan Country 
Section, Force 136' in W0 203/5642.
139 Ibid.
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assistants, Hong Chee and Tai Man, fought several skirmishes with MPAJA 
guerrillas who had attacked their camps near Grik and Lenggong. Force 136 
officers initially tended to side with whichever group they were in contact, 
but finally higher echelons intervened and stopped the fighting.
Similarly, in Kelantan MPAJA and KMT groups fought in the Krai-Merapoh area. 
Many casualties were suffered on both sides. Malay villagers were often 
executed or had their houses burnt down when suspected by one side of 
helping the other. Force 136 finally forced Lee Fong Sam to withdraw his 
men from the affected area, while the MPAJA guerrillas based in the Meraoph 
area were withdrawn to Perak. The MPAJA group withdrew only when Force 136 
threatened to cut off arms and supplies if it refused. However, the trouble 
did not stop. Whenever armed MPAJA and KMT guerrillas were in the same 
area, fighting broke out.^^
Like the MPAPA groups, the OCAJA groups were equally distrustful
of Malays. In early 1943 the OCAJA sacked and burned Kampong Temengor in
Upper Perak not far from their Lenggong base. One Malay account which
clearly identifies it as the rOne-Star Army', describes the incident as a
massacre in which about 80 Malay villagers, including women, children and
the aged, were reported killed. Ten Malays, seven of whom were subsequently
released, were taken prisoner and put to work on the OCAJA farms at 
141Sungai Kepayang. The reason for the OCAJA attack is not clear. Apparently
the OCAJA suspected the kampung of either supporting the Japanese or the 
MPAJA.
(b) The. Malay Guerrillas
The total armed Malay guerrilla strength never exceeded five 
hundred. The first British Force 136 party to contact the Malays was 
dropped by parachute into North Perak in December 1944 and was led by 
Lt-Colonel (then Major) Dobree. He found the Malays in that area only 
too enthusiastic to take up arms against the Japanese and had to discourage 
many from joining him. He started arming and training small sections and 
gave them the name Askar Melayu Setia (AMS) or the Loyal Malay Army.
In Pahang, Major J.D. Richardson was able to contact a Malay District
140 Ibid. For other accounts of the MPAJA/KMT clashes, see Victor Purcell, 
The Chinese in Malaya, London, 1949, 258-62; W.L. Blythe, The Impact 
of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, London, 1968, 332-33; and 
Short, 24n.
141 Tok Muda Raja Razman bin Raja Abdul Hamid, et.al., Hulu Perak Dalam 
Sej arah (Upper Perak in History), Ipoh, 1963, 80-82.
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Officer, Yeop Mahidin, who secretly set up the Tentera Wataniah (Patriotic
Army) for raising and training Malays with their own officers with the
142borrowed authority of Sir Abu Bakar, Sultan of Pahang. It was to be the
great regret of the British that their scheme to recruit and organise a
resistance force among the Malays was started belatedly at the closing
stages of the war. It appears that initially the British were rather
reluctant to encourage their development. As Aziz and Silcock have
observed, the history of post-war Malaya would have been very different
had the British created more Malay guerrilla forces than Chinese guerrilla
143forces to fight the Japanese. However, there were many Malays who were
on the side of the British during the war. Among those who worked with SEAC
were Mohamed Suffian bin llashim (now Malaysia's Lord President) and Tan
Sri General Ibrahim bin Ismail (presently Chief of the Armed Forces Staff
in Malaysia). Chapman reported that there was a plan to organise a Malay
resistance force, although he thought that the Malays with their freedom of
movement in the country were more valuable 'for collecting information than
144actual fighting, especially as their security was not very good'. Despite
the British distrust of the Malays, Force 136 officers obtained good
support from the two resistance forces which they belatedly raised and trained.
According to O'Ballance, the MPAJA took the field against the units of the
Askar Melayu Sofia in north Perak and Kedah, at the same time as it clashed
with those of the KMT guerrillas near the Siamese border, and succeeded in
breaking them up. In west Johor there were also clashes between the MPAJA
and groups of armed Malays. However, the Malay account of Askar Melayu Setia
145mentions no such clashes with the MPAJA. There was little or no liaison
142 For an interesting Malay account of the Askar Melayu Setia, see Abdul 
Aziz bin Zakaria, Lt. Nor. Pahlawan Geril^a, Kuala Lumpur, 1963.
143 Aziz and Silcock, 'Nationalism in Malaya' in William Holland (ed.)
Asian Nationalism and the West, New York, 1953, 292.
144 Chapman, 412. The truth was that the British were generally suspicious 
of the Malays whom they believed to be favourably disposed towards the 
Japanese. About 150 Malays were rounded up and imprisoned by the 
British just before the fall of Singapore on charges of working with 
the Japanese. These Malays were mostly officials and members of the 
KMM led by Ibrahim Yaacob. Moreover, it should be remembered that none 
of the Sultans followed the British in their retreat from Malaya to 
India or Australia. See Chapter II.
145 O'Ballance, 62; see also Abdul Aziz bin Zakaria, op.cit.
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between the MPAJA and the Malay guerrillas.
(c) The Ho PI Tui (Reserves), Chinese Secret 
Societies and Personal Resistance
One of the measures which the MPAJA adopted to recruit
manpower for the MPAJA was to raise volunteer units known as the Ho
Pi Tui (Reserves) in every village, town and district. These volunteers
were mostly Chinese with a sprinkling of Indians and Malays. They did
not leave their local areas till they were called up by the MPAJA.
Not all the Ho Pi Tui came under the command of party members. Some
were left under the command of respected village elders, secret society
chiefs and trusted KMT officials who were to use the Volunteers as a
'self-defence' force to safeguard their homes and villages. Instead,
many of these Ho Pi Tui, due to lack of stringent supervision by the
Party, degenerated into gangs of robbers and bandits, given to rape,
146looting and terrorism.
There were two other types of resistance groups. One type 
consisted of small roving bandit gangs of all races, which operated 
during the occupation. They were armed with weapons picked up during 
the war or bought from others who had done so. They would include the 
Chinese criminal gangs or secret societies known variously as Samseng Tong, 
or Hong Mun, specialising in 'protection' rackets. Some of these gangs
146 Information on the Ho Pi Tui is given by R. Balan, a former MPAJA 
leader of Indian origin. Interview, Kuala Lumpur, 2 April 1973. 
Chinese-speaking Balan joined the MPAJA in the jungle in 1942 and 
while there, worked in the propaganda section of the MCP, editing 
the Tamil news-sheets. The MCP leadership displayed a great deal 
of trust and confidence in him and before long had accepted him 
into the party as a member. After the war, Balan became the party's 
key activist in the estate labour unions. He was elected into 
the MCP's central committee in 1947, after he had attended the 
Empire Conference of Communist Parties in London with two other 
MCP representatives (Wu Tien Wang and Rashid Maidin). While 
involved in an estate labour strike in June 1948, Balan was arrested 
and detained. He remained in detention throughout the period of the 
Emergency until his release in 1961 (13 years). In 1955, while still 
in detention, Balan was elected vice-president of the MCP's central 
committee. He is now aged 60 and in poor health. Anthony Short 
describes Balan as one of the most skilful and successful communist 
union organisers who, when he was arrested, was within six hours of 
taking to the jungle. Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 
60, 66, 92.
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were converted by the MPAJA and joined the Ho Pi Tui. However, the
majority continued to exist on their own, claiming to be 'Anti-Japanese
Forces', MPAJA or KMT in whatever manner suited their best interests at 
147the time. In Perak the most notorious bandit gang was the Kwangsai
group led by Hong Chee, who was a member of the KMT resistance force, 
the OCAJA. These bandit gangs gave both the MPAJA and the KMT a very 
bad name.
The other type of secret society was one formed by individuals 
or groups for the purposes of self-protection, or to carry out their 
own forms of resistance against the Japanese. One was that of the 
Sikh, Gurchan Singh, a former policeman who operated under the name 
'Singa' (meaning 'Lion' in Malay). He and three friends operated an 
independent resistance group, which succeeded in carrying out intelligence 
and sabotage of Japanese communications and installations in various parts 
of the country. Another was the Eurasian woman Sybil Karthigasu who, 
with her doctor-husband, treated wounded guerrillas, was arrested and 
endured Japanese torture.
The MCP from 1942 to 1945: Lai Tek as Kempeitai Agent
Lai Tek's arrest by the Japanese Kempeitai and his work as
their agent was to cause great harm to the MCP's organisation. An
attempt will now be made to piece together his wartime dealings with the
Japanese, a little known aspect of events in this period.
Lai Tek was arrested in Singapore in early March 1942. He
was then known as 'Wong Kim Gyock (or Giok)', one of his innumerable
aliases. There are several versions of how he was arrested. According
to a Japanese source he 'was easily found out by the Kempeitai because
149he was sending wireless transmission . A British Special Branch source,
however, claims that Lai Tek was pointed out to the Japanese by former
147 See 'Memorandum by Head of Malaya Country Section, Force 136 on 
Resistance Forces in Malaya' in WO 203/5642.
148 See Gurchan Singh, Singa of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, n.d. [1946?] 
and Sybil Karthigasu, No Dram of Mercy, London, 1954.
149 Mamoru Shinozaki, My Wartime Experiences in Singapore, Singapore, 
1973, 111, Shinozaki obtained details about Lai Tek from Major 
Sartoru Onishi of the Kempeitai.
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Chinese detectives of the Singapore Special Branch. The conclusion was
that it was difficult for him not to betray the MCP as he was really
an ’imperialist' agent and, to save his own life, he cooperated with
150the Japanese Kempeitai throughout the occupation.
Another account of his arrest was given by Major R.J. Isaacs,
formerly of SEAC Headquarters, who got the story from Major Sartoru
Onishi of the Kempeitai.^^ It was reported that on 26 March 1942
Sargeant Mitsuo Nakayama, with the assistance of a Malay and a Chinese,
arrested a person known as 'Wong Show Tong'. He was taken to Kempeitai
Headquarters where he admitted that he was an executive member of the
MCP. The information he gave impressed Major Onishi and orders were
given that he should be treated well, given good food, cigarettes and
special accommodation. In a matter of weeks 'Wong Show Tong' and Onishi
were on very good terms. One day, to Onishi's surprise, 'Wong Show
Tong' confessed that he was in fact 'Wong Kim Gyock', the secretary of
the MCP, that there was no such thing as a Central Committee and that he
in fact was in a position to order and direct the whole of the communist
activities on Singapore island and on the mainland of Malaya.
Through the interpreter Lee Yem Kong, a former photographer in
Johor, Onishi and 'Wong Kim Gyock' struck a bargain. They agreed that
Lai Tek would give the names of the MCP's top executives and collect
them in one place where they could be liquidated by the Japanese. In
return, Lai Tek's life would be spared and he could earn a considerable
sum of money. Towards the end of April he walked out of Kempeitai
153headquarters 'a free man with a bundle of dollars in his pocket'.
Contact was thereafter to be established at a certain cafe in Orchard 
Road, or Lai Tek would. call on his bicycle at the home of Lee Yem Kong, 
who acted as interpreter for Warrant Officer Shimomura, the man present to
150 Special Branch, Singapore, file Ref. OF/A/1/81 (Y) No.31 (n.d.), 
cited in Yap Hong Kuan, 30.
151 See Isaacs' report entitled 'Wright helps Japs to trap Reds
at Batu Caves', in The Malay Mail, Kuala Lumpur, 31 August 1953.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
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receive all information. As one Japanese writer recalled the agreement:
So he agreed and accepted the Kempeltai1s offer. And 
he promised to work for the Kempeitai by supplying 
them with information. He told the Kempeitai they 
must keep everything top secret so he could continue 
to maintain contacts with all quarters; if they [the 
Party] knew he had been arrested by the Kempeitai 
then all communications will be cut, then he will 
have no more information. He proposed to the Kempeitai 
that they should only appoint two of their staff to have 
contacts with him....154
Consequently, the arrest of Lai Tek and his employment as an
agent was a well-kept secret within the Kempeitai itself. Only four people
in the Kempeitai were said to have known of Lai Tek’s capture - Colonel
Oiishi, the head of the Kempeitai; Major Sartoru Onishi, his second-in-
command; and two junior individuals, Warrant Officer Shimomura and
Sargeant Yamaguchi, detailed to keep in close touch with Lai Tek and to
155collect information which he passed to them. Lai Tek had been taken
into custody with his whole family. Apparently the Kempeitai kept a
hold on some family members to ensure his compliance or threatened to
betray his collaborator activities to the MCP if he failed to perform
properly. His wife had a shop in Singapore but he himself was said to
156be constantly changing his address.
In making the bargain with Onishi, Lai Tek was mainly motivated 
by personal gain. If his prewar pattern of cooperation with the British 
authorities was any guide, Lai Tek would demonstrate once again that he 
had no scruples about sacrificing party members and officials to serve his 
personal interests. He had been intelligent enough not to reveal all 
that he knew, or all that the British authorities wanted to know about 
the Communist Party. This was evident by the fact that the MCP continued 
to be a main source of unrest between 1936 and 1941, when Lai Tek was 
known to be working as a police informant. Lai Tek was shrewd enough
154 Shinozaki, My Wartime Experiences in Singapore, 113.
155 Pers. comm, from Sartoru Onishi, Tokyo, to Professor Yoji Akashi 
of Nanzan University, 29 October 1976. I am grateful to Professor 
Akashi for putting several questions to Mr Onishi on my behalf.
156 Shinozaki, 113.
to realise that if he disclosed everything to the Government it would 
destroy the party organisation completely, and what had been a perennial 
source of trouble to the Government, and lead the police to dispense 
with his services as an informant. As far as Lai Tek was concerned the 
MCP, the British and the Japanese were merely different means for 
serving his own ends. In his dealings with the Kempeitai Lai Tek was 
to show again that he would scrupulously fulfil his part of the bargain - 
and give away little else.
The arrest of Lai Tek was, in fact, known to MCP officials in 
Singapore. In the wake of the Japanese sook chlngs the story which 
circulated within the party then, was that Lai Tek had been seen being 
picked up by the Japanese some time in March while he was riding on his 
red bicycle. he was suspected as a ’KMT cadre’, and when the Japanese 
found out that he was innocent, he was r e l e a s e d . T h e  communists
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157 This was revealed by Ng Yell Lu, a former Singapore Town Committee 
member of the MCP who was captured by the Japanese in April 1942, 
in his statement 'How MCP Central's Secretary General Lai Tek 
slaughtered KMT, MCP and Allied Forces cadres. To all people who love 
and protect the MCP and wish to uphold justice' (Ma-kung chung-yang 
tsung-shu- chi Lai T'e ju-ho sha-hai kuo-kung liang-tang chi lien- 
chun kan-pu kei yi-ch'ieh ai-hu Ma'kung yuan-hi ch-t'ai kung-tao-ti 
jen-men), in Guo jushi pao (International Times), Singapore, July/
August 1968, 20-28. Yeh Lu is now a prominent businessman and was until 
recently Singapore's ambassador to Japan. He is better known in 
Singapore by his new name Wee Mong Sim. His denunciation of Lai Tek 
is believed to have appeared first In a Penang Chinese newspaper 
(name unknown) in September 1945, but the story was regarded by the 
MCP as incredible and dismissed as the fabrication of a former 
Kempeitai. agent. Yeh Lu had, in fact, worked as a translator for the 
Kempeitai when he was released in 1943 after a year's detention. It 
was while working for the Kempeitai that he discovered that it had 
been his highly-respected party leader Lai Tek who had betrayed him and 
other MCP officials. Yeh Lu claims in his statement that his own 
conscience was clear as he did not betray any MCP member during his 
work for the Kempeitai. He was moved to write the statement to reveal 
the 'truth' to the party in order to help it get rid of the poisonous 
Lai Tek who was still in office and enjoying still greater influence 
after the war. The statement was published by Guo ]u shi pao for 
purposes of historical record, as the editor claims in his preface that 
the statement had been given to him by Yeh Lu in 1945 at the end of the 
war. Yeh Lu had also contacted the British police officer, A.E.G. Blades 
(who Jater became Commissioner of Police in Singapore) in an attempt to 
get the British to detain Lai Tek. Blades, however, advised Yeh Lu to 
leave the matter in police hands. Soon after this meeting, said the 
editor, instead of punishing Lai Tek for his betrayal of Lim Bo Seng and 
other Allied personnel, the British continued to use Lai Tek to control 
the MCP. See the editor's preface, 'Wo sou chi dao de Lai T'e yu Yeh Lu' 
(What I know about Lai Tek and Yeh Lu), 19, op.cit. The editor, Chuang 
llui-tsuan, was a former KMT member and a close friend of the late Lim 
Bo Seng. Anthony Short in his The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 
38-39, refers to Yeh Lu's denunciation, although he does not mention 
Yeh Lu's name or the name of the Penang newspaper which published it.
In a personal communication, dated 23 May 1978, Short confirms that 
the former Malaysian Commissioner of Police, the late Sir Claude 
Fenner, had told him that it was Ng Yeh Lu who had written the Penang 
article exposing Lai Tek. Cf. Miller, Menace in Malaya, 62.
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a p p a r e n t l y  d i d  n o t  want  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  a r r e s t  was t h e  end o f  t h e i r
s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l !  At t h a t  t ime  members o f  t h e  S in g a p o re  Town Committee
c o n g r a t u l a t e d  t h e m s e lv e s  on t h e i r  l u c k  b e c a u s e  o f  h i s  r e l e a s e .  The
p e r s o n a l i t y  c u l t  s u r r o u n d i n g  La i  Tek had been b u i l t  up d u r i n g  th e  l a s t
days b e f o r e  S in g a p o re  f e l l  i n t o  J a p a n e s e  h a n d s .  Banners  had been  h o s i t e d
o u t s i d e  t h e  S in g a p o re  MCP h e a d q u a r t e r s  p r o c l a i m i n g  ’ Suppor t  ou r  a b l e
l e a d e r  L a i  Te '  and ' L a i  Te t h e  most  l o y a l  d i s c i p l e  o f  S t a l i n ’ . MCP
c a d r e s  s t r o n g l y  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  i f  o n ly  La i  Tek c o u ld  s u r v i v e  t h e  f u t u r e
158o f  t h e  MCP would be b r i g h t .  Such f a i t h  b l i n d e d  p a r t y  o f f i c i a l s  to
any p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  he  co u ld  b e t r a y  them and made them i n c r e a s e  t h e i r
l o y a l t y  to  him.  I r o n i c a l l y ,  most  o f  t h e  o f f i c i a l s  i n  t h e  S i n g a p o re  Town
Committee  who r e j o i c e d  a t  La i  T e k ' s  r e l e a s e  were s h o r t l y  t o  be b e t r a y e d
by him t o  the  J a p a n e s e  and e i t h e r  k i l l e d  o r  i m p r i s o n e d .  Ng Yeh Lu, one
o f  the  i m p r i s o n e d  S i n g a p o re  Town Committee  was to  r e f l e c t  w i t h  some
i n s i g h t  a t  the  end of  t h e  war:
When we t h i n k  back we b e g i n  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  what  happened  
i n  March 1942. Then do we r e a l i s e  t h a t  whenever  t h e  
J a p a n e s e  a r r e s t e d  a p e r s o n ,  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  r e l e a s i n g  t h a t  p e r s o n ,  w h e t h e r  he was i n n o c e n t  o r  
n o t .  Tha t  i s  the  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  La i  Tek had a l r e a d y
I c n
c o l l a b o r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  J a p a n e s e  a t  t h a t  t im e .  y
When La i  T e k ' s  c o n n e c t i o n s  w i t h  the  K e m pe i t a i  were d i s c o v e r e d
by communists  im p r i s o n e d  in  S i n g a p o r e  a t  l e a s t  two known a t t e m p t s  were
made to  p a s s  the i n f o r m a t i o n  to  t h e  p a r t y  o u t s i d e .  Each t im e ,  however ,
La i  Tek s u c c e e d e d  i n  n e u t r a l i s i n g  t h e i r  a c t i o n s .  Some t im e a f t e r  J u l y
1943, a S i n g a p o re  C e n t r a l  Commit tee  member named Li  Ying Kang made t h e
d i s c o v e r y  and managed t o  p a s s  a message  t o  p a r t y  comrades o u t s i d e  t h e
p r i s o n .  C u r i o u s l y ,  t h e  word g o t  back  to  La i  Tek who t h e n  d e v i o u s l y
c o n t r i v e d  h i s  r e l e a s e .  When Li  r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  c o n t a c t s  w i t h  t h e  p a r t y ,
h i s  s t o r y  was d i s b e l i e v e d  and h i s  i n t e g r i t y  was q u e s t i o n e d .  He f a i l e d
t o  g e t  a pa rdon  from t h e  p a r t y  and was b u r i e d  a l i v e  i n  J u ro n g  ( S in g a p o r e )
In A p r i l  1944 a n o t h e r  r e l e a s e d  communist ,  Ah L ing ,  of  t h e  S in g a p o re
Town Commit tee ,  a t t e m p t e d  to  p a s s  a message  to  p a r t y  o f f i c i a l s ,  b u t  he
160was e x e c u t e d  In  J o h o r  Bahru,  a p p a r e n t l y  as  a ’ t r a i t o r ’ to  the  p a r t y .
158 Ng Yeh Lu, o p . c i t . ,  23.
159 I b i d .
160 I b i d .
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In most cases Lai Tek and the Kempeitai ingeniously used released 
communists as 'scapegoats', so that the party would suspect these former 
detainees as having betrayed the party.
Japanese sources confirm that Lai Tek was responsible for the 
arrest or elimination of the MCP's entire prewar Central Executive 
Committee throughout Malaya and the break-up of the whole communist 
network in Singapore by April 1943. The betrayals began in May when he 
revealed the identities of the Singapore Town Committee members who were 
subsequently arrested or killed in Japanese raids on their homes or 
meeting places." This was followed by further arrests in July in Johor 
when he exposed the Johor State Committee, lie then moved to Negri 
Sembilan, Malacca and Selangor, passing back details to the Kempeitai 
each time he made contact with the MCP committees.^^
The MCP's Central Executive Committee before their elimination 
succeeded in convening a meeting on 30 May 1942. Apparently Lai Tek 
attended the meeting which carried out an 'analysis of the present 
political situation'. The Committee's conclusion was that the anti- 
Japanese struggle was a struggle for the national liberation of Malaya, 
and should thus be extended to prevent the Americans or the British 
from returning to rule Malaya. The anti-Japanese struggle had to be 
coordinated with favourable international conditions, especially the 
victory of Soviet Russia. More importantly, the Committee stressed the 
party should rely on its own strength and on the strength of the Malayan 
people in order to coordinate its counter-offensive with those of the 
Allied Powers. 'The future of Malaya should be decided by the people
162themselves and by the strength of the party', the Committee declared. 
This decision meant the party would launch an all-out struggle against
161 Personal communication from Sartoru Onishi, Tokyo, to Professor 
YojiAkashiof Nanzan University, 29 October 1976. See also 
Major Isaacs' report in The Malay Mail, 31 August 1953.
162 Nan Tao Chih Ch'un, 24. Yap Hong Kuan quotes from a secret MCP 
document dated 'January 1945' containing identical points as in 
Nan Tao Chih Ch'un which, however, dates the resolution as '30 May 
1942'. Yap's source is the Special Branch file OF/A/1/81 (Y)
No.31 based on information obtained during interrogation of 
Kempeitai officials.
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both the Japanese and the British, and take advantage of any opportunity 
to seize power.
However, in August 1942 Lai Tek began a plot to liquidate the 
CEC. Through the Selangor State Committee leader So Chun he arranged to 
be present at a full meeting of the CEC, State party officials and group 
leaders of the MPAJA at the Batu Caves, some ten miles from Kuala Lumpur.
The meeting was to review the party's political and military struggle. 
Information on the meeting was relayed by Lai Tek to Onishi, who took 
personal charge of the initial investigation. The Batu Caves is a 
popular holiday picnic area. Taking advantage of this fact, one or two 
Sundays before the fateful day some Japanese soldiers with a number of 
cabaret girls were seen frolicking and picnicking in the area. Outwardly 
they seemed just ordinary soldiers, but in fact they were Kempeitai officers 
in disguise. They were surveying the area and collecting information 
for Onishi.
Lai Tek had called the party meeting in a small village near
the Caves. On the last day of August a large number of Japanese troops
164moved into position. At daybreak of 1 September, as the group leaders,
CEC members and their bodyguards were resting in the village, the 
Japanese attacked. The battle was reported to be fierce, but when it 
ended 29 party officials, including four MPAJA 'Political Commissars’ 
and their bodyguards were dead, 15 were arrested and only a handful 
managed to e s c a p e . C h a p m a n  narrates how a girl guerrilla was the 
heroine of the clash: 'While the men made their escape a girl gave them
163 Isaacs' report in The Malay Mail, 31 August 1953.
164 Hai Shang Ou, 35, claims that there were more than 1,000 Japanese 
troops involved in the operation.
165 Sartoru Onishi, ’Malai Kyosanto chuo taikai no tobatsu' (Raids on 
the Central Committee of the Malayan Communist Party) in the 
National Association of Military Police, Nippon Kempei Seishi 
(Official History of the Japanese Military Police), Tokyo, 1976,
984. Hai Shang Ou, 35, claims that over 100 MCP officials and 
members were killed. Among those reported killed were Hsiao Chung, 
CEC member and Chu Wei, political Commissar of The Fourth Independent 
Regiment, MPAJA (South Johor). The Kempeitai figures appear to be
be more reliable.
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c o v e r i n g  f i r e  w i t h  a Tommy gun u n t i l  she  h e r s e l f  was s h o t ' . ^ ^
J a p a n e s e  c a s u a l t i e s  were one NCO k i l l e d  and t h r e e  s o l d i e r s  i n j u r e d .
A number of  machine  guns ,  a u t o m a t i c  r i f l e s  and g r e n a d e s  were r e c o v e r e d
and s e v e r a l  p r i n t i n g  p r e s s e s  s e i z e d .
Those who e s c a p e d  i m m e d ia te ly  went  i n t o  c o n f e r e n c e  to  r ev i e w
t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  to  c o u n t  t h e i r  dead and wonder who had b e t r a y e d  them.
One t h i n g  g l a d d e n e d  t h e i r  h e a r t s .  La i  Tek ,  t h e  s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l ,
had n o t  a r r i v e d  and was t h e r e f o r e  s a f e .  La i  Tek,  i n  f a c t ,  was ' s i t t i n g
168p e a c e f u l l y  and c o n t e n t e d l y  i n  h i s  own home i n  S i n g a p o r e ' .  S u b s e q u e n t l y
th e  J a p a n e s e  K e m p e i t a i  th rew  a r e c e p t i o n  t o  c e l e b r a t e  the  e v e n t .  As
I s a a c s  r e l a t e d  the  o c c a s i o n :
. . . t h e  K em peit a i  i n  Kuala  Lumpur were t o a s t i n g  Major  
O n i s h i  who s u p p l i e d  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  o b t a i n e d  i n  
S i n g a p o r e .  I f  you had been  i n  Major  O n i s h i ' s  p r i v a t e  
rooms, you would have been  a s t o n i s h e d  f o r  O n i s h i  
was t o a s t i n g  none o t h e r  t h a n  th e  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  MCP,
L a i  Tek h i m s e l f . 169
Some t im e  a f t e r  1944,  Major  O n i s h i  w r o te  b r i e f l y  in  t h e  Kem pe i t a i  
magazine  an a c c o u n t  o f  how to  make use  o f  c o u n t e r —s p i e s . I t  i s  an
i n t e r e s t i n g  bu t  d i r t y  s t o r y  -  d i s t r u s t ,  d o u b l e - c r o s s ,  s e l l i n g  your  
f r i e n d s ,  c o v e r i n g  up y o u r s e l f ' ,  r e c a l l s  a J a p a n e s e  w r i t e r .
When he met  p a r t y  o f f i c i a l s  l a t e r ,  L a i  Tek c o n s o le d  them. He 
s a i d  t h a t  the  p a r t y ' s  l o s s e s  meant  t h a t  e v e r y o n e  would have to  work h a r d e r .  
He t o l d  them t h e  c a r  which  he was u s i n g  t o  come up from S in g a p o re  had 
b roken  d o w n . * ^  The MCP s e t  down 1 Sep tem ber  a s  the  d a t e  on which  a n n u a l l y
166 Chapman, 159-60.
167 S a r t o r u  O n i s h i ,  'R a i d s  on th e  C e n t r a l  Commit tee  o f  t h e  Malayan 
Communist P a r t y ' ,  984.
168 I s a a c s '  r e p o r t  in  The Malay M a i l , 31 August  1953.
169 I b i d .
170 S h i n o z a k i ,  113.
171 I s a a c s '  r e p o r t ,  The Malay M a i l , 31 Augus t  1953, c l a i m s  t h a t u 
La i  Tek was i n  S in g a p o re  when t h e  i n c i d e n t  a t  t h e  Batu Caves
o c c u r r e d .  However,  Anthony S h o r t ,  The Communist  I n s u r r e c t i o n _i n
Ma l a y a , 20, s a y s  t h a t  La i  Tek was t hen  known to  be i n  Kuala  Lumpur, 
n o t  f a r  from the  Batu Caves.
134
they would commemorate the 'martyrs' who had lost their lives at the Batu 
Caves village. After this incident communist activities in the urban 
centres of Malaya were temporarily at a standstill. There is a theory that 
Lai Tek's reason for betraying the CEC and State group leaders to the 
Kempeitai was to purge the party of those who were getting too strong and 
were liable to wrest control from him. However, given the bargain which
172Lai Tek had struck with Major Onishi, this theory is purely speculative.
Some time in October some of the remaining CEC members arrived 
in Singapore to revive the Singapore Town Committee. They set up a 
secret organisation known as the 'Self-Defence Corps' which published a 
periodical called 'Self-Defence Monthly' and tried to recruit new members, 
to reorganise the Singapore Committee's branches and to raise morale.
But on 19 December, following a tip-off from Lai Tek, the Kempeitai raided 
the meeting-place and eliminated these officers. After this raid the 
Kempeitai was alerted for further MCP action as this December 1942 report 
shows:
The MCP is suffering from the numerous arrests and 
scarcity of food. Their economic difficulties are 
increasing all the time. It may not be easy for 
them to re-establish the MCP again. However, as 
has been seen in the past, remaining communists will 
reorganise the party. We should not relax and allow 
them to do so.
According to information we have received, the measures 
the communists are likely to take are: (a) To strengthen
unity among the party and armed units; (b) to intensify 
political and military training of members; and (c) to 
obtain money from people and sympathisers, based on 
their cultural propaganda.... We must take the 
initiative to eliminate the MCP vigorously at this 
time it is declining.173
In February 1943 Lai Tek was reported to have convened a meeting 
of the 'rump' CEC which adopted a nine-point programme, the first objective
172 Major Isaacs puts out this theory in The Malay Mail, 31 August 1945.
173 The Japanese Malayan Military Administration, Police Department, 
'Malai ni okeru chianjo ichiko satsu' (Observations on the 
security situation in Malaya), December 1942, 14, in the Tokugawa 
Papers, Self-Defence Agency archives, Tokyo. See also Sartoru 
Onishi, 'Malai kyosanto chuo taikai no tobatsu' (Raids on the 
Malayan Communist Party), in Nippon Kempei Seishi, 984.
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of which was to expel the 'Japanese Fascists' from Malaya and to establish 
a 'Malayan Democratic Republic'. The other aims of the programme 
included an elected 'national government', the establishment of democracy, 
improvement of the people's livelihood, free education in all languages, 
and absorption of the Anti-Japanese Army into a National Army. The 
party would combine with Soviet Russia and China to support 'the struggles 
for independence of the oppressed nations in the Far East*, as well as 
joining with the Japanese people 'to fight against Fascism'.
By April 1943 none of the Central Committee members who were
elected into office during the Sixth and Seventh Expanded conferences
] 75of the CEC was left except Lai Tek. From January to April 1943 the
Kempeltai continued to carry out raids and arrests in Singapore to 
disrupt attempts made to reorganise the Singapore Town Committee. Either 
the communists were not reading the danger signs clearly or they were 
provoked by Lai Tek to show themselves. In January 1943, seven Singapore 
Town Committee members were arrested. A few days later five more were 
picked up. MCP officials tried to revive activities again in April, and 
this time eleven MCP members were arrested. In each of these incidents 
Lai Tek was said to have informed the Kempeitai, by providing the 
number of persons involved, their names, the time and place of the 
meeting. After this raid communist activities in Singapore were reported 
to have ceased completely.
The Kempeitai's successful operations began to raise suspicions 
about traitors within the party and led to several purges. The Fifth 
Independent Regiment of the MPAJA in Perak formed mobile 'killer squads' 
to hunt down suspected party traitors and police informers. In August 
1943 their Ipoh 'killer squad' succeeded in killing 24 informers and 
detectives. Onishi recalls that these counter-ingelligence operations 
were so successful that he told Lai Tek to 'lie low' for a while.
1 74 Nan Tao Chili Ch ' un, 25.
175 An th o n y Short, The Con ununis t Insurrection in Malaya, 22.
176 'Malai ni okeru chianjo ichiko satsu', 15; see also Sartoru 
Onishi, 'Malai kyosanto chuo taikai no tobatsu', 984.
177 Sartoru Onishi, pers. comm, to Professor Yoji Akashi.
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D e s p i t e  t h e s e  MPAJA e f f o r t s ,  La i  T e k ’ s c o n t a c t s  w i t h  t h e
K e m pe i t a i  were n o t  d i s c o v e r e d .  His p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  MCP remained
u n c h a l l e n g e d .  In  f a c t ,  a f t e r  A p r i l  1943, t h e r e  was n e i t h e r  a p r o p e r
C e n t r a l  Committee  n o r  P o l i t b u r o .  L a i  Tek now ran  t h e  p a r t y  s i n g l e - h a n d e d .
He made a l l  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  h i m s e l f  and c o n s u l t e d  on ly  t h o s e  whom he t r u s t e d .
He k e p t  h i s  movements s e c r e t ,  and m a i n t a i n e d  c o n t a c t s  o n ly  w i t h  c e r t a i n
key e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  MCP and MPAJA n e tw o rk .  He d id  n o t  seem to  c a r e  v e ry
much f o r  t h e  MPAJU. His  c o n t a c t s  r e g u l a r l y  r e p o r t e d  a r e a  a c t i v i t i e s
to  him.  The f a c t  t h a t  he k e p t  the  MPAJA o r g a n i s a t i o n  i n t a c t  and
o p e r a t i o n a l  and a number o f  t h e  p a r t y ' s  S t a t e  and d i s t r i c t  Commit tee
o f f i c i a l s  ’ l o y a l ’ to  him a l i v e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  he had h i s  own p l a n s  f o r  t h e
communist movement. O n i s h i  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  i t  was on ly  when th e  B r i t i s h
i n t e r r o g a t e d  him a t  t h e  end o f  t h e  war t h a t  he came to  know t h a t  La i
Tek had h e l d  back  a g r e a t  d e a l  of  i n f o r m a t i o n  from him. O n i s h i  gave
t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  Lai  T e k ’s c o n d u c t :
. . . h e  [Lai Tek] was f a r - s i g h t e d .  He r e a l i s e d  t h a t  
J a p a n  would n o t  win t h e  war ;  t h e r e f o r e  he d i d  
n o t h i n g  to  damage the r e a l  war e f f o r t  as  he was 
l o o k i n g  fo rw ard  to  h i s  f u t u r e  a s - d i c t a t o r  of  t h e  
Malayan Communist P a r t y .
Th is  was an ex p o s t  f a c t o  c o n c l u s i o n  which  O n i s h i  made unde r  B r i t i s h  
i n t e r r o g a t i o n .  I t  was p r o b a b l y  meant a s  a w a rn in g  to  t h e  B r i t i s h  of  
the  dange r  which Lai  Tek m igh t  pose  to  them. Tha t  La i  Tek i n c r e a s e d  
h i s  powers  and c o n s o l i d a t e d  h i s  p o s i t i o n  d u r i n g  th e  o c c u p a t i o n  was 
i n c i d e n t a l  to  h i s  p r im a ry  and unsw erv ing  aim o f  s e r v i n g  h i s  s e l f - i n t e r e s t .
La i  T e k ' s  sys tem  o f  c o n t a c t s  i n  m a in la n d  Malaya was i n c r e d i b l y  
open.  He t r a v e l l e d  w i t h  e a s e ,  by c a r  on t h e  main r o a d s ,  and y e t  t h i s  i s  
n o t  known t o  have a r o u s e d  p a r t y  s u s p i c i o n s .  Not c o n t e n t  w i t h  r e c e i v i n g  
r e g u l a r  r e p o r t s  from MCP c o u r i e r s  a t  h i s  S i n g a p o r e  b a s e ,  La i  Tek made 
p e r s o n a l  v i s i t s  to  P e r a k ,  S e l a n g o r  and n o r t h  J o h o r  once a month i n  o r d e r  
to  keep i n  touch  w i t h  t h e  more i m p o r t a n t  S t a t e  l e a d e r s .  D i s t r i c t  
Committee  and MPAJA commanders o f  o t h e r  s t a t e s  would send  m essages  o r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  to  meet  him a t  s e c r e t  p l a c e s .  A M orr i s  8 I I .P.  S a lo o n ,  
b e a r i n g  No.S4678,  the  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  S i n g a p o re  K e m p e i t a i , was used by 
La i  Tek i n  h i s  t r i p s .  O c c a s i o n a l l y  h i s  V ie tnam ese  m i s t r e s s  accompanied  him.
178 Quoted by Major  I s a a c s  i n  h i s  r e p o r t  i n  The Malay M a i l , 31 August  1953.
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The first place visited was usually Kuala Lumpur, where Lai Tek would
either stay at the Coliseum Hotel in Batu Road, or at a Chinese hotel in
t 179Jalan Sultan.
The contact point in Kuala Lumpur was a Chinese sundry goods
shop at the comer of Klang Road’. It was here that Lai Tek would be
informed by his men of the place of meeting and would be provided with
a guide. The normal venue for meetings with communist leaders was a
mill, 12 miles out on the Ipoh Road. Yeung Kuo, the Selangor State
Secretary, and other communist leaders would then report to him of the
180situation regarding other districts.
Perak would be the next place of call, and near Bidor Lai Tek
would meet Chin Peng, the Perak State Secretary, of whom Lai Tek was
extremely fond. Then aged 24, Chin Peng was known as Lai Tek's ’little
boy', and was slowly being groomed by Lai Tek as his second-in-command.
In 1943 Lai Tek appointed him a member of the Central Standing Committee,
a member of the Military High Command and a representative of the MPAJA
to liase with Force 136 officers. Despite his close association with
Lai Tek, Chin Peng appears not to have known of Lai Tek's contacts with
the Kempeitai. It was Chin Peng who subsequently played a leading part
in the investigations which unmasked Lai Tek's subsequent role as British 
182agent.
181
Lai Tek's monthly trips to the mainland, during which he 
discussed party affairs with important communist leaders, lasted two 
or three days and were carried out with the full knowledge of the Kempeitai. 
Lai Tek had a special arrangement with the South Johor district committees 
who organised secret contacts which delivered to him written messages 
by the independent regiments of the MPAJA. Couriers, usually women,
179 Special Branch File OF/A/1/81 (Y) No.31, cited in Yap Hong Kuan,
50. In April 1945, Davis, Broome, Chapman and Colonel J.P. Hannah, 
who had parachuted into Davis' camp, met Lai Tek at a mill nearby.
As usual he told the group a story of how he got there in a Japanese 
car by bribing the driver. Statement of J.P. Hannah to Yap Hong 
Kuan, 67.
180 Yap Hong Kuan, 50.
181 Ibid., 33.
182 McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, 310.
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would carry these messages to Singapore. They travelled mainly by
rail, as it was found that the stations were not carefully watched by
the Kempeitai. On arrival at Singapore couriers would disembark at
Bukit Timah. At the contact point they would request a personal meeting
with Lai Tek, and hand him messages personally. There were occasions
when Lai Tek met couriers personally at Bukit Timah station. Messages
were all written in code. Very small pieces of paper 10 cm. square were
183used for reports, so the characters had to be written very small.
As a result of his cultivation of a 'faithful* party leadership
a cult of personality grew up around Lai Tek. His aliases were legion,
but everyone in the party knew that it was their secretary-general.
Not only party members but supporters had heard of his superhuman qualities.
Circulating around him were numerous anecdotes and fables. An Englishman
who stayed with a MPAJA regiment in south Johor recalled how one Chinese
MCP member rhapsodized about the great wisdom of Lao Wu (another of
Lai Tek's aliases) with the following anecdote: 'During a bicycle journey
from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore (over 200 miles) Lao Wu saw a poor crippled
184worker. He gave him the bicycle and finished his journey on foot'.
Lai Tek left the MPAJA very much alone, under its own High 
Command. The reason for this is probably it was a British creation.
It was likely to prove of value to him subsequently if the fortunes 
of war changed in favour of the British and the Allied Powers, as it 
eventually did. However, Lai Tek initially appears to have been 
somewhat doubtful about the British ability to mount a successful counter­
offensive against the Japanese. There are indications to show that some 
time between July and October 1943, when the three Force 136 officers - 
Davis, Broome and Lim Bo Seng - had landed on the Perak coast, Lai Tek 
passed information he had obtained from MCP agents to Onishi. He gave 
details of their landing sites, and Onishi deployed a large Singapore
183 Yap Hong Kuan, 141.
184 John Cross, Red Jungle, 93. Chapman also mentions Lai Tek's 
legendary abilities, one of which was to pass through Japanese 
positions easily. Stories were told in his camp of the MCP secretary- 
general being credited with innumerable attributes - 'being able
to pilot an aeroplane, drive a tank, speak many languages, and 
hoodwink the Japanese in any way he liked'. Cf. Chapman, 58.
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Kempeitai field force to Terak to comb the area. But the three
Force 136 officers had vanished into the jungle while their KMT agents 
had been safely set up in cover jobs in Ipoh. The Kempeitai raids, 
however, recovered all the supplies, wireless sets and arms which the 
Force 136 officers had hidden on the beach.
Based on further information from Lai Tek, more raids were
carried out on the Perak coast and a scheduled rendezvous with a British
submarine by the Force 136 officers was disrupted. Onishi claims that
due to the information Lai Tek gave, arrangements were also made with
the Japanese Navy and Air Force which succeeded in sinking the submarine.
Despite the damning Kempeitai evidence which has turned up against Lai
Tek, Davis and Broome have taken an extremely charitable view of Lai
Tek’s role as a Japanese informer. They maintain that Lai Tek did
not betray any British officer to the Japanese and the death of Major
Paddy Martin, the Force 136 officer who landed in Kota Tinggi in east
Johor in March 1945, was not due to Lai Tek at all. Broome says:
We [Davis and he] did not know that Lai Tek was a 
Japanese informer. The thought may have crossed 
our minds, but if so we rejected it. I feel fairly 
safe in saying, also, that he did not betray any 
British officer. I have no direct information about 
Major Martin, but Davis does not think it was a
betrayal. In fact I think with regard to our mission
Lai Tek worked perfectly genuinely, in spite of all 
that has been revealed.
It would seem that Davis and Broome set much store by the agreement which 
they subsequently concluded with Lai Tek. Either on 31 December 1943 or 
1 January 1944 at Blantan, a camp in the Perak jungle, Lai Tek under
the alias ’Chang Hong’ and Chin Peng met Major Chapman and the three
Force 136 officers - Davis, Broome and Lim Bo Seng - for talks on MPAJA
185 Sartoru Onishi, ’Teki sensuikan no senyu chosha' (Espionage 
agents smuggled by submarine) in Nippon Kempei Seishi, 987. See 
also Ng Yeh Lu, 28.
186 Ibid.
187 Pers. comm, from Richard Broome, Dorset, England, 18 January 1978.
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assistance for the Allied cause. Details of the agreement have been
discussed above. None of the British officers knew the true identity of
’Chang Hong’ until after the war. Chapman reported that at this meeting
'Chang Ilong' whom Chapman called 'the Plen' (short for plenipotentiary) was
'most meticulous in getting a clear-cut decision on every decision,
discussing each point in detail, and it was equally clear that he meant
to stand by everything in detail.' However, Chapman also noticed that
there was a 'certain air of cautiousness and even cynicism'. The
'cautiousness and cynicism' apparently referred to Lai Tek's behaviour, and
might explain his doubts about the Allied potential for a counter-offensive.
He was carefully weighing his options, and the agreement meant that he had
decided to play a double game. In his post-war report to the MCP's Central
Committee in January 1946, Lai Tek said that the CEC had sent 'Chang Hong'
(meaning himself) in September 1943 to conclude a military pact with the
189Allies 'for the sake of liberating Malaya from Japanese fascist rule.'
At this meeting Lai Tek must have discovered the true identity 
of Lint Bo Seng, even though the latter used the alias 'Tan Choon Lim', 
for in March 1944 as Lim Bo Seng moved down to Ipoh to contact his KMT 
agents, Lai Tek informed the Kempeitai. Lim Bo Seng and his agents were 
all rounded up.^^a Thus, the KMT intelligence network collapsed, leaving 
Davis, Broome and Chapman helpless and dependent on the MPAJA. Lai Tek 
could have proceeded to betray the three men and the whole Force 136 in 
Malaya subsequently, but he refrained from doing so. It was in this latter 
respect that Davis and Broome may be right in stating that Lai Tek did not 
betray them - when he certainly could have done so.
Subsequently Chin Peng reported to Davis that the agreement 
had been ratified by the Central Executive Committee of the MCP. This 
apparently comprised Lai Tek, Chin Peng and a few other 'faithful'
State Committee officials, carefully handpicked by Lai Tek. On 15 April 
1945 a second meeting was held between the MCP representatives, 'Chang 
Hong' (Lai Tek) and Chin Peng, and Davis, Broome and Chapman. Major 
Lim Bo Seng's absence must have been noted, but there is no record of 
it having been raised by anyone at this meeting, which was concerned 
with ratifying the points reached in the earlier agreement. Apparently 
because he had now read clear signs that the Allies were going to win
188 Chapman, 249.
189 See Lai T'e's report, op.cit. , 5.
189a Sartoru Onishi, 'Espionage agents smuggled by submarine', in
Nippon Kempei Seishi, 987-988. Some details of Lim Bo Seng's arrest 
are given in Chapman, 375.
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the war, Lai Tek appeared more accommodating than a year before. John
Davis, on recollection, believes that Lai Tek then knew that his life
would later depend on the British, even though the British did not know
190then that he was working with the Japanese. The extent of concessions
which Lai Tek is believed to have made to the British at this second meeting
on behalf of the MCP may be gauged from Chapman's succinct account:
...at this conference the atmosphere from the beginning 
was one of complete understanding and cordiality: there
was no bargaining whatsoever. It seemed clear that the 
Plen had come from his headquarters with instructions 
to 'get on with the war' and there was not a point of 
disagreement throughout. He was perfectly frank about 
the powers and limitations of the guerrillas, and whenever 
we hesitated to ask him to do things, he not only consented 
but usually broke in to go further than we asked. No 
written agreements were made or were necessary, as the 
conference was largely devoted to methods of carrying 
out the agreement previously made. The principle arrived 
at was the tactical decentralization of the guerrillas, 
increase of powers for all their officers, and 
encouragement of individual initiative.
After spending most of the night encoding and sending 
reports of the conference to Colombo, we returned to 
Burun [base camp] with the feeling that all the guerrillas 
would now be told that it was their duty to cooperate to 
thefull with British officers, and that the days of 
shilly-shallying and secretiveness were over. 191-
In May 1945 Germany unconditionally surrendered to the Allied
Powers. If Lai Tek was reading the signs he knew that this meant that
the whole military might of the Allies would now be shifted to defeating
Japan. Lai Tek might have calculated that it would be a matter of time
before the war was over. If he wanted the MPAJA to seize power, he had
to make elaborate preparations. According to one writer, the idea of
opposing the British had in fact been canvassed in the closing stages of
the war amongst sections of the MPAJA. In Johor, in particular, suggestions
had been made that all Force 136 officers attached to MPAJA units should
be killed and the forces of reoccupation be presented with a takeover
192of power as a fait accompli. However, nothing came out of this
190 John Davis, interview at his home, Kent, April 1976.
191 Chapman, 375.
192 Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 34.
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s u g g e s t i o n  a p p a r e n t l y  b e c a u s e  La i  Tek v e to e d  i t .  A l though  t h e  MCP had 
a 1943 programme which a d v o c a t e d  ’ a Malayan D em ocra t i c  R e p u b l i c '  as  i t s  
p r im a ry  g o a l  a f t e r  t h e  ' J a p a n e s e  F a s c i s t s '  had been e x p e l l e d ,  i t  a p p e a r s  
t h a t  i t  was n o t  L a i  Tek who was i n t e r e s t e d  i n  s e i z u r e  o f  power.  The 
i d e a  o f  a r e p u b l i c  had been  worked ou t  by members o f  t h e  p rew ar  CEC 
b e f o r e  th e y  were e l i m i n a t e d  by th e  K e m p e i t a i . However, s i n c e  
t h e s e  p o l i c i e s  had g e a r e d  t h e  communist  c a d r e s  to  a m i l i t a n t  s t r u g g l e  
f o r  n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n ,  t h e r e  was a l i k e l i h o o d  o f  d i s s e n s i o n  and c o n f l i c t  
i f  t h e  p a r t y  f a i l e d  to  c o n t i n u e  w i t h  a r e v o l u t i o n a r y  l i n e .  The i s s u e  
came t o  a head  when t h e  J a p a n e s e  s u r r e n d e r ,  announced  on 15 August  1945, 
became known to  t h e  p a r t y .
At a m e e t in g  o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  E x e c u t i v e  Committee  o f  t h e  MCP,
L iu  Yau, c ha i rm an  o f  t h e  p a r t y ' s  M i l i t a r y  A f f a i r s  Commit tee ,  was r e p o r t e d
t o  have  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  p a r t y  c a r r y  o u t  a coup d ' e t a t , so as  t o  p r e s e n t
t h e  B r i t i s h  w i t h  a f a i t  a c c o m p l i  b e f o r e  t h e i r  r e t u r n .  But he was
193o v e r r u l e d  by La i  Tek who a d v i s e d  a g a i n s t  such  a move. ~ La i  T e k ' s
a t t i t u d e  was s a i d  to  have  been  i n f l u e n c e d  by h i s  f e a r  t h a t  Chiang Ka i -
s h e k ' s  t r o o p s  m igh t  be s e n t  t e m p o r a r i l y  t o  occupy Malaya o r  p a r t  o f  i t .
La i  Tek wavered  unde r  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o f  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  and even  when he
saw t h a t  t h e  C h inese  N a t i o n a l i s t  t r o o p s  would n o t  a f t e r  a l l  be moving
i n t o  M alaya ,  he s t i l l  opposed  t h e  i d e a  when he r e a l i s e d  what  t h e  B r i t i s h
194m i l i t a r y  o p p o s i t i o n  to  such a move m igh t  be .  From t h i s  a c c o u n t ,
i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  La i  Tek had d e c i d e d  to  c o o p e r a t e  w i th  t h e  B r i t i s h  a g a i n .  
While t h e  o t h e r s  in  t h e  CEC were keen  on t h e  coup d ' e t a t , on ly  L a i  Tek 
was a g a i n s t  i t .  As he h e l d  t h e  powers  w i t h i n  the  p a r t y ,  h i s  v o i c e  was 
d e c i s i v e .
La i  Tek was a l s o  s a i d  to  have  t u r n e d  down a l a s t - m i n u t e  
r e q u e s t  o f  Ib ra h im  Y a a c o b ' s  Malay Giyu Gun made to  t h e  MCP/MPAJA 
to  j o i n  t h e i r  f o r c e s  to  f o r e s t a l l  t h e  r e t u r n  o f  the  B r i t i s h  
and to  f i g h t  f o r  Malayan i n d e p e n d e n c e .  On 18 August  1945 I b ra h i m  
d e s p a t c h e d  a 2 8 0 - s t r o n g  u n i t  o f  t h e  Giyu Gun b a s ed  in  S in g a p o re  to  
Malaya to  p l a c e  th em s e lv e s  a t  the  command of  MPAJA H e a d q u a r t e r s ,  b u t  
the f o l l o w i n g  day the  f o r c e  was s t o p p e d  a t  Muar by the  MPAJA.
193 O ' B a l l a n c e ,  62 -63 .
194 I b i d .
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Two days l a t e r  t h e  Giyu Gun f o r c e  was t o l d  to  d i s b a n d ,  as  t h e  MCP/MPAJA had
d e c i d e d  n o t  to  r e s i s t  t h e  r e t u r n i n g  B r i t i s h  b e c a u s e  t h e  A l l i e d  Radio i n  New
D e lh i  had  r e p o r t e d  b r o a d c a s t  a s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  G overnm en t ' s
i n t e n t i o n  to  e s t a b l i s h  a d e m o c r a t i c  government  i n  Malaya on t h e  B r i t i s h  r e t u r n .
I b r a h i m  Yaacob has  b i t t e r l y  c r i t i c i s e d  L a i  Tek f o r  r e j e c t i n g  t h i s  o p p o r t u n i t y
to  c o n t i n u e  t h e  armed s t r u g g l e ,  s a y i n g ,  'T hose  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a l l o w i n g  th e
195B r i t i s h  to  r e t u r n  a r e  t h e  MCP MPAJA l e a d e r  L a i  Tek and h i s  c o m r a d e s . '
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e  m in u te s  o f  t h i s  c r u c i a l  m e e t in g  o f  t h e  MCP's
CEC a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  and one can on ly  c o n j e c t u r e  what  o t h e r  a rgum e n ts  L a i
Tek must have  p r e s e n t e d  t o  win t h e  CEC o v e r  t o  h i s  v iew s .  Regarded  as  an
e x p e r i e n c e d  communist  w i t h  CCP and Comin te rn  b a c k g ro u n d ,  La i  Tek migh t
have  c o n v in c e d  t h e  CEC t h a t  a m o d era te  p o l i c y  was ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h e  p a r t y ' s
own b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  and a c o r r e c t  r e a d i n g  o f  t h e  Comin te rn  l i n e  o f  t h e
' P o p u l a r  F r o n t ' . He a d v o c a t e d  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h .  As t h e
S o v i e t  Union was an a l l y  o f  B r i t a i n ,  America and Ch ina ,  t h i s  was s t i l l
a c c e p t a b l e .  As a w a r - t i m e  a l l y  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h ,  t h e  MCP co u ld  b e n e f i t  f rom
p o s tw a r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  m ea su res  which  t h e  B r i t i s h  migh t  be e x p e c t e d  to
i n t r o d u c e  i n  Malaya on t h e i r  r e t u r n .  C o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  MCP's e x c e l l e n t
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  SEAC, t h i s  was s t i l l  a c r e d i b l e  p o s i t i o n .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,
c o o p e r a t i o n  meant  B r i t i s h  i n t e n t i o n s  c o u ld  be t e s t e d ,  and i f  t h e y  were
w i l l i n g  to  b r i n g  a bou t  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t  and a l l o w  t h e  MCP t o  o p e r a t e
u n h i n d e r e d ,  deve lo pm en ts  would t h e n  h e l p  t h e  p a r t y  t o  move i n  the
d i r e c t i o n  o f  a c h i e v i n g  power.  The CEC' s  d e c i s i o n  to  abandon r e v o l u t i o n
was c o l l e c t i v e .  But La i  Tek,  a s  a p rew ar  B r i t i s h  a g e n t ,  had
c e r t a i n l y  encou raged  such m i l d  s t r a t e g i e s  b e c a u s e  t h e s e  were s t r a t e g i e s
which he knew the B r i t i s h  d e s i r e d .  McLane s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a d v i c e  g i v e n  to
t h e  MCP by t h e  C h inese  and B r i t i s h  communist  p a r t i e s  i n t h e  p o s t - w a r  p e r i o d
196t e n d e d  to  s u p p o r t  La i  T e k ' s  m o d e r a te  p o l i c i e s ,  a l t h o u g h  th e y  p l a y e d  
no p a r t  i n  i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  Augus t  d e c i s i o n .
As a r e s u l t  of  t h e  CEC's d e c i s i o n ,  on 27 August  1945 ( f i v e  
days a f t e r  t h e  J a p a n e s e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  Malaya had co n f i rm e d  news of
195 See I b ra h im  Yaacob,  S e k i t a r  Malaya M erdeka , 35.
196 McLane, 313.
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the surrender), the party announced to the public its intention to
cooperate with the British government but to demand that it carry out
reforms, grant civil liberties and improve the people's standard of
living. The lengthy manifesto of the CEC issued by the party's Selangor
State Committe gave an analysis of the 'favourable' international situation
197and internal conditions which the end of the war had brought about.
The MCP indicated that with the defeat of Japan, the party's 
armed struggle had come to an end. Britain was returning to rule Malaya, 
and the party would cooperate with the British administration because 
such cooperation seemed most advantageous to the interests of the party 
in the present situation. The party's manifesto contained an eight- 
point programme which the CEC had adopted:
1. Support the Allies of the Soviet Union, China,
Britain and America and the new International Peace 
Organisation [i.e., the United Nations].
2. Establish a democratic government with an elected 
National Assembly and an elected State Assembly 
based on an electorate drawn from all races in each 
State and the Anti-Japanese Army.
3. Abolish Fascism, Japanese political structure, and 
laws.
4. Allow freedom of speech, publications, societies, 
and public meetings. Assure the legal position of 
all parties and organisations.
5. Reform the educational system and introduce 
democratic education in t he respective national 
languages. Expand national culture.
6. Improve the living conditions of the people.
Develop industry, agriculture and commerce; relieve 
the unemployed and refugees; increase wages 
universally and practise the eight-hour work system.
7. Stabilise prices, and punish traitors, corrupt 
officials, hoarders and profiteers.
8. Ensure good treatment of the Anti-Japanese Army 
and provide compensation for the families of those 
who died for the Allied cause.
In justifying this programme, the party said that the end of the 
war had resulted in a favourable international and local situation for
197 See Appendix A, below, for full text of the statement found in 
BMA Sei. C.A. 162/45.
198 Ibid.
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the Malayan people. 'New Democratic' movements had sprung up everywhere.
The United Nations had approved the principles of democracy, self-
government and human rights. The 'capabilities and intelligence' of the
party's leadership in the anti-Japanese struggle had won the people's
support. The spirit of resistance and the unity of the people had also
increased, as a result of the three years of war and struggle. The
party's manifesto continued:
Today Malaya is located in a new situation and in a new 
generation.... The problem of Malaya has become a part 
of the international problem. All advanced countries of 
the world and their peoples will certainly help us....
As a result, the National Liberation of Malaya has obtained 
more beneficial terms, and is certain to be successful 
and victorious in the end. The future prospect of Malaya 
is unlimitedly bright.200
The manifesto had painted an extremely optimistic future to 
support the leadership's policy that the party should adopt a constitutional 
role. But what about the goal of the 'Malayan Democratic Republic' 
embodied in the party's 1943 programme? This was now to become a long-term 
goal, relegated to the background, whose 'preliminary steps' it was hoped 
would be facilitated by the eight-point programme. This was explained 
as follows:
We had suggested before, 'Establish Malaya into a 
Democratic Republic'. Today we are not deviating from 
this programme, because it is the object of our struggle.
We have been consistent for 20 years, because we want 
Malaya to be established into a Democratic Republic. But 
in order to cope with the demands of the present situation, 
we again suggest the present eight principles. These 
eight principles are to realise the preliminary steps 
of the Democratic Republic, because they are part of the 
requirements of the Democratic Republic.201
199 Ibid. The term 'New Democratic' refers to Mao's 'New Democracy' 
which indicates that the MCP had begun to adopt the CCP's policy.
Much was to be heard of 'New Democracy' in the MCP's postwar propaganda.
200 Ibid
201 Ibid
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The whole p a r t y  was a s k e d  to  c o n s o l i d a t e  i t s  g a i n s  and a p p ly  
t h e  U n i t e d  F r o n t  s t r a t e g y  i n  p a r t y  work unde r  t h e  incoming  B r i t i s h  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  However,  t h e  m o d e r a t i o n  and r e s t r a i n t  o f  t h e  MCP 
l e a d e r s h i p  was e n t i r e l y  a g a i n s t  t h e  r i s i n g  a n t i - B r i t i s h  mood i n  t h e  
p a r t y  and t h e  e n t h u s i a s m  o f  the  g u e r r i l l a s  f o r  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  a c t i o n  (as  
w i l l  be shown in  C h a p te r  VI ,  b e lo w ) .  The 27 August  1945 p o l i c y  was 
s u b s e q u e n t l y  r e p u d i a t e d  and b i t t e r l y  c r i t i c i s e d  by t h e  new l e a d e r s h i p  
under  Chin Peng who r e p l a c e d  La i  Tek i n  1947. Th is  c r i t i c i s m  has  been  
r e p e a t e d  w i t h o u t  f a i l  e v e r  s i n c e  i n  t h e  p a r t y ’ s a n n i v e r s a r y  r e v i e w  o f  
i t s  h i s t o r y :
. . . a t  t h e  c r u c i a l  p o i n t  when th e  J a p a n e s e  F a s c i s t s  
s u r r e n d e r e d ,  ou r  P a r t y  a d o p te d  t h e  R ig h t  
c a p i t u l a t i o n i s t  l i n e ,  i . e . ,  t h e  r e v i s i o n i s t  l i n e  
advanced  by t h e  enemy a g e n t ,  L a i  T ' e ,  gave up t h e  
armed s t r u g g l e ,  w a t e r e d  down the  programme f o r  
a D e m o c ra t i c  R e p u b l i c  and N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a t i o n  
i n t o  a programme f o r  s e l f -  
t h e  P a r t y  o f  the  f r u i t s  o f
gove rnm en t ,  t hus  b e t r a y i n g  
v i c t o r y .^02
C o n c l u s io n
The Chinese  Communist P a r t y ’ s c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  communist  
a c t i v i t i e s  i n  Malaya a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  t u r n e d  th e  MCP i n t o  a m ain ly  
C h inese  o r g a n i s a t i o n  i n s t e a d  o f  a m u l t i - r a c i a l  one .  While  t h e  CCP 
c a d r e s  were p a r t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  f a i l i n g  to  d i r e c t  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n  
o f  C h inese  members away from China  towards  Malaya ,  t h e  l o c a l  C h inese  
t h e m s e lv e s  l a c k e d  a l o c a l  i d e n t i t y  and hence  were p rone  to  look  to  
CCP o r  KMT or  anyone e l s e  who had a ' h o m e la n d '  f o c u s .  The MCP’ s 
p r e d o m i n a n t ly  C h inese  l e a d e r s h i p  f a i l e d  to  u n d e r s t a n d  t h a t  t hey  had  to  
t h i n k  o u t  Malayan p rob lems a lo n g  Malayan l i n e s .  T h i s  meant  f i r s t l y  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  th e  problems o f  t h e  p l u r a l  s o c i e t y  i n  which th e y  o p e r a t e d  -  
the  d i f f e r e n t  h i s t o r y ,  l a n g u a g e ,  r a c e  and r e l i g i o n  o f  t h e  p l u r a l  
p o p u l a t i o n .  I t  meant  t h a t  communist s  must  a t t e m p t  a non-communal  a p p ro a c h  
and accommodat ion o f  t h e  d i v e r s e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  r a c e s ,  n o t  
j u s t  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  the  C h in e s e  a l o n e .  The p a r t y  a l s o  needed  t o  d e f i n e  
c l e a r l y  what  i t  meant  to  be ' M a l a y a n ' , how i t  would form a government
202 See ' S t a t e m e n t  by t h e  C e n t r a l  Commit tee o f  t h e  Communist P a r t y  
o f  Malaya commemorating th e  40 th  a n n i v e r s a r y  o f  i t s  b i r t h ' ,  
d a t e d  25 A p r i l  1970, (mimeographed) .
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or set up a republic, and how it viould ensure just and fair representation 
within the 'Malayan Parliament'. These were just some of the problems 
which the MCP had to deal with before it could hope to win the mass 
support of Malays and Indians.
A crucial factor which seems to have been absent within the 
MCP's 'ideological line' was the lack of attempts to mount a genuine 
class struggle which could cut across racial lines. If the MCP labour 
uniqns had organised Malay peasants and Chinese and Indian workers 
consistently in a struggle against landlords and capitalists of all 
races, class unity would have emerged in a matter of time. On such a 
basis it would have been possible to build a strong communist movement. 
Instead of concentrating on class unity, the MCP attempted to achieve- 
unity through broad political struggles.
In short, MCP policies were in a muddle. It attempted to 
direct all races into anti-Japanese Fascist and anti-British imperialist 
struggles, while at the same time encouraging Malays, Chinese and Indians 
to pursue their own separate racial or national independence struggles.
Such diversity of objectives reflected the MCP leadership's more fundamental 
inability to analyse the political situation and to work out a viable, 
comprehensive programme of struggle.
The anti-Japanese struggle during the occupation perpetuated 
the prewar racial divisions within Malaya. The MPAJA was predominantly 
Chinese. The MCP failed to formulate policies of integrating the races 
within the party and within the MPAJU/MPAJA to accommodate each other's 
interests so that they could use their combined strength to fight and 
evict the Japanese. Instead the MCP drifted with the tide of Chinese 
patriotism and Chinese unity and did not prepare its cadres for dealing 
with Malaya's own peculiar communal problems. Without a Malayan 
orientation and explicit policies of mutual accommodation of the races, 
the details of the MCP's programme if implemented would mean a government 
formed by Chinese communists, in which Malays and Indians had little or 
no place.
The problems of the MCP were accentuated further by the role 
of Lai Tek as a Kempeitai agent. The weaknesses in party policies
plus the destruction of the party organisation ensured that the MCP
was unlikely to be in a position to take advantage of opportunities which
came its way in the vacuum following the Japanese surrender.
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CHAPTER IV
IBRAHIM YAACOB AND THE MALAY INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
LIKE Llie MCP, the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM, or Young Malay Union) 
had a programme of achieving independence for Malaya.^ But unlike 
the MCP, the KMM sought the support of the Japanese to realise this 
objective. There was contact and cooperation between KMM members and 
the Japanese before and during the Japanese attack on Malaya. This 
cooperation continued during the Japanese occupation. It Ls necessary 
to examine the KMM's role to see what rewards collaboration brought 
the KMM and its leaders and how the KMM struggled to realise its 
objective of independence.
Ibrahim Yaacob - the 'Double Agent'
The story of how the KMM came to work with the Japanese 
really begins with Ibrahim Yaacob's own desire to play the role of 
'double agent' (with the Japanese and the British) in order to advance 
not only his own interests but also the interests of the KMM, the Malay 
race, the Malay independence movement and Indonesia Raya.
1 The origins of the KMM is discussed in Chapter I above, 
see 20-22.
Ibrahim had great charisma, but was also self-centred and autocratic.
He was the KMM's undisputed leader and moving spirit as much as Sukarno 
in the PNI or Mussolini in the Italian Fascist Party. He took all 
decisions himself without consulting other members of the party. The 
only KMM official he might have occasionally confided in was Onan Haji 
Siraj, his brother-in-law. In 1940, aged 29, Ibrahim was still a young 
man, and one who had developed as an ardent and radical nationalist 
with a particular admiration for Sukarno, his ideas and political style - 
especially his oratory.
2 Ibrahim was born in Temerloh in central Pahang. His great great­
grandfather was a Bugis who came from Celebes to Riau, and from 
there to Pahang. He claims that he was of the same stock as the 
late Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak. He graduated 
from the Sultan Idris (Teachers) Training College (better known 
as SITC), Tanjong Malim, Selangor, in 1931, and soon after joined 
the teaching staff of the Kuala Lumpur Police Depot. He began 
to take an interest in journalism, and wrote articles to Malay 
newspapers critical of various aspects of British administration.
He was called up by the Police Commissioner (J.D. Harrie?) and told 
that, unless lie stopped writing anti-British articles he would 
be transferred up-country. He resigned and joined Majlis, a 
Malay newspaper in Kuala Lumpur. Later he became a sub-editor of 
the Utusan Melayu newspaper in Singapore. In 1938, together with 
several Malay graduates of the SITC and other colleges., he formed 
the KMM. It was registered in Selangor in 1940. The movement 
spread rapidly throughout the country until the outbreak of war 
in December 1941. In compiling these biographical details, I have 
used the following sources: the notes compiled by my ANU colleague
Robert Reece (hereinafter referred to Robert Reece’s Notes) based 
on an interview with Ibrahim in Jakarta in February 1973; and on 
the Fortnightly Intelligence Reports, Nos 7, 10, 12 and 13 (covering 
the period May to September 1943) of the wartime Far Eastern Bureau, 
British Ministry of Information, New Delhi, as found in C.O. 273/669/ 
50744/7. I shall be making frequent reference to these sources, as 
they contain much of relevance to Ibrahim's activities in 1940 and 
1941. Some biographical details already covered in these sources,
are found in William Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, 172-73.
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As far as his relationships with the Japanese or British were
3concerned, Ibrahim adopted an ambivalent attitude. It is doubtful 
whether Ibrahim really ever believed in the Japanese slogan of 'Asia for 
the Asians', or in any of their promises of self-government and 
independence for colonial territories in Southeast Asia. It was not 
Japanese propaganda but conditions in 1940 and 1941 which encouraged 
him to set out to take advantage of the situation for himself and for 
the cause of the KMM. The United States, Britain and other European 
colonial powers in the region appeared to Ibrahim to be pursuing a 
contradictory policy. On the one hand they seemed to be appeasing 
Japan by giving In to some of her political and economic demands, thus 
emboldening and encouraging her. On the other hand they were re-arming 
themselves to resist the Japanese threat.^ The outbreak of war in 
Europe made the British authorities more alert to the growing Japanese
3 In taking this view, I am much inclined to the views of Ibrahim's 
colleagues, such as Mustapha Hussein and Ishak 11aji Mohammed, 
that Ibrahim was not only an extremely self-centred man, but also 
a clever opportunist. Ishak, in fact, calls him 'a brilliant 
opportunist'. Interview with Ishak, Kuala Lumpur, January 1977.
Both Ishak and Mustapha also say that some of Ibrahim's accounts 
of the KMM's activities are either exaggerated or untrue, and they 
relate instances of where their recollections differ from his. 
However, as far as the episode involving Ibrahim's contacts
with the Japanese prior to the Japanese Occupation is concerned, 
none of them challenge his account. This is because neither 
Ishak nor Mustapha nor any of their other KMM colleagues had any 
knowledge of the meetings, or knew what Ibrahim said or did with 
the Japanese, since lie acted alone. Yet, the impact of his actions 
was always such that they affected the whole KMM movement, for better 
or for worse. Because of this, Ibrahim’s accounts pertaining to 
that episode have to be given the benefit of the doubt, until 
contrary evidence proves them to be false. It should also be noted 
that Ibrahim's 'confession' that he was a 'double agent' was only 
made in 1973. He did this publicly in Malaya when he gave a talk 
to the History Department, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, on 
29 August 1973, under the latter's oral history project. He 
had revealed this privately to Robert Reece a few months earlier.
In his role as 'double agent' Ibrahim displayed such a wealth 
of detail that his credibility is difficult to call into question.
4 Ibrahim gives his insight on the international situation involving 
Japan and the 'ABCD bloc' (American, British, Chinese and Dutch) 
in I.K. Agastja (adopted Indonesian name of Ibrahim), Sedjarah dan 
Perdjuangan di Malaya (History and Struggle in Malaya), Jogjakarta, 
1951, 88-91.
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i n t e r e s t  i n  Malaya .  B r i t i s h  s u r v e i l l a n c e  o f  J a p a n e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  and
B r i t i s h  d e f e n c e  p r e p a r a t i o n s  were i n c r e a s e d . “*
To I b r a h i m  and t o  o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l l y - c o n s c i o u s  Malays ,  a s
w e l l  a s  to  t h e  B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  t h e  most  d i s t u r b i n g  t r e n d  was t h e
i n c r e a s i n g  J a p a n e s e  i n f l u e n c e  in  Siam. Between 1935 and 1940 Siam
had become f r i e n d l y  w i t h ,  and i n c r e a s i n g l y  d e p e n d e n t  on,  J a p a n .  The
p o s s i b i l i t y  had a r i s e n  t h a t  Siam m igh t  p l a y  t h e  r o l e  o f  an a l l y  i n
f)J a p a n e s e  e x p a n s i o n i s t  p l a n s  i n t o  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a .  S p e c i f i c a l l y  i t  was 
f e a r e d  t h a t  t h e  Siamese would a l l y  t h e m s e lv e s  to  t h e  J a p a n e s e  i n  r e t u r n  
f o r  the  p r o m i s e s  t h a t  t h e  f o u r  n o r t h e r n  Malay s t a t e s  o f  B r i t i s h  Malaya -  
P e r i l s ,  Kedah,  K e l a n t a n  and Trengganu -  would be g i v e n  back  to  Siam 
a f t e r  J a p an  had o c c u p ie d  M alaya .^
In  June  1940 Ib ra h im  l o s t  h i s  j o b  as  a  j o u r n a l i s t  on t h e  
M a j l i s  a f t e r  a q u a r r e l  w i t h  t h e  newspaper  b o a r d  o v e r  p o l i c i e s .  He began  
a t o u r  o f  Malaya t o  c o n t a c t  KMM b r a n c h e s  and to  s u r v e y  t h e  d e f e n c e  
s i t u a t i o n  f o r  h i m s e l f .  On th e  c o a s t s  o f  Trengganu  and K e l a n t a n  he 
o b s e r v e d  t h a t  b a t a n g  p i s a n g  (banana t r e e  t r u n k s )  had been  d r e s s e d  up as  
s h o re  d e f e n c e  b a t t e r i e s .  He knew t h e n  t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  d e fe n c e  m easu res
O
c o u ld  n o t  s t o p  t h e  J a p a n e s e .  When he v i s i t e d  t h e  J a p ane se -ow ne d  i r o n  
mines a t  Dungun, T rengganu ,  some J a p a n e s e  m in ing  p e o p le  t h e r e  s u g g e s t e d  
t o  him t h a t  he s h o u ld  meet  one I s h i k a w a ,  a m in ing  e n g i n e e r  whose o f f i c e  
was i n  High S t r e e t ,  S i n g a p o r e .  L a t e r  i n  h i s  t o u r  he met S u l t a n  Z a i n a l  
Ab id in  o f  Trengganu and h i s  M e n t r i  B e s a r  ( C h i e f  M i n i s t e r ) , Tengku S e t i a
5 Ian  M o r r i s o n ,  Malayan P o s t s c r i p t , London,  1942, 11-22 ,  g i v e s  a 
good d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  B r i t i s h  d e fe n c e  m easu res  i n  S in g a p o re  and on 
the  m a i n l a n d .
6 F .C .  J o n e s ,  J a p a n ’ s New Order  i n  E a s t  A s i a :  I t s  r i s e  and f a l l ,
1 9 3 7 - 4 5 , London, 1961, 231 -34 .
7 A g a s t j a ,  86-87 .
8 Robe r t  R e e c e ’ s N o te s .  Ib ra h im  a l s o  d e s c r i b e s  h i s  t o u r  i m p r e s s i o n s  
i n  M e l i h a t  Tanah A i r  ( I )  ( O b s e r v a t i o n s  on the  M o th e r l a n d  -  P a r t  I ) ,  
i n  J a w i ,  Kota Bharu ,  1941. The book i s  c r i t i c a l  o f  B r i t i s h  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  p o l i c i e s  towards  t h e  M alays ,  and g i v e s  an a c c o u n t
o f  Malay h i s t o r y  and c u l t u r e .  However , I b ra h im  i s  c a r e f u l  n o t  to  
d i s c u s s  m i l i t a r y  m easu res  o r  c o n t a c t s  w i t h  J a p a n e s e .  The m a n u s c r i p t  
o f  P a r t  I I  was s e i z e d  by t h e  p o l i c e  when they  a r r e s t e d  him i n  
December 1941.
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R a j a  Omar who,  l i k e  I b r a h i m ,  had  R i a u  c o n n e c t i o n s .  Bo th  t h e  S u l t a n
an d  Tengk u Omar e x p r e s s e d  d o u b t s  a b o u t  t h e  a d e q u a c y  o f  B r i t i s h  d e f e n c e
9
m e a s u r e s  and a l s o  v o i c e d  f e a r s  a b o u t  S ia m es e  i n t e n t i o n s .
S i m i l a r  d o u b t s  w e re  r a i s e d  by S u l t a n  Abu B ak a r  o f  P a h a n g  when 
I b r a h i m  met  h im l a t e r .  P r o b a b l y  t h e  i d e a  had  a l r e a d y  t a k e n  r o o t  when 
I b r a h i m  met  t h e  J a p a n e s e  m i n e r s  a t  Dungun,  b u t  he t o o k  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  
l o  d i s c u s s  w i t h  t h e  r u l e r s ,  b o t h  i n  h i s  c a p a c i t y  a s  KMM p r e s i d e n t  and 
a s  a j o u r n a l i s t ,  a p l a n  o f  a c t i o n  (which  he  i n t e n d e d  t o  c a r r y  o u t  
h i m s e l f )  t o  h e l p  t h e  Malay  p e o p l e  a c h i e v e  w h a t  h e  c a l l e d  ' a  b a r g a i n i n g  
p o s i t i o n ’ . As h e  p u t  i t :
In  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  KMM l e a d e r s h i p  t o o k  c o u r a g e  
and d i d  n o t  f e a r  d e a t h ,  b u t  e n d e a v o u r e d  t o  s a c r i f i c e  
t h e i r  l i v e s ,  by j o i n i n g  t h e  w o r l d  o f  i n t r i g u e s  and 
e s p i o n a g e  i n  o r d e r  t o  s e c u r e  c o n c e s s i o n s  w h ich  would  
g i v e  t h e  M alays  ’ a b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n *  t o  s a f e g u a r d  
t h e i r  r i g h t s  an d  open  a p a t h  w h i c h  w o u ld  l e a d  t o  t h e  
a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  M al ay  i n d e p e n d e n c e . . . .  10
I b r a h i m  d e c i d e d  t h a t  he  was g o i n g  t o  e n g a g e  i n  e s p i o n a g e ,
and he c l a i m s  t h e  S u l t a n s  gave him t h e i r  b less ings . '*" '*'  I b r a h i m  r a t i o n a l i s e d
t h a t  w h i l e  o t h e r  g r o u p s  o f  c o m m u n i t i e s  w e r e  w o r k i n g  w i t h  t h e  J a p a n e s e
t o  a d v a n c e  t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  I n d i a n  I n d e p e n d e n c e  L e a g u e ,
t h e  pro -W ang Ch ing  Wei g r o u p s ,  and e v e n  t h e  A c e h n e s e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  g r o u p s
(some o p e n l y  i n  Bangkok an d  o t h e r s  u n d e r g r o u n d  i n  M a l a y a ) , t h e  M a l a y s
12h ad  done n o t h i n g  to  s a f e g u a r d  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  The Malay r u l e r s ,  
a l t h o u g h  a w are  o f  J a p a n e s e  p r o p a g a n d a  and  a l s o  o f  t h e  d a n g e r o u s  t r e n d  
i n  J a p a n e s e  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  S ia m ,  w e r e  r e s i g n e d  t o  a c c e p t  B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  
p r o t e c t i o n .  I b r a h i m  t h e r e f o r e  d e c i d e d  t h a t  he w o u ld  become a J a p a n e s e  
a g e n t  i n  t h e  hope  t h a t  h e  and t h e  KMM c o u l d  g a i n  v a l u a b l e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  
J a p a n e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  an d  t h u s  e n a b l e  t h e  M a lay s  t o  p r e p a r e  t h e m s e l v e s  
and p r o t e c t  t h e i r  l i v e s  an d  f u t u r e .
9 R o b e r t  R e e c e ’ s N o t e s .
10 From I b r a h i m ' s  t a l k  on ' S e j a r a h  P e r i n t i s  Kemerdekaan M a l a y s i a '  
(The h i s t o r y  o f  p i o n e e r s  o f  M a l a y s i a n  i n d e p e n d e n c e ) ,  P a r t  i i ,  
g i v e n  t o  t h e  H i s t o r y  D e p a r t m e n t ,  U n i v e r s i t i  K e b an g as an n  M a l a y s i a ,  
K u a l a  Lumpur ,  29 A u g u s t  197 3 ,  u n d e r  i t s  o r a l  h i s t o r y  p r o j e c t ,  
t y p e s c r i p t ,  7.
11 I b i d .
12 I b i d . ; A g a s t j a ,  8 1 - 8 3 ;  R o b e r t  R e c c e ’ s N o t e s .
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To show the varied nature of Ibrahim’s interests, the Riau
episode serves as an excellent illustration. Before he got in touch
with the Japanese, Ibrahim was involved in a project to restore the
Riau Sultanate and to declare its independence from Dutch rule.
Earlier in his Malayan tour he had interested the Mentri Besar (Chief
Minister) of Trengganu, Tengku Setia Raja Omar in reviving his legitimate
claims to the Riau Sultanate. He had in his possession a 100-year-old
historical document tracing the genealogy of the Riau Sultanate, and
his aim was to end Dutch rule by having Tengku Omar installed on the
13throne with British support. Apparently Tengku Omar encouraged his
efforts, for soon after touring Malaya Ibrahim went to Riau where he
contacted other people including Raja Haji Yunus, who also had a claim
to being the Raja Muda of Riau. He tried to interest
everyone he met in the project. Ibrahim also had a plan, which seems
fantastic today but apparently was not thought so then, of making Riau
a ’buffer state' between Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies in the
event of the latter administration capitulating to the Japanese as the
French administration had done in Indochina in September 1940. He also
wanted to make Riau the symbol of Malay-Indonesian unity and resistance,
14allied to Britain and America, against Japan.
What he himself would gain from the materialisation of this 
plan is open to conjecture, but the urge to play an important role in 
'big power’ politics and to be the first man to think out the idea, were 
certainly factors. This Riau project took up quite a lot of his time, 
and when he returned to Singapore a few weeks later he met again with 
Tengku oraar and Raja Haji Yunus, who had come to discuss the project 
further with him. The plotters (as evidently they were) decided that 
British assistance was absolutely vital, so Tengku Omar discussed the 
matter with the Director of the Special Branch, L.M. Wynne, Ibrahim 
going along as his aide.^ British interest was kindled, as the 
British were also quite unsure about how the Netherlands East Indies
13 The Riau episode is described in detail in I.K. Agastja, Sedjarah 
dan Perdjuangan di Malaya, 81-83.
14 Agastja, 82.
15 Ibid.
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would react to Japanese pressure. Through these meetings Ibrahim
established a friendly relationship with Wynne. In September 1941 the
latter sent him to Riau to collect whatever information he could about
whether the Japanese would really establish themselves there. The plot
thickened when he and Tengku Omar were granted an interview some time
late in 1941 with the British High Commissioner, Sir Shenton Thomas.
however, the plan was finally killed when the Netherlands East Indies
showed itself to be positively resisting Japanese pressure. ^
While the Riau plot was being developed Ibrahim approached the
mining engineer Ishikawa to indicate his willingness to become a Japanese
agent.^ Besides Ishikawa, Ibrahim also met Michio Uirakawa who was said
to be ’the centre of a certain Japanese intelligence organ' in Malaya.
This information about Hirakawa was given by a wartime Domei newsagency
report which mentioned his contacts with Hirakawa. The report said
that Hirakawa obtained 'strong Japanese backing for the KMM, which
was 'converted Into an active secret society'. They discussed his
role, and Ibrahim suggested that the best cover was to have a newspaper
of his own. Negotiations got under way, involving the Japanese Consul-
General in Singapore, Ken Tsurumi. After Tokyo's approval had been obtained
Tsurumi met Ibrahim again, in April 1941 and a sum of $M18,000 was handed
over to Ibrahim to purchase the Warta Malaya, a Malay newspaper in Singapore
owned by an Arab, Syed Hussein bin Ali Alsagoff. Ibrahim also bought a car
1 8with additional money given to him by Tsurumi.' After the KMM had bought 
the Warta Malaya and Ibrahim had become head of the newspaper, able members
16 Ibid.
17 Ibrahim has given conflicting accounts about which side took the 
initiative first. In the interview with Robert Reece, he claims it 
was he who took the initiative. But in Agastja, 87, and in his talk
to Hniversiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, he claims he was approached by Japanese 
agents. I tend to accept the first account, as this is in keeping with 
the rest of Ibrahim's story.
17a When the Japanese attacked Malaya, Ibrahim was in a Singapore prison
and Hirakawa interned in India. Hirakawa returned to Japan by exchange 
ship from India. See Fortnightly Intelligence Report (FIR) No.13, for 
period ended 11 September 1943, In CO 273/669/50744/7. For Japanese 
accounts confirming these contacts, see Nagai Shinichi, 'The Malay 
Nationalist Movement During the Pacific War: From the perspective of
the Leftist Nationalist leadership - Part I' (in Japanese), in Azia 
Keizai, Tokyo, 15 October 1975, 40-50; and Fujiwara Iwaichi, F Kikan, 
Tokyo, 1971, 168-69.
18 Interview with Fujiwara, Tokyo, September 1976. See also Nagai 
Shinichi, op.cit., 40-50; Robert Reece's Notes.
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of the KMM were assigned to branches of the newspaper all over 
Malaya. Domei later disclosed in September 1943 that by this means 'all 
kinds of intelligence about the disposition of defence works of British 
troops, such as landing spots in Kota Bharu, fortifications on the Perak 
River and the stronghold in Klang were collected'.
Ibrahim's involvement with the Japanese escalated in November 1941, 
when a fifth column organisation known as KÄME (tortoise) was formed under 
Tsurumi's direction. It was an espionage network which included certain 
Japanese residents and organisations like the IIL and the KMM. KÄME was the 
idea of Major Fujiwara Iwaichi, who was attached to the 8th Section
19(propaganda), Second Bureau, of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters.
In October 1941, Fujiwara arrived in Bangkok on a mission to help the Japanese 
military attache in Bangkok develop contacts in Malaya, to work with anti- 
British movements among the Indians, and also with Malays. If war broke out 
he was to ensure cooperation between the Japanese Army and the peoples of
m i 20Malaya.
In late November Tsurumi' flew to Bangkok to report to Fujiwara
on the IIL and the KMM. Tsurumi said it was necessary to supply more funds
for espionage work and that he had given Ibrahim additional money. At this
meeting Fujiwara told Tsurumi to form KÄME and to arrange for KMM members
in the northern Malay States to act as guides and interpreters for the
invading Japanese Army. These people should be easily identified by armbands
carrying the word KÄME. During his stay in Bangkok Fujiwara also met a few
KMM members and discussed the KÄME project. These members later accompanied
21him to southern Thailand in readiness for the Japanese assault. ' Despite
the evidence of Tsurumi and Fujiwara, Ibrahim claims that he gave no
instructions to KMM members in the northern Malay States to act as guides
and interpreters for the Japanese. If there was such cooperation on their
22part, he says, it was done voluntarily. Ibrahim's statement is difficult 
to accept. The high degree of coordination and cooperation which was 
achieved between Fujiwara and the KMM members in southern Thailand
18a See FIR No.13, 11 September 1943 in CO 273/669/50744/7.
19 Fujiwara, interview.
20 Joyce Lebra, Jungle Alliance, Singapore, 1971, 3-4; Louis Allen,
The End of the War in Asia, London, 1976, 134.
21 Fujiwara, interview.
22 Agastja, 92, 97.
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and in the northern Malay States suggests that there must have been advanced 
planning. Ibrahim does not deny British charges that in late November he
had already been recruited into KÄME by Ken Tsurumi and other Japanese
? aagents.■
Different interpretations have appeared on what was actually
agreed on between Ibrahim and the Japanese agents. Tsurumi, Ishikawa and
Fujiwara all claim that they gave the KMM no political promises that the
Japanese would support the KMM's objective of Malay independence within
24the Indonesia Raya. The Japanese aim was said to be to get Ibrahim and
his KMM members to carry out espionage and propaganda, and to obtain assistance
25of Malay guides and interpreters during the Japanese attack on Malaya.
On the other hand, Ibrahim says that while the agreement related to espionage2 0and propaganda, it did not cover provision of guides. The Japanese also
wanted an assurance that the Malays would not oppose them when their troops
entered Malaya. He gave them this assurance, he says, in exchange for money
and promises that Malay independence would be considered in the future, that
Malay sovereignty, Malay religion and customs would be upheld and that
Malay women and property would be respected in the event of war. The KMM
also wanted Japanese support for a Union of Malay States merged within 
27Indonesia Raya. Ibrahim further argues that the newspaper Warta Malaya 
pursued a cautious editorial policy, not openly siding with the Japanese,
23 There is a suggestion from a former KMM executive committee member, 
Pachik Ahmad, that during one of his frequent trips to the mainland, 
Ibrahim visited aboriginal settlements and recruited several 
aborigines as guides for the Japanese. See Abdul Ilj. Md. Hanafiah, 
'Sejarah Perjuangan Kesatuan Melayu Muda, 1937-1945’ (History of the 
Struggle of the KMM), B.A. Hons thesis, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 
1975, 205. For a reference to the aborigines, see Ibrahim Yaacob, 
Melihat Tanah Air, 88-89, which also has a picture of him and Sakais 
(an aboriginal tribe) riding an elephant.
24 Fujiwara, interview. Tsurumi and Ishikawa also made a similar 
statement to Nagai Shinichi. See Nagai Shinichi, op.clt., 40-50.
25 Fujiwara, interview.
26 Ibrahim's talk to Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 29 August 1973.
27 The Malay terms which Ibrahim uses to describe the Union of Malay 
States are 'Kesatuan Tanah Melayu'. Agastja, 87-88.
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2 g
a l t h o u g h  i t  was r a t h e r  c r i t i c a l  o f  B r i t i s h  p o l i c i e s .  He d i d  use  t h e
n e w s p a p e r ' s  c o r r e s p o n d e n t s  to  c o l l e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  on d e fe n c e  m a t t e r s ,  b u t
he m a i n t a i n s  he was s t i l l  d i s t r u s t f u l  o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  and c o n t i n u e d  t o  keep
i n  to u ch  w i t h  Wynne and w i t h  t h e  MCP th ro u g h  Su tan  D j e n a i n ,  an I n d o n e s i a n
29communist ,  on t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  an  unde rg ro u n d  a n t i - J a p a n e s e  movement.
Even as  he was w ork ing  f o r  KÄME, I b ra h i m  c l a i m s ,  he was a l r e a d y  
r e p o r t i n g  to  Wynne. Ib ra h im  went  to  s ee  Wynne once a week,  b u t  i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r
O rv
what e x a c t l y  Ib ra h im  t o l d  him.  u I f  I b r a h i m ' s  r o l e  o f  ' d o u b l e  a g e n t '  f o r  
t h e  B r i t i s h  i s  a c c e p t e d ,  and t h e r e  i s  no e v i d e n c e  t o  p rove  o t h e r w i s e ,  t h e  
a r r e s t s  o f  I b r a h i m  and a b o u t  110 o f  h i s  KMM s u p p o r t e r s  on 7 December 1941 
need t o  be e x p l a i n e d .  A cco rd ing  to  a Malay s o u r c e  t h e  i n c i d e n t  which 
p r e c i p i t a t e d  t h e  a r r e s t s  was a J a p a n e s e  r a d i o  b r o a d c a s t  i n  Malay a few days 
b e f o r e .  The b r o a d c a s t  had c a l l e d  on t h e  Malay p o p u l a t i o n  t o  r i s e  up i n  
s u p p o r t  o f  KÄME, which was unde r  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  J a p a n ,  t o  f r e e  t h e  Malays 
from c o l o n i a l  r u l e  and become p a r t n e r s  i n  t h e  J a p a n e s e  New Order  f o r  A s i a .
The b r o a d c a s t  went  on:
. . . t h e  Malay p e o p le  i n  Malaya must  g iv e  t h e i r  s u p p o r t  
to  KÄME; i t  i s  KÄME which  w i l l  s t r u g g l e  t o  l i b e r a t e  
them from B r i t i s h  c o l o n i a l i s m . . . 3 1
The shocked  r e a c t i o n  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s  co u ld  w e l l  be
i m a g in e d .  I n v e s t i g a t i o n s  were im m e d i a t e l y  s t a r t e d ,  and the  c o n n e c t i o n s
be tween  KÄME and t h e  KMM soon e s t a b l i s h e d .  Although  Wynne may have
e x p l a i n e d  I b r a h i m ' s  ' d o u b l e  a g e n t '  r o l e ,  h i g h e r  a u t h o r i t i e s  must  have  f e l t
t h a t  t h e  J a p a n e s e  open r e f e r e n c e  t o  KÄME was e x t r e m e l y  dange rous  and co u ld
n o t  go u n n o t i c e d .  P r o b a b ly  t h e y  were a l s o  d i s t r u s t f u l  o f  Ib ra h im .  I t
i s  no c o i n c i d e n c e  t h a t  the  a r r e s t s  o c c u r r e d  on the  eve o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e
28 One B r i t i s h  r e p o r t ,  w h i l e  i t  does  n o t  c l a i m  t h a t  Warta Malaya was used
to  s p r e a d  J a p a n e s e  p r o p a g a n d a ,  does a l l e g e ,  however ,  t h a t  i t  was used  f o r  
' v i o l e n t l y  n a t i o n a l i s t  p ropaga nda  and t o  e n c o u ra g e  r e c r u i t m e n t  f o r  KMM'. 
i t  went  on:  'The  KMM, th ro u g h  i t s  l e a d e r s ,  s p r e a d  p ropaganda  b a s e d  on
a n t l - B r I t I s h  , Malay R e p u b l i c  and Pan A s i a t i c  a p p e a l ' .  Sec ' S i n g a p o r e :  
Repor t  f o r  S e c u r i t y  I n t e l l i g e n c e  f o r  P l a n n i n g  S e c t i o n :  g e n e r a l  i n f o r m a t i o n
from 1940 and d u r i n g  J a p a n e s e  O c c u p a t i o n ' ,  A p r i l  1945,  WO 220/ 5 6 1 . I t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  v e r i f y  bo th  I b r a h i m ' s  and B r i t i c h  c l a i m s ,  as  no c o p i e s  o f  
Warta Malaya a re  e x t  an t
29 Su tan  D j e n a i n ,  an emigre  o f  the  I n d o n e s i a n  Communist P a r t y  (PKI) who f l e d
to Malaya f o r  r e f u g e  a f t e r  t h e  P K I ' s  a b o r t i v e  u p r i s i n g s  i n  1926 /1927 ,  was 
s a i d  to  1)0 a member o f  t h e  KMM. R obe r t  R e e c e ' s  N o te s :  Nagai  S h i n i c h i ,
o p . c i t .  , 40 -50 .
30 Robe r t  R e e c e ' s  N o tes .  - No known a c c o u n t s  o f  t h i s  e n c o u n t e r  by Wynne e x i s t .  
Wynne d i e d  in  Sumatra  d u r i n g  t h e  war .
31 Abdul  M a le k , 209.
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attack on Malaya. The sequence of events is not clear, but probably the
arrests took place after the Japanese thrust had become known. The British
records have revealed that the editor of Warta Malaya, Ishak Haji Mohamed,
was arrested a day after Ibrahim. A search of his premises showed that
Ibrahim’s organisation had agents in all the States and Settlements of
the peninsula. On the Information received, 110 Malays were taken into
custody in the Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negri
Sembilan), and in Kclantnn, Trengganu, Malacca, Johor and Singapore. Owing
to the rapid Japanese advance no action could be taken in Perlis and 
32Kedah.
Why had the British delayed the arrests until the last minute?
This must remain an intriguing question. Ibrahim himself has nowhere
suggested that the delay was because he was a British agent, yet this may
have been the real reason. Presumably the British doubted he would remain
'loyal' in conditions of (temporary) Japanese ascendancy. Ibrahim claims
that soon after his arrest, he was supposed to be sent to India for
internment, but because there was not enough time due to the rapid Japanese
33advance the plan was dropped. Ibrahim's own defence against the arrests 
was that he had never been serious in the Japanese fifth column work: he
had been opposed to 'Japanese Fascism' until his arrest; he had left no 
instructions to KMM members to assist the invading Japanese forces; he 
had instead ur,ged them to make underground preparations to fight the Japanese. 
In fact, he argues that by arresting him and the other KMM members the 
British made a serious miscalculation, because this convinced the Japanese 
that the Malay population were on their side and influenced many Malays to 
support the Japanese.^
32 See Monson's notes to Keating, 14.6.43, in CO 273/671/50790. Monson 
seems to be misinformed that no arrests took place in Trengganu
and Kelantan, but he is probably right that the British were too late 
in Perlis and Kedah, where KMM pemudas carried out crucial fifth 
column work (according to Abdul Malek, 209-11) to help the Japanese 
Army pierce the weak spots of British defences. A list of 20 KMM 
branch officials arrested in the police sweep throughout Malaya is in 
Abdul Malek, 210-11. His list is based on information given in 
interviews with three former KMM officials, including executive committee 
member Ahmad Boestamam, who was among those arrested.
33 Robert Reece's Notes: see also Ibrahim's talk to Universiti Kebangsaan
Malaysia (UKM), 29 August 1973.
34 Ibrahim's talk to UKM, 29 August 1973.
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KMM Pemudas as Japanese Army Guides
Soon after the arrests, last-minute efforts were made by the
British administration to get four Malay Rulers to urge their Malay subjects
35to remain loyal to Britain. This alarmed KMM members attached to units
of the invading Japanese Army as guides and interpreters, who feared that the
Japanese might take punitive action against the Rulers after they had overrun
the country. They attempted to convince their Japanese officers that the
36Rulers had been forced to act under duress. Actually some of the Rulers 
and princes were potentially sympathetic to the Japanese. Between 1934-1937, 
many of them had been encouraged to visit Japan. Sultan Ibrahim of Johor 
visited Japan in 1934 and was the subject of very special attention and 
compliments. He developed cordial relations with Marquis Tokugawa and his 
son, both of whom later offered him protection and arranged for Johor 
students, among them Ungku Abdul Aziz and Wan Abdul Hamid, to study 
in Japan. Raja Uda of the MCS and Raja Nong of Selangor visited Japan 
in 1935, and Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1937. An attempt to persuade the Raja 
Muda of Selangor to visit Japan in 1935 failed, as he only wanted a 
loan.37
Despite the arrests of Ibrahim ahd the KMM members, a remarkably 
efficient KMM underground movement seems to have survived. Although it 
was claimed that no instructions were left behind, many members sided with 
the invading Japanese 25th Army. KMM members like Abdul Kadir Adabi in 
Kota Bharu and others in Perlis and Kedah, the front-line states where 
communications had been severed immediately after the first Japanese attacks, 
were reported to have come forward voluntarily to offer their services to 
the Japanese. Major Fujiwara quickly provided them with KÄME armbands, 
which gave them protection and standing among Japanese troops, and which 
enabled them to save friends, relatives and countless other Malays in trouble
35 See Chapter II above, 28.
36 Abdul Malek, 212-13.
37 See Monson’s notes to Keating, 14.6.43, in CO 273/671/50790.
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with the invading forces. Ibrahim has maintained that the enthusiastic
support of the KMM members for the Japanese Army came as a surprise 
39to him later.
40Mustapha Hussein, the KMM's vice-president, who had
eluded arrest by the British, began to establish close liaison with
Major Fujiwara. He supervised the KMM members and showed himself to
be not only an able organiser but clear-sighted about the KMM's aims
and the opportunities with which the invasion presented the party. In
compliance with Japanese requests, Mustapha quickly organised more
groups of KMM members into a body called Barisan Pemuda (Youth Corps),
41who were to act as guides and interpreters. Their role in the 
military and social upheaval following the Japanese invasion was extremely 
important. Pemuda groups were assigned to seek out and save Malays in 
the Police Force, Malay Regiment and Army Volunteers who were likely to 
be massacred by the Japanese as 'British supporters'. Pemudas were also 
instructed to look for Sultans who had gone into hiding and to bring 
them back to their palaces. Other pemudas sought the support of IIL 
groups in case the Japanese-sponsored pro-Wang Ching Wei groups
38 This is confirmed in interviews with several KMM members in Perak 
and Perils, see Abdul Malek, 225-30; see also Agastja, 97.
The only KMM official said to have received last-minute 
instructions after the Japanese attack was Onan Haji Siraj,
Ibrahim's brother-in-law. Ibrahim secured Onan's release by lying 
to the police that Onan was his chauffeur. Onan was freed in 
Singapore, quickly moved up to Taiping to look for Mustapha Hussein, 
and both managed to organise the KMM pemudas on their own initiative. 
Ishak Haji Mohammed gives a similar account of Onan's release in 
his article, 'Kenangan Ilidup Pak Sako' (Memories of Pak Sako alias 
Ishak Haji Mohammed), No.27, in the weekly Mingguan Malaysia,
4 July 1977. Ishak's pen-name Pak Sako originated during the 
’Japanese occupation.
39 Agastja, 92, 97.
40 Born in Matahg, Perak, Mustapha was educated at the College of 
Agriculture, Serdang (Selangor), He served as an agricultural 
officer in Cemor, Perak, before being transferred to the College
of Agriculture as an assistant lecturer. Mustapha was probably the 
most leftist of the KMM leaders. He was a member of the British 
'Left Book Club', had read a lot of leftwing books, especially on 
China and on the Russian Revolution, and was very much influenced 
by revolutionary ideas.
41 Agastja, 92-96.
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(consisting of Chinese, Formosans and Koreans) attacked Malays, a
42prospect which Mustapha feared might happen.
Mustapha himself had familiarised the peniudas with his
requests to the Japanese commanders: that they should not harm the
Malay people and their Rulers, that they should help rescue the detained
KMM leaders as quickly as possible, and that they should respect the
customs, religion, property and women of the Malays. He also requested
that any Malay (civilian or uniformed) who was captured by the Japanese
troops should be referred to the Barisan Pemuda. The Japanese officers,
especially Major Fujiwara, realising how important these pemudas were4 3as guides, met as many of the requests as possible. It is claimed
by a former KMM member that Japanese bombers flew leaflets over British-
held positions warning the British not to harm Ibrahim and the other
44KMM prisoners. As the Japanese troops swept through each village 
or town in their advance down the peninsula, more pemudas joined them, 
so that by the time the Japanese Army entered Singapore, about 300 to 
500 pemudas were said to have been recruited.
A conflict of aims between the KMM under Mustapha and the 
Japanese quickly emerged. After the Japanese forces had entered Kuala 
Lumpur some time in January 1942, Mustapha had bravely gone up to Major 
Fujiwara and other Japanese officers to ask for Japanese backing for 
a proclamation of Malay independence. He said that the KMM had believed 
in Japan's promises to liberate Malaya from British rule. This was 
also the KMM's objective. He requested the Japanese commanders to 
carry out the promise now by declaring a Republic. Mustapha was not 
naive, but believed that this was the best time to test Japan's true 
intentions. To this demand, one of the officers replied:
42 Ibid. Although Mustapha was said to have been the most 'anti- 
monarchical' of KMM leaders, he had to agree to Ibrahim's 
instructions that the Sultans should be protected so that they 
could be used later by the KMM. Mustapha himself would soon try 
to get the Japanese to support the idea of a Republic.
43 Abdul Malek, 223-48.
44 Information given by former KMM executive committee member 
Pacik Ahmad, in Abdul Malek, ibid.
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’ I f  you say  t h a t  t h i s  i s  yo u r  a im,  t h e n  show us you r  n a t i o n a l  anthem
and f l a g . ' ^  Mustapha was t a k e n  aba ck  by t h i s  c l e v e r  r e p l y ,  b u t  he
q u i c k l y  r e c o v e r e d  h i s  composure to  say  t h a t  he would p r e s e n t  b o th  to
t h e  J a p a n e s e  w i t h i n  the  n e x t  few d a y s .  The KMM group went away, and
r e t u r n e d  a few days l a t e r  w i t h  t h e  r e d - a n d - w h i t e  f l a g  o f  I n d o n e s i a  and
a h a s t i l y - c o m p o s e d  anthem s e t  to  a m a r t i a l  a i r .  The J a p a n e s e  commanders,
how ever ,  r e f u s e d  to  a c c e p t  t h e s e  emblems as  l e g i t i m a t e ,  e s p e c i a l l y
t h e  f l a g ,  as  t h e y  p o i n t e d  ou t  i t  was I n d o n e s i a n .  They t o l d  Mustapha
t h a t  a R e p u b l i c  was ou t  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  a s  t h e  Malays s t i l l  had t h e i r
S u l t a n s  and i t  was J a p a n e s e  p o l i c y  t o  back  th e  S u l t a n s .  M u s ta p h a ' s
d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  w i t h  t h e  J a p a n e s e  began from t h i s  p o i n t  and he was to
46d i s t r u s t  e v e r y t h i n g  they  d id  o r  s a i d  t o  him t h e r e a f t e r .
I b ra h i m  and t h e  o t h e r  d e t a i n e d  KMM members were r e l e a s e d  by
t h e i r  B r i t i s h  p r i s o n  wardens  t h r e e  days b e f o r e  S i n g a p o re  f e l l  on
15 F e b r u a r y  1942. About t h e  same t i m e ,  two advance  p a r t i e s  o f  M u s ta p h a ' s
pemudas , one l e d  by Onan H a j i  S i r a j  , i n f i l t r a t e d  t h e  B r i t i s h  l i n e s  on
t h e  w e s t  c o a s t  o f  S in g a p o re  and r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  c o n t a c t s  w i t h  I b ra h im
4 7and h i s  group a t *  t h e  o f f i c e s  of  t h e  Warta  Malaya i n  C e c i l  S t r e e t .
Some o f  t h e  pemudas  j o i n e d  i n  the  l o o t i n g  o f  h a s t i l y  abandoned  C h inese  
and I n d i a n  s hophouses  i n  o r d e r  to  o b t a i n  r i c e ,  s u g a r ,  and o t h e r  f o o d s t u f f s ,  
w h i l e  o t h e r s  c a r r i e d  on w i t h  t h e i r  work to  r e s c u e  Malay s o l d i e r s ,  
p o l i c e m e n  and c i v i l i a n s  who had gone i n t o  h i d i n g  once news o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  
d e f e a t  had become k n o w n . ^
45 I b i d .
46 I b i d . , 235-37 .  Ib ra h im  h i m s e l f  h e a r d  a bou t  M u s ta p h a ' s  demands t o  the  
J a p a n e s e  commanders a few days a f t e r  h i s  r e l e a s e  from p r i s o n ,  when 
some o f  M u s t a p h a ' s  pemudas made c o n t a c t  w i t h  him.  I b r a h i m ' s  r e a c t i o n  
was one o f  d i s a p p r o v a l ,  on t h e  g rounds  t h a t  i n  t h e  e x c i t e m e n t  and
• f l u s h  o f  v i c t o r y ,  Mustapha and h i s  pemudas had r a s h l y  f o r g o t t e n  t h a t  
J a p a n  was a c o l o n i a l  power,  n o t  a l i b e r a t o r .  Whether  t h i s  was s a i d  
w i t h  h i n d s i g h t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  t e l l .  See A g a s t j a ,  94-95 .
47 A g a s t j a ,  95 -96 .  See a l s o  I s h a k  H a j i  Mohammed, 'Kenangan Hidup Pak 
Sao No 29 '  i n  Mingguan Malays i a ,  18 J u l y  1977.  I s h a k  i s  b i t t e r l y  
c r i t i c a l  o f  t h e  a r r o g a n t  b e h a v i o u r  o f  Onan H a j i  S i r a j ,  on a r r i v a l  
a t  t h e  newspaper  o f f i c e .  Onan i s  s a i d  to  have  thrown h i s  w e ig h t  
a b o u t ,  o f t e n  r a i s i n g  h i s  v o i c e  and c h i d i n g  e v e ry o n e  f o r  l a c k  of  
d i s c i p l i n e .
48 I s h a k ,  i b i d . , g i v e s  an u t t e r l y  f r a n k  a c c o u n t  o f  l o o t i n g  by KljM 
members and C h inese  groups i n  S i n g a p o r e  j u s t  b e f o r e  the  i s l a n d  
f e l l  to  t h e  J a p a n e s e .
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Ibrahim convened a meeting of the KMM executive committee 
on the night of 17 February, at a house in Bukit Timah. Ibrahim heard 
reports of what the pemudas had done and the attitudes of the Japanese 
officers towards them. Mustapha narrated his encounter with the 
Japanese commanders and their rejection of his demands to set up a 
Malayan Republic. Ibrahim criticised Mustapha for his stand. lie told 
the meeting:
Comrades, Japan’s present victory is not our victory.
Our struggle has still a long way to go and we do 
not know the attitude of Japan. Who knows, Japan 
might also turn colonialistic....^
lie turned to Mustapha and told him that he had made a great blunder.
'You won’t get a Republic. They will behead you,' he said.^^ Mustapha
argued that his meeting with the Japanese officers had been a test-case
and an ’eye-opener’. The Japanese could not be trusted because they
wanted merely to use the Malays for their own ends. He called on the
meeting to adopt a policy of withdrawal and ’non-cooperation’."^
Ibrahim, however, urged caution. Mustapha had put pressure too early
on the Japanese. The KMM should ’wait-and-see’. The situation might
change and force the Japanese to give in to KMM demands. There was no
point in acting hastily. His arguments won the day. Mustapha agreed
to go along with the majority temporarily, but differences had arisen
which were to divide the KMM leadership into two groups, Mustapha’s and
Ibrahim's, resulting before long in the complete withdrawal of the former.^
The Lone of the meeting clearly suggests that rather early the
KMM leadership had become aware and distrustful of Japanese intentions.
Ibrahim's own disillusionment with the Japanese was soon to begin. At that
moment, he still set the KMM’s priorities as firstly, to rescue and to
49 Agastja, 96.
50 Interview with Robert Reece, Jakarta, February 1974.
51 Mustapha's version is in Abdul Malek, 248-51, who gives a detailed 
account of the proceedings, based on interviews with Mustapha and 
other participants.
52 Abdul Malek, 132-48, 210-11, 266-69.
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assist the Malay aristocratic leaders and Malay 'prisoners of war', and
secondly, to explore Japanese aims and plans. He was extremely suspicious
of Major Fujiwara, with whom he was in contact often. Ibrahim's suspicions
had first been aroused by stories of the Japanese guerrilla 'Harimau O'.
He had never met Fujiwara nor 'Harimau O' before, yet the Major was
53publicly linking the exploits of the KMM pemudas and 'Harimau O'.
'Harimau O' (from the Malay harimau meaning tiger), was, in fact, Tani
Yutaka, who was born in 1910 in Malaya of Japanese parents. Ibrahim
refers to him only as 'Tani'. It was the death of his eight-year-old
sister by rampaging Chinese mobs during the anti-Japanese campaign in
Malaya in 1932 which was said to have made Tani take up a career of
violence and revenge. He organised a group of Thais and Malays at the
Malay-Thai border, which became notorious for its crimes of extortion
and banditry. By November 1941 Tani and his exploits had come to the
attention of F Kikan, Major Fujiwara's intelligence agency, which used
him first as an espionage agent and later in sabotage work behind
British lines. Apparently he had been in contact with local KMM members
without Ibrahim's knowledge. He was said to be quite successful in some
of his assignments with KMM members, especially in blowing up communications
centres. He accompanied the Japanese 25th Army to Johor Bahru where he
came down with fever. He died in the Johor General Hospital two days
54after the fall of Singapore.
Ibrahim was quite well-versed in the art of diplomacy, or 
' jalan diplomasi' as he called it. One of his first acts was to lead 
a KMM delegation to meet Major Fujiwara on 18 February at the Japanese 
military headquarters in Tanglin Road. The purpose was to extend 
congratulations on Japan's splendid victory over the British forces and 
to offer the KMM's services. He asked the Major to accept the KMM's 
gesture as proof of support of the Malay population as a whole for Japan,
53 Agastja, 97-99.
54 Fujiwara describes his activities in F Kikan, 25-27. See also 
Joyce Lebra, 8-10. A Domei newsagency report of 15 July 1943 
disclosed that a film 'Harimau Melayu' (Malay Tiger) depicting
'the exploits of the Japanese leader of an anti-British secret society' 
would be sent to the 'Southern Regions' (i.e., Southeast Asia) by 
the Board of Information. In Fortnightly Intelligence Report, up to 
17 July 1943, in CO 273/669/50744/7.
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and to disregard the belated anti-Japanese proclamations by the four 
Malay Rulers, which had been due to British pressure. He also requested 
the Japanese to treat humanely the 2,000-odd Malay 'prisoners of war' 
who were detained at a camp in Farrer Park. Fujiwara promised to render 
whatever help he could to meet the KMM requests. He told the KMM 
delegation that the war was still not over, as the Japanese Army had to 
move on to the Netherlands East Indies, and in the operations against 
the Dutch he hoped the KMM would continue to give the same valuable 
services which their pemuda had rendered in the Malayan campaign against 
the British troo p s . F u j i w a r a  then accompanied the KMM delegation to 
meet the Japanese Military Administrator of Malaya-Singapore, Watanabe. 
Ibrahim seized the opportunity to present Watanabe with two requests:
(a) the KMM should be allowed to continue with its activities as before, 
in view of the services it had rendered to the Japanese; and (b) the 
prewar Malay newspaper, Warta Malaya, which he and the KMM had owned and 
managed, should be allowed to resume publication under the control of 
the KMM. Watanabe granted the requests. But in the case of the Warta 
Malaya they had to wait a while before the newspaper was reopened, and 
when it did the management came under a Japanese officer, much to the 
annoyance of Ibrahim and his group.^
The initial delay in rewarding the KMM leaders and members in 
Singapore with immediate jobs and important positions in the military 
administration infuriated Ibrahim. He began to spend a lot of time on 
reorganising and building up the KMM's organisational strength. As he 
kept waiting impatiently for the sinecures to arrive, Ibrahim also made 
plans for an underground KMM movement, in anticipation of future trouble 
with the Japanese. He Instructed Sutan Djenain, who had been freed from 
prison together with Ibrahim, to return to Selangor and to re-establish 
contacts with the MCP and the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). 
All KMM branch leaders had gone back to their States to reorganise 
their previous organisations at two levels - open and underground.
Ibrahim and a few leaders remained behind In Singapore, their base, but
55 Robert Reece's Notes.
56 Ibid.
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they toured the peninsula frequently and kept in touch with the branches. ^  
Some time in March 1942 Ibrahim quarrelled with the Japanese 
over the role of the KMM. The Dutch administration in the Netherlands 
East Indies had capitulated to the Japanese Army quickly, so that the
5 8Japanese in Singapore did not need the assistance of the KMM pemudas.
About 15 March, the KMM's Barlsan Pemuda was moved to Tanjong Katong,
a district of Singapore, where the Japanese wanted them to become romusha
(forced labour) for construction projects. Ibrahim disagreed. He
argued so heatedly with the Japanese officers that one of them slapped
59him, but this incident was kept secret. It was his moment of truth.
In April Ibrahim and other KMM leaders such as Ishak Haji
Mohammed were recruited into the Sendenbu (Propaganda Department),
and soon after appointed journalists on the staff of Berita Malai,
6 0a Malay language newspaper. However, because a Japanese was made
boss over him and because he was not given a free hand as editor in
running the newspaper, Ibrahim began to drop off from work and to
concentrate on his duties as president of the KMM. He went upcountry
frequently to give rousing speeches about the KMM's struggle. On 11 May,
at Muar (Johor), Ibrahim addressed a KMM meeting which was graced by the
presence of the local Japanese commander and the Malay District Officer,
Datuk Othman bin Buang. That night the KMM branch hosted a dinner
in his honour, which 200 people attended including the Japanese
61commander and the Malay D.O.
Apparently to show his pique over Japanese failure to give the 
KMM a proper role in the administration, Ibrahim boycotted a public 
ceremony held on 29 April 1942 to mark Emperor llirohito's birthday.
At this ceremony he and other Malay Chinese, Indian and Eurasian public
57 Abdul Malek, 271-74.
58 Robert Reece's Notes.
59 Ibid.
60 Fujiwara, interview, Tokyo, September 1976.
61 See extract from the weekly Matahari Memanchar, Muar, No. 3,
15 August 1942, in Arena Wati, Cherpen Zaman Jepun (Short Stories 
of the Japanese Occupation period), Kuala Lumpur, 69-71.
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figures were to be awarded certificates of honour for services rendered 
62to the Japanese. After May, he did not come to the newspaper office 
63anymore.
It was when he returned from a Malayan tour in June that he
was told that the Japanese administration had decided to ban the KMM
and that he was instructed to discontinue its activities and to inform
64party branches to dissolve. This was a big blow to Ibrahim. Perhaps 
to mollify him, Captain Ogawa (secretary to Watanabe, the Director- 
General of Malaya-Singapore) invited him to accompany the Director- 
General on an upcountry tour along with other community leaders. 'They 
went as far as Perlis, and returned at the end of July.^ About 8 August 
1942 Ogawa invited Ibrahim and four other KMM members to dinner. Ogawa 
was extremely sympathetic to Ibrahim’s complaints about the lack of a 
political role for the KMM and advised him to accept a government post 
as adviser on Malay affairs to the Singapore-Malaya administration in 
Singapore. An advisory board consisting of five to six Malays would be 
appointed. Ibrahim would select them and be the head. However, the 
secretary would be a Japanese (a Mr Hosai, a civilian with the rank of 
Colonel), and he would be in actual charge of things. The KMM ’inner 
council’, consisting of Ibrahim and a few of his trusted executive 
councillors, discussed the offer and finally agreed that he should 
accept the appointment.^ Henceforth, although Ibrahim’s public position 
was to improve further, his political influence and the KMM movement 
was to disappear altogether.
62 Robert Reece's Notes.
63 At Ibrahim's suggestion, the well known Malay journalist Abdul Rahim 
Kajai was appointed editor of Berita Malai, either in May or June 
1942. Interview, A. Samad Ismail, former Berita Malai journalist, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1973.
64 Robert Reece's Notes.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
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The KMM and Malay Society
Between February and June 1942 the standing of the KMM 
was quite high at the village or district level of Malay society on 
the peninsula. The Japanese turned to the local KMM members and officials 
as immediate sources of knowledge and manpower. As a result the KMM 
became extremely influential. it was able to give protection and to 
fulfill most of the requests of the Malay population, whether it was 
for licences to move goods, buy or sell rice, or obtain letters of 
safe conduct.Membership within the first two months leapt spectacularly, 
to about 10,000. Among those who rushed to join were members of the 
Malay aristocracy, including 'Raja Shariman in Perak, Datuk Hamzah bin 
Abdullah in Selangor, Tengku Mohammad bin Tengku Besar in Negri Sembilan, 
Tengku Mohammad bin Sultan Ahmad in Pahang, Datuk Onn bin Jaafar in 
Johor and others'.^
During this period the KMM members emerged as the new privileged 
political elite, whose prestige superseded that of the Malay aristocracy 
and the British-trained Malay bureaucratic elite. They had easy access 
to Japanese officers, political influence, information, special food 
rations and allowances. More importantly, they could extend protection 
and help, and so became the new patrons of the Malay peasant masses. 
Consequently, there was resentment against the KMM elite from among 
the Malay aristocracy and the Malay bureaucrats. An impression of this 
resentment comes through in the recollection of a member of the Malay 
bureaucratic elite:
The KMM officials swaggered about in the villages and in 
the government offices, throwing their weight around as 
if they were the government. No doubt the Malay 
population appreciated what they had done during the 
transitional period of Japanese takeover. They saved 
Malay lives and helped to protect Malay women and 
property.
But they were ill-qualified to take over the administration.
Most were clerks, primary school teachers and those holding
67 Halinah Bamadhaj, 'The Impact of the Japanese occupation of Malaya 
on Malay society and politics 1941-1945', M.A. thesis, University 
of Auckland, 1975, 76-86.
68 Agastja, 68.
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junior positions in government service. The senior 
civil servants initially had to take orders from them, 
because the Japanese Army officers relied on them for 
advice and they were also the eyes and ears [meaning 
spies and informers] of the Japanese. They were extremely 
arrogant, but later when the Japanese realised they 
could not rely on them to run the government they turned 
to the prewar British-trained civil servants.69
Part of this resentment stemmed from the fact that the KMM 
members were responsible for the arrest and interrogation of ’uncooperative* 
Malay aristocrats and civil servants in many areas. It was a nascent 
conflict between different elite strata which proved abortive for several 
reasons. Firstly, Ibrahim Yaacob encouraged the KMM to accommodate 
elements of the Malay aristocracy and the bureaucratic elite within their 
ranks for the sake of achieving Malay unity under KMM leadership.
Secondly, enough members of both traditional elites sensed that the KMM 
was the direction the ’wind of change’ was blowing and quickly adjusted 
themselves to the new situation. Many became KMM members and were 
allowed to assume leadership positions within KMM branches in several 
rural districts. Lastly, the KMM’s ’reign’ was short-lived; had the 
KMM lasted throughout the occupation it is probable that greater social 
divisions would have developed in the competition for rewards and 
political influence in Malay society.
In fact, soon after the KMM’s dissolution in June, the tables
were turned. The rival aristocratic elite reasserted itself quickly
and their members were the first to exact revenge on the KMM elite.
Ibrahim Yaacob describes the actions of these aristocrats as 'betrayals’:
Throughout the Japanese occupation none of the numerous 
prewar Malay associations [a reference to the aristocratic- 
led Malay State associations known as the Persatuan- 
Persatuan Negeri] dared to rise to defend the rights of 
the Malays either openly or in secret. The leading 
-raj as and datuks [titled aristocrats] were only interested 
in safeguarding their own security. Initially they took 
refuge within the KMM and became members of the KMM 
leadership in the districts. But when the KMM was dissolved,
69 Datuk (Dr) Awang Hassan, Malaysian High Commissioner to Australia. 
Interview, Canberra, June 1978.
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some of them betrayed several KMM district members 
causing the latter to be detained and tortured by the 
Japanese.70
The dissolution of the KMM and the ’victimisation’ of KMM 
members which followed saw the KMM movement suppressed for most of the 
remainder of the Japanese occupation, until the closing months of the 
war in 1945, when Japan's unfavourable military position brought a 
reversal of policy which allowed the KMM to be revived under a new name 
KRIS (Kesatuan Ra’ayat Istimewa, or Union of Special People).^ During 
its years of suppression Ibrahim was unable to keep the movement intact 
underground or to maintain close touch with party elements and branches, 
which slowly disintegrated. KMM members, lacking leadership or an 
organisation to give them political cohesion, became preoccupied with 
their own survival.
Japanese accounts indicate that the KMM's dissolution in June
was due to Japanese military policy, which did not wish to encourage
72political activities by any local group. It was feared that if the
KMM was encouraged then Chinese, Eurasians and other groups might ask
for similar privileges. The IIL was supported because it was an India-
oriented organisation and was part of Japanese military designs for
the invasion of India. This Japanese policy was to restrain Ibrahim
from pursuing his political aspirations. It has been generally assumed
that the KMM's fortunes were affected by Major Fujiwara's posting to
73Burma in March 1942, but there is little evidence to show that Major 
Fujiwara had done much for the KMM. Fujiwara himself says:
70 Ibrahim Yaacob, Nusa dan Bangsa Melayu (The Malays and their 
Islands), Jakarta, 1951, 61.
71 See below, 180-83.
72 Interviews with Fujiwara and Professor Yoichi Itagaki, the former
adviser on Malay affairs to the Japanese Military Administration 
in Malaya, both in Tokyo, September 1976. See also Document no.l, 
’Principles governing the administration of Occupied Southern 
Areas), in Benda et.al., Japanese Military Administration in 
Indonesia: Selected Documents, Yale University, 1965, 2.
73 Halinah Bamadhaj, 93-94.
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I did not encourage the KMM because of the multi­
ethnic nature of Malayan society. I did not want 
to upset the status quo. But I saw to it that 
Ibrahim and some KMM members got jobs as rewards 
for their cooperation.74
ib rah 1 in In Office
It was as adviser on Malay affairs to Somubucho Watanabe
that Ibrahim came very much into the limelight, making broadcasts and
public speeches, calling on Malays to cooperate with the Japanese
administration and hinting that they would achieve their nationalist
goals in the near future. Ibrahim sow to it that the other KMM officials
such as Ishak Haji Mohammed, Abdullah Kamel, Taharuddin Ahmad and
Mohamed Zallehudin were satisfactorily employed on the Berita Malai and
other Malay publications published by the Propaganda Department. However,
other KMM officials, such as Mustapha Hussein, Ahmad Boestamam, Idris
Hashim, Abdul Kadir Adabi and M.N. Othman, had left Singapore before
May 1942 to return to their own villages, partly to keep in touch with
local KMM organisations, partly due to their own dissatisfaction over
the failure of the Japanese to meet the KMM’s demands on Malay independence
76or a greater share in the administration.
Mustapha found his position as the KMM's vice-president 
untenable. Owing to personal differences with Ibrahim and his clique, 
Mustapha withdrew to his kampung in Perak some time before May and had 
nothing more to do with the Japanese administration. His withdrawal 
was caused partly by an incident in which he was kicked and slapped by 
a Japanese soldier because he got in the latter's way when trying to 
fix his bicycle on the road.^ This incident convinced Mustapha that 
the Japanese were not only unreliable, but cruel and barbaric. Ahmad 
Boestamam and Idris Hakim both returned to Ipoh where they worked in
74 Interview, Tokyo, September 1976.
75 The Director-General of the Japanese Military Administration 
(Malaya) in Singapore.
76 Abdul Malek, 132-48, 210-11, 266-69.
77 Interview with Professor Yoichi Itagaki, Tokyo, September 1976. 
Itagaki said he heard the story from Ibrahim.
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the Propaganda Department. M.N. Othman was re-employed in the Malayan
Railways in Kuala Lumpur. These three former KMM executive committee
members were dissatisfied with what they described as Ibrahim's 'autocratic'
78leadership, 'arrogant' behaviour and his formation of 'cliques'.
Besides the 'inner circle' of KMM officials, he was said to have his own
group of trusted confidantes including his brother-in-law Onan Haji
Siraj. His 'inner circle' was not constant but included among others
Mustapha, Hassan Manan (KMM secretary-general), Abdul Karim Rashid, Ishak
Haji Mohammed, Mohd. Isa Mahmud and Othman Mohd. Noor (all KMM executive
committee members). Ibrahim was also known to have two other 'cliques',
known as the 'outer circle' and the 'ordinary circle'. KMM executive
committee members Ahmad Boestamam and Idris Hakim were in the 'outer
79circle' and were usually sealed off from policy-making.
In 1943 the public sinecures which Ibrahim finally secured
went only to him and his 'clique'. In June of that year, Japanese
Premier Tojo, on his return from visiting Singapore and Thailand,
announced in the Imperial Diet the coming independence of Burma and the
Philippines, and promised that the administration of the 'Indonesian
peoples' would move forward, and that political participation of natives
80in Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Borneo and the Celebes would be granted.
This speech was welcomed with great enthusiasm by the Malay press.
On 28 July Ibrahim led an eight-man delegation from Singapore and the
Malay States (members of the Malay Advisory Board) on a three-month
inspection tour of Japan under war conditions. Those from the Malay
States were all members of the Malay aristocracy whom Ibrahim had
recruited to gain their support. They included Nik Ahmad Kamil (Kelantan),
Raja Sulaiman Ahmad (Selangor), Datuk Bandar Seremban (Negri Sembilan)
81and Tengku Ibrahim (Trengganu). The delegation was joined by another
78 Abdul Malek, 132-48, 210-11, 266-69.
79 Ibid.
80 See the full text of Tojo's speech, Document no.9, in Benda, 
et.al., 51.
81 Syonan Shimbun, 30 July 1943. See also the Fortnightly Intelligence 
Reports (FIR) of the wartime Far Eastern Bureau of the British 
Ministry of Information in New Delhi, Nos 7, 10, 12 and 13 (covering 
the period July to September 1943), which give announcements and 
periodic reports of Ibrahim's visit to Japan, in CO 273/669/50744/7.
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from Sumatra, and during the tour their activities were widely
reported by Domei newsagency. Ibrahim, as the delegation leader from
Malaya, was highly acclaimed for his speeches praising Japan’s war
effort, and Domei carried biographical details about him and his
contribution in helping Japanese intelligence in the Malayan campaign
82leading to the fall of Singapore.
Ibrahim and the Giyu Gun
While the delegation was in Japan, the newsagency Domei put
out statements that the Japanese had adopted measures ’to rouse Indonesians,
including Malays, from the stupor into which they had fallen during the
Dutch and British regimes'. In Java they had initiated 'the first
steps in provincial autonomy’ in line with Tojo’s statement. They hoped
that this would 'inspire the people in Malai to work in ever closer
cooperation with the authorities in the hope that when the time is
ripe they too will be accorded similar privileges'. Domei also remarked
that Japan had brought 'a new gospel of coexistence and coprosperity'
to the Malays and that 'right has been restored to Malai to determine 
8 3its own future'. These statements were made on 16 August, and on
20 August Japan signed away the four northern Malay States of Perlis,
Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu to Thailand. The formal transfer of these
states was made on 18 October that year. When Ibrahim returned in October,
84he was in time to witness the transfer. It upset him terribly.
Apparently to comfort him, the Japanese told Ibrahim that he 
had been chosen to help establish the Giyu Gun (Volunteer Army) and 
Giyu Tai (Volunteer Corps). The former was to be a fighting force used 
only for the defence of Malaya and the latter for defence of the coastline 
and the preservation of public peace and order. The Japanese had created 
the Heiho (Auxiliary servicemen) in June to assist Japanese forces in 
labour services. Ibrahim was instructed to organise Malay pemuda into 
both the Giyu Gun and the Giyu Tai, and was told that he himself would
82 See FIR No.13, 11 September 1943, ibid.
83 FIR No.12, 12 August 1943.
84 Ibrahim's talk to Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 29 August 1973.
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undergo six months' military training in order to take command of the 
85Giyu Gun. Although the original intention of the Japanese was to 
make the Giyu Gun into a multi-racial army, it ended up mainly as a 
Malay force. Ibrahim, who was known to have made a request to the 
Japanese for a Malay Army to be raised, was quite willing to take up 
the appointment in the hope that he could convert the Giyu Gun into a 
nationalist army, but in this respect he was to fail.
In early November 1943 Ishak Haji Mohammed, assistant editor
of Berita Malai, visited Tokyo to attend the Dai Toa (Greater East Asia)
Journalists' Conference. On 14 December, after the conference, he and
other Journalists visited Nanking, Taiwan and the Philippines, where they
met the Filipino leader, Jose Laurel. While he was away the chief editor
of Berita Malai, Rahim Kajai, died. On his return, Ishak took over the
post and spent the next month making speeches and broadcasts urging
Malay youths to join the Giyu Gun and Giyu Tai. It is clear that the
Singapore KMM leaders had been used by the Japanese to mobilise Malay
pemudas for the Giyu Gun. From the political appeals they made it appears
they regarded the Giyu Gun as serving the cause of Malay independence
as well. But they failed to reckon with Japanese shrewdness, which
ensured that selection of Giyu Gun recruits would be done not by the
KMM leaders but by the Japanese themselves. Japanese officers would also
86instruct the Giyu Gun recruits.
The formation of the Giyu Gun and Giyu Tai in Malaya coincided 
with the formation of similar groups in Sumatra and Java. It was clearly 
the Japanese aim to encourage national and political consciousness and
85 Ibid. Ibrahim prefers to call the Giyu Gun by the Malay name PETA 
which stands for Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Motherland).
86 The disappointment which came to Ishak and Ibrahim later is nicely 
captured in A. Samad Ismail's highly evocative and semi-autobiographical 
novel, Patah Sayap Terbang Jua (literally, a broken wing can fly, too). 
In the novel the character Hashim bears a close resemblance to
Ishak, and Shamsuddin to Ibrahim Yaacob. Samad, who was on the staff 
of Berita Malai, was regarded among the newspaper staff as Ishak's 
'protege'. Samad, then twenty years old, matured politically and 
credited it all to Ishak. 'He taught me journalism, politics and the 
rough and tumble of life', Samad recalls. 'Due to Ishak, my world 
view broadened.' Interview, Kuala Lumpur, June 1973. Samad was 
later to become one of Malaysia's leading Malay writers.
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to persuade local populations to assume a role in defence against 
Allied attacks. The Japanese were now prepared to display some confidence 
and trust in the local people, partly due to Japan's uncertain position 
in the war and to greater deployment of Japanese troops to battle-fronts 
such as Burma and the Pacific areas.
The KMM journalists in Berita Malai and other Malay publications 
mounted a big publicity campaign to get Malay youths to join, using 
Ibrahim Yaacob's appointment as Giyu Gun commander to arouse their 
interest. The monthly magazine Fajar Asia (Dawn of Asia) made a most 
nationalistic appeal to Malay youths to join the Giyu Gun:
The Giyu Gun is a genuine Army which will consist only 
of Malays. The recruits must be those who genuinely 
wish to defend their motherland. The second unit has 
already been formed and only awaits the arrival of more 
dedicated youths who are prepared to carry out their 
responsibilities to the motherland. Malay pemudas must 
seize this excellent opportunity to show the world that 
within their.breasts flows the blood of Hang Tuah [the 
Malay warrior] who once reminded us: 'The Malays shall
not vanish in this world.' Mr Ibrahim Yaacob who has 
been appointed commander of the Malay Giyu Gun says 
he wishes to see every male Malay enlist as a soldier 
and establish the Army.87
Other writers in the magazine made a similar appeal to Malay youths
to 'rise to the defence of their motherland'. One writer had suggested
earlier that the British should be prevented from landing and declared:
'The Malay keris [dagger] demands blood, after centuries of being locked
88within its sheath by the oppression of Western colonialism.'
In December 1943, while Ibrahim was busy with recruiting 
campaigns for the Giyu Gun, the Japanese administration announced the 
formation of regional councils (Sangi Kai) in Singapore and the other states 
in Malaya in line with Tojo's policy to allow native participation in 
political administration. Except in Singapore, no KMM members were
87 Fajar Asia, Singapore, December 1943.
88 See the article entitled, 'Bangunkanlah Tentera Sukarela!' (Raise 
the Volunteer Army!) in Fajar Asia, Singapore, October 1943.
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included in these State councils; Malays in the other States were 
represented by titled aristocrats, senior civil servants and Arabs.
In Singapore, on Ibrahim's nomination, Onan Haji Siraj and Daud bin Mohd. 
Shah of the KMM were appointed. Another important shift in policy in 
the composition of these Councils was that more seats were given to the 
Malayan Chinese. The Japanese administration had previously adopted a 
repressive policy towards the Chinese. However, following recall of the 
hard-liner Watanabe and transfer of the four northern Malay States to 
Thailand (which resulted in the remainder of Malaya becoming over­
whelmingly non-Malay in composition), political concessions were now
made to the Chinese and Chinese representatives were to be found on every 
89State Council.
Recruiting proper for the Giyu Gun began on 9 December 1943.
In a 1944 New Year's Day message Ibrahim Yaacob made a direct appeal
to Malay youths to enlist in the Army:
I am living in a camp somewhere in Syonan [Singapore] 
undergoing rigorous training as a foundation officer 
of the Giyu Gun. The Giyu Gun and the Giyu Tai will 
form the Giyu Hei or the Malai Protection Army which,
I believe, will symbolise the desire of every able- 
bodied Malai^O youth to serve his country.
Never in my life and in the course of my difficult 
career as a leader of the Malai people, do I feel more 
extremely gratified at the prospect of being able to 
serve more actively as a soldier to defend my beloved 
Malai, and to help complete the construction of New 
Malai.
My training here, though rigorous, is strengthening my 
spirit and my faith, and will help to qualify me better 
to serve my people....91
By June 1944, when Ibrahim had completed his training and had been given 
the rank of Lt-Colonel, some 2,000 Malay youths were said to have been 
recruited and trained as a single unit with a central training camp and 
barracks at Johor Bahru. In July the Giyu Gun was put out on anti-guerrilla
89 The composition of the various Sangi Kais (Advisory Councils) 
is discussed in Yoichi Itagaki, 'Outlines of Japanese policy in 
Indonesia and Malaya during the war with special reference to 
nationalism of respective countries', in The Annals of the 
Hitotsubashi Academy, Tokyo, II, 2 (April 1952), 188.
90 'Malai' in Japanese means either 'Malay' or 'Malaya'.
91 Syonan Shimbun, 1 January 1944.
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operations. Although an understanding was said to have been reached between
Ibrahim and the MCP/MPAJA, it did not prevent these forces from clashing
in mid-1944 in the jungles of Kota Tinggi, resulting in 25 guerrillas 
92being killed. Japanese suspicions of the Giyu Gun were said to have
been aroused in Ipoh, however, when not a single engagement occurred
between the Giyu Gun and the MPAJA. The units were then suddenly withdrawn
to Singapore and dispersed to different Japanese Army units. Ibrahim
93was made an adviser and promoted to Colonel, but had little power.
Japanese distrust and tight control had made the Giyu Gun impotent.
Being a military officer, Ibrahim’s movements now became somewhat 
restricted but he tried to keep in touch with the KMM officials in 
Singapore. By this time Ishak Haji Mohammed had left his job as editor 
of Berita Malai over a tiff he had with Onan Haji Siraj. Ishak left 
for Bintan Island, south of Singapore, some time in 1944, ostensibly 
to help the- 'grow more food' campaign there. After a while he was 
recalled to Singapore by Ibrahim, and soon after he went back to his 
kampung in Pahang, where he remained until the Japanese surrender.
92 Abdul Malek, 297-302.
93 Ibid; see also Agastja, 106.
94 Ishak disliked Onan for his arrogant attitude and said that Ibrahim 
gave him 'too much face'. When Ishak was in Bintan, Ibrahim 
repeatedly called on him to return, to no avail until the intervention 
of a close friend, Pacik Ahmad. When he arrived at Singapore's 
Clifford Pier, Ibrahim met Ishak and ordered a sack of rice Ishak
had brought back from Bintan to be taken to Ibrahim's car. The 
rice was removed to Ibrahim's house instead of being returned to 
Ishak. 'This was typical behaviour for Ibrahim and Onan', recalled 
Ishak bitterly. Interview, January 1977. For Pacik Ahmad's account, 
see Appendix D, Abdul Malek, 363-67.
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The KRIS and Indonesian Independence
As the war situation deteriorated the political advancement
promised by Tojo was taken a stage further by his successor, Koiso.
In a statement on 9 September 1944, Koiso promised Japan would prepare
the former Netherlands East Indies for independence, and that regions
which had completed preparations would be granted independence first.
95Java was to be given priority. Neither Malaya nor Sumatra were
considered for independence because the Japanese considered these areas
politically backward. In Java, Sukarno and other Indonesian nationalist
leaders were given more prominent roles to play in political
administration. The KMM group, inspired by developments in Java,
accordingly revived their pan-Indonesian aspirations. In the early
months of 1945 the many newspapers and magazines edited by the group
gave support to the idea of a closer union of the Malay and Indonesian
96territories, which they called Indonesia Raya. i
It was in May 1945 that the Japanese finally accelerated their
plans for granting Indonesia independence. Following upon this a few
Japanese' civilian officers of the Military Administration in Malaya,
sympathetic to Malay political aspirations decided on their own to
bring the KMM group in line with the Japanese plans for Indonesian
independence. Two of these men were Professor Yoichi Itagaki, of
Hitotsubashi University, the specialist in Malay affairs, and his superior,cProfessor Akamatsu, both of the Military Administration’s Research Bureau. 
Itagaki had attended the 2-3 May 1945 meeting in Singapore of Japanese 
administrators from various regions, including Java, Sumatra,
Celebes and Malaya, wherein preparations for the independence of Indonesia 
were discussed. It was at this meeting that the idea developed in
<*
. o95 See Koiso s statement, and the draft statements of the Army 
Ministry (1944) in Benda, et.al., 257-59.
96 See Fajar Asia, issues from December 1944 to February 1945, which 
carried articles on Sukarno, Indonesian historical heroes like 
Diponegoro and the Indonesian national anthem ’Indonesia Raya’.
97 Interview, Professor Itagaki.
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I t a g a k i ’ s own mind t o  do som e th ing  f o r  Malayan in d ep e n d e n c e  as  w e l l .
With p e r m i s s i o n  from t h e  C h i e f  o f  S t a f f  i n  S i n g a p o r e ,  I t a g a k i  took  p e r s o n a l  
c h a r g e  o f  I b ra h im  Yaacob,  who was now C o l o n e l  o f  t h e  Giyu Gun. I t a g a k i  
u rged  I b ra h im  t o  convene  a m e e t in g  o f  h i s  group to  d i s c u s s  p rob le m s .
T h i s  m e e t in g  was s a i d  t o  have  t a k e n  p l a c e  on 4 o r  5 May 1945 
a t  I b r a h i m ’ s house  i n  Tan jong  Ka tong ,  S i n g a p o r e .  About  s e ven  o r  e i g h t  
KMM members,  i n c l u d i n g  Onan H a j i  S i r a j , were p r e s e n t .  I t a g a k i  began  by 
s a y i n g :
What I  have  to  say  t o n i g h t  i s  u n o f f i c i a l ,  b u t  I  t h i n k  
t h e  in d ep e n d e n c e  o f  Malaya i s  coming.  To be r e a d y  f o r  
t h i s ,  you a l l  s h o u ld  s t a r t  making p r e p a r a t i o n s .  Today 
I  have  s e c u r e d  t h e  p e r m i s s i o n  o f  t h e  C h ie f  o f  S t a f f ,  so 
t h a t  I b ra h i m  can f u n c t i o n  as  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  Malay 
n a t i o n a l i s t  movement. I  hope you a l l  w i l l  t h i n k  
s e r i o u s l y  a b o u t  t h e  i d e a . 99
To t h i s  I b ra h im  r e p l i e d :
Independence  o f  Malaya h a s  been  o u r  d e s i r e  f o r  a long  
t im e ,  b u t  i t  has  been  t o t a l l y  s u p p r e s s e d  by t h e  J a p a n e s e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Of c o u r s e ,  we b e l i e v e  t h e  words o f  t h e  
P r o f e s s o r .  However , we c a n n o t  r e p l y  i m m e d i a t e l y .  We 
c a n n o t  s t a r t  a n y t h i n g  w i t h o u t  Mustapha H u s s e i n ,  who i s  
t h e  v i c e - c h a i r m a n  o f  KMM. Moreover ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  no 
ag reem en t  from M us ta pha ,  t h e r e  i s  no hope o f  s u c c e s s .
To m o b i l i s e  800 c o m r a d e s , h i s  s u p p o r t  i s  i n d i s p e n s a b l e .
To make m a t t e r s  w o r s e ,  he  h a s  been  i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  he 
would n o t  c o o p e r a t e  w i t h  t h e  J a p a n e s e  s i n c e  t h e  i n c i d e n t  
i n  which he was k i c k e d  and s l a p p e d .  10(3
Where upon I t a g a k i  p ro m is ed  to  accompany I b ra h im  t o  T a i p i n g ,  where
Mustapha l i v e d ,  t o  p e r s u a d e  him t o  r e j o i n  t h e  movement.  The group
t h e n  a d j o u r n e d  b r i e f l y  f o r  a d i s c u s s i o n ,  and when th e y  r e t u r n e d ,
Ib ra h im  announced t h a t  t h e y  had  p i c k e d  on t h e  name KRIS, o r  Kekuatan
Rakyat  I s t im ew a  ( l i t e r a l l y  Supreme e f f o r t  o f  t h e  P e o p l e ) f o r  t h e i r
98 See t h e  a c c o u n t  i n  h i s  memoirs ,  Az ia  tono  Taiwa (D ia logue  w i t h  
A s i a ) ,  Tokyo, 1968, 158-61 .
99 I b i d . , 161-64 .
100 I b i d .
101 I b i d .
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movement. Ibrahim subsequently referred to KRIS as 'Kesatuan Rakyat
J 02Indonesia Semenanjung' (The Union o£ Peninsular Indonesians). A third
name for KRIS is believed to be 'Kerajaan Ra'ayat Indonesia Semenanjung*
103(The Government of Peninsular Indonesians).
Some time after this meeting Itagaki and Ibrahim left for 
Taiping, where Ibrahim contacted Mustapha. However, the latter was not 
willing to join KRIS, as he did not believe Itagaki*s words that Japan 
would really grant independence to Malaya. To convince him both Itagaki 
and Professor Akamatsu met Mustapha. The two professors then arranged 
for the whole group to meet with General Umezu, the Somubucho of the 
Malal Cunsei Kanbu (the new Director-General of the Malayan
administration). Umezu, who shared the two professors* sympathies for 
the nationalist movement, was contacted by Itagaki on the telephone, 
and told of Mustapha's intransigence. Umezu agreed to do what he could 
to persuade Mustapha.
At the meeting, the venue of which is not known, Umezu appears
to have made an immediate impact on Mustapha when he said,
I wish to speak honestly with you all today. Our policy 
towards the Malay nationalist movement all this while has 
been wrong. We realise this too late. We must change 
our policy. We should now do our best to respond to 
your nationalistic desires. Although the war is still 
on, we must do our best to implement this policy.104
Itagaki, who was interpreting, noticed that Mustapha's demeanour was
suddenly transformed. He was smiling. Later, Mustapha said he was
impressed by Umezu*s sincerity, especially his admission about the
Japanese mistake in policy (which he said few Japanese would ever make).
When the group returned to Itagaki*s residence they were so exuberant
that they began dancing and singing. There were also tears in Mustapha's 
105eyes.
102 Ibrahim Yaacob, Sekitar Malaya Merdeka, 28.
103 Arena Wati, Cherpen Zaman Jepun, 26n.
104 Itagaki, Azia tono Taiwa, 165-69.
105 Ibid.
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Between May and J u l y  Ib ra h im  began  t o  form KRIS b r a n c h e s
t h r o u g h o u t  Malaya.  His  i d e a  was to  use  fo rm er  KMM b r a n c h e s  as  n u c l e i  ,
b u t  he found  t h a t  fo rm e r  b r a n c h  o f f i c i a l s  were now s c a t t e r e d  and t h a t
much t ime  had to  be s p e n t  i n  l o o k i n g  f o r  them and i n  r e c r u i t i n g  new
members .  However , he d i d  s u c c e e d  i n  fo rm ing  b r a n c h e s  c o n s i s t i n g  of
a b o u t  t e n  members e a c h .  In  J u l y ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  make s u r e  t h a t  Malaya was
i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  programme o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  I b ra h i m  s e n t  t h r e e
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  to  meet w i t h  Suka rno .  They conveyed  a message  from b o t h
h i m s e l f  and t h e  pemudas o f  Malaya r e q u e s t i n g  t h a t  Malaya be i n c l u d e d
106w i t h i n  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  n a t i o n .
Meanwhile ,  i n  J a k a r t a ,  p r e p a r a t i o n s  were under  way f o r  I n d o n e s i a n  
i n d e p e n d e n c e .  On 28 May 1945 t h e  62-member Badan P e n y e l i d i k  Usaha 
P e r s i a p a n  Kemerdekaan I n d o n e s i a  (BPKI, o r  Body t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  m easures  
f o r  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  I n d o n e s i a n  In d ep e n d e n c e )  was i n a u g u r a t e d ,  w i t h  
J a p a n e s e  a p p r o v a l .  In  m i d - J u l y  t h e  BPKI d i s c u s s e d  t h e  b o u n d a r i e s  o f  t h e  
f u t u r e  I n d o n e s i a n  s t a t e .  The t h r e e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a t  i s s u e  were w h e th e r  
I n d o n e s i a  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e :  (1) j u s t  t h e  fo rm e r  N e t h e r l a n d s  E a s t  I n d i e s ;
o r  (2)  t h e  fo rm e r  N e t h e r l a n d s  E a s t  I n d i e s  p l u s  M alaya ,  New Guinea ,  N or th  
Borneo and fo rm er  P o r t u g u e s e  Timor;  o r  (3)  t h e  fo rm er  I n d i e s  minus 
New G u inea .  Mohammad Yamin a d v o c a t e d  I n d o n e s i a  R a ya , o r  G r e a t e r  I n d o n e s i a ,  
which was t h e  second  a l t e r n a t i v e .  Sukarno s u p p o r t e d  him and r e v e a l e d  
t h a t  t h r e e  young pemudas from S i n g a p o r e  had made a d i r e c t  r e q u e s t  t o  him 
t h a t  Malaya  s h o u l d  be i n c l u d e d  w i t h i n  I n d o n e s i a .  Sukarno a l s o  s a i d  t h a t  
a w e l l  known Malay l e a d e r ,  L t - C o l o n e l  'A b d u l l a h  I b r a h i m '  ( i . e . ,  I b r a h im  
Y a a c o b ) , had a l s o  made a s i m i l a r  r e q u e s t . A l t h o u g h  he r e c o g n i s e d  t h a t  
t h e r e  were r i s k s  i n v o l v e d  i n  M a l a y a ' s  i n c l u s i o n  w i t h i n  I n d o n e s i a ,  Sukarno 
s a i d  t h a t  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  I n d o n e s i a ' s  d e fe n c e  and s o v e r e i g n t y  Malaya 
s h o u l d  be i n c l u d e d ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  b o t h  s i d e s  o f  t h e  S t r a i t s  
o f  M a lacca  were i n  I n d o n e s i a n  h a n d s .  When p u t  to  a v o t e ,  t h e  second
106 See Muhammad Yamin ( e d . ) ,  Naskah P e r s i a p a n  Undang-Undang Dasar  1945 
( P r e p a r a t o r y  D r a f t  o f  t h e  B a s i c  Laws o f  1945) ,  J a k a r t a ,  1959,
2 0 5 -0 6 .  See a l s o  G.S .  K a n a h e le ,  'The  J a p a n e s e  O c c u p a t io n  o f  
I n d o n e s i a :  P r e l u d e  t o  I n d e p e n d e n c e ' ,  Ph.D t h e s i s ,  C o r n e l l  U n i v e r s i t y ,
1967,  210 -11 ,  319.
107 Muhammad Yamin, i b i d .
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alternative was carried by 39 votes, with 19 for the first proposal and 
six for the third. Mohammad Hatta was in favour of the first proposal,
but said he did not object to Malaya’s inclusion within Indonesia
jr , 4 , 108 if it was so inclined.
On 29 July the second meeting of Japanese regional administrators 
in Singapore discussed the need to accelerate the programme of Indonesian 
independence. After attending this meeting, Itagaki was convinced that 
Indonesian independence was imminent. He told Ibrahim that it was time 
to launch the KRIS movement. He suggested that an All-Malaya Pemuda 
Conference be held on 17 and 18 August at the Station Hotel in Kuala 
Lumpur to inaugurate KRIS. He anticipated that 18 August would be the day 
on which the date of Indonesian independence itself would be announced.
The KRIS meeting should declare support for Indonesian independence, 
express the wishes of the Malay people for union with the Indonesian
people, and approve a delegation to be sent to attend the official
. , , 109independence ceremony.
The first two weeks of August saw Ibrahim making intense 
preparations for the Pemuda Conference. He sent out agents to every 
State to invite all KRIS branches and interested Malay bodies to send 
delegates to the conference. At the same time, it is claimed, he was 
preparing to set up an interim government to coincide with the declaration 
of Indonesian independence. Among those he intended to include within 
the Cabinet were the Sultans of Perak, Pahang, and Johor 
as well as the aristocrats Datuk Onn bin Jaafar, Datuk Abdul Rahman 
(Johor), Datuk Hussein Mohd. Taib (Pahang) and Raja Kamarulzaman Raja 
Mansor ( P e r a k ) . T h e  names of an eight-man delegation to attend the 
independence ceremony were also decided. Among those he consulted
108 Ibid.
109 Itagaki, Azia tono taiwa, 167-69.
110 For the names in the Cabinet, see Abdul Malek, 302-07, who is the 
only source for this information. It is believed that the 
Sultans agreed to the formation of KRIS, but when the question
of forming a government to be called 'Kerajaan Ra’ayat Indonesia 
Semenanjung' (The Government of Peninsular Indonesians) was 
broached, the Sultans baulked at the idea. See Arena Wati, 
Cherpen Zaman Jepun, 26n.
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on c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  d e l e g a t i o n  was S u l t a n  Abdul  Aziz  o f  P e r a k ,  who
a g r e e d  to  be a member. The re  were to  be f o u r  S u l t a n s  and f o u r  KRIS
o f f i c i a l s  ( I b r a h i m ,  Dr B urha nudd in ,  Onan H a j i  S i r a j  and Hassan M a n a n ) . ^ ^
A l l  t h i s  w h i l e  I b ra h i m  and I t a g a k i  were i n  T a i p i n g  d i s c u s s i n g
p l a n s  w i t h  o f f i c e r s  o f  t h e  2 9 th  Army, i n c l u d i n g  G e n e r a l  Umezu, t h e
Somubucho. Umezu i s  s a i d  by Abdul  Malek to  have g i v e n  h i s  f u l l  a p p r o v a l
112t o  t h e  KRIS programme, i n c l u d i n g  f o r m a t i o n  o f  an i n t e r i m  governm ent .
The l a t t e r  a p p e a r s  d o u b t f u l ,  however ,  b e c a u s e  n e i t h e r  I b r a h i m  n o r  I t a g a k i  . 
i n  t h e i r  w r i t t e n  a c c o u n t s  e v e r  m e n t io n s  i t .  Members o f  I b r a h i m ’s c l i q u e  
c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  i d e a  was o n l y  c a s u a l l y  r a i s e d  w i t h  Umezu, who u n d e r s t o o d
i t s  f u l l  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  w h i l e  more d e t a i l e d  p l a n s  on C a b i n e t  members
. 113were k e p t  s e c r e t .
On 12 o r  13 Augus t  S u k a r n o ' s  d e l e g a t i o n  made an u n e x p e c t e d  
s t o p - o v e r  i n  T a i p in g  on t h e i r  way to  D a l a t  f o r  t a l k s  on I n d o n e s i a n  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  w i t h  F i e l d  M a r s h a l l  T e r a u c h i ,  t h e  Supreme Commander o f  
J a p a n e s e  F o r c e s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a .  I t a g a k i ,  I b r a h i m  and t h e  KMM g r o u p ,  
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  G e n e r a l  Umezu, were a t  T a i p i n g  a i r p o r t  t o  welcome t h e  p a r t y .  
The d e l e g a t i o n  had lu n c h  w i t h  Umezu a t  h i s  r e s i d e n c e  and t h e n  l e f t  f o r  
t h e  a i r p o r t .  There  Suka rno ,  l l a t t a  and members o f  h i s  d e l e g a t i o n  met
114
111 Ib ra h im  Yaacob,  S e k i t a r  Malay a M erdeka , 30.
112 Abdul Malek ,  302-07 .
113 I b i d .
114 The i t i n e r a r y  o f  S u k a r n o ’ s d e l e g a t i o n  i s  u n c l e a r .  I b ra h im  Yaacob,  
S e k i t a r  Malaya M e rde ka , 29 ,  c l a i m s  t h a t  on 12 Augus t  1945 when t h e  
d e l e g a t i o n  was on i t s  way back  t o  J a k a r t a  f rom Sa igon  t h a t  
t h e i r  a i r c r a f t  s t o p p e d  i n  T a i p i n g .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  G e n e r a l  
A.H. N a s u t i o n ,  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  Army h i s t o r i a n ,  i n  h i s  S e k i t a r  P e r a n g  
Kemerdekaan I n d o n e s i a  (Concerning th e  War o f  I n d o n e s i a n  I n d e p e n d e n c e ) , 
V o l . I ,  Bandung, 1977,  273 ,  s t a t e s  t h a t  on 13 Augus t  1945 S u k a r n o ’ s 
d e l e g a t i o n  f i r s t  s t o p p e d  i n  T a i p i n g  b e f o r e  making t h e i r  way t o  
S a i g o n ,  and th e n  on t h e i r  way back  to  J a k a r t a  s t o p p e d  in  
S in g a p o re  where th e y  met  I b ra h i m  a g a i n .  I  a c c e p t  N a s u t i o n ’ s v e r s i o n  
b e c a u s e  t h e  r e t u r n  s t o p o v e r  a t  S i n g a p o re  i s  m en t io n e d  by Mohammad 
H a t t a  in  h i s  S e k i t a r  P r o k l a m a s i  17 Augus tus  1945 ( C onc e rn ing  t h e  
P r o c l a m a t i o n  of  17 Augus t  1945) ,  J a k a r t a ,  1970, 24 -25 .  S t r a n g e l y ,  
H a t t a  f a i l s  to  m en t io n  t h e  T a i p i n g  m e e t i n g .  The two key s o u r c e s  f o r  
t h e  T a i p i n g  m e e t in g  a r e  I b ra h i m  and I t a g a k i ,  t h e  l a t t e r  p r o v i d i n g  a 
group p h o to g ra p h  which  i n c l u d e s  Sukarno  and I b r a h i m  as  e v i d e n c e .
See t h e  p i c t u r e  on 175.
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Ibrahim and the KMM pemudas for a private discussion which Itagaki did
not attend. A c c o r d i n g  to Ibrahim he reported to Sukarno and Hatta
the desire of the Malays to achieve Malayan independence within
Indonesia Raya. It was proposed, too, that 'Malayan independence' be
proclaimed at the end of August (apparently after the Indonesian
proclamation which was expected to take place earlier), and that an
eight-man delegation attend the independence ceremony in Jakarta. It
was at this moment that Sukarno, with Hatta next to him, shook Ibrahim’s
hand and said: 'Let us create one motherland for those of Indonesian
116ethnic stock'. To which Ibrahim replied: 'We Malays in Malaya will
faithfully create the motherland by uniting Malaya with an independent 
Indonesia'.^  ^
There are conflicting versions as to what Hatta's reaction to
the idea of including Malaya within the Indonesian state actually was.
According to Itagaki, 'Ibrahim later told me Sukarno showed an
appreciation of his proposal, but it was'Hatta who welcomed it whole-
118heartedly. This was an idea which Hatta had always advocated.'
On the other hand, another source claims that two representatives of the
Sultan of Johor, Major Datuk Haji Muhammad Said and Colonel Musa bin
Yusof (Pak Lomak), who were also present at the Taiping meeting, recall
that Hatta and another member of the Indonesian delegation (not
119identified) rejected the Indonesia Raya union idea. I tend to
accept the latter view, as this conforms with Hatta's voting decision at 
the BPKI meeting in mid-July. Also, Ibrahim has nowhere shown any 
endearment for Hatta, unlike his glowing admiration for Sukarno.
Probably as a reflection of how important he rated the KRIS union idea, 
Hatta also has not referred to this proposal in his Sekitar Proklamasi 
17 Augustus 1945 or in his other writings.
115 Itagaki, Azia tono taiwa, 203-05.
116 Ibrahim Yaacob, Sekitar Malaya Merdeka, 29.
117 Ibid.
118 Interview, Tokyo, September 1976.
119 Arena Wati, Cherpen Zaman Jepun, 26n.
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Meanwhile, with pemuda representatives arriving from various
parts of the country, the Station Hotel in Kuala Lumpur had become a
hive of activity. Delegates from Patani (southern Thailand) and the
Riau Islands, south of Singapore, arrived too, apparently in anticipation
that plans for Malayan independence within Indonesia Raya might include
tlieir territories too. Among the delegates who turned up at the hotel
were Datuk Onn Jaafar from Johor, and Sardon Haji Jubir, a lawyer
(later a Minister in the Alliance Government), and A. Samad Ismail, both
from Singapore. Sardon recalls that most of the pemuda delegates had
difficulty in getting through to Kuala Lumpur because of MPAJA roadblocks
He himself travelled to Kuala Lumpur with Tengku Hussein, president of
the Singapore Malay Welfare Association, and two Japanese. They were
stopped outside Kuala Lumpur by the MPAJA, but managed to get through.
A. Samad Ismail claims that he arrived on 17 August because his train
120was derailed by MPAJA guerrillas.
On 15 August news of the Japanese surrender became known.
Itagaki broke the news to Ibrahim when they were travelling in a car
to Kuala Lumpur. As Itagaki recalls it,
He [Ibrahim] was not surprised because he had some 
hint of it from his KMM colleagues. I told him,
'Japan can no longer help your movement or you or your 
people's aspirations. What do you intend to do now?'
He said, 'Please ask the Somubucho in Singapore to 
provide me with a plane. I want to escape to Java.'
I told Ibrahim, 'If you want to be the future leader 
of Malaya, you should never run away from the 
motherland. You must hide yourself in some place in 
, the country.
'Some social disturbances will occur. Try and conceal 
yourself meanwhile. Jawarhalal Nehru and Gandhi were 
arrested by the British, but they were never killed.
The British do not kill political prisoners.' He 
uttered no sound, but merely looked out the window.
120 Ibrahim Yaacob's talk to Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 23 August 
1973. Information from Sardon Haji Zubir is given in Halinah 
Bamadhaj, 120. Information from Samad Ismail, interview, Kuala 
Lumpur, June 1973.
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Finally he said, 'When we reach Kuala Lumpur, I will 
discuss with my friends and I will then inform you 
of my final plans.'121
On reaching Kuala Lumpur Ibrahim decided to convene an emergency
meeting of the KRIS committee, either on 15 or 16 August (which date
122is not clear), instead of on the scheduled 17 August. At that
meeting two ideas were uppermost in the minds of the delegates. One was
to push through Malaya Merdeka (Malayan independence) within Indonesia
Raya, in order to prevent Chinese domination of the country. The other
was the stigma of collaboration which hung over the KRIS delegates.
Dr Burhanuddin made the call for Malay pemudas to resist the expected
British landings which were rumoured to be due on 20 August. (The
123landings, in fact, did not begin until 2 September.) The rumour
added a note of urgency to the discussions. Ibrahim agreed to a proposal
to deploy the Giyu Gun to Malaya to help join in the armed struggle.
It was clear that the KRIS delegates feared that the return of the
British would mean retribution against KRIS supporters.
The meeting also decided, apparently at Ibrahim's suggestion,
that he and two other KRIS officials should leave immediately for
Singapore, where the Malay Giyu Gun was based, and attempt to get the
units onto the mainland. They were then to leave for Jakarta to attend
the Indonesian independence ceremony. Dr Burhanuddin was appointed
12 AKRIS chairman in Ibrahim's absence. The meeting is also believed to
have adopted twelve resolutions, the most important of which was to 
proclaim the establishment of the government of Malaya Demokratik Rakyat 
(The People's Democratic Malaya) over the radio stations at Penang and 
Kuala Lumpur. The Cabinet would be led by Sultan Abu Bakar of Pahang,
121 Itagaki, Azia tono taiwa, 169-74.
122 Abdul Malek, 313 and 316, claims that the KRIS meeting was held on 
15 August 1945, while Ibrahim Yaacob, Sekitar Malaya Merdeka, 33, 
says that it was on 16 August.
123 Hassan Manan, in an interview with journalist Zubaidah binte Abdul 
Rahman of the Berita Marian, Kuala Lumpur, 30 April 1970. Hassan 
Manan, who is now resident in Bali, was on a short visit to Kuala 
Lumpur when he was interviewed by Zubaidah. I am grateful to Zubaidah 
for showing me her notes which contain details of the KRIS meeting 
not found in her published reports on Hassan Manan.
124 Abdul Malek, 313-24, gives the most detailed account of the KRIS 
meeting, based on interviews with several of the participants.
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who would also become head of State. Others in the Cabinet would include
Sultan Abdul Aziz of Perak, Sultan Musa Uddin of Selangor, Datuk Onn
Jaafar of Johor, Ibrahim Yaacob, Mustapha Hussein, Hassan Manan, Dr
Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, A. Karim Rashid and Ishak Haji Mohammad.
Many names had been included without agreement being obtained from the
126nominees themselves. The meeting appointed two delegates to approach
the people concerned to obtain their consent. Once this was done the 
message was to be communicated to Ibrahim in Singapore.
It is clear that by rushing off next to Singapore Ibrahim was 
going to be cut off from the KRIS officials in Kuala Lumpur and from the 
others mentioned in the Cabinet. Probably he hoped that coordination 
could be achieved by telephone. The KRIS meeting also decided to 
instruct KMM pemudas throughout the country to quickly destroy all oil 
installations, airfields, bridges, and telecommunications lines to 
prevent these from falling into British hands. Instructions were also 
to be sent to selected pemuda groups to raid Japanese arms depots and to 
seize whatever weapons possible for the impending armed struggle against 
the British. After this meeting Ibrahim and Abdul Karim Rashid left 
aboard a train for Singapore.
The proposed KRIS inaugural meeting at the Station Hotel on
17 August was called off, but the convenors decided to hold a reception
that night at another venue - a Malay house in Kampung Bahru, a district
of Kuala Lumpur. There were about 20 people present, including Itagaki
and two of his colleagues, Mr Yamada Hideo and Professor Oono Siezaburo.
Itagaki told the gathering that the birth of the KRIS movement had been
proposed to coincide with Malayan independence within Indonesia Raya.
'But I am sorry that that scheme has been totally disrupted by the
Japanese surrender', he said. 'Malayan independence is now your problem.
12 7You are on your own'. Dr Burhanuddin, the acting KRIS chairman,
made an impassioned speech, which was well received, in which 
he said that the KRIS could carry on the struggle to achieve Malayan
125 Ibid.
126 For the full list of names in the Cabinet, see Abdul Malek, 315.
127 Ibid., 320-24.
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independence through Indonesia Raya. A note of discord was struck at 
this meeting by Datuk Onn bin Jaafar, however. Datuk Onn urged the 
Malays to think carefully before talking of Malay independence. ’We 
must first improve our economic standards’, he said. ’We must make use
of Malay lands, strengthen agriculture and establish cooperatives.
128We must endeavour to achieve economic independence first.’
The mood at the meeting was dampened by news that the Indonesians 
had already proclaimed their independence without including Malaya or 
North Borneo within the Indonesian state. The initial reaction of the KMM 
pemudas in Malaya was one of disillusion. Uncertainty also set in and 
inhibited initiative. Had the Indonesians kept to the union plan, militant 
action on the part of the KMM pemudas was assured. Elaborate plans to 
take over Japanese military installations and public buildings had been 
drawn up. But now only small groups of pemudas were able to carry out 
plans independently. Most pemudas were too shocked and confused to know 
what to do, as they had not been told of any alternative to the union 
plan. The thought of opposing the British without Japanese or other support 
soon atrophied. Pemuda representatives like A. Samad Ismail, who arrived 
on 17 August, were disappointed to find the KRIS meeting cancelled and the 
following day left with other KRIS delegates, such as Datuk Onn Jaafar,
Sardon Haji Zubir and Hassan Manan, aboard the next available southern- 
bound train for Singapore. As an indication of the chaotic situation in 
the country following the surrender, their train came under the attack 
of the MPAJA guerrillas and one of the coaches was derailed. It was 
some six hours later before they could resume their journey aboard another 
train. Once they arrived at their respective destinations the KRIS 
delegates dispersed to their hometowns to wait out the return of the 
British. Many of them were to be arrested later.
The confusion of the pemudas was compounded at this critical 
moment by the departure for Jakarta of KMM leaders like Ibrahim Yaacob, 
Hassan Manan and Onan Haji Siraj. In fact on his arrival in Singapore, 
Ibrahim was immediately instructed by the Japanese Army headquarters to 
disband the Malay Giyu Gun. Realising that his Indonesia Raya idea had 
now collapsed, Ibrahim quickly made contact with Chinese communists in
128 Itagaki, Azia tono taiwa, 169-74.
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the MCP and offered that the Malay Giyu Gun team up with the communist
MPAJA to jointly fight both the Japanese and the British (which had been
agreed to in principle earlier by both the MCP and the KMM, according to 
129Ibrahim). On 19 August, when he had not heard from the MCP on his
cooperation offer, he sent a 280-man unit of the Malay Giyu Gun under
Major A. Manaf, Captain Zakaria and Lieutenant Mohd. Said to Kuala Lumpur
to place themselves under command of the MPAJA Headquarters. However,
they were stopped at Muar by the MPAJA and on 22 August were forced to
disband their forces because the MCP had rejected Ibrahim's offer and
130had adopted a policy of cooperation towards the British. The disbanded
Giyu Gun units joined in the inter-racial Malay-Chinese clashes which had
erupted in the Muar and Batu Pahat areas. Some of the Giyu Gun soldiers
were able to acquire more arms from their Japanese superiors, who
apparently were only too happy to see the Malay Giyu Gun fighting the
131Chinese-dominated MPAJA. Ibrahim was unaware of this, for on the
19th itself, accompanied by his wife, brother-in-law Onan Siraj and
Hassan Manan, he left aboard a Japanese aircraft for Jakarta. There he
met Sukarno, who told him: 'The union idea including Malaya is not
convenient, as we would have to fight both the British and Dutch at the
same time'. Sukarno advised the KMM group to live in Java and to join
132in the struggle to achieve the aspirations of Indonesia Raya.
Ibrahim's departure to Jakarta meant that he had abandoned 
leadership of the Malay independence movement at a time when he was 
most critically needed. His hasty exit is still the subject of heated 
controversy among his KMM colleagues. Some say they felt a sense of 
betrayal, of abandonment, and even accuse Ibrahim of cowardice. Others
129 Ibrahim Yaacob, Sekitar Malaya Merdeka, 33-34.
130 Ibid. See also Chapter III, above, 115-17.
131 Abdul Malek, 323-24.
132 Nagai Shinichi, op.cit., in Azia Keizai, 40-50. A.H. Nasution,
275, reveals that Ibrahim Yaacob was left in the care of Winoto 
Danusmoro, Sukarno's close friend in Sukabumi. Nagai Shinichi 
states that Ibrahim plunged into the Indonesian independence struggle 
and later joined Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan (Struggle 
Association).
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argue that by going to Indonesia Ibrahim was continuing the struggle
133for Indonesia Raya (which is also Ibrahim's own argument). Ibrahim
had appointed Dr Burhanuddin as his second-in-command in Malaya, but 
neither Dr Burhanuddin nor other KMM officials had the same charisma 
in the eyes of the pemudas. Ibrahim himself did not leave clear and 
specific instructions as to what the pemudas should do, so that the 
uncertainty and confusion which followed was chaotic in the extreme.
The KMM pemudas, like their Indonesian counterparts, were poised for 
militant action and for political victory, which was to have been Malay 
independence within Indonesia Raya. At least six groups of pemudas 
hastily organised in different parts of the country, such as Ipoh, Taiping, 
Kota Tinggi and Singapore, did attack Japanese arms depots and seize 
weapons for use in the coming resistance struggle, which they had been 
told to expect, against the British. But when the KMM plan for armed 
struggle fizzled out they smuggled the arms to the Indonesian islands, 
including Pulau Karimon and Pulau Bantam. Major Manaf and Captain 
Rashid of the Giyu Gun went over to Sumatra to join the Indonesian armed. i 134struggle.
The tide of Malay disillusionment which generally set in was,
in fact, an anti-climax to the KMM's Malay independence struggle. With
the exception of the troubled areas of Muar and Batu Pahat, where the
Malay population welcomed the elements of the disbanded Giyu Gun, Giyu
Tai and Heiho units in the fighting against the MPAJA and the Chinese,
many Malays - especially those who had suffered as romusha and Heiho -
were stoned and abused as they returned to their villages. They in turn
concentrated their anger against Ibrahim Yaacob, Onan Haji Siraj and other
KMM members whom they began to curse as penjual romusha (sellers of 
135romusha). The taint of collaboration with the Japanese was too heavy
to be easily erased by mutual recriminations, however. It involved all 
strata of Malay society, including the Rulers. Besides, the political
133 Abdul Malek, 326.
134 A.H. Nasution, 274.
135 Ibid.
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threat posed by the Chinese and the MPAJA guerrillas soon forced the 
Malays to close ranks and mend their fences.
Conclusion
The Malay independence movement failed largely due to 
unpreparedness and confusion among KMM pemudas. It was only Itagaki’s 
eleventh-hour initiative that got the KMM group reactivated under its 
new name, KRIS. Preparations to launch KRIS did not begin, however, 
until both Itagaki and Ibrahim obtained approval from Japanese military 
commanders at the end of July. As it turned out, this did not give the 
pemudas sufficient time to organise themselves for any action - either 
to establish an interim government following the expected declaration 
of Indonesian independence, or to offer future armed resistance against 
the British. Whatever the situation following Indonesian independence, 
the pemudas were now fully committed to the Japanese side and would have 
to share some blame for odious Japanese measures in wartime. News of 
the Japanese surrender caught them in mid-stream, the KRIS still unborn.
Confusion in the minds of the pemudas was created because the 
KRIS plan relied so heavily on Japanese and Indonesian support. The 
Japanese surrender made the KRIS plan appear no longer viable. There 
was also no easy means of communicating with the Indonesians, so that 
the pemudas could not know what the Indonesians would do or how they 
were to coordinate their actions. On 17 August the pemudas were taken 
by surprise as the Indonesians went ahead to declare their own independence 
without including Malaya in their state, despite Sukarno’s earlier 
agreement with Ibrahim. The news shattered their hopes, since the 
pemudas had focussed their whole struggle on Indonesia Raya. They had 
no other plan. This led them to lose confidence and determination 
to continue the struggle on their own. One more factor which added to 
the pemudas mood of futility and despair was circulation of a rumour 
that the British would land on 20 August. What could they do in the 
short time left? The only hope was to rely on the Glyu Gun unit in 
Singapore, which Ibrahim Yaacob promised to send to Malaya to launch 
the armed struggle against the British. The pemudas did not know that 
they would have an interregnum of about two weeks, rather than three 
days, before the British arrived. Had they known this, they might have 
reassessed the situation quickly and tried to form a provisional 
government.
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To make matters worse, Ibrahim, probably driven by the rumour, 
fled to Jakarta on 19 August. By abandoning the pemudas at this most 
critical moment Ibrahim ensured that the KMM/KRIS movement, which he had 
built up around his own admittedly charismatic personality, would 
collapse. Had he stayed back, they might have gone ahead with plans to 
form an interim government. They could not have prevented British 
return but the British would have had to deal with them in some way. 
Precious time might have been gained to launch a broader independence 
movement. An example of how inept and dispirited Ibrahim’s supporters 
became without him was the failure of the if80-man Giyu Gun unit to offer 
any resistance when ordered to disband by the MPAJA. The Giyu Gun 
soldiers dispersed with their arms to the Johor countryside to join 
Malay villagers in random inter-racial clashes against the MPAJA and the 
Chinese population.
In contrast to Java at the time of the Japanese surrender,
Malaya lacked a political atmosphere charged with excitement, expectancy
and exultation. The Japanese had prepared the Indonesians to receive
independence, but news of the surrender did not dampen the enthusiasm
of the Indonesian pemudas, who indeed became more intoxicated with the
idea of seizing independence from the Japanese in order to show the world
that their movement was spontaneous and genuine. It was the Indonesian
pemudas who forced reluctant older nationalist leaders like Sukarno
136and Hatta to go through with the plan to proclaim independence.
Thus, lacking a leadership ready and willing to fight, prepared 
to rely on its own initiative and strength if necessary, the Malay 
independence movement collapsed. The Malay masses became leaderless.
This in turn led them to lash out fiercely, yet somewhat blindly, in 
the inter-racial clashes against the MPAJA and the Chinese.
136 For an account of the events surrounding the Indonesian pemudas 
and the proclamation of Indonesian independence, see Benedict 
Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese 
Occupation, 1944-45, Ithaca, 1961, and his Java in a Time of 
Revolution, Ithaca, 1972.
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CHAPTER V
HIE POST-SURRENDER INTERREGNUM 
(15 AUGUST-12 SEPTEMBER 1945)
FOLLOWING the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945 there was a brief 
period in which law and order collapsed, rumour dominated fact, and 
diverse groups in Malaya were faced with critical decisions.
One of the most important rumours was that the British Army 
would land on 20 August to reoccupy Malaya. As it turned out, it was not 
until 3 September, or nineteen days after the Japanese surrender, that the 
first British reoccupation force landed at Penang. As we saw in Chapter IV, 
however, the rumour of immediate British arrival was a key factor inhibiting 
the Malay KRIS group in Kuala Lumpur from actually forming a provisional 
government and declaring national independence. The rumour probably had 
the effect, too, of causing the KRIS leader Ibrahim Yaacob to flee to 
Jakarta, one of the reasons why the Malay independence movement 
disintegrated entirely.'*'
Many rumours had some original grain of truth, but it was only 
a matter of hours before they were embellished or distorted in transmission 
and became sources of mass confusion. Thus, the initial rumour of Japan's 
surrender came through to most people in such strange terms that it was 
impossible to know what was happening. It was said among other things 
that units of Chiang Kai-shek's Army were to come to Malaya for temporary 
occupation duty. Others simply wanted to believe that the end of the war 
had arrived.
The immediate Japanese response was to discount all peace 
rumours and to threaten rumour-mongers with dire punishment. Without 
referring to the atomic bombs or the surrender at all, the Syonan Shimbun 
of 15 August in effect ordered everyone to keep quiet and await official 
instructions:
No one has any sympathy for those who deliberately repeat 
idle rumours and get themselves into trouble over it.
But for the sake of the good citizens, it is desirable 
that all foolish rumours should be stifled and those who
1 See Chapter IV, above, 189-90.
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are given to gossip warned of the serious harm which 
indulgence in what might seem harmless gossip might 
lead to. The insensible type of gossiper has had 
enough time and warning. If they persist in their 
foolish ways, they must be taught a severe lesson.^
While some people in Malaya took the rumours of Japan’s
surrender seriously and acted immediately, others thought there was 
reason to be cautious. One person recalled his disbelief and hesitancy 
in the following terms:
The newspapers came out with a report of the bombing 
of Hiroshima with a bomb of a hitherto unknown type.
The damage was negligible, however, they said. Two 
days later came an admission of thousands of casualties. 
But in the interval there had been an unprecedented crop 
of rumours to which we lent greedy ears. The effects 
had been cataclysmic, we were informed. Japan's will- 
to-war had been pulverised. She was suing for peace.
The news seemed too good to be true. A cold fear 
gripped our hearts. Could it be that the rumours emanated 
from the Kempei [Japanese military police] and.were 
disseminated by their underlings to tempt disaffection 
to rear its head,... No, we were not going to throw 
caution to the winds.^
It was about the time of the surrender too that the rumour 
concerning the impending arrival in Malaya of the Chinese Nationalist
Army of Chiang Kai-shek started. There was no basis for this rumour
other that the association of Chiang's name with the Potsdam Declaration.
However, it elated and encouraged the most chauvinistic speculation on
the part of the Chinese population. On the other hand, the Malay population
was most unhappy and fearful of the consequences of such an arrival, as
it feared that Malaya would then come completely under the heel of the
Chinese. A Malay informant who lived in Singapore at that time, recalled:
We Malays thought that the Chinese troops would land 
on the island first because of the large Chinese population 
there. In fact, some of my Chinese friends expected this
2 Syonan Shimbun, 15 August 1945.
3 N.I. Low and H.M. Cheng, This Singapore, Singapore, 1946, 162-63. 
Their work, based partly on the papers in the Chinese Affairs 
Secretariat where Cheng worked, is generally regarded as a pro- 
Kuomintang account because of the authors' sympathies for the 
Malayan KMT official, the late Lim Bo Seng who died in a Japanese 
prison camp at Batu Gajah in 1944. In 1973 Low brought out a revised 
version of the book called When Singapore Was Syonan-to.
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to happen. Many Chinese suddenly became quite 
chauvinistic and arrogant. We were quite worried 
and did not know whether it was true [the rumour 
that the Chinese Army would arrive in Singapore.]
A Malayan Chinese informant who had heard the rumour himself, thought
that It was the KMT elements in the Communist-dominated MPAJA who had
spread the rumour:
Thinking people discounted the rumour. Only the very 
gullible hawkers and others in the market-place thought 
that that was quite possible. It is my view that such 
rumours were circulated by KMT elements in the MPAJA 
to bolster up the morale of the Chinese throughout the 
country. Some British supporters were getting frustrated 
and disappointed with the British for their belated return.
The rumours were a psychological ploy to play up Chinese 
admiration of Chiang Kai-shek as one of the heroes of 
World War Two. In those days, the heroes were: Churchill,
Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek.
Even the MCP, whose MPAJA guerrilla units had British liaison officers 
from Force 136 equipped with short-wave radio sets, were reported to have 
become influenced by these rumours. Although they had been told by the 
British officers that it would be the British Army which would reoccupy 
Malaya, yet the MCP leaders had their doubts. It is believed that 
fear of the arrival of the KMT Chinese Army in Malaya played a part in 
influencing the decision of the MCP's Central Committee not to attempt 
a coup d'etat. An example of the persistence of this rumour was the 
display of Chinese posters and slogans on triumphal arches by some 
groups of Chinese in certain areas to welcome the Chinese Army and the 
other Allied forces.
In Malacca, Kin'Ichiro Nakazawa, editor of a Japanese newsagency, 
noted that on the night of 15 August when he took a walk in Malacca Park, 
citizens appeared to know that the war had ended.
4 A. Samad Ismail, editor Berita Harian, Kuala Lumpur, interview, 
April 1973.
5 Pers. comm, of Chin Kee Onn, 26 July 1977.. Chin is the well-known 
author of Malaya Upside Down and Ma-Rai-Ee both dealing with
the Japanese occupation.
6 See O'Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-60,
63. See also Chapter III, above, 142-43.
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A few days earlier the Allied radio had reported that 
the Japanese had accepted the terms of the Potsdam 
Declaration. This was followed by the lifting of the 
blackout. There was a change in the night scene. The 
streets became brighter. There was a big multitude 
of people in the park. It was a moonlit evening. The 
attitude of the people towards the Japanese appeared not 
to have changed. Japanese songs were still being sung.?
Several days later, smoke was seen coming from the chimneys of several
State government buildings. Japanese civilian and military officers
were burning all their secret and confidential documents. The State
government had also ordered government stores and Japanese firms to release
all stocks of food to the citizens, and there was a stampede among the
local population to get at the goods. Malacca shops suddenly became
stocked with foodstuffs and goods, and prices fell rapidly. The goods
were sold to absorb the military scrip which the Japanese burnt in
order to lessen Japan's ultimate liability for war indemnities. The
Governor ordered the people and the military to conduct themselves with
gprudence and not indulge in lawless activities.
Rumours of Japan's possible surrender had circulated as early
as the evening of 10 August, and were confirmed on 15 August by those who
listened in to Allied radio broadcasts reporting the Japanese Emperor's
speech. Official news of this event, however, appears to have spread
rather slowly in the country, due to General Seishiro Itagaki,
commander of the Seventh Area Army who, on 15 August, announced from his
9headquarters in Singapore that his forces would resist the British.
7 Kin'ichiro Nakazawa, 'Shusen - Marakka no hyojo', (The end of the 
War and the expressions of Malacca), in Takizo Sato (ed.), Sekidohyo 
(Equator Monuments), Tokyo, 1975, 116-17. Sekidhohyo is a collection 
of reminiscences published by the Japanese Veterans of the Equator 
Association whose members had served in civilian sections of the 
Japanese wartime administration in Southeast Asia.
8 Ibid.
9 Allied Land Forces, South East Asia, Weekly Intelligence Review 
(hereafter referred to as ALFSEA, WIR), No.49 for week ending
7 September 1945, in WO 172/1782. See also the news report,
'General Itagaki's First Refusal', in The Straits Times, Singapore,
7 September 1945.
198
Itagaki's defiant attitude only created apprehension rather than relief 
among the local population. A day after this speech, Itagaki is believed 
to have been summoned to fly to Dalat to meet with Field-Marshal 
Terauchi, Supreme Commander of Japanese forces in Southeast Asia.
Itagaki returned to.Singapore about 19 August,^ and on 20 August 
all Malayan newspapers carried the Emperor's 15 August speech. It was 
then clear that Itagaki had bowed to the Imperial order and would 
offer no resistance to the Allied forces.
On 21 August there was a conference of all the area commanders 
under Itagaki. At this meeting, held at his headquarters at Raffles 
College (now the University of Singapore) in Bukit Timah Road, Itagaki 
declared:
Now that the Emperor has accepted the Potsdam 
Declaration, we must lay down our arms. Obeying 
the Emperor's order, we shall not fight. We must 
keep peace and order and we shall not make any 
trouble.H
Many of Itagaki's staff officers were distraught when they heard his
speech, and some later were reported to have taken their own lives.
While the majority of Itagaki's staff agreed to comply with his orders,
several officers favoured the idea of going to Sumatra, especially to
Aceh where the Japanese Army was believed to be in good favour with the
local population. Among those who deserted to Aceh were Major Ishijima,
head of the intelligence section Ibaragi Kikan, and his subordinates,
Captain Adachi and Captain Kondo. Itagaki was furious when he heard of
this and signalled immediately to the Army commander in Sumatra to round
12up Ishijima and his fellow fugitives. Other Japanese officers and 
soldiers were reported to have fled with their arms and ammunition to 
the neighbouring islands of Singapore. Some were later caught and
10 Dutch interrogation of Generals Tanaba and Shimura, both of the 
25th Army in Sumatra in June 1946 at Singapore. See the reports 
of the Consulate-General of the Netherlands, Singapore, I.C. 
009402. Notes of Dr Anthony Reid.
11 Mamoru Shinozaki, Syonan - My Story, Singapore, 1975, 94-95.
12 Dutch interrogation of General Shimura.
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brought back to Singapore by Itagaki's troops. On 23 August, after
meeting with the Imperial envoy who had arrived in Singapore, Itagaki
made a strong appeal to his troops:
We were ready to fight to the last man prior to 
the receipt of the Imperial Command, which is absolute 
and irrevocable. Now, and without hesitation, we 
shall obey the wishes of the War Council.^
In this connection, Japanese preparations for ’fading into 
the landscape’ in anticipation of the Allied invasion of Malaya (i.e., 
prior to the Japanese surrender) are of some interest. There are reports 
suggesting that in Johor the Japanese were trying to make friends with 
Chinese communist guerrillas. Captain Adachi of Ibaragi-Kikan was 
reported to have attempted to contact the MCP leadership in Batu Pahat 
on 13 August to propose some sort of deal ’to fight as Asians against 
the returning British imperialists'. He was hoping to be captured by 
the MPAJA and so brought to MCP leaders, but these efforts were cut short 
by the surrender and by a very sharp order from Singapore to desist.'*"“’ 
Many Japanese soldiers did, in fact, retire to the hills to join the 
communists, apparently under the impression that all communists were 
automatically anti-British. A number were later captured or killed
16by British troops, but several did successfully achieve this mission.
13 Shinozaki, 94-95.
14 ALFSEA, WIR No.49 for week ending 7 September 1945 in 
WO 172/1782.
15 Pers. comm, of Dr Anthony Reid who interviewed Adachi in Tokyo,
1973. See also the British Psychological Warfare Information 
Review No.19 for an intelligence report dated July 1945 on Japanese 
attempts at establishing friendly contacts with MPAJA in WO 172/1776.
16 British Army intelligence reports in Malaya between September and
December 1945 indicate that the number of Japanese deserters attempting 
to join the communists was at least about 50. Most were captured, 
however. Following are some reports. Intelligence Summary (hereafter 
ISUM) Hqs. Malaya Command, 28 November 1945 reads: ’Klang area
[Selangor]. Three Japanese war criminals found in hiding. Two 
captured, one escaped. Suspected they were associating with local 
Chinese leftists.' ISUM, 29 November 1945: ’Third Japanese in Kuala
Langat forests [Selangor] captured by local Malays.’ ISUM, 5 December 
1945: 'Much activity by Chinese leftwing elements Sungei Buloh
area [Selangor]. Two Japanese officers reported to be in this area.' 
Enclosures in BMA ADM9/16.
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As of 1977 the MCP's guerrilla force at the Malaysian-Thai border was
still said to include two Japanese World War Two hold-outs.^
It was probably to prevent extremist actions by individual
hot-heads that a certain measure of disarmament was reported to have been
18carried out among Japanese troops in Malaya as early as 22 August.
However, as far as relations with their various satellites were concerned
Japanese attitudes varied. The Malay Giyu Gun (Volunteer Army), Giyu
Tai and Heiho were disbanded on 18 August. This was probably a measure
of self-protection to ensure that whatever arms held by these units did
19not fall into the hands of anti-Japanese elements. Towards the Indian
National Army the attitude was somewhat different. Where Japanese forces
had withdrawn, INA troops that remained behind had orders not to fight
but to ensure their own protection. On one occasion when an INA camp
was attacked by a Chinese guerrilla party, the Japanese were reported to
have placed two tanks at the disposal of the INA commander. The question
of INA surrender was left to their own commanders. Probably some time
before 26 August an order was put out by the rear headquarters of the
INA, addressed to all units and formations in Singapore and Malaya,
commanding cessation of hostilities and preparations for handing over
20all INA arms and military stores to the British authorities.
Breakdown of Authority
Following Itagaki's obedience to the Imperial order and his 
willingness to accept the orders of Admiral Mountbatten through Marshal 
Terauchi in Saigon, Japanese troop movements throughout Malaya followed 
a two-phase plan: first, the halting of any strategic moves in progress;
17 The Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, 2 September 1977, 42.
18 See Psychological Warfare Information Review No.19 (for reports up 
to July 1945), in WO 172/1776.
19 Japanese Self-Defence Agency, War History Library, Nansei homen 
rikugun sakusen (Malai ran in no bogi), Army operations in Southwest 
areas (Defence of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies), Tokyo, 
1966, 454.
20 ALFSEA, WIR No.49, 7 September 1945, in WO 172/1782.
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secondly, the progressive concentration of units in certain specified
areas. With regard to the first, the 37th Division, strung out from
Thailand in an apparent move to strengthen defences in Malaya, was
ordered to split, one regiment in the latter country, the remainder
21of the unit in the Bangkok area. The concentration of outlying troops
into certain areas led to the build-up of detachments and units at
communication centres such as Ipoh, Taiping, Kuala Lumpur and Kluang.
The Japanese reaction to local disturbances was to protect themselves
and maintain law and order until the arrival of Allied forces. In the
larger towns such as Singapore, Taiping, Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur, Japanese
military control remained firm. Sentries were posted at major buildings
and military installations. This was done too in other areas where there
were sufficient Japanese troops. However, when the Japanese withdrew
their outlying detachments from the smaller towns, the anti-Japanese
resistance guerrillas began moving in and taking over, and many local
22disturbances broke out.
Japanese commanders persisted with these withdrawals, initially
to remove their troops from public sight, avoid provocation and reduce
vulnerability. They continued to withdraw in compliance with Allied
directives, even though they knew that in the countryside this meant
the breaking down of law and order. The guerrillas moved into the small
towns and other pockets in force and began dealing out summary justice
to the police, to Kempeitai collaborators and to profiteers. Girls who
had been the mistresses of Japanese were among those who suffered. Many
of these arrested by the guerrillas were marched or dragged through the
23streets and given a ’people's court’ trial.
The Japanese troop withdrawals led to the break-down of the 
district administration in Malaya. The DOs, penghulu and ketua kampung 
were no longer able to get Japanese protection. Nor were the local 
police of much help, as the police stations had become the first targets 
of attack of the guerrillas. Consequently many DOs and Malay headmen
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.; see also Shinozaki, Syonan - My Story, 96-97.
23 Shinozaki, 97.
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were captured and executed. Among those killed were the DO of Kluang,
2 AEsa bin Abdullah. A 'reign of terror' now existed in the countryside, 
as the Chinese guerrillas - the only armed force - went unchallenged 
and exercised their new power to the hilt.
Reprisals were meted out by guerrillas to police officers,
detectives and informers of the Kempeitai. Even the ordinary mata-mata
(policeman) was vulnerable to anyone seeking revenge for the slightest
insult or injury suffered during the heyday of Japanese power. It was
when the reprisals extended to the Malay policemen and to the Malay
25kampung that Malay-Chinese inter-communal violence erupted. Only
in a few instances did Japanese troops go to the rescue of their former
local agents of authority and repression. During these weeks the police
force became utterly demoralised and a large portion of the men went
into hiding and singly tried to survive until the British Army arrived.
One informant, a Malay ex-police sergeant who served the Japanese, still
shuddered visibly when he recounted to me memories of those days:
It was a world gone mad, a world turned upside down.
Suddenly, people seemed to remember every little 
wrong I did, even when I did not do them. There 
was a lot of anger and hatred about, and this resulted 
in people being abducted, beaten and murdered.
Initially, before the violence became racial, even 
some of our Malay kinsmen believed that the police 
force was the tali barut (lackey) of the Japanese and 
had discredited themselves. But they came to our 
help later when they could not bear some of the things 
done to the Malay policemen, such as their bodies were 
mutilated and their eyes gouged out... These actions 
which the people seeking revenge did were no different 
from the Japanese troops against whom they railed.
They had degenerated to the same level of barbarism.
Although the inter-racial clashes will be discussed more 
fully in Chapter VII, it should be mentioned that on 15 August (i.e. the 
day of the Japanese surrender), the Malays in Sungai Manik (Perak),
24 Datuk (Dr) Awang Hassan, Malaysian High Commissioner to Australia, 
interview, Canberra, 15 June 1978. See also Chapter II, above,
45, 60-61.
25 Mountbatten of Burma, Post-Surrender Tasks: Section E of the
Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1943-45, 1969, 301.
26 Interview, Kuala Lumpur, November 1976. Informant's identity 
withheld at his request.
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near Teluk Anson, clashed with the MPAJA and the local Chinese settlers 
after the MPAJA attempted to take over Sungai Manik and other neighbouring 
towns." Fighting raged until the arrival of British troops in September.
So forceful was the Malay counter-attack that by September the Sungai 
Manik basin was cleared of both the MPAJA and all the local Chinese.
They were forced to seek refuge in Teluk Anson, a predominantly Chinese 
town which became an MPAJA stronghold. In Batu Pahat (Johor), fighting 
between Malays and Chinese, which had raged intermittently since May, 
resumed in intensity on or about 21 August after the MPAJA swept into 
town.
The disintegration of law and order in the major towns of the 
peninsula States is conveyed, too, by several Japanese reports. In 
Taiping (Perak), a Japanese Officer attached to the 29th Army Propaganda 
Unit, Shigeru Saito, reported that soon after news of the surrender was 
known train services to Taiping ground to a halt. The north-south 
peninsula railway lines were cut by resistance forces at various 
points, and this had caused one train to be derailed. Saito and his 
unit were ordered to move to Kuala Lumpur, but en route encountered 
a guerrilla roadblock. A skirmish followed in which both the Japanese 
and the guerrillas suffered casualties. Before he left Taiping, Saito 
had noted that Japanese authority was being defied in many places.
Looting and plundering had started. Many Japanese collaborators had left
town to try to avoid capture and execution by the guerrillas and other
, . 27armed groups moving m.
In Malacca, the newsagency head Nakazawa observed that public 
peace and order in the State worsened from around 20 August, as the secret 
manoeuvres of the MCP's guerrillas became more overt. But whether in 
fear or in deference to the Japanese, no one, especially not the Chinese 
shopkeepers concentrated in the city centre, yet displayed the MCP 
flag, the Chinese national flag or the Union Jack. However, many MCF 
members had infiltrated Malacca town. Civil servants and influential 
Chinese merchants who had collaborated with the Japanese Army, fled 
into hiding. The president of the Malacca Chinese Merchants’ Association,
27 Shigeru Saito, ’Taiping-no yuutsu’, (The melancholy of Taiping), 
in Sato (ed.), Sekidohyo, 116-17.
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Ch'en Ssu-an, and the vice-president, Lo Chin-shui, slipped out of town
unnoticed. Many of the local policemen at the city police station
went over to the communists, carrying their weapons with them. Every
evening large numbers of MCP members would occupy the parks in the city,
agitating and spreading propaganda, and many appeared at the local
recreational clubs. However, no injury was inflicted on any Japanese 
28person.
It was near the Malacca State borders that the disturbances
developed. The main trunk road between Singapore and Malacca was under
threat of communist and irregular guerrilla bands, and travel between
these two centres was impossible. Around Batu Pahat and Muar Japanese
vehicles were attacked. Nakazawa learnt that communist guerrillas were
in complete control of the countryside and were attacking Japanese
storehouses and arms depots in every region in search of weapons, .
ammunition, food and vehicles. His speculation was that they were
29trying to arm themselves before the British return.
However, some areas can be said to have been more unsettled
than others. Particularly bad were the four Malay states taken over
by Thailand in 1942 - Perlis, Kedah,'Kelantan and Trengganu. Previously the
area had been dominated by KMT guerrillas, and only since infiltration.
30of MPAJA guerrilla bands after the surrender did disturbances occur.
The degree of Thai control in the area did not appear great. The 
MPAJA was reported to have occupied the State capital of Kuala Trengganu, 
killing collaborators. According to one local source it then moved 
towards Kota Bharu, capital of Kelantan State, which was already in the 
hands of the KMT guerrillas. In the north-west states of Perlis and 
Kedah too, there had been several guerrilla takeovers. The island of 
Penang remained quiet, however. In Kuala Lipis, capital of Pahang State, 
the MPAJA was reported to be anti-British and its leader responsible for
28 Kin'ichiro Nakazawa, 'Shusen - Marakka no Hyojo’, (The end of 
the war and the expressions of Malacca), in Sato, Sekidohyo,
135-36.
29 Ibid.
30 See ALFSEA, WIR No.51 for week ending 21 September 1945 in
WO 172/1784. The extensive breakdown of Japanese authority is best 
conveyed in a lengthy report entitled 'Bandits Attempt to disturb 
peace of Malai: Series of serious incidents reported from all parts
of the country', in Malai Sinpo, Kuala Lumpur, 3 September 1945. 
Reproduced in Appendix E, below.
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anti-British propaganda, banditry and intimidation of the local population. 
Elsewhere in Pahang the situation was reported normal. There were reports 
of Japanese disposing of arms to local civilians in Sungai Patani (Kedah) 
and in Perak and Selangor. It was thought that these arms were being sold 
either to bandits or to MPAJA and KMT guerrilla units. Certain inter­
racial clashes between Malays and Chinese were reported in Malacca and
31Johor, in particular at Kluang, Mersing, and Batu Pahat.
Not only Japanese authority was being defied. Force 136
influence in many MPAJA camps was also growing largely ineffective. The
eighty British officers who had been parachuted into the country by 13 August
found that the MPAJA patrols did not come under their command. Local
MPAJA commanders reacted to the situation very much as they saw fit. In
some areas close cooperation between Force 136 and MPAJA was achieved,
but in other areas, particularly Kedah and north Johor, MPAJA commanders 
32appeared hostile. Some British officers found that so long as the
guerrilla forces with which they had liaison were confined to jungle camps
their control tended to weaken as guerrillas continually slipped out of
their camps to take over towns. But as soon as the guerrillas were
allowed openly-to enter and to take over certain areas the officers were
33able to reassert some influence. SEAC Headquarters had instructed Force
136 officers to ensure that guerrillas avoid engagements with the Japanese,
as any premature flare-up might upset the landing plans of the reoccupation
forces. This instruction had been difficult to observe, however. The
guerrillas made repeated attacks on individual Japanese troops and sentries,
police stations and small garrisons to seize weapons. In areas taken over
by guerrillas not in contact with British officers the scale of these
34attacks was higher. After these towns had fallen into their control,
31 ALFSEA WIR No.51 for weeking ending 21 September 1945 in 
WO 172/1784.
32 See report 'The Japanese and Malayan Resistance Forces' by a senior 
Force 136 officer (name not given) in 25 Indian Division, Hqs. Malaya 
Command, WIR No.13 for week ending 12 December 1945, 5-6, in MU 
Secret 335/46 Vol.I.
33 John Davis, interview, Kent, 14 April 1976; see also F.S.V. Donnison, 
British Administration in the Far East, 1943-46, London, 1956, 384-85.
34 See the Force 136 report, 'Chinese resistance forces', 28 November 
1945 in BMA PSD/29.
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guerrillas marched along the main streets under triumphal arches erected 
in their honour by supporters, and the Chinese population came out in large 
numbers to greet them. What happened following the guerrilla takeovers 
will be discussed in Chapter VI.
The intensity of guerrilla attacks on the Japanese forces suggests 
that they found the Japanese surrender an opportune moment to settle accounts 
with the demoralised Japanese troops. At any rate, some MPAJA attempts 
to take over areas did meet with resistance from Japanese garrisons. A 
belated Force 136 assessment in December tried to play down the significance 
of the skirmishes:
At the time of the Japanese surrender there were 
something over three thousand guerrillas in contact 
with British liaison officers of Force 136. They 
had received orders to remain in their camps pending 
a clarification of the situation. Later, they were 
allowed to take over areas evacuated by the Japanese, 
but not to enter areas still under Japanese 
occupation. Only in North Johor and in Kedah - where 
liaison contacts were bad - was there any marked 
disobedience of these instructions. At this time 
there were also many guerrillas throughout the country 
who were not in contact with Force 136. These men 
were not well armed to attack the Japanese even if they 
wished to do so; but they did take over most of the 
minor police stations in the country. The Japanese 
themselves withdrew the arms from all except the most 
outlying posts, and so in no case could entries into 
police stations be classed as attacks - as the police 
did not remain to be attacked.
Force 136, of course, wanted to create the impression of the situation being 
under control. Japanese reports presented a more complete picture. Between
the date of surrender and 31 August the guerrillas were reported to have.
'suddenly burst forth furiously' against both the Japanese Army and the local
police. They carried out a total of 212 attacks, of which 42 were against
the Japanese Army, 66 against the police, 38 against cars, 11 against railways,
369 against factories and stores and 46 were 'miscellaneous'. On 27 or 28 
August an attack mounted by guerrillas of the 5th Regiment, MPAJA, at 
Songkai, near Slim River (Perak), resulted in thirty-four Japanese and
35 Ibid
36 See the Japanese statistics of guerrilla attacks from the surrender 
to 3.1 August 1945 in Appendices B and C, as found in ibid.
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and three guerrillas being killed. The incident was reported to have
37been provoked by an excess of zeal on the part of a guerrilla road check.
Colonel J.P. Hannah, the senior Force 136 officer attacked to this Regiment,
appears to have been unable to stop the guerrillas from carrying out their 
38action. Tn fact, the high Japanese losses so infuriated the Japanese
local commanders that they carried out a reprisal attack on 31 August
on the 4th Regiment, MPAJA, patrol stationed at Serendah (Selangor) police
post. But only one guerrilla was killed in this attack. The fighting was
stopped after the Force 136 officers, Colonel John Davis and Colonel Douglas
Broadhurst, were able to contact both the Japanese and MPAJA sides for a
parley. During these negotiations the Japanese refused to recognise the
MPAJA guerrillas as part of the British force and, in fact, invited the
British officers to come over to their side to assist in maintaining law 
39and order. None of the British officers appeared to have accepted the 
invitation, preferring instead to remain with their MPAJA patrols.
The extent of the breakdown in Force 136 authority in the 
countryside is best exemplified by a Japanese appeal broadcast from 
Singapore on 25 August urging Force 136 officers to cooperate whole­
heartedly with the Japanese forces in maintaining peace and order prior 
to the arrival of the Allied forces. The broadcast said such cooperation 
had become necessary owing to increasing violence and guerrilla clashes 
with Japanese troops. The Japanese gave the impression, however, that 
they thought the guerrilla attacks on them had been instigated by Force 
136 officers. Because of this the Japanese Command said it had instructed 
its forces throughout Malaya to cease military operations completely as
from zero hour of 25 August. The broadcast went on:
...the wishes of the Headquarters to assemble the 
forces in order to negotiate with the British command 
in a peaceful manner, will be extremely difficult 
to carry out in the face of subversive conduct on the 
part of armed elements, believed to be under the 
command of agents of the British Army.
Recently such activities as destroying railway lines, 
attacking trains, clashing with military or police
37 Ibid.; see also Donnison, 384.
38 See Hannah's report in Yap Hong Kuan, 'Perak Under the Japanese',
BA Hons thesis, University of Singapore, 1957, 79-82.
39 John Davis, interview.
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forces and seizing arms and food supplies by 
force, have increased to such an extent that 
they can hardly be expected to cease immediately... 
the Japanese Armed Forces have no intention of 
clashing with forces under the command of the 
British Army agents, and are prepared to surrender 
Malai, as well as Syonan, in a peaceful, orderly 
manner. They are only endeavouring to maintain 
peace and order until the arrival of Allied forces, 
and therefore request the British Army agents to 
cooperate in carrying out these wishes.^
Despite the unilateral Japanese decision to cease military operations against
the guerrillas, the latter continued to launch attacks against the Japanese
forces and Force 136 officers were unable to enforce a cease-fire order
on the guerrillas.
The delay in the arrival of British troops in Malaya was also 
responsible for prolonging the chaos in the countryside. British Force 
136 officers and their Gurkha support of twenty men each, who had been 
airdropped into guerrilla camps about two months before the surrender, 
quickly showed up in several towns as advance parties of the British Army. 
While the welcome they received everywhere from the local population was 
said to be warm and enthusiastic, they were not numerous enough to deter 
lawless elements or to enforce order on their own. Consequently they had 
to rely on the MPAJA and other guerrilla forces to carry out police duties, 
as the Japanese-appointed police force had broken down completely.
Breakdown of Authority In Singapore and Penang
Jn Singapore, newspaper reports indicate that after the news of 
the surrender had been officially confirmed on 20 August, violence and 
other lawless behaviour in the city soon increased. This is surprising when
40 Syonan Shimbun, 27 August 1945. Captain Alastair Morrison of Force 
136 who was in the MPAJA camp at Ulu Yam (Selangor) heard the 
Japanese broadcast calling for Force 136 help on 25 August 1945.
He had it recorded in his diary. Interview, Canberra, 13 June 
1978.
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it. is realised that Singapore had one of the biggest garrisons of Japanese 
41troops.
Mamoru Shinozaki, head of the Welfare Department in the Syonan 
Tokubetsu Shi (Singapore Municipality), recalled that some people hoisted 
the Chinese national flag over their homes, which were then angrily torn 
down by Japanese soldiers. He saw that a nasty situation could develop 
and decided to make a public announcement of the end of the war at the 
Majestic Theatre in New Bridge Road (this was a day or two before the news 
was officially released by the Japanese Military authorities). This is 
his recollection:
'There is no need now to evacuate to Bahau or Endau 
[settlements on the mainland peninsula],' I told the 
audience. 'The war is over. The Emperor has 
accepted the Allied proposals. Peace has come at 
last. But, as you can see, there are many Japanese 
still armed and still willing to fight. This could 
lead to a dangerous situation. I therefore ask 
you to be peaceful and calm. Do not aggravate a 
dangerous situation. Do nothing rash.
Wait patiently until the Allied forces arrive. Do 
not, meanwhile, put up flags.' I left the Theatre 
and was driven direct to the railway station to stop 
the evacuation train from leaving.
That night, pistol shots could be heard. Several 
officers had decided to kill themselves rather than, 
face surrender. Hand grenades were used for mass 
suicides. The next day I was summoned to Army 
headquarters and severely reprimanded for announcing 
the end of the war without authority. Certain young 
officers threatened to kill me. I hid in the Poh 
Leong Kok (Home for the rehabilitation of women) in 
Pearl's Hill. Two days later, Major-General Kamata, 
the General Officer commanding Defence Headquarters, 
addressed his officers and men. He restored discipline.^
41 The total strength of Hqs 7th Area Army amounted to 77,245 troops 
including 27,192 at the Singapore Garrison. The Headquarters was 
in direct control not only of Singapore island but also of the 
mainland state of Johor, the garrison of the Riau and Lingga 
archipelagoes south of Singapore, and the Annambas and Tambelan 
Islands between Malaya and Borneo. The mainland of Malaya, excluding 
Johor, but including the neck of Siam to the Kra Isthmus and the Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands were under the command of Hqs 29th Army at Taiping 
(Perak). The total strength of the 29th Army was 45,980. See the 
statistics in Hqs 14th Army, ISUM No.50 based on information up to 
October 1945 in BMA PSD/29.
42 Shinozaki, 94-95.
210
In the second and third weeks of the Interregnum, the Japanese 
Army first withdrew its troops from the city centre to Jurong, about 20 
miles away, and then moved them across the Johor Causeway to Kluang where 
they remained until disbandment. This meant that the security of Singapore 
was left to a small police force and a few Kempeitai officers, with 
disastrous consequences for public order.
As soon as they learnt that the Japanese troops were withdrawing
from the Singapore city centre, the MPAJA guerrillas from the mainland,
especially those in Johor, crossed over to Singapore. When a political
vacuum had clearly emerged in the city centre a few days before the arrival
of British troops they showed themselves and established their headquarters
at the Japanese Club (the present Selegie Complex). Thus began what
Shinozaki described as 'a second period of terror and confusion for Singapore1
(the first being the Japanese occupation on 15 February 1942). Those
local collaborators able to do so fled to Hong Kong. Some gave themselves
43up to the police, feeling safer in prison than outside.
As in Singapore, so in every other state on the peninsula
mainland, officials of the Overseas Chinese Association (OCA) fled into
hiding immediately after news of the surrender became known. Because they
had been instruments of Japanese policies and because they had failed to
ameliorate Chinese sufferings, OCA leaders were prime targets for retaliation.
The guerrillas succeeded in capturing the Taiwanese adviser to the OCA,
Wee Twee Kim, who had played a major role as the Japanese ’hatchet man’
in extracting the $50 million 'gift' from the Chinese in March 1942.
Shinozaki records how Wee and other collaborators met their deaths:
Those were Lhe days - no more than a few days, 
fortunately - of the Whispering Terror. Whispers 
could bring aboul death. Tan Boon Wu was stabbed 
in the heart because of a whisper. His body was 
left hanging on a tree. Wee Twee Kim, the 
Taiwanese, was another summarily executed...
The Syonan Shimbun of 22 August reported widespread elation 
and celebrations of Lhe end of the war (the word 'surrender' was not 
used at all). Blackouts ended and the streets of the city once more 
became brighly lit after nearly four years of war. No restrictions were
43 Ibid., 97.
44 Ibid.
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placed on the public's expression of joy and relief, but some concern 
was expressed lest the public allow their enthusiasm to impede maintenance 
of order. The Japanese authorities emphasised that it was their 
responsibility to prevent any looting or lawlessness in order to keep 
the city intact. The newspaper, in its editorial entitled 'Be calm,
Be exemplary', urged every responsible citizen to consider himself 'a 
policeman':
...not necessarily vested with the powers of policemen 
in the accepted sense, but feel by duty bound as a good 
citizen to tactfully discourage acts of hooliganism and 
immediately communicate with the regular police or 
auxiliary police should any acts come to their notice 
which are likely to disturb public peace and safety...
The use of the word 'policeman' was most unfortunate in the circumstances..
The newspaper seemed unconscious of its ironical implications, because with
Japanese authority crumbling no one but 'anti-Japanese elements' would
now become 'policemen' to try to take the law into their own hands.
On 23 August the Syonan OCA met and decided to dissolve itself. 
On 25 August the Japanese authorities were forced to appeal for further 
public restraint. The Syonan Shimbun said it had been specially requested 
to draw the attention of the public to the need for strict discipline 
pending the changeover. It stressed that the Japanese Government was 
still in full control of the city and would continue to be in full control 
until an official announcement was made. The authority of the Military 
Administration would be fully exercised against those who attempted to 
commit any acts of disrespect for law and authority. It described 
objectionable actions as: acts of hooliganism, the displaying of flags
of countries 'other than Nippon and allied Dal Toa (East Asia) nations' 
and acts liable lo 'excite national emotions and cause inter-racial
friction'. The public was urged especially 'to show consideration for the
46 : .feelings of Nippon nationals'. The use of short-wave radios was still
prohibited. The Japanese Army Headquarters also warned that since all
buildings and establishments being used by the Japanese were scheduled to
45 Ibid.
46 See the editorial, 'Respect the law', Syonan Shimbun, 25 August 
1945.
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fall under the jurisdiction of the Allied powers, severe punishment would
be meted out to anyone attempting to loot or damage such property.^
On 1 September the British fleet carrying the occupation forces
was reported to have anchored off Penang and to have held surrender talks
with Japanese commanders there. Between that date and 5 September, when
British troops arrived in Singapore, authority collapsed completely in
the city centre. Proclamations were issued one after another in an
attempt to stop the violence. By this time the communist guerrillas had
infiltrated across the Johor Causeway into Singapore in large numbers and
made their presence felt. Raids on Army depots, attacks on individual
Japanese and killings of collaborators had taken place. The roof-tops
and windows of buildings and shophouses began displaying the, Communist
Party's red flag as well as some Allied flags including those of China and
the Soviet Union. It was now difficult for the Japanese authorities to try
to stem the tide of defiance being manifested everywhere. A proclamation
48of 3 September declared:
PROCLAMATION TO ALL CITIZENS 
It is highly regrettable that some citizens, who are 
under the impression that the landing of the Allied 
Forces would be effected today or tomorrow, have acted 
ruthlessly and lawlessly by taking advantage of the 
interim period believing that they will not be punished 
by any authority....
DATE OF NEGOTIATION UNKNOWN: LANDING ONLY
AFTER NEGOTIATION COMPLETED
...As a result of a thorough understanding on the part 
of the Allied Forces, the Japanese Armed Forces are to 
bear the responsibility of maintaining peace and order, 
therefore sabotage and all other acts violating peace 
and order will be punished severely by the Japanese 
Armed Forces. The Police Forces must carry on their 
duty as before because they will be transferred intact 
to the Allied Forces to maintain peace and order just 
as they did before.
An instagator of the sabotage of the Police will be 
severely punished. Any one who hoists the Red Flag or 
one who instigates the masses by unfounded rumours will 
also be punished....
Stop all unnecessary violence and shedding of blood. Do 
not commit any evil act but calm yourself.
JAPANESE ARMED FORCES
47 Ibid.
48 Syonan Shimbun, 3 September 1945.
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In its last issue on the eve of the British arrival,, the 
Syonan Shimbun carried a prohibition against any public assembly. This 
was apparently to ensure that there would be some semblance of order at 
the time of the changeover.
PROCLAMATION
All the undermentioned actions are hereby 
prohibited:
1. Gatherings of over 500 persons
2. Demonstrations or activities of a
similar nature
3. Other activities likely to bring about
disorder
Japanese Armed Forces 
A Sept. 19A5 9^
In Penang, the breakdown of order had already started a few
days before the British troops landed on the island. As in Singapore,
communist guerrillas and other irregular armed groups of Chinese crossed
over from the mainland to the island. , The Communist Party made its
headquarters at a Chinese restaurant in the city centre, while guerrillas
roamed about the island exercising power and meting out rough justice to
police personnel and to those they suspected of being informers, traitors,
and profiteers. While some people had reason to fear the communists and
the chaos, others who had been outraged by the Japanese administration
and who had suffered hardship and persona], loss rejoiced at these moments
of retribution. One who saw the retribution as ’judgment day' was a
Chinese journalist of an English-language newspaper:
Many people were abducted or taken from their homes 
because they had been informers and henchmen of the 
hated Kcmpeitai. They were never seen again. The 
communists carried out most of these summary executions.
They had a very good spy network and as far as the 
Chinese population on this island was concerned, they 
were regarded as heroes, dedicated and fearless fighters 
against the Japanese and their lackeys. While I don’t 
support communism, I believe that some of the people 
who were killed deserved their fate, especially the evil­
doers and the informers. My brother was informed upon by 
someone who found out that he was listening to a short­
wave radio. He was executed, hut he was not a communist.
A9 Syonan Shimbun, A September 19A5.
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The informer later died at the hands of the communists 
because he had betrayed my brother and others to the 
Kempeltai.50
A few hours after the British fleet arrived off Penang on 
2 September, Vice-Admiral Walker accepted the surrender of the Japanese 
commanders on the island aboard his flagship, 1I.M.S. Nelson. The following 
day 480 marines landed at 0800 hours to begin the takeover. There were 
no incidents. Strategic points on the island were occupied and Japanese 
forces were evacuated first to a concentration centre at Glugor and 
later to the mainland. The Officer-in-Charge at Penang was Captain T.J.N. 
Hilken. His principal difficulty was guarding from widespread looting the 
many food dumps left scattered over the island by the Japanese. Several 
riots occurred in the struggle over food dumps in Indian localities between 
Hindus and Indian Muslims. The rioting went on throughout the day and 
night, for several days, before British troops established control and 
distributed food rations."^
The non-recognition of Japanese currency, which Hilken immediately
announced and made effective, caused a great deal of hardship in Penang.
As he thought further food riots would break out he immediately sought and
obtained SEAC Headquarters permission temporarily to retain some purchasing
value for Japanese currency. The suggested rate was 100 Japanese dollars
to one British dollar, until sufficient new British currency was in 
52circulation. in this respect Penang became an exception to the general 
BMA policy for demonetisation of Japanese currency. As tension decreased 
in Penang, shops reopened and labour returned to work. However, there 
were some disturbances caused by communist guerrillas who had crossed 
over from the mainland. Lt was reported that two hundred communists 
had taken over the Ayer llitam district on the island. A conference of 
senior naval and Civil Affairs officers on 9 September was interrupted 
by information that Bayan Lepas airfield would be attacked by the communists
50 Klior Cheang Kee, Penang news editor of The New Straits Times, 
interview, Penang, 11 January 1977.
51 See Hilken's diary,- 'Report of the Proceedings at Penang',
25 September 1945 in WO 172/1784.
52 ibid.
215
that night. Following this alarm, 75 marines were posted at the aerodrome, 
but nothing happened. After this scare it was decided that armed and 
uniformed Chinese guerrillas would be banned from crossing over from the 
mainland to Penang. Apart from those disturbances the British military 
occupation proceeded smoothly.
Soon after the British fleet's arrival in Penang, two naval 
officers, Lieutenant Russell Spurr and Sub-Lieutenant Frank Worth, 
commandeered a car and set off on a 500 mile trip down the peninsula to 
Singapore. Their eye-witness account, published in The Straits Times of 
8 September, is interesting for the information they reval of the situation 
on the mainland. The local population gave them a warm and enthusiastic 
welcome wherever they stopped, and they got the support of the Chinese 
resistance forces and also the whole-hearted cooperation of the Japanese 
Army. They saw evidence of the damage and trouble the guerrillas had 
caused the Japanese Army. Bridges had been blown up, and roads cut. Between 
Taiping and Ipoh the Japanese insisted on providing them with an armed 
escort as 'Communist guerrillas' were said to have made the road 'unsafe'. 
Further argument was useless. They could not tell the Japanese of their 
arrangement with the Chinese Resistance Army at Taiping. At Ipoh an 
armoured car was considered necessary for their escort because in their 
safety 'lay the honour of the Japanese Army'. The police posts now let 
them pass without question. Just before Segamat the armoured car broke 
down, and they had to proceed on their own. Previously, whenever a 
great crowd collected around their car, Japanese troops had appeared and 
the crowd had melted away. But now no Japanese troops appeared to disperse 
the crowds. In the last stretch of the road from Segamat to Singapore, 
the officers saw further evidence of the work of the guerrillas. Bridges 
had been set on fire by the Resistance Army, and had to be crossed very 
carefully.
Near Johor Bahru the roads became choked with sullen, evacuating 
Japanese troops. Lines of trucks were parked at the roadsides, most of
53 See Minutes of Naval and Civil Affairs Officers conference at 
Penang, 6-10 September 1945, in Appendix to Hilken's Diary, in 
WO 172/1784.
54 See their story in The Straits Times, Singapore, 8 September 1945.
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them broken down, frantic drivers juggling with the engines. Baggage 
and equipment was piled high in every truck, some carried beds and furniture, 
and one had a small car on the back. The Japanese were piled as high as 
their baggage, hanging on by every available means. A small crowd cheered 
the two British officers, saw the Japanese, and changed their mind.
Japanese troops lined the road and scowled at their Union Jack. Military 
police blocked the entrance to the Johor Causeway, which was choked with 
traffic. Empty lorries were preparing to return to Singapore, and more 
laden trucks were pouring out of the city. A staff car containing high- 
ranking Japanese officers cleared the way for them, and they forged 
through past the saluting sentries into Singapore. ^
On 4 September, the British cruisers Sussex and Cleopatra 
steamed into the Singapore roads, after destroyers and minesweepers had 
cleared a path through the heavily-mined Straits of Malacca. General 
Itagaki, the 7th Area Army commander responsible for Malaya, Sumatra 
and Java, led a delegation aboard the Sussex to discuss surrender arrangements
for Japanese forces in Singapore. Itagaki was alleged to have almost
broken down during the last three hours of discussions with Lt-General
Christison and Admiral Holland. ^  Early on 5 September a large convoy
of troopships sailed into Singapore. The occupying force landed on the
island immediately thereafter. Later in the day the first Civil Affairs
units went ashore to start setting up the Military Administration. The
Chief Civil Affairs Officer (CCAO), Maj.-General Hone, and the Deputy
CCAO (Singapore), Brigadier P.A.B. McKerron, accompanied this party.
The proclamation by the Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral Mountbatten,
establishing Military Administration, had already been posted at the
58railway station and at other public centres some hours earlier.
55 Ibid.
56 Maj.-General S. Woodburn-Kirby, The War Against Japan, V, London, 
1969, 266.
57 See signal from Haywood to McKelvie on the surrender ceremony aboard
the Sussex, 6 September 1945, in WO 172/1781. The signal reads in 
part: ’His [Itagaki’s] eyes were red with sorrow. He signed
Singapore away to Britain. Tears trickled down his face near the 
end. Later he left the ship, a sad beaten man who was once Chief
of Staff of the famed Kwangtung Army in China but whose hardness 
could not stand surrender.’
58 Donnison, 154-55.
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On 8 September a Civil Affairs detachment passed through
Singapore and reached Johor Bahru. Then, on 9 September, the main
landings were made on the Morib beaches between Port Swettenham and Port
Dickson, as originally planned for 'Operation Zipper'. On the 10th,
seven Civil Affairs detachments and other units went ashore. The Deputy
CCAO (Malaya,), Brigadier H.C. Willan, reached Kuala Lumpur on 12 September
and set up his headquarters. For the other regions, three to five weeks
were to elapse before British forces or Civil Affairs units arrived to
59establish the Military Administration.
On 12 September in Singapore Admiral Mountbatten accepted the 
formal document of surrender signed by General Itagaki as personal 
representative of Field-Marshal Terauchi, who was too ill to travel from 
Saigon to attend the ceremony.^ On their way to the ceremony at the 
Singapore City Hall Itagaki and six other Japanese area commanders were 
hissed and jeered at by a large Chinese crowd that had gathered at the public 
field opposite the building. Shouts of 'Baka daro! (you fool!)' rent 
the air. The crowd had been waiting for this moment for more than an 
hour and the cry of 'Baka daro!' became more intense than before. Many 
among the crowd broke through the barricade of British troops, threw 
stones at the car which brought the Japanese and pushed forward towards 
the Japanese, who were protected by the British troops. 'It grieved me 
greatly', recalled General Shibata Taichiro, one of the commanders with 
Itagaki, 'to think the Chinese felt such intense hatred towards the 
Japanese Army.'^
The surrender ceremony formally brought the Japanese regime to 
an end. However, for the British the task of reoccupying the country was 
not yet completed. Large areas of the outlying districts were still in 
guerrilla hands. For instance, in the remote north-east state of Trengganu, 
Force 136 officer Lt-Colonel D. Headley, who had been in the jungle with 
the guerrilla forces for two or three months before the surrender, 
established himself as the SCAO, Trengganu, early in September. The state
59 Ibid.
60 Maj.-General S. Woodburn-Kirby, 271-72.
61 From the memoirs of General Shibata Tai'chiro of the 25th Army in 
Sumatra, currently being translated into English.
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of affairs in the countryside is best illustrated by an account of the
situation which met Headley in Trengganu:
Headley was warmly welcomed by the inhabitants and on 
his journey from Dungun to Kuala Trengganu, the capital, 
he was accompanied by the State judge, Tengku Paduka 
Diraja. On reaching the capital he found that it was in 
a mess. The top Japanese officials had fled to Siam by 
way of Telemong and, since the surrender, power had 
lain with the MPAJA. They had taken the law into their 
own hands, tried and killed suspected Japanese 
collaborators, and even went to the extent of ransacking 
the local police station, and seizing available rifles 
and ammunition. The Commissioner of Police 
Tengku Indern Scgcra, was a powerless and frightened 
man. Obviously the first task of Headley was to 
establish law and order. Assisted by the ageing Mentri 
Besar, Dato Jaya Perkasa, Headley registered members of 
the MPAJA, paid them salaries and supplied them with new 
rifles and ammunition. This registration later facilitated 
their demobilisation and the return of these arms.
Meanwhile, with the arrival of Indian troops, the morale 
of the people was raised and law and order restored....^
Conclusion
The breakdown of authority in most of the outlying districts 
of Malaya following the withdrawal of Japanese troops to concentration 
points created a power vacuum which was immediately filled by the MPAJA 
guerrillas. The MPAJA takeovers lasted from two to six weeks, sometimes 
more, depending on how soon British troops arrived to dislodge the 
guerrillas. The takeovers and the widespread hoisting of the Red Flag in 
the main Lowns demonstrate that had the MCP wished to form a provisional 
government and declare its 'Malayan Democratic Republic' it could have 
done so. The British would have found it difficult to suppress the 
movement immediately. It is even possible that larger sections of the 
Japanese troops would have gone over voluntarily to the MPAJA side, in 
what they would have deemed to be an anti-British struggle. As it turned 
out the decision of the MCP's Central Committee to abandon a national 
revolution, which appeared in the statement of 27 August (see Chapter III, 
above), meant that the MCP lost its opportunity by default.
62 Alwce bin Jantan, 'Trengganu, 1945—47: A study in political
development', B.A. Hons Thesis, University of Malaya in 
Singapore, 1958, 19-20.
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By 12 September it was clear that the country was in British 
hands. Since the MCP had announced it would cooperate with the British 
the immediate problem of the British Military Administration (BMA) was 
to seek communist cooperation and to bring the MPAJA guerrillas quickly 
under control. Whether genuine MCP cooperation would be forthcoming 
remained to be seen. In any case, it appeared that the British needed 
to make some political concessions to the communists. This, in turn, 
was bound to affect inter-ethnic relations between Malays and Chinese, 
since conflicts between the two races had already broken out in 
different parts of the country.
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CHAPTER VI
THE MPAJA GUERRILLAS TAKE OVER
Banners  a r e  w av ing ,  drums a r e  b e a t i n g ,
We c e l e b r a t e  a v i c t o r y ;
Heroes  o f  b a t t l e  s t e p  from t h e  r a n k s ,
And s m i l i n g ,
S tand  t o  r e c e i v e  o u r  t h a n k s ,  t o  r e c e i v e
our  j o y f u l  t h a n k s .
’ G lory  to  ou r  h e r o e s ! '  comrades c r y ;
O v a t io n s  r i s e  to  t h e  s k y ,  to  t h e  sky .
MPAJA s o n g ,  V i c t o r y  C e l e b r a t i o n ^
AS we h a v e  s e e n  i n  C h a p t e r  I I I ,  t h e  MCP f a i l e d  t o  p r e p a r e  i t s e l f  t o  
s e i z e  power owing t o  w e a k n e s se s  i n  i t s  p o l i c i e s  and t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  
o f  p a r t y  o r g a n i s a t i o n  c a u se d  by L a i  T e k ' s  r o l e  as  K e m p e i t a i  a g e n t .  I t  
was now t o  l o s e  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  J a p a n e s e  s u r r e n d e r  to  
s n a t c h  pow er ,  an o p p o r t u n i t y  which  t h e  V ie tn am ese  communists  e a g e r l y  
s e i z e d .  As a c o n t r a s t ,  i t  may be p e r t i n e n t  to  d i s c u s s  b r i e f l y  what  
t h e  V ie tna m ese  communists  d i d .
The r e a c t i o n  o f  t h e  MCP’ s CEC t o  t h e  news o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  
s u r r e n d e r  was i n  s h a r p  c o n t r a s t  to  t h a t  o f  the I n d o c h i n e s e  Communist 
P a r t y .  The l a t t e r  h a d ,  i n  f a c t ,  t a k e n  a d e c i s i o n  i n  J u l y  1944 to  p r e p a r e  
an u p r i s i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e  p r o - J a p a n e s e  Vichy French  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  
Vietnam. T h e i r  p r e p a r a t i o n s  were  w e l l  u n d e r  way, and t h e  i n s u r r e c t i o n  
was to  have  been  l a u n c h e d  in  O c t o b e r  1944. However ,  b e f o r e  t h a t  d a t e ,
Ho Chi Minh o r d e r e d  i t  t o  be p o s tp o n e d  t o  a more o p p o r tu n e  moment. Th is  
came when t h e  J a p a n e s e  o v e r t h r e w  t h e  F rench  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  in  March 1945.
As the  F re n ch  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  c o l l a p s e d  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y s i d e ,  the  w e l l - p r e p a r e d  
Vie tminh ( a s  t h e  communist  army came t o  be c a l l e d )  moved down r a p i d l y
1 From Mona Brand and L e s l e y  R i c h a r d s o n ,  Two P l a y s  About M a la y a , 
London,  1954,  Appendix  I I I ,  143. The MPAJA song  i s  one o f  f o u r  
a u t h e n t i c  Malayan g u e r r i l l a  songs  t r a n s l a t e d  from the  C h inese  and 
appended  t o  L e s l e y  R i c h a r d s o n ’ s p l a y ,  ' F o r  Our Mother  M a la y a ! '
The p l a y  i s  s y m p a t h e t i c  to  t h e  MPAJA and t r i e s  to  show what  m o t iv e s  
i n f l u e n c e d  th e  g u e r r i l l a s  to  s u f f e r  e n d l e s s  r e p r i s a l s  r a t h e r  t h a n  
r e l i n q u i s h  t h e i r  s t r u g g l e  a g a i n s t  t h e  B r i t i s h  i n  1948.
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down from t h e  h i l l s  to  s e i z e  power i n  a t  l e a s t  s i x  p r o v i n c e s  and b e f o r e
lo n g  had a l r e a d y  e s t a b l i s h e d  a ' L i b e r a t e d  Z o n e ' .  When news o f  the  J a p a n e s e
s u r r e n d e r  became known, Hanoi  was t a k e n  on 19 A ugus t ,  a f t e r  a s e c r e t
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  had  been  r e a c h e d  be tw een  t h e  c i t y ' s  c a d r e s  and t h e  J a p a n e s e
g a r r i s o n  commander. The J a p a n e s e  f o r c e s  were t o l d  t hey  would n o t  be
a t t a c k e d  and food s u p p l i e s  t o  them would c o n t i n u e .  The p a r t y ' s  C e n t r a l
Commit tee  and main Vie tm inh  f o r c e s  were s t i l l  i n  t h e  h i g h l a n d s ,  and d id
n o t  a r r i v e  i n  Hanoi  u n t i l  t e n  days l a t e r .  O th e r  V ie tnam ese  c i t i e s  soon
2f e l l  i n t o  t h e  hands  o f  t h e  p a r t y .
The q u e s t i o n  i s :  Could t h e  MCP a t  t h a t  h o u r ,  on l e a r n i n g  a b o u t
th e  J a p a n e s e  s u r r e n d e r ,  s t i l l  have  p r o c l a i m e d  t h e i r  p ro p o se d  'Malayan  
R e p u b l i c '  and e s t a b l i s h e d  a government?  The answer  i s  c e r t a i n l y ,  as  
Lau Yau had  s u g g e s t e d ,  i t  was s t i l l  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  p a r t y  t o  have done 
s o .
The R i s i n g  A n t i - B r i t i s h  Mood o f  MPAJA G u e r r i l l a s
Owing to  t h e  d e l a y e d  a r r i v a l  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  o c c u p a t i o n  f o r c e s ,  
s i g n s  o f  u n r e s t  i n  t h e  MPAJA r a n k s  were d a i l y  b e i n g  r e p o r t e d  by Force  136
3
o f f i c e r s  i n  t h e  f i e l d .  The J a p a n e s e  had begun w i t h d r a w i n g  t h e i r  g a r r i s o n s  
from o u t l y i n g  towns and d i s t r i c t s  a b o u t  22 o r  23 A u g u s t ,  and i n  many remote  
a r e a s  the  J a p a n e s e  had l e f t  much e a r l i e r ,  t h e r e b y  l e a v i n g  a vacuum i n  
t h e s e  a r e a s .  There  were some i n  t h e  MPAJA who were o b v i o u s l y  g l a d  t h a t  
the  J a p a n e s e  were d e f e a t e d ,  b u t  who no l o n g e r  w ished  f o r  t h e  r e t u r n  o f  
t h e  B r i t i s h .  T h e i r  aim was an i n d e p e n d e n t  R e p u b l i c  f o r  a l l  Malayan p e o p le s  
b a s e d  on t h e  MCP's programme. These f a c t i o n s  a t t e m p t e d  to  u su rp  a u t h o r i t y  
in  a r e a s  v a c a t e d  by t h e  J a p a n e s e .  There  a r e  no i n d i c a t i o n s ,  however ,  t h a t  
t hey  had r e c e i v e d  t h e  b l e s s i n g  o f  t h e  MPAJA H e a d q u a r t e r s .  On th e  o t h e r  
h a n d ,  t h e r e  were no i n d i c a t i o n s  o f  any r ebuke  f o r t h c o m i n g  from th e  
MPAJA Hq. L oc a l  communist  p u b l i c a t i o n s  had  been a p p e a r i n g  s u p p o r t i n g  
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h ;  t h e r e  had  been a dvances  to  the  J a p a n e s e  t o  
s e l l  t h e i r  a rms;  and t h e r e  were i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  d i f f i c u l t y  was b e i n g
2 See G e n e r a l  Chu Van Tan,  R e m in i s c e n c e s  on t h e  Army f o r  N a t i o n a l  
S a l v a t i o n , I t h a c a ,  1974,  24 -2 5 ;  Vo Nguyen G iap ,  U n f o r g e t t a b l e  Months 
and Y e a r s ,  I t h a c a ,  1975,  45 -47 .
3 'Memorandum on the  Force  136 O r g a n i s a t i o n  i n  M a l a y a ' ,  by L t - C o l o n e l  
D.G. O i 1 1 - D a v i e s , 13 Sep tem ber  1945,  3,  i n  BMA PSD/39 .
222
e x p e r i e n c e d  by Force  136 o f f i c e r s  i n  c o n t r o l l i n g  g u e r r i l l a  groups  n o t
4
i n  c o n t a c t  w i t h  them.
By 23 August  t h e  B r i t i s h  f o r c e s  were s t i l l  n o t  i n  s i g h t .  The 
s m a l l  advance  p a r t i e s  o f  Fo rce  136 o f f i c e r s  and s u p p o r t  s t a f f ,  t o t a l l i n g  
n o t  more t han  350 men, were s c a t t e r e d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  
and pose d  no r e a l  c h a l l e n g e  to  t h e  MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s .  I t  was r e p o r t e d  
t h a t  the  MPAJA was a b o u t  7 ,000  s t r o n g  a t  t h i s  t i m e . ^  Most o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  
o f f i c e r s  were i n  MPAJA camps and c o u ld  have  been d e t a i n e d .  There  was 
a s u g g e s t i o n  from t h e  MCP r a n k s  i n  J o h o r  t o  t h e  C e n t r a l  Committee  t h a t  
a l l  Fo rc e  136 o f f i c e r s  a t t a c h e d  t o  MPAJA u n i t s  s h o u l d  be k i l l e d ,  and t h a t  
t h e  f o r c e s  o f  r e o c c u p a t i o n  be p r e s e n t e d  w i t h  a f a i t  a c co m p l i  t a k e o v e r  
o f  pow er .^  N e i t h e r  o f  t h e s e  i d e a s  was t a k e n  up by t h e  MCP l e a d e r s h i p ,  
which a l s o  f a i l e d  to  e n d o r s e  t h e  g u e r r i l l a  t a k e o v e r s  by d e c l a r i n g  
in d ep e n d e n c e  and e s t a b l i s h i n g  a n a t i o n a l  governm ent .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  27 
Augus t  p o l i c y  s t a t e m e n t  c a l l e d  on c a d r e s  and g u e r r i l l a s  t o  c o o p e r a t e  w i t h  
t h e  r e t u r n i n g  B r i t i s h  and t o  a d o p t  a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i n e  o f  s t r u g g l e  
( s e e  C h a p t e r  I I ) .
With t h i s  p o l i c y ,  La i  Tek s o u g h t  to  dampen the  a n t i - B r i t i s h  
mood now r i s i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  p a r t y ’ s r a n k s .  The p a r t y ’ s b r a n c h e s  and 
s a t e l l i t e s  were a sked  t o  e n d o r s e  t h e  C e n t r a l  C o m m i t t e e ' s  d e c i s i o n .  One 
by one th e y  d i d  s o .  The S e l a n g o r  S t a t e  C o m m i t t e e ' s  e ndo rsem en t  came 
f i r s t .  On 1 Sep tem ber ,  t h e  4 t h  In d e p e n d e n t  Regiment  ( i n  cha rge  
o f  South Jo h o r )  and t h e  South  J o h o r  MPAJU came o u t  j o i n t l y  i n  s u p p o r t  
o f  the  p a r t y ’ s e i g h t - p o i n t  programme ’ drawn up f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n ' . ^  
They a d o p te d  the  f o l l o w i n g  s l o g a n s :  ( i )  'U pho ld  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  l e a g u e
of  Ch ina ,  The S o v i e t  Union,  B r i t a i n  and A m e r i c a ’ ; ( i i )  ’Welcome G r e a t  
B r i t a i n  t o  a d m i n i s t e r  M a la y a ’ ; and ( i i i )  ’A l l  r a c e s  u n i t e  t o g e t h e r  f o r  
t h e  sake  of  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a d e m o c r a t i c  M a la y a ’ . In  t h e i r  j o i n t  s t a t e m e n t
4 I b i d .
5 V i c t o r  P u r c e l l ,  The C h in e s e  i n  M a la y a , 262.
6 Anthony S h o r t ,  The Communist I n s u r r e c t i o n  i n  M a la y a , 34-35 .
7 See e x t r a c t  o f  j o i n t  s t a t e m e n t  o f  4 t h  In d e p e n d e n t  Regiment ,  MPAJA, 
and South J o h o r  MPAJU, e n t i t l e d  ’Announcement  i n  F e l i c i t a t i o n  o f  
V i c t o r y  i n  Fa r  E a s t e r n  A n t i - J a p a n e s e  Campaign’ , d a t e d  1 Sep tember  
1945, i n  WO 2 0 3 / 5 6 4 2 .
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in Chinese, the two organisations said:
...we trust that a righteous and just policy will be 
executed by the British Military Administration in 
future in order to bestow on us happiness and freedom.
As Great Britain is a righteous nation we believe we 
shall be granted proper rights and given the opportunity 
to offer our cooperation to the British Government.
Simultaneously, we expect all races and political 
parties to join with us in the task of establishing a 
New Malaya under the democratic flag....®
While the expectations expressed in the above statement may 
seem unduly optimistic, it is a fact that many communists after the 
surrender came to believe that some postwar British rewards to the MCP 
and the MPAJA for their wartime cooperation were inevitable. A strong 
belief lingered among many MCP members that some sort of bargain had been 
struck with the MPAJA command, or offers made, which meant that the
9British would allow them to play a political role in post-war Malaya.
It appears that subtle British propaganda spread by broadcasting stations 
was largely responsible for this (to be discussed shortly). On the other 
hand, there were also communists who distrusted British motives, who 
considered that while they had to go along with the party leadership's 
decision to abandon the armed struggle, a 'cooperative' policy towards 
the British could only be tactical, in line with their own strategic 
assessment that 'British colonialism' was still the party's enemy, and 
that before long the interests of both sides would again come into 
conflict.
On 11 August, when Japanese surrender was imminent, a message 
was sent to Force 136 officers. They were told to inform the guerrillas 
that victory was near, and that Allied forces would soon reach them.
The guerrillas were congratulated on the part they had played. They 
were instructed to avoid military engagements with the Japanese and not, 
to enter any towns or districts where Japanese were present. In areas 
where there were no Japanese they could, in conjunction with Force 136 
officers, enter and take over responsibility for ensuring law and order
8 Ibid.
9 R. Balan, former MCP/MPAJA member. Interview, Kuala Lumpur, 
2 April 1973.
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u n t i l  A l l i e d  f o r c e s  a r r i v e d .  The Force  136 o f f i c e r s  were  a l s o  t o l d  
i n  the  same m essage :
I t  w i l l  be  some days b e f o r e  r e g u l a r  A l l i e d  F o rc es  
a r r i v e .  In  t h e  i n t e r v a l  i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  a v o id  
c l a s h e s  be tw een  AJUF [ the  A n t i - J a p a n e s e  Union and 
F o r c e s  -  t h e  SEAC name f o r  t h e  MPAJA] and J a p a n e s e  
and to  p r e v e n t  AJUF s e i z i n g  power.  ^
However , on 16 A u g u s t ,  Force  136 o f f i c e r s  were t o l d  t h a t  t h e
g u e r r i l l a  f o r c e s  s h o u ld  n o t  come o u t  o f  t h e i r  camps u n t i l  i t  was known
12beyond doubt  t h a t  t h e  J a p a n e s e  would obey t h e  s u r r e n d e r  o r d e r s .  I t
i s  n o t  known w h e t h e r  t h e s e  v a r i o u s  o r d e r s  were p a s s e d  on i m m e d ia te ly  t o
Chin Peng to be r e l a y e d  to  MPAJA H e a d q u a r t e r s .  In  any c a s e ,  between  15
and 17 Augus t  MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  were c o n t i n u a l l y  s l i p p i n g  away t o  the
towns and p o p u l a t e d  a r e a s .  Force  136 o f f i c e r s  found t h e i r  ’ c o n t r o l ’
weaken ing .  Only when g u e r r i l l a  f o r c e s  were a l l o w e d  f o r m a l l y  to  e n t e r
such  a r e a s  were B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r s  a b l e  t o  accompany them and th u s  r e v i v e
13t h e i r  ’ a u t h o r i t y ’ . Ti lls i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  MPAJA H e a d q u a r t e r s  d id  n o t  a c t
on SEAC's ' s t a n d s t i l l '  o r d e r ,  a l t h o u g h  the  Force  136 m i s s i o n  c la im e d
14t h a t  i t  was b e i n g  obeyed .
In f a c t ,  on o r  a b o u t  22 August  t h e  MPAJA C e n t r a l  H e a d q u a r t e r s  
o r d e r e d  i t s  e i g h t  r e g i m e n t s  ’ to  t a k e  o v e r  a l l  s m a l l  and b i g  towns i n  t h e  
c o u n t r y ’ . The r e g i m e n t s  were a l s o  i n s t r u c t e d  to  c o o r d i n a t e  t h e i r  
e f f o r t s  w i t h  t h o s e  o f  MPAJA b r a n c h e s  i n  e a c h  S t a t e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  ’P e o p l e ’ s 
C o m m i t t e e s ’ and to  assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  s e c u r i t y ,  r e s c u e  o f  r e f u g e e s
10 See ’ D r a f t  Te leg ram to  All  A l l i e d  L i a i s o n  O f f i c e r s  in  M a laya ’ ,
n . d . ,  i n  WO 2 0 3 / 5 6 4 2 . F .S .V .  D o n n i s o n , B r i t i s h  M i l i t a r y  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
in  t he Fa r  Ea s t ,  1943- 4 6 , 384,  q u o t e s  an a lm o s t  i d e n t i c a l  message 
d a t e d  11. August .
11 ' D r a f t  Te leg ram to  A l l  A l l i e d  L i a i s o n  O f f i c e r s  i n  M a laya ’ .
12 D o n n i s o n , 384.
13 I b i d .
14 Commander 
21 August
Fo rce  136 to  H . P . D . ,  'R e p o r t s  
1945 in  WO 203 /5 6 4 2 .
on MPAJA from M a la ya ’ ,
15 Hqs MPAJA E x - S e rv i c e m e n ’ s A s s o c i a t i o n ,  1’M a - l a i - y a  ren  ming kang
j i h  chun chan j i ’ , (The War D ia ry  o f  the  MPAJA), in  Li  Tieh  Min, 
e t . a .  (ed)  , The O v e r s ea s  C h inese  and t h e  Second World War (The Malaya 
S e c t i o n ) ,  ( i n  C h i n e s e ) ,  29.
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and restoration of communications. The MPAJA/MPAJU branches in each
State were ordered to convene jointly a 'State People's Representatives'
Congress'. The aim behind the exercise, says the MPAJA's official
16history, was 'to put the initial chaotic situation in order'. The 
history does not record receiving or obeying any requests or orders of 
Force 136, and clearly intends to indicate that the decision was entirely 
its own.
Apparently because of the MPAJA guerrillas' non-compliance of 
the 15 or 17 August order, SEAC Headquarters had no other choice but to 
rescind that order and to endorse the MPAJA Headquarters order of 22 or 
23 August. Following receipt of this message on 23 August, Force 136 
officers began to readjust their positions. They now reported that, 
despite the new attitude, some MPAJA groups were friendly, others hostile. 
The friendly guerrillas were said to be in Central Perak, Selangor, Malacca 
and South Johor. The attitude of MPAJA Central Headquarters was reported 
to be friendly and cooperative. This was evident in the amicable 
relationship established between Headquarters representative Chin Peng 
and John Davis. In Upper Perak, Kedah, north Johor and parts of Pahang, 
Force 136 officers encountered hostility and non-cooperation from MPAJA 
guerrillas.^
These different reactions were due to two factors. In many 
areas MPAJA units had no liaison contacts with Force 136. When several 
of these Force 136 officers parachuted into MPAJA camps after the surrender, 
they were treated as unwelcome guests who had dropped in without any 
introduction or advice from Central Headquarters. Secondly, Force 136 
officers In contact with MPAJA units had incurred the hostility of some 
MPAJA groups by their initial attempts to restrain the guerrillas from 
leaving their camps to take over towns and villages, whether vacated by 
the Japanese or still under Japanese occupation. This action was apparently 
regarded by some MPAJA guerrilla units as an attempt to rob them of the 
fruits of Japanese defeat.
16 Ibid.
17 'Memorandum on the Force 136 Organisation in Malaya' by Lt-Colonel 
D.G. Gill-Davies, 13 September in BMA PSD/39. See also another 
Force 136 report in 25 Indian Division, Hqs. Malaya Command WIR,
12 December 1945 in Ibid.
226
While a central MPAJA command did exist, how each unit was to
react to a local situation depended on individual area MPAJA commanders.
The question of how successful each Force 136 officer was in exercising
any 'tactical command' over the MPAJA guerrillas depended on his relations
with the area MPAJA commander. It would seem that in the first week of
the Japanese surrender, the officers found it very difficult to confine
the guerrillas to their camps. The high incidence of MPAJA guerrilla
attacks on the Japanese and local police between 15 and 31 August also
18suggests a further 'defiance' of orders of the Force 136 officers.
SEAC Headquarters had explicitly instructed that military engagements 
between the guerrillas and the Japanese should be avoided at all costs 
because they might escalate and disrupt the landings of the British 
occupation forces.
These 'acts of defiance' meant either that there was a breakdown 
in communications between Force 136 and MPAJA Headquarters, or that the 
latter, while agreeing to cooperate with the British, intended to utilise 
the situation following the surrender to its own advantage as much as 
possible - such as seizing towns and setting up 'People's Committees'.
After SEAC Headquarters had authorised guerrilla takeovers of 
areas vacated by the Japanese, it refused to define any further tasks they 
should undertake on re-entry of British forces to Malaya. Before the 
Japanese capitulation SEAC had, in fact, planned to launch 'Operation 
Zipper' to invade and recapture Malaya either in late August or some time 
in September. For that military operation the MPAJA's agreement had been 
sought and obtained. The MPAJA had wholly supported the British desire 
to drive the Japanese out of Malaya. It was ready to cooperate with any 
planned British invasion of Malaya, and was to be allotted specific tasks, 
such as sabotage and diversionary engagements with Japanese forces to 
facilitate the landing of British forces. But the sudden surrender of the 
Japanese and their apparently docile acceptance of Allied terms, rendering 
the role of the MPAJA no longer necessary, presented a different picture 
entirely. The question arose at SEAC Headquarters whether the MPAJA would 
now be more of a hindrance than a help to British occupation forces.
.18 For statistics of guerrilla attacks and casualties see Appendices 
B and C, below.
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Hie attitude of SEAC is best summed up as a wish that the MPAJA would
simply get out of the way. It should also avoid any hostilities with the
Japanese troops in order to prevent unnecessary bloodshed and disruption
of landing plans. The failure of SEAC to give a clear order to the MPAJA
to assist in its reoccupation of Malaya has been blamed by Force 136
Headquarters as being responsible for allowing the MPAJA guerrillas to do
virtually whatever they liked in the areas they took over in the interval
19before the British forces arrived. It is necessary to follow the 
deliberations at SEAC Headquarters to see how they viewed the MPAJA threat 
to British reoccupation plans.
Mountbatten and the Resistance Movements in Malaya
Since July 1944 Mountbatten had taken a special interest in
Malaya’s political problems, paying particular attention to the resistance
movements and to the Chinese and MCP problem. The Secretary of State for
the Colonies, Oliver Stanley, in a secret memorandum presented to the War
20Cabinet on 9 December 1944 recorded Mountbatten’s views as follows:
I have been in correspondence with the Supreme Allied 
Commander South East Asia, who has strongly represented 
to me the importance of making known our future plans in 
general to the peoples whom these plans will affect. 21- 
Admiral Mountbatten holds that the proper reception of 
our future policy in Malaya depends upon its being fully 
explained beforehand, and that the time is now ripe to 
do this.
In advancing this point of view, the Supreme Allied 
Commander is thinking not only of long-term considerations, 
but also of the creation of a favourable atmosphere for 
the setting up of a military administration for which he 
will be responsible. Moreover, those responsible for 
present operations of a social character within his 
Command have made the same case for their own reasons.
So much so that the organisation [i.e. SEAC] has had to be 
given certain general guidance on the subject for the use 
of its agents....
19 ’Memorandum on the Force 136 Organisation in Malaya’ by Lt-Colonel 
T) G. Gil 1-Da vies.
20 See Memorandum by Secretary of State for the Colonies on ’Constitutional 
Policy in Malaya', 9 December 1944, in CAB 98/41.
21 These plans were the 'Malayan Union’ plans which were to give the 
Chinese citizenship and equality of status with Malays.
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To the requests of Mountbatten and his staff, the Minister had
replied that he was not yet convinced that ’the time has come for our
plans to be divulged in full, since this would involve committing ourselves
to every feature of those plans at a time when many relevant facts are
22by force of circumstances unknown to us.’
On 11 May 1945 Mountbatten sent a telegram to the British Chiefs
of Staff requesting them to urge the British Government to publicise its
proposed Malayan Union policy. He did this while at the same time asking
the Chiefs of Staff for instructions on the resistance movements in Malaya.
Mountbatten argued that publicity of the Malayan Union policy would greatly
increase his power to utilise the Chinese resistance movement, i.e., the
MPAJA. As he explained to the Chiefs of Staff:
The best change of military action against the Japanese 
lies in my supporting the largely Chinese movement known 
as the Anti-Japanese Union and Forces [AJUF] .
The political implications of this are governed by the fact 
that the Chinese in the greater part of Malaya did not in 
the past enjoy equality of status. Consequently support 
of this movement might invite pressure to secure these 
privileges once hostilities are over.
The potential danger will be minimised if HMG's [His 
Majesty’s Government’s] policy for the future of Malaya is 
disclosed now. This policy offers the local Chinese 
something concrete and if its disclosure is deferred until 
after liberation we may well appear to be making concessions 
to the Chinese under pressure. Whereas if it is disclosed now 
the AJUF can be told that no additional undertakings as to 
postwar status can be given to any resistance movement as such 
but that their objective must be limited to the expulsion of
the Japanese.23
This is one of the clearest official statements in support of 
some British offer of rewards or political concessions to the MPAJA 
guerrillas in particular, and to the Chinese community in general. In 
the same memorandum Mountbatten also suggested that Force 136 should 
offer increased support to the MPAJA and the Malay resistance movements,
22 Ibid.
23 Telegram from Mountbatten to British Chiefs of Staff, ’Malayan 
Resistance Movement - Chinese in Malaya’, 11 May 1945, in
WO 172/1763. Copies of this enclosure are also found in WO 203/2967 
and FO 371/46339/01382.
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hut that British attitude towards the KMT guerrillas should be the subject 
of further consideration. According to him, the KMT guerrillas 'present a 
political problem of their own, since as members of the Kuomintang, they 
are affiliated with China proper and may well be used as a nucleus to 
spread In Malaya the strong Chinese nationalism which is manifesting itself
9 /
in China today.'
On 11 May itself, Mountbatten wrote again personally to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, explaining the background to the request
he had made through the British Chiefs of Staff. It is an important document
as it expresses succinctly his liberal political aspirations for Malaya
and contains little known details of the British Colonial Office's plans
to prepare post-war Malaya for self-government. These included the
formulation of common political identity and multi-racial integration among
25the three major races of Malaya. His letter reads in extenso:
In the case of Malaya, there is of course the difficulty 
that the Resistance Movements arc largely composed of 
Chinese elements and that the Chinese in the greater part 
of Malaya did not in the past enjoy equality of status.
If we back them to any appreciable extent, and accept 
their cooperation, wo shall owe them a special debt and 
this will give them a strong case if they choose to ask for 
special privileges.
T feel, however, that this point is already largely covered 
in the Directive on HMG's policy for Malaya, forwarded to me 
by the War Office in their letter 098/4335 (CA4) of the 10 July 
1944 (WD) which in the first para states that 'our declared 
purpose of promoting self-government in colonial territories 
should provide for a growing participation in the Government by 
the people of all. the communities in Malaya.' T also feel that 
you personally strongly back the implementation of this aim, 
since in your letter to me of the 21st August 1944 you state 
that 'our pre-war experience offered hardly any sign of a 
conception nmonj»st the throe peoples that they were Mn 1 ayans.
Our plan is to proceed both from the top and the bottom in 
fostering the growth of such a conception - viz. by a single 
representative legislature at the top, and at the same time 
the institution of local bodies which will not be purely 
Malay but more broadly based and representative of the 
conn try. '
24 Ibid.
25 Mountbatten to Oliver Stanley, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
11 May 1945, in WO 172/1763.
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If HM Government's policy is made public, it becomes possible 
to tell the Chinese elements that we cannot guarantee any 
additional privileges on account of services rendered in the 
Resistance; but we can point to the fact that the policy 
offers them concrete advantages.
I am aware that publicity may be regarded as prejudicial to 
the negotiations which we are contemplating with the Sultans, 
following our reoccupation of Malaya. But it seems to me that 
if we are convinced of the rightness of the solution we 
propose, and are backed by world opinion, we can afford to 
risk that complication.
I very much hope that the War Cabinet will see their way to 
agreeing with my new proposals. The question of Resistance 
. Movements within the British Empire is in a special category. 
Presumably we have not previously found Colonial Subjects 
rising to fight on our behalf when we were about to occupy 
their territory, and the fact that they are doing so today 
seems to me a wonderful opportunity for propaganda to the 
world in general, and to the Americans in particular, at a 
time when we are being accused of reconquering colonial peoples 
in order to re-subjugate them.26
Although there is no record of a reply from the Secretary of
State to the Colonies being received by Mountbatten, there is a telegram
sent to him by the British Chiefs of Staff on 7 June 1945 stating that
since the British Cabinet had not given its final approval, no advance
publicity could be made on the Malayan Union policy. The telegram stated:
Post-war constitutional policy on Malaya has only received 
provisional approval of Cabinet for planning purposes and 
Is liable to modification. Until this has been decided no 
publicity of policy can be made and you should ensure that 
your clandestine organisations impress upon the resistance 
movements that any association with them is purely military.27
The British Chiefs of Staff approved Mountbatten’s earlier 
proposals in his telegram of 11 May on the use of the 'AJUF' and the Malay 
resistance movement. They also agreed that their attitude towards the KMT 
guerrillas should be subject to further consideration, after investigations 
into the scope and extent of their organisation. However, they urged him 
to obtain such intelligence as he could from the KMT guerrillas ’without
26 Ibid. Emphasis added.
27 Top Secret Telegram of Chiefs of Staff to Mountbatten, 7 June 1945, 
in WO 172/1767. Copy also available in WO 203/56.
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prejudice to any decision we may wish to make in future regarding our
28recognition of this movement.'
On 4 August 1945, after Force 136 investigations had provided
SEAC Headquarters with the relevant information on the nature of the three
sections of the Resistance movement in Malaya and their relationships to
each other, Mountbatten recommended further to the British Chiefs of
Staff that he should be authorised to accept the ’fullest cooperation’ of
the MPAJA and the MPAJU, that he should try to induce the Malay Resistance
Movement to cooperate with the former, but that he should be released
29from any obligation to the KMT movement. According to the BMA historian
Donnison, his reasons for these proposals were:
that the MPAJA and the MPAJU had expressed enthusiastic 
'pro-Malayan' sentiments, whereas the Kuomintang stood 
for the strengthening both of the Chinese community as 
a separate community in Malaya, and of the bonds between 
this community and China; that there was great hostility 
between the two sections of guerrillas so that it would be 
difficult to back both; that he trusted the Communist 
Party's undertaking to cooperate with the British during 
the period of military administration; and that 
clandestine operations yielding valuable intelligence 
were entirely dependent upon the friendship and support of 
this section. True, the 'pro-Malayan' sentiments of the 
Communists involved the expulsion of the British, the 
establishment of a Communist-dominated Republic of Malaya, 
and without doubt, the dominance of the Chinese; but 
Admiral Mountbatten still felt that the rank and file of 
the Communist guerrillas could probably be weaned from 
these views if other methods could be devised of granting 
to' them the equality of status witli Malays which was what 
they most desired; for this purpose he pressed again for 
the publication of the British plans for the future 
constitution of Malaya, which included the creation of 
Malayan Union citizenship....-^
Mountbatten's proposal that he should be released from any obligations to 
the KMT guerrillas appears to have had no effect. As Donnison points 
out, his proposal was soon crowded out by the many problems surrounding 
the imminent surrender of Japan. There is no record of any decision
28 Ibid.
29 Donnison, 383.
30 I bid.
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either by the British Chiefs of Staff. As a result, Force 136 officers 
continued to he attached to KMT resistance forces in Malaya.
SEAC’s Post-surrender Expectations
On 15 August, with Japanese surrender imminent, Mountbatten 
received a conference paper prepared by SEAC's Political and Intelligence 
Divisions on appropriate actions to be taken by Force 136 and the resistance 
movements in Malaya, Burma, Siam and Sumatra, all within Mountbatten's 
jurisdiction. With regard to Malaya, the paper made a fairly perceptive 
assessment of the MPAJA guerrillas and how they were likely to act in the 
interval before the arrival of British forces. This was presented as 
follows:
(a) The Malay movement and the KMT guerrillas are of 
little account and the policy to be adopted should, 
therefore, be based on the AJUF.
(b) The AJUF are first and last anti-Japanese and not 
pro-British except Insofar as such an attitude might 
be of advantage to them. They would very easily 
become anti-British if differently handled.
(r) British and American officers witii AJUF arc hy no 
means in command, and can only exercise a limited 
controlling influence. They might easily become 
casual prisoners.
(d) The desire of the guerrillas to kill Japanese will
not stop 1n the event of capitulation. By restraining 
them, we wilL to some extent be cheating them of 
their prey. They will undoubted 1y busy themselves 
In paying off old scores, and in liquidating 
’collaborators’.
(o) The guerrillas are hungry and cut off from supplies 
by the Japanese; they are, therefore, likely to do 
their best to take advantage of Japanese inactivity to 
Improve their lot.
(f) Guerrillas are ’fair game’ for the Japanese, whether 
the latter have capitulated or not, since their 
activities can clearly be considered offences against 
law and order.
(g) Unless the AJUF are given clear instructions which it 
suits them to observe they will be potential trouble­
makers. They arc a menace to civil authority from
the point of view of long-term policy. There is little 
doubt that the Communist Party and Union [i.e., the 
MPAJU] will seize every opportunity during the period
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which is bound to set in following the Japanese 
capitulation to further their political ends. They 
may use force.31
The paper considered that if the guerrilla forces were to be properly
utilised to SEAC's advantage then they should be kept in their areas
and remain as far as possible under the control of the Allied Force 136
officers. They should avoid clashes with the Japanese, and should be
ready to carry out whatever tasks were considered necessary, such as
provision of intelligence, guides and interpreters, or making contacts
with Allied prisoner of war camps.
The conference paper had incorporated the main points raised
in a separate Force 136 Headquarters memorandum. The objects of the
memorandum were stated as: ’To prevent seizure of power in Malaya by AJUF
32and to avoid unnecessary bloodshed before the arrival of regular forces.'
Force 136 Headquarters in Kandy reckoned that no regular forces would reach
Malaya for at least 14 days. There were, however, some eighty British
officers with about 200 support staff liaising with the MPAJA and communicating
with SEAC Headquarters through about forty wireless telecommunications sets.
The MPAJA was a body of some 3,000 guerrillas, mostly Chinese communists, and
containing elements ’desirous of preventing a permanent return of British 
32arule’. ' All were violently anti-Japanese, and had agreed to SEAC's orders
with the object of throwing the Japanese out of Malaya. More than 2,000
arms had been hcmiL to them since1 May 1945. Experience had Hhown,
particularly in Greece, that resistance movements should be gLvcn clear
instructions on what to do when their country was liberated, otherwise they
would inevitably cause trouble, and might well attempt to 'seize power in
33the principal towns.' The Greek communist rising, which had taken place
31 Conference Secretariat Minute 5/235, 'Action to be taken by clandestine 
organisations and indigenous resistance movements in the event of 
Japanese capitulation', 15 August 1945, for discussion at Supreme 
Allied Commander's staff meeting on 15 August 1945, in WO 172/1777.
32 Hqs Force 136 to H.P.D., 'Directive to AJUF on conclusion of 
Armistice', 13 August 1945 In WO 203/5642.
32a Tbld.
33 Ibid. The Greek communist resistance movement ELAS (National Popular 
Liberation Army) had begun an insurrection in December 1944, following 
withdrawal of German occupation forces from Athens and other towns. It 
was British military intervention which checked the communist forces 
and helped the royalist forces to stem the communist tide. See C.M. 
Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece 1941-1949, London, 1976, 129-31.
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some eight months before the war with Japan had ended, had taught the
British what to expect from communist resistance movements in Southeast
Asia in the event of a Japanese capitulation.
At the same time, Force 136 Headquarters stated:
AJUF have been very nearly our only friends during the 
occupation. We are under an obligation to them, and 
do NOT wish to give them the impression that we are 
ready to drop them now that we NO longer have any use
for them.34
Considering the courses of action open to SEAC, Force 136 said that to
do nothing pending the arrival of regular forces would be to allow what
had happened in Greece to take place. On the other hand, to tell the MPAJA
to cooperate with the Japanese in the administration of the country, pending
arrival of Allied troops would certainly not be understood by violently
anti-Japanese guerrillas. Force 136 suggested that British liaison officers
should be instructed as follows: (i) prevent contact between the MPAJA
and the Japanese; (ii) keep the MPAJA in the country districts where
there were no Japanese; and (iii) give the MPAJA the task of keeping
35order generally in such districts.
On 15 August, the date on which the Japanese Emperor broadcast
acceptance of the Allied surrender terms, Mountbatten's staff meeting at
SEAC Headquarters approved the recommendations outlined in the above 
36conference paper. On the 16th, at another meeting, General Sir William
Slim, Commander-in-Chief, ALFSEA, suggested that the resistance forces in
Malaya, Burma, Siam and Sumatra should not come out into the open until
it was beyond any doubt that the Japanese would comply with Allied surrender
37orders. Mountbatten agreed with this view. On 18 August, as an indication 
of the great concern felt in Whitehall, the War Office in London wired 
Mountbatten, expressing its views on likely developments in Japanese-occupied
34 Hqs Force 136 to H.P.D., 'Directive to AJUF on conclusion of 
13 August 1945 in WO 203/5642. (Emphasis In original text.)
Armistice',
35 Ibid.
36 See Minutes of SAC's 78th staff meeting on 15 August 1945', 
WO 172/1727.
in
37 See 'Minutes of SAC's meeting on clandestine organisations', 
August 1945, in WO 172/1776.
16
235
territories in which Britain had an interest. On Malaya, the War Office 
said:
Much depends on how successfully we disarm the AJUF.
These appear to consist mainly of Chinese communists 
with Anti-British tendencies. We consider AJUF 
elements more likely further source of trouble than 
the Kuomintang Chinese.... 38
Since 11 August, directives were going out to Force 136 officers 
in Malaya. A telegram, undated but believed to have been communicated 
on 11 August, said:
It will be some days before regular Allied Forces 
arrive. In interval it is essential to avoid clashes 
between AJUF and Japanese and to prevent AJUF seizing 
power. At same time we do not wish to give AJUF 
impression that we are preparing to discard them now 
that they have served their purpose. You should 
therefore inform AJUF as follows:
1. Victory is now at hand and your contribution has 
been important and is appreciated.
2. Allied troops will shortly arrive but meanwhile 
to prevent clashes and unnecessary bloodshed you 
should avoid all towns and other districts where 
Japanese are present.
3. Where there are no Japanese you should in 
conjunction with Allied officers attached to you 
take over responsibility for ensuring law and 
order until Allied Forces arrive.39
On 16 August, as we have noted earlier, SEAC instructed that the
guerrilla forces should remain in their camps. Colonel John Davis, chief
of the Force 136 mission in Malaya, was unhappy with these instructions.
In a very blunt telegram to Force 136 Headquarters on.19 August, he said:
Your recent telegrams are disturbing. Following must 
of course be obvious to you. Controlled AJUF are 
soldiers under command of SACSEA. They expect and 
await specific orders and not vague directives. I am 
satisfied they will obey such orders provided they are 
reasonable. Orders for them to remain half starved in 
the hills while the Allies leisurely take over the 
administration from the Japs will not be reasonable.
38 Top Secret telegram from War Office to SACSEA, TOO 181100, 
18 August 1945 in WO 172/1777.
39 See ’Draft Telegram to All Allied Liaison Officers in Malaya', 
n.d., in WO 203/5642.
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Some arrangement must be made with the Japs for 
controlled AJUF to emerge during the interim period 
though they need not interfere with the Japs administration.
AJUF must be given full share in the honours of victory.
Controlled AJUF should now be limited to those already 
armed by us plus other armed men who will accept our 
control. They must be fully equipped, rationed and used 
by us at the earliest opportunity until time for 
disbandment.
Good treatment of controlled AJUF will have an excellent 
effect on uncontrolled AJUF many of whom may later be 
absorbed. Do your utmost to preserve and strengthen 
central control otherwise discipline will collapse. The 
alternative to all this is chaos and anarchy which may 
take decades to eradicate. The matter is very urgent.
There is serious risk of a disastrous anticlimax.^
Davis was most anxious that MPAJA Central Headquarters be accorded a
proper status, that its guerrillas be treated as Allied soldiers (this did
not happen until 4 September) and used jointly with arriving British forces
to-liberate Malaya. Worried that SEAC might still view the MPAJA with
suspicion, Davis sent another message on 21 August:
Your must not give SACSEA [i.e., Mountbatten] impression 
that MPAJA are threatening to breakout. Nothing could 
be further from the truth. The danger is that SACSEA 
may irreparably damage MPAJA discipline and cause such 
a break-out by failing to exercise the control and give 
the support which MPAJA have been led to expect.^
On the same day, a meeting chaired by Mountbatten discussed the
guerrilla activities in Malaya. The reports from Davis were presented by
Captain Garnon-Williams, head of the Political Division, who shared the
sentiments expressed by Davis. He suggested that definite tasks should
be allotted to guerrilla forces when the Allied reoccupation forces landed
in Malaya. If this was not done, he feared it would be very difficult to
control 'men who, up to now, had obeyed the standstill order and were very 
42short of food'. General Sir William Slim, however, opposed this view.
40 See message of Colonel John Davis, attached to Memorandum of Commander, 
Force 136 to H.P.D ., 'Force 136 policy - Malaya', 19 August 1945, in 
WO 203/5642.
41 Commander, Force 136 to H.P.D., 'Reports on MPAJA from Malaya',
21 August 1945, in WO 203/5642.
42 See 'Minutes of SAC's Meeting at Hq. SACSEA, Kandy, 21 August 
1945' on 'Guerrilla activities in Malaya', in WO 172/1778.
237
He said that if the Japanese behaved correctly and British landings went
off without incident, any guerrilla activities might upset a situation
which would otherwise be under control. The guerrillas should only report,
as formed bodies under British officers, to arriving British forces, and
then be given certain tasks as part of the regular reoccupation forces.
Colin Mackenzie, Commander, Force 136, said that although such a course of
action would be suitable where it was easy for the guerrillas to make
contact with British forces, he thought that it would not be easy to prevent
sporadic guerrilla hostilities with the Japanese, particularly in the more
remote areas of northern Malaya. He suggested that the guerrillas be
given some definite tasks. In the end Slim had his way. Mountbatten,
however, directed the Head of the Political Division to consult with Slim
and to prepare a paper formulating the actions which guerrilla forces should
be instructed to take upon re-entry of British forces to Malaya. He also
directed that a note be prepared on the local political and military
43problems which SEAC was likely to face on re-entry.
Mountbatten was understandably very anxious to land British
forces as quickly as possible in Malaya. He was unable to do so, however,
because of General MacArthur’s request that landings be delayed until 
4431 August. As MacArthur had rightly predicted, Field-Marshal Terauchi
made it clear on 22 August that he would not obey Mountbatten’s orders until
45he had heard from the Emperor. British occupation forces, therefore, 
could not begin landing at Penang until 3 September, and were delayed from 
landing elsewhere in Malaya due to the need to clear beforehand Japanese 
naval mines in the Straits of Malacca.
In the meantime, SEAC decided to increase the strength of Force 136 
personnel in Malaya to prevent the MPAJA guerrillas from usurping the 
functions of government. One of those who volunteered to return to Malaya 
by parachute at the end of August was Colonel Spencer Chapman, who had 
returned to Colombo on 19 May by submarine. He was parachuted into Pahang,
43 Ibid.
44 Mountbatten to Chiefs of Staff on delay in surrender procedure,
20 August 1945 in WO 172/1778.
45 See Telegrams 220327Z and 220329Z to Mountbatten, 22 August 1945, 
in WO 172/1778.
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where it was feared the guerrillas might get out of hand. He was asked
to assist Force 136 Major J.R. Leonard, a former Malayan Game Warden.
Leonard had dropped blind some distance from a district MPAJA headquarters,
and had reported that the MPAJA guerrillas were unhelpful, even hostile.
As a result of these reports SEAC decided to drop one or more support
groups to give Leonard necessary assistance in controlling these
47’refractory' guerrillas. Force 136 officers in other areas also reported 
meeting with MPAJA non-cooperation and hostility, especially those in 
Kedah and North Johor.
Meanwhile, Civil Affairs officers who were to run the British
Military Administration (BMA) in Malaya were making their own careful analysis
of what to expect from the MPAJA guerrillas. Sir Ralph Hone, the Chief
Civil Affairs Officer (CCAO) designate, along with other senior Civil
Affairs officers, feared that 'the communists in the jungle at the time of
the Japanese surrender had every intention of taking over control in 
48Malaya'. On 22 August, a SEAC Headquarters forecast of expectations of
disturbances in the Far East stated that in Malaya the MPAJA was the likely
source of trouble because its 'hard-core elements' were 'communists who
hold extremist and anti-imperialistic views and are known to support the
49idea of an Independent Republic of Malaya'.
On 24 August, apparently owing to the worsening guerrilla 
situation in Malaya, Colin Mackenzie, Commander of Force 136, wrote a 
memorandum to the senior staff at SEAC Headquarters stating that the 
inevitable delay between the ceasefire and the reoccupation of Malaya 
was rapidly 'increasing the difficulties with which we shall be faced
46 Chapman, op.cit., 414-18.
47 Ibid.
48 Sir Ralph Hone, in reply to questionnaire from Hull University 
student George Sweeney, 21 May 1971, in 'Papers of General Hone', 
MSS Brit. Empire S. 407/3, Rhodes House Library, Oxford.
49 Director of Intelligence to SACSEA, 'An estimate of likelihood of 
disturbances which would require military forces in various areas 
of the Far East', 22 August 1945 in WO 172/1778.
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in connection with the AJUF.'“^  He urged that the British Government 
should now be asked to disclose the relevant details of its Malayan Union 
policy for postwar Malaya. Mackenzie said the new policy would remove two 
important grievances connected with the AJUF. He discussed these two 
grievances as follows:
It must be borne in mind that the AJUF is:
(a) Almost entirely composed of domiciled Chinese whose 
status as citizens has been inferior to that of the 
Malays in various important respects, and
(b) Contains within its ranks Communists who have 
undoubtedly widened their influence considerably 
during the last three years. The Communist Party 
was treated before the war as an illegal association 
and as such was subject to the attention of the 
police.
The new Colonial Office policy almost entirely removes 
these two grievances.51
Mackenzie earnestly urged that Mountbatten should be requested to
send a further signal to the British Government stressing the importance of
an immediate authorisation to disclose the relevant details of the policy.
Mackenzie also suggested that Force 136 officers in Malaya be authorised
to release relevant details of the Malayan Union policy to the AJUF. He
presented his arguments as follows:
Every hour increases the danger of some occurrence which 
may place the AJUF irretrievably in the wrong and 
subsequently lead to the embitterment of relations after 
the necessary counteraction has been taken by the British.
Moreover, any further delay in disclosing essential details 
of this policy will expose us to an increasingly serious 
risk of it appearing that the policy has only been extorted 
from us by fear of further AJUF activity which might be 
detrimental to order and good government.
The best chance we have of avoiding these problems is 
to strengthen the hands of the Liaison Officers now with
50 Top Secret Memorandum of Commander, Force 136 to H.P.D., C.P.A.,
etc., 24 August 1945, in WO 203/5642/X/102339. The C.P.A. (or Chief 
Political Adviser to. Mountbatten) M.E. Dening was one of 
the most influential officials at SEAC Headquarters. He was shortly 
to urge Mountbatten to act on this Force 136 request.
51 Ibid.
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AJUF. One of the best ways of doing this is to be 
able to authorise them to inform the members of the 
AJUF of the Government's new policy.
It is understood that one reason given for the delay 
In announcing the policy is that it is necessary first 
to inform the Sultans that the new policy will involve 
some loss in their powers etc. If, as we suppose, it 
is not a question of negotiating with the Sultans but 
simply of informing them for the sake of courtesy of the 
incidental effect on their position, we urge that the 
information it is desired to pass to the Sultans be set 
out in a fixed form and communicated to the appropriate 
Force 136 officers who could quickly arrange for the 
communication to reach the various Sultans.
We again urge ^ e  increasing and serious dangers of 
further delay.
A few days later Mountbatten was to take action. By then, however, the 
situation involving the MPAJA had become clearer.
SEAC's broadcasting stations were now instructed on the new
propaganda to disseminate to Malaya. The line to be taken was (a)
maintenance of law and order; (b) emphasis on Britain's strength and
confident determination to carry out her mission to Malaya; (c) presentaton
of Britain's aims through an approach likely to be sympathetic to
'progressive elements' in Malaya; and (d) avoidance of over-optimism
53regarding return to peace-time conditions. The Dominions Office in
London also issued to the Australian Government similar guidelines on
broadcasting to Malaya.^4 It said that 'trouble being caused by armed
Chinese communists in Malaya' should be the first consideration in any
propaganda to the people of Malaya.
Tn any event we should cater for the worst poss-ib.le 
contingency. These bands, which are formed from a 
pre-war nucleus, have a controlling influence in the 
resistance movement in Malaya which has cooperated 
loyally with us. A small element has announced their 
intention to establish a Malayan Republic....
52 Ibid.
53 SACSEA to Psychological Warfare, Broadcasting Unit, 'Official
directive for output to Malaya', 18 August 1945 in WO 172/1777.
54 Dominions Office to Australian Government, 22 August 1945,
'Broadcasts to Ma1 aya' ln FO 371/46340.
55 Ibid.
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Because of Australia's geographical proximity to Malaya, its radio stations
were to put out as fully as possible stories from Britain on planning
for a postwar world, pointing out in commentaries that Malaya had no small
place in these plans, and that Britain envisaged 'a prosperous Malaya
which will eventually enjoy self-government within the British Commonwealth
56by a representative government regardless of race.'"
On 25 August a radio talk was broadcast by SEAC Headquarters
to the resistance movements in Malaya.6? The guerrillas were
told that in some areas their first orders would be to move into parts
of the country the Japanese had left. Their first duty would be to keep
order, to prevent looting, burning and stealing, and to guard roads,
railways, bridges and other important places from attack by bandits or by
collaborators 'who want to stir trouble, so that they will be able to
58disappear in the confusion that follows.' As soon as British troops 
arrived in Malaya the guerrillas should put themselves under the orders of 
the local British commander. If there was no British force nearby, they 
should keep on ensuring peace and order in their areas. British officers 
already with them would become responsible, when British forces arrived, 
for the guerrillas' support and rations. The BMA, which was to take over 
from the Japanese, would help the guerrillas take their place in Malaya.
The guerrillas would be found work, and those who wanted it would be able 
to secure training for a trade or occupation. They would receive subsistence 
while they were being found work, or while in training. Provision would 
also be made for their wives and families. The broadcast ended with this 
appeal:
Keep close contact with the British officers. Carry out 
carefully the orders they pass to you from the Supreme 
Allied Commander. Above all, see that life in your 
district goes on smoothly and quietly until the British 
forces arrive.69
56 Ibid.
57 SACSEA to Rear SACSEA, 'Special talk for resistance movements in
Malaya to be used in Malay, Chinese and English', 25 August 1945 in 
WO 172/1778.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
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Although the Force 136 minute at Kandy states that the broadcast
was to be issued in Malaya, Chinese and English, it was heard in Malaya
only in Malay and English. This struck Captain Alastair Morrison, a Force
136 officer listening to the broadcasts in the MPAJA camp in Ulu Yam,
(Selangor) as absurd, since the bulk of the MPAJA guerrillas was Chinese. 0^
This apparently was an oversight for a similar message was also included
in SEAC’s newsletter, Victory Herald, dated 25 August, which appeared in
61Malay, Chinese and English. Thousands of copies of this newsletter were
airdropped into Malaya before the reoccupation began. The radio talk and
the newsletter while allotting guerrillas specific tasks, were directed
at all resistance movements in Malaya, and not specifically to the MPAJA.
Both fell far short of the request of Davis and Force 136 Headquarters that
only the 'central control' of MPAJA Headquarters should be used, and that
MPAJA guerrillas should be regarded as SEAC troops. SEAC conceded this
recognition only on 4 September, when Japanese surrender delegates at
Rangoon were asked to treat them as Allied forces. By that time the MPAJA
guerrillas had taken the law into their own hands in many places. It
appears that only about 11 September was authority given for guerrilla
forces to enter Japanese-occupied areas to maintain order, if the Japanese
6 2were not already doing this. The chief Japanese surrender delegate
at Rangoon, General Numata, cabled Field-Marshal Terauchi on 10 September
informing him of the SEAC order that the MPAJA in Malaya should be accorded
treatment as Allied forces. They were to be distinguished by a green
uniform and a green French-style beret and on occasion might wear in
6 3addition a tiger badge.
60 Alastair Morrison, Interview, Canberra, 13 June 1978.
6.1 See copies of the Victory Herald, 25 August 1945, in WO 203/4015. 
They contain the item 'Future of the Resistance Movement in 
Malaya'.
62 Donnison, 384.
63 Telegram from Lt-General Numata to Field-Marshal Terauchi,
10 September 1945 in WO 172/1782.
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MPAJA and Other Guerrilla Takeovers
The areas taken over by the MPAJA and other guerrilla groups
were quite extensive. One source says that about 70 percent of the small
64towns and villages throughout the peninsula fell into guerrilla hands,
while another states that the MPAJA 'virtually held complete control'
6 5of the peninsula, especially the more remote inland regions. The actual
size of the areas taken over is difficult to establish with any certainty.
But clearly a vast political and military vacuum existed for the guerrillas
to fill as Japanese troops evacuated outlying districts.
The specific movements of Japanese troops into larger
concentrations will perhaps give an indication of the outlying districts
which fell to the guerrillas. Japanese troops in the 'northern area'
(i.e., Kedah, Perlis and Kelantan) began concentrating in three directions:
those in northern Kedah moved to Sungei Patani, troops in Kelantan moved
into Siam, while the remainder in Kedah withdrew to Alor Star or further
66south to Bukit Mertajam. Troops in the central area (i.e., Perak) 
joined Hq. 29th Army at Taiping or moved to Ipoh and Kuala Kangsar. In 
the 'southern area' (i.e., Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and Pahang) 
troops began to concentrate at Kuala Lumpur, the base of Hq. 94 Division, 
or moved to Kuala Lipis, Bahau (near Seremban) and Malacca. About 5,000 
troops were concentrated at the naval garrison of Penang. The Hq. 7th Area 
Army moved its troops in Singapore to Jurong, about 20 miles from the city 
centre, and then withdrew them further into Johor where they rejoined the 
remainder of the Army in Johor, either at Kluang or Kota Tinggi, and finally 
at Allied orders were concentrated at Rengam, about 40 miles northwest of 
Johor.^
The withdrawal of the Japanese was effected slowly and without 
fanfare. In many areas such as Kluang, Bentong and Kuala Trengganu the 
troops slipped out at night, so that the local population did not know until
64 Chin Kee Onn, Malaya Upside Down, Singapore, 1946, 202.
65 Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle in Malaya, 49.
66 - ISUM No.50, Hqs 14th Army, 6 October 1945 in BMA PSD/27.
67 Ibid.
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the next morning that the Japanese were gone. In other areas the Japanese
left in broad daylight and were watched silently by the local population.
At Raub and Fraser’s Hill, both small towns in Pahang, a few people in
the largely Hainanese Chinese community began to boo and shout the Japanese
terms of abuse ’Baka daro! Baka daro! (You fool)’ after the troop convoy
6 8was on its way out of town. As one informant recalled the scene:
Most of the Hainanese at Fraser’s Hill were communists 
or communist sympathisers, so this accounted for their 
boldness. A few people, however, feared that the troops 
would turn back. When the trucks kept going, more 
people took up the cry. It was clear to everyone that 
the Japanese were leaving the town for good as the trucks 
were loaded with their bicycles and other belongings.
An Indian who stood beside me yelled, 'The shorties 
[a derogatory term referring to the size of the Japanese 
soldiers] have gone! The shorties have gone!'69
The disappearance of the Japanese was usually the signal for 
the ’jungle or hill people' (the local terms for the guerrillas) to come 
out into the open - often within a matter of hours.
Except for Kota Bharu, which fell to KMT guerrillas, most of 
the towns on the east coast of Malaya were taken over by the MPAJA.
These included one or two towns such as Kuantan and Pekan where a token 
force of Japanese remained apparently at Allied orders to maintain order. 
These token forces of Japanese preferred to confine themselves 
to barracks in order not to provide provocation to the guerrillas who were 
allowed to take over the town.  ^ Although the Japanese were more numerous 
on the west coast, they still pulled out from many smaller towns in that 
area, such as Kluang, Batu Pahat, Tampin, Klang, Bidor, Lenggong and Kroh.
The MPAJA guerrillas, however, attempted to seize several towns 
still under Japanese occupation. Guerrilla attacks on Japanese positions 
were quite serious in fact. Force 136 officers did all they could to avoid 
clashes between the guerrillas and the Japanese, but with limited success. 
The general tactical pattern of the MPAJA was to start scattered shooting
68 H.C. Cheah, Interview, Klang, December 1976. The informant is 
my father.
69 Ibid.
70 Chapman, 419—20.
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in various parts of a town and then to attack the Japanese post or police 
station on the main road outside the town.^ It is indicative of the 
feverish guerrilla activity about this time that literally overnight 
barricades, roadblocks and fortified posts appeared in and around most 
small towns. Main roads were obstructed with fallen tree-trunks. Inter­
district traffic was paralysed. Cars, lorries and vehicles belonging to 
Japanese were commandeered. Many local policemen and Japanese soldiers 
and civilians were killed in the fights. Between the date of surrender 
and 31 August the guerrillas launched 212 attacks on the Japanese Army, 
police, railways, factories and stores. During the same period the Japanese 
suffered 135 casualties, including 63 killed. Local police casualties 
were 31 dead or wounded and 357 missing. The MPAJA guerrillas suffered 78 
killed and 48 arrested. ^
Something of the turbulent conditions prevailing in the countryside 
in Malaya, shots heard day and night, can be conveyed by describing some 
of the violent incidents which erupted between the MPAJA guerrillas and 
their rivals.
(a) The_ Ma Lay Groups
The Malay resistance forces Askar Melayu Setia (AMS), which operated 
in north Perak and Kedah, and the Wataniah in Pahang, were separate and 
autonomous units under British Force 136 'control'. They had very few 
dealings with the MPAJA before the Japanese surrender, but soon afterwards 
antagonisms developed between the Malay guerrillas and the MPAJA over control 
of areas. Because the AMS was a smaller force than the MPAJA, its members 
sided with the KMT groups in Perak and in Kelantan. The MPAJA took the
field against some units of the AMS guerrillas and succeeded in breaking
, 74them up.
In Pahang, about 17 August, after learning about the Japanese surrender, 
the Wataniah guerrillas informed Force 136 that they feared Sultan Abu Bakar
71 R. Balan, Former MCP/MPAJA member. Interview, Kuala Lumpur, 
23 April 1973.
72 Chin Kee Onn, 202-03.
73 See Appendices B and C, below.
74 Edgar O'Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 62.
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of Pahang might fall into communist hands. In that event he would either 
be killed or forced to aid communist plans for a takeover of the State.
A radio message was sent to SEAC Headquarters advising them of the situation. 
A day or two after this, when the Sultan and his party arrived at the Ng 
Tiong Keat plantation on their way from Kuala Lipis to Pekan to collect 
food supplies, he was approached by six armed members of Force 136, three 
Americans and three Nationalist Chinese under the command of Lieutenant 
Betoise. After explaining the situation to the Sultan, Lieuteuant Betoise 
revealed that his orders, which had been radioed from Ceylon, were to take 
the whole party into the jungle and keep them in a place of safety.^
The next day the Japanese, who thought that the Sultan had been 
kidnapped by the communists, sent out regular troops to investigate.
They killed a number of innocent Chinese and caused the remainder of the 
estate workers in that area to flee into the jungle. In the meantime 
the Japanese posted notices in Malay claiming that the Sultan had been 
abducted and murdered by Chinese communists. Fearing that this would 
produce racial clashes, members of Wataniah under instruction from their 
headquarters followed the bill-posters around and tore down the inflammatory 
notices when no Japanese were in sight.
On 8 September Captain Dorrity of Force 136 arrived at the camp and
conducted the whole party to the main road, where Colonel Headley and a
detachment of Wataniah in full uniform were waiting to escort the Sultan
back to his capital. The Ruler, wearing a colonel’s uniform supplied by
Force 136, received a tumultous welcome in every town and village through
which he passed. The Wataniah, backed by Gurkha paratroops of Force 136,
then took over control of large areas of Pahang from the Japanese and
remained on the alert to frustrate any attempt by the MPAJA to seize control,
7 6until a detachment of regular troops was landed from destroyers at Kuantan.
It is probable that Force 136 did not allow the royal party to 
emerge until 8 September because the situation remained unsafe. Until 
that date, neither Force 136 or Wataniah was in a position to do much to
75 William Shaw, Tun Razak: His Life and Times, Kuala Lumpur, 1976, 53.
See also Haji Buyong Adil,Sejarah Pahang, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, 365, 
and Harry Miller, ’The Ruler who was Kidnapped', in The Straits Times, 
Singapore, 29 May 1957.
76 Ibid.
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check the MPAJA, which had entered Bentong, Raub, Kuala Lipis and Jerantut, 
the main towns in Pahang. Brigadier L.H.O. Pugh, sent to Pahang to take 
control of the State in September, found these towns virtually in the 
hands of the Chinese guerrillas of the MPAJA. In Raub they flew the 
hammer and sickle flag above the Union Jack. ’I refused to let them 
participate in the Victory Parade in the town unless the position of 
those flags were reversed,’ said Pugh. The communist flag soon fluttered 
below the Union Jack.^
Despite Wataniah's precipitate action in asking Force 136 to 
’kidnap’ the Sultan, there is no evidence that the MPAJA was inclined
to seize any Malay ruler anywhere Jn the country. However, the action
is important in showing the extent of Malay fears of a communist takeover.
Some time in early August the Malays in Kedah heard ominous
reports that on the day of surrender communist guerrillas would emerge •
from the jungle and take possession of Kedah towns and villages. It
was reported that they would draw the Japanese flags down and hoist their
own three—starred red emblems. A secret Malay political association
called Saberkas (Unity), which operated under the guise of a cooperative
store, decided to organise Malay youths to prevent Alor Star, the capital,
7 8or any Kedah town or village from falling into Chinese communist hands.
The leaders of Saberkajs were Tunku Abdul Rahman, who was then Superintendent 
of Education (later to be Malaysian Prime Minister) and his friends Mohamed 
Khir Johari and Senu Abdul Rahman (later to be his Ministerial colleagues).
A few days after, the MPAJA was reported to have taken over Kedah police
stations at Kepala Batas, Alor Janggus, Takai and Simpang Empat and seized 
79the weapons.
Saberkas members who had some contacts with the. MPAJA warned 
the latLer that there would be inter-racial trouble if the MPAJA guerrillas 
attempted to take over the capital. In some villages in Kedah communist 
units had begun to run affairs openly, which raised tensions between Malay
77 See Harry Miller, Menace in Malaya, 51.
78 See Harry Miller, Prince and Premier, 70-71. See also Baharuddin
Abdul Majir, ’Saberkas: Pergerakan dan perjuangannya (Saberkas:
the movement and its struggle), 1944-1946', B.A. Hons thesis, 
University of Malaya, 1975/76, 178-80.
79 Baharuddin, 178.
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and C h in e se  i n h a b i t a n t s .  Malays p r e p a r e d  f o r  c o u n t e r  a c t i o n .  Pa rangs  
( t h e  l o n g  Malay k n i v e s )  and axes  were s h a r p e n e d  i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n .  In  
A l o r  S t a r  i t s e l f  members o f  t h e  C h inese  Chamber o f  Commerce, a p p a r e n t l y  
members o f  t h e  MPAJU, were r e p o r t e d  t o  have  wa lked  i n t o  t h e  p o l i c e  s t a t i o n  
and s a i d  t h a t  t h e y  would t a k e  o v e r  c o n t r o l .  Tunku Abdul  Rahman r u s h e d  
to  t h e  s t a t i o n .
He [ the  Tunku] found Malays m i l l i n g  o u t s i d e .  He s t o o d  
on a t a b l e  and u r g e d  them t o  keep calm.  I n s i d e  the  
s t a t i o n  he found some e x t r e m e l y  w o r r i e d  C h in e s e .  T h e i r  
a u d a c i t y ,  b r a s h n e s s ,  and a r r o g a n c e  had  been  p r i c k e d  l i k e  
a b a l l o o n .  They a s k e d  f o r  a s s i s t a n c e  to  g e t  home s a f e l y .
They were  g i v e n  s a f e  c o n d u c t ,  and th e  im m edia te  t h r e a t  
o f  r a c i a l  t r o u b l e s  i h  A lo r  S t a r  d i s a p p e a r e d . 80
S a b e rk a s  a l s o  c o n t a c t e d  t h e  AMS g u e r r i l l a s  unde r  Fo rce  136
command i n  Kua la  Berang  i n  n o r t h  Kedah, and u rged  them t o  e n t e r  A lo r  S t a r
q u i c k l y  to  f o r e s t a l l  t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  e n t r y  o f  MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s .  The l o c a l
J a p a n e s e  g a r r i s o n  commander was a l s o  i n fo r m e d .  J a p a n e s e  t r o o p s  were s e n t
from J i t r a ,  f rom where t h e  communist  t r o o p s  were r e p o r t e d  r e a d y  to  s t a r t
t h e i r  t r i u m p h a n t  march t o  A l o r  S t a r .  The J a p a n e s e  took  up p o s i t i o n s ,
b u t  a g e n t s  were s a i d  t o  have  r e p o r t e d  back  t o  t h e  communis t s ,  who c a n c e l l e d
t h e i r  march.  When Force  136 o f f i c e r s  and AMS g u e r r i l l a s  a r r i v e d  a t  A lo r
S t a r  the  Kedah f l a g  was f l y i n g  from t h e  m as thead  o u t s i d e  t h e  B a l a i
B e s a r ,  t h e  r o y a l  a u d i e n c e  h a l l  i n  t h e  h e a r t  o f  t h e  c a p i t a l .  I t  had been
h o i s t e d  by S a b e r k a s y o u t h s  who had armed t h e m s e lv e s  w i t h  wooden s t a v e s
81and s t o o d  gua rd  a round  t h e  b u i l d i n g .
The Malays a p p e a r  to  have  beeil f u l l y  a l e r t  t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  a C h inese  o r  MPAJA/communist t a k e o v e r  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  -  an e v e n t  which  
they  were d e t e r m i n e d  t o  p r e v e n t .  While  t a k e o v e r s  o f  p r e d o m i n a n t ly  
Chinese  towns and v i l l a g e s  went  o f f  w i t h  l i t t l e  t r o u b l e ,  t a k e o v e r s  o f  
l a r g e l y  Malay a r e a s  p roduced  i n t e r - r a c i a l  c o n f l i c t s ,  e . g . ,  i n  the  d i s t r i c t s  
o f  s o u t h - w e s t e r n  J o h o r  and th e  Sunga i  Manik d i s t r i c t  o f  Lower P e r a k .
In each  c a s e  t h e  MPAJA t a k e o v e r  was opposed  by Malays and l e d  to  Malays 
a t t a c k i n g  C h in e s e .  The i n t e r - r a c i a l  c o n f l i c t s  i n  s o u t h - w e s t e r n  J o h o r  were 
more e x t e n s i v e  and s t a r t e d  e a r l i e r  than  t h e  Sungai  Manik c o n f l i c t s .  Both 
i n c i d e n t s  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  i n  C h a p t e r  V I I .
80 M i l l e r ,  72-73.
81 I b i d .
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(b ) The  C h inese  S e c r e t  S o c i e t i e s ,  KMT G u e r r i l l a s  and B a n d i t  Gangs
Th is  was a t ime when th e  p i s t o l  and k n i f e  r e i g n e d .  While  the  MPAJA 
p la y e d  t h e  r o l e  of  h e r o e s  in  many p l a c e s ,  t h e i r  a r r o g a n t  and r u t h l e s s  
b e h a v i o u r  a l s o  a n t a g o n i s e d  many pe o p le  who t u r n e d  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n  to  o t h e r  
g r o u p s ,  such  as  the  Chinese  s e c r e t  s o c i e t i e s .  In  t im e s  o f  c r i s i s  such  
as  t h e  p o s t - s u r r e n d e r  i n t e r r e g n u m ,  p e o p le  were c o n c e r n e d  on ly  w i t h  
s u r v i v a l  and w i t h  o b t a i n i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  f,rom any group c o n s i d e r e d  s t r o n g  
and w i l l i n g  to  p r o t e c t  them. With rumours  o f  a J a p a n e s e  s u r r e n d e r  
s u r f a c i n g  i n  e a r l y  August  1945,  n o t  o n l y  c o l l a b o r a t o r s  had  r e a s o n  
to  f e a r  t h e  vengeance  o f  t h e  MPAJA b u t  a l s o  anyone p o l i t i c a l l y  opposed  
t o  a communist  r eg im e .
In P e r a k ,  a t  l e a s t ,  a l l  t h e s e  e l e m e n t s  combined t o  t u r n  many p e o p le
to  t h e  T r i a d  s o c i e t i e s ,  o f  which th e  Ang Bin Hoey was t h e  most  p r o m i n e n t .
S h o r t l y  b e f o r e  t h e  J a p a n e s e  s u r r e n d e r ,  when MPAJA r e t r i b u t i o n  i n  t h e s e
a r e a s  seemed im m in en t ,  t h e  Ang Bin Hoey members were s a i d  t o  have r e c e i v e d
s e c r e t  p e r m i s s i o n  from the  J a p a n e s e  o f f i c e r  in  c h a rg e  o f  Kuala  Kurau
,  . 82
d i s t r i c t ,  t o  o r g a n i s e  a l l  T r i a d  e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  a r e a  f o r  m u tua l  p r o t e c t i o n .
Seven b a g a n s ( e s t u a r i n e  f i s h i n g  v i l l a g e s )  were o r g a n i s e d  w i t h  t h e  h e a d q u a r t e r s ,
t h e  Ang Bun Tua K ongs i ,  c o v e r i n g  and c o n t r o l l i n g  th e  whole a r e a  from
P r o v i n c e  W e l l e s l e y  to  P a t a n i  Remis.  New members j o i n i n g  the  Hoey a t
t h i s  t ime were in fo rm e d  t h a t  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  the  s o c i e t y  was p r o t e c t i o n
from ’ i n v a s i o n '  by t h e  communist s .  S u p p o r t  came to o  from Penang T r i a d
members who had t a k e n  r e f u g e  i n  K r i an  and L a r u t  d u r i n g  th e  O c c u p a t i o n ,
and from t h e  Kwangsai  gangs i n  the  Kuala  Kangsar  h i l l s .  Arms were o b t a i n e d
( p o s s i b l y  a t  Simpang) f rom s t o c k s  which t h e  J a p a n e s e  r a p i d l y  c o n s o l i d a t e d
a f t e r  t h e  s u r r e n d e r ,  and were d i s t r i b u t e d  to  T r i a d  groups  i n  e v e r y  c o a s t a l
v i l l a g e .  Some, however ,  a l s o  f i l t e r e d  th ro u g h  t o  t h e  n e a r b y  communist ,
83
s y m p a t h i z e r s  a t  Selama from t h e i r  c o n t a c t  i n  Kuala  Kurau.
In a d d i t o n  to  C h i n e s e ,  some one h u n d red  M a la ys ,  m a in ly  B a n j a r e s e  
w i t h  a r e p u t a t i o n  f o r  b e l l i g e r e n c y ,  were r e c r u i t e d  from t h e  d i s t r i c t  
be tween  Kua la  Kurau and Tanjong  P ia n d a n g .  The Malays who j o i n e d  t h e  
s o c i e t i e s  d i d  so f o r  m utua l  p r o t e c t i o n ,  l a t e r  e x t e n d e d  to  i n c l u d e  p r o t e c t i o n
82 W.L. B l y t h e ,  The Impact  o f  C h inese  S e c r e t  S o c i e t i e s  i n  M a la y a , 
London,  1968,  229-32 .
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250
f rom the  MPAJA. They underw ent  a s p e c i a l  form o f  i n i t i a t i o n  ceremony,  
such  as  s w e a r i n g  on t h e  K o r a n . ^
When t h e  J a p a n e s e  s u r r e n d e r  was c o n f i r m e d ,  t h e  MPAJA u n i t s  s u rg e d
o u t  o f  t h e  j u n g l e  to  t a k e  o v e r  c o n t r o l  o f  v a r i o u s  a r e a s  i n  P e r a k ,  b u t
were opposed  by th e  Chinese  s e c r e t  s o c i e t i e s ,  t h e  OCAJA g u e r r i l l a s  and t h e
Kwongsai  b a n d i t  gangs .  The MPAJA f o r c e s  f rom S i t i a w a n  took  o v e r  t h e
o u t s k i r t s  o f  T a i p i n g  as the  c e n t r e  o f  c o n t r o l  f o r ' L a r u t ,  and o t h e r  t r o o p s
from Selama made Bagan S e r a i  t h e i r  h e a d q u a r t e r s  f o r  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  K r i a n .
These o p e r a t i o n s  were a c c o m p l i s h e d  w i t h o u t  d i f f i c u l t y ,  b u t  t h e  MPAJA
were n o t  a lo n e  i n  t h e  f i e l d ,  f o r  t h e i r  r i v a l s ,  t h e  OCAJA g u e r r i l l a s ,
a l s o  came s w i f t l y  down from Lenggong and e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e m s e lv e s  i n  Kua la
K a n g s a r ,  where t h e y  were r e i n f o r c e d  by Kwongsai  gangs who had a l s o  s p e n t
85the  o c c u p a t i o n  i n  t h e  h i l l s  i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t .
There  a r e  some i n d i c a t i o n s  o f  armed c l a s h e s  be tw een  t h e  two g r o u p s ,  
as  t h e  MPAJA a t t e m p t e d  u n s u c c e s s f u l l y  t o  d i s a r m  t h e  OCAJA. Moreover ,  
when t h e  MPAJA a t t e m p t e d  t o  e x t e n d  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  t o  t h e  f i s h i n g  v i l l a g e s  
o f  the  P e rak  c o a s t  they  were met  w i t h  armed o p p o s i t i o n  from
t h e  Ang Bin Hoey. At Kua la  Kurau ,  where  t h e i r  s u g g e s t i o n  
t h a t  the  Hoey s h o u l d  c o o p e r a t e  i n  s e t t i n g  up a communist  government  was 
r e j e c t e d ,  and where the  T r i a d s  r e f u s e d  t o  hand o v e r  t h e i r  a rm s ,  two T r i a d  
members -  t h e  l e a d i n g  Chinese  t r a d e r  o f  t h e  v i l l a g e  and h i s  b r o t h e r  -  
were a r r e s t e d  and t a k e n  t o  Bagan S e r a i ,  and t h e i r  shop l o o t e d .  T h e i r  
p r o s p e r i t y  unde r  t h e  J a p a n e s e  had  made them o b v io u s  t a r g e t s .  They were 
s u b s e q u e n t l y  r e l e a s e d  in  exchange  f o r  a p r o m in e n t  MPAJA l e a d e r  c a p t u r e d  
by the  Ang Bin Hoey n e a r  T r o n g . ^
The f i g h t i n g  was i n t e n s e ,  b u t  e v e n t u a l l y  MPAJA t r o o p s  p r e v a i l e d .
A f t e r  a r r i v i n g  i n  Malaya ,  B r i t i s h  t r o o p s  s t o p p e d  th e  f i g h t i n g ,  a r r e s t e d  
T r i a d  members and d i sa rm e d  some MPAJA u n i t s .  B l y t h e  g i v e s  a d r a m a t i c  
a c c o u n t  of  t h e  f i g h t i n g :
Both s i d e s  began an armed f i g h t  f o r  c o n t r o l .  S e v e r a l  
s e v e r e  c l a s h e s  took  p l a c e  a t  Kuala  Kurau ,  i n  one o f  which 
some t e n  MPAJA men were k i l l e d ,  and a la rm e d  a t  p r o b a b l e
84 I b i d .  , 229-32 .
85 I b i d . , 232.
86 I b i d .
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r e t r i b u t i o n  b o th  from t h e  MPAJA and t h e  r e t u r n i n g  
B r i t i s h ,  a b o u t  100 T r i a d  members , i n c l u d i n g  many 
who had t a k e n  r e f u g e  d u r i n g  t h e  o c c u p a t i o n ,  f l e d  
to  P e n a n g . . .  At Kuala  Gula a young l e a d e r ,  Tan 
Leng Lay,  p roved  a f i e r c e  f i g h t e r ,  and from P o r t  
Weld t h e  T r i a d  v e t e r a n ,  Yeoh Ah Bah,  drove  the  
communists  o u t  o f  Matang and back  to  T a i p i n g .
F u r t h e r  s o u t h  a g a i n  f i e r c e  f i g h t i n g  took p l a c e  i n  
t h e  Trong a r e a ,  where some o f  t h e  MPAJU a r e  s a i d  
to  have  been  a t t a c k e d  by T r i a d  members w i t h  n ib o n g  
s p e a r s .  E v e n t u a l l y ,  how ever ,  t h e  MPAJA groups  
p r e v a i l e d ,  and t h e  T r i a d  f i g h t e r s  took  r e f u g e  in  
t h e  i n a c c e s s i b l e  swamps o f  P a s i r  H i tam , where t h e y  
were j o i n e d  by KMT g u e r r i l l a s .  Throughout  September  
the  s t r u g g l e  c o n t i n u e d ,  and as  l a t e  as  the  28 th  
two b o a t l o a d s  o f  wounded T r i a d  men s a i l e d  a c r o s s  to  
Penang  I s l a n d  to  s e e k  s u c c o u r  f rom t h e i r  B r e t h r e n .
On t h e  e a s t  c o a s t  o f  Malaya a f o r c e  o f  170 KMT g u e r r i l l a s  who had been
c o n f i n e d  to  t h e  Thai  b o r d e r  by Force  136,  f o l l o w i n g  c l a s h e s  w i t h  t h e
MPAJA i n  e a r l y  1945,  were now a b l e  to  e n t e r  and occupy Kota Bharu ,  t h e
c a p i t a l  o f  K e l a n t a n .  Fo r  s e v e r a l  weeks th e y  were b e s i e g e d  by a b o u t  150
MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  from a b a s e  i n  T rengganu .  A t r u c e  was e v e n t u a l l y
e s t a b l i s h e d  by a Force  136 o f f i c e r ,  C o l o n e l  H e a d le y ,  who r e q u e s t e d  t h e
MPAJA to  remain  in  Trengganu .  On 21 Sep tem ber  t h e  KMT g u e r r i l l a  l e a d e r s
met and a g r e e d  to  hand o v e r  a l l  p r i s o n e r s  a r r e s t e d  by them and to  work
88in  t h e  f u t u r e  w i th  the  p o l i c e  unde r  o r d e r s  o f  t h e  BMA. One a c c o u n t ,
a l t h o u g h  m i s t a k i n g  the  C h inese  KMT g u e r r i l l a s  i n  Kota  Bharu f o r  t h o s e
o f  t h e  MPAJA, d e s c r i b e s  what  had happened :
In Kota B h a r u . . . t h e  C h ine se  g u e r r i l l a s  o c c u p ie d  the  
town and p r o c l a im e d  th e m s e lv e s  m a s t e r s .  They 
t e r r o r i z e d  t h e  l o c a l  p e o p l e s ,  robbed  them, and 
l o o t e d  t h e i r  homes. They p u t  up road  b l o c k s ,  examined 
e v e r y  v e h i c l e  and a l l  p a s s e n g e r s  and s to p p e d  e v e r y  
p e d e s t r i a n .  They e x a c t e d  a t o l l  and a s a l u t e .  Only 
f i rm  h a n d l i n g  by B r i t i s h  f o r c e s  when Lliey a r r i v e d  pu t  
an end to  MPAJA t e r r o r i s m . ^
87 I b i d .
88 ALFSEA, Weekly I n t e l l i g e n c e  Summary N o .99,  10 O c to b e r  1945,  
i n  WO 1 7 2 /1 7 8 7 .
89 M i l l e r ,  Menace in  M a la y a , 51.
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Bandit gangs were also rampant after the surrender. They claimed
to be 'Anti-Japanese Armies', but in fact used the 'Anti-Japanese Army'
cloak to rob, extort and intimidate the public. One example was a group
of lawless Chinese elements who operated at Ampang, a Chinese settlement
about eight miles from Kuala Lumpur. During the Japanese occupation
members terrorised the inhabitants of Ampang with their robberies, extortions
and ruthless murders. The gang was heavily armed. In 1944, following
complaints from the local inhabitants, the MPAJA started a drive to
exterminate the gang. After Japanese surrender the gang became aware of
the change of circumstances and started to call itself the 'Kee Tong
guerrillas' (Kee Tong in the Hokkien dialect meaning Public Service).
At the same time the gang sent representatives to negotiate with the
MPAJA who, thinking it had turned over a new leaf, accepted its cooperation.
Members were sent to guard a police station and to help maintain peace
and order before the arrival of British troops. Instead, they used
the 'MPAJA cloak' to their advantage to carry out further criminal
activities. Later the MPAJA was forced to disband the gang and helped
90the British police to take its leaders into custody.
Roving bandit gangs also operated in more remote and isolated areas.
They usually picked Chinese squatter settlements existing along the jungle
fringe. An eye-witness account of one of these roving bands in Pahang
shows how they would descend suddenly on farming communities:
I was about 10 years old when the war ended. My father, 
uncle and elder brothers had been butchers in Kuantan, 
but we fled to open a farm near the jungle fringe. We 
supported the MPAJA because they had saved one of our 
relatives from the Japanese. The family fled into hiding 
because it was feared that the Japanese would round up 
everyone of the family.
Our farm was among four farms in the area. Since the 
Japanese surrender became known, there were a lot of 
trouble-makers roaming the countryside, robbing and 
killing. One day, just after the surrender, the MPAJA 
unit in our area headed by my uncle had just left our 
house after their meals. Probably about 15 minutes had 
elapsed, when suddenly we saw about seven or eight 
armed men entering the path leading to our hut. We did 
not recognise these men. My mother quickly herded us
90 The story is told by Tan Tai Tee, deputy commander of the First
Regiment, MPAJA, in Sin Min Chu (New Democracy), Singapore, 17.10.45.
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children into the hut and bolted the door.
The men surrounded the hut. A thin bearded man holding 
a gun knocked at the door, asking to be allowed in.
My mother said there were only women and children in 
the house and asked them not to bother us. They said 
they were Anti-Japanese people. They needed food and 
money, as they were hungry, otherwise they threatened 
to confiscate our pigs, poultry and vegetables, and 
even burn our hut down. We were terrified. This was 
not the talk of the MPAJA who were always respectful 
to the people and would pay for the things they bought. 
My grandmother tearfully appealed to them to spare our 
lives. They kept throwing their bodies against the 
door to break it down. Suddenly, there was some 
commotion outside and shots were fired. The firing went 
on for some time. Finally, the armed men withdrew, and 
I saw my elder brother and the MPAJA men outside the 
house. They had returned in time to save us from the 
bandits. The bandits had been able to inflict some 
injuries on the MPAJA men before fleeing but one of them 
was shot and captured. He was immediately executed by 
the MPAJA.91
Pattern of MPAJA takeovers
Broadly, the MPAJA takeovers followed two patterns. Areas 
vacated by the Japanese would be entered immediately by a column of 
uniformed guerrillas marching down the main street under triumphal arches 
erected by supporters to welcome them. The MPAJA units were always 
greeted by the Chinese population with 'enthusiasm. There was clearly 
Chinese admiration for their endurance in facing the rigours of jungle 
life and resisting the Japanese. However, areas still under Japanese 
occupation did not provide such easy glory. They involved Japanese 
resistance, so that the guerrillas had first to attack and overrun Japanese 
military or police posts. It is conceivable that in some instances small 
detachments of Japanese troops under siege handed over their posts to the 
MPAJA without a skirmish, after negotiating a safe withdrawal from the 
area, but there is little evidence to indicate this. If Japanese troops 
were deployed in strength in an area, such as Ipoh and Taiping, the 
MPAJA would not attack. Their usual tactic was to infiltrate behind
91 Albert S.P. Lim, a lawyer. Interview, London, April 1976.
254
Japanese positions and carry out sabotage missions and looting of Army 
stores and arms depots. Probably because of the increasing scale of 
these attacks, the Japanese were forced to accelerate withdrawal of 
their forces from many areas.
In both categories of takeovers, the first site to be occupied 
was usually the police station. There were many reported instances of 
police stations being seized, ransacked and burnt down. Where the 
Japanese had evacuated, the remaining Malay and Sikh policemen would either 
run away or barricade themselves inside the police stations or quarters.
They were often 'fair game', the first victims of revenge meted out by 
guerrillas to collaborators. If policemen did not surrender, their police 
station would be attacked. If they gave themselves up without a fight, 
they would be disarmed, victimized or killed. In big towns, such as Ipoh, 
Taiping and Seremban, Japanese troops confined themselves to barracks 
in the last few days preceding arrival of British forces in September, and 
and local policemen too barricaded themselves within the Police 
Headquarters, usually a large fortress-like building.
The treatment meted out to policemen, detectives, Kempeitai 
informers and profiteers began what became known as the 'reign of terror'.92 
Actions of the guerrillas encouraged people in general to take the law 
into their own hands. Many began to settle old scores, some even dating 
back to before the war. In fact anyone accused of profiteering, causing 
harm or death to people,robbery or rape was liable to be abducted, dragged 
out into the streets and given a 'people's trial'. Many were summarily 
executed. liiere were also reported instances of mob violence. Mobs 
would vent their anger on the victims as they were paraded in the streets.
The hands of the victims would be tied behind their backs, or their hands 
and legs would be tied up and strung over a pole. Then, either in the 
face of persistent demands from the crowd, or in response to a MPAJA 
command, the victim would be made to kneel. The trial commenced immediately. 
This was an opportunity for those with any grievances to hurl allegations 
at the victim. When the crowd or the MPAJA had had enough of the tirade,
92 See Hamzah bin Mohamcd, 'The Fourteen Days of Terror: Before,
During and After', B.A. Hons thesis, University of Malaya, 1969/70.
255
someone would yell out for the death sentence. The victim would either 
be spirited away to be shot, or, more commonly, killed on the spot, in a 
most callous and brutal manner. Shooting the victim was often rejected 
by the crowd as being too simple and painless a way to die. Every hideous 
form of torture imaginable would be tried out - beating with sticks, iron 
rods or any sharp objects, bayonetting, stabbing, and finally mutilation 
or decapitation. Victims cried out in agony, and sometimes the ritual 
continued even after life had been extinguished. The process of mutilation 
would continue - eyes would be gouged out, genitals cut off, the lower body 
disembowelled.
Often it was not the guerrillas themselves but those with the 
most grievances against the victim who perpetrated these acts. Public 
approval seems to have been quite commonplace, as this contemporary 
account shows:
The most gruesome part of the ’Communist* programme was 
the cleaning up of traitors and running dogs. Those 
of the informers, detectives, blackmailers, sub-inspectors, 
sergeants, and 'third-degree-experts' who failed to 
’disappear’, were combed out. The ’hill-people' had 
agents in all railway stations, border towns and boundary 
posts, and, many informers and detectives attempting 
to escape, were caught. They were given a 'trial'.
Village headmen and peoples’ representatives were present 
at the trials, and according to people who had witnessed 
these assizes, they were 'democratic and fair'.
When the verdict was Guilty of Death!* the convicted 
were cold-bloodedly executed in public. In certain 
places in Selangor and Perak, certain 'condemned dogs' 
were put into pigs' cages, carried round the town, and 
then butchered before the crowds. Indian and Malay 
Communists had also participated in such executions, 
and what is significant is that the crowds condoned 
the vengeance of the 'Communists'! Even the slaughter 
of mistresses of the Japanese, especially MP's 
paramours, received public approval. Such was public 
hatred against the 'oppressors of the people'.
Where the verdict was 'Guilty, but not amounting to 
death , the convicted people were put through varying 
dogroes nnd forms of punishment. In the case of 
policemen and detectives, they were given the third- 
degree, just as they had meted it out to others. It 
was nothing short of 'An eye for an eye, and a tooth 
for a tooth.'93
93 Chin Kce Onn, 203-04 .
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Many British who had lived with the MPAJA guerrillas in the jungle had
already seen tortures carried out on traitors or offenders. They had
considered these practices both revoltingly cruel and unnecessary.
Often the traitors and informers caught deserved to be punished by death,
as they had brought death and suffering to many people. But the MPAJA
turned the execution into an elaborate exhibition of terror to serve as
94warning to future offenders.
At Titi, a small town in the Jelebu district of Negri Sembilan,
soon after Japanese troops had withdrawn, some ten, pale, rough-looking
Chinese MPAJA guerrillas appeared in the main street of the town. All
were armed with machine-guns and rifles. They immediately went into
the homes of three Chinese detectives, dragged them out to an open space
95and bayonetted them to death. Revenge was the dominant theme of the
new government during its first week of control. For several days no
one was allowed to leave Titi. In the meantime public notices in Chinese
were issued, asking people to report complaints against Japanese
collaborators to the MPAJA. A few days later a ’public court' was held
on the same spot where the detectives were killed. Eight prisoners, tied
from hand to foot, were carried from their place of captivity suspended
from a pole. They were made to kneel before the crowd.
The embittered ones began to rush forth to the accused and 
kicked and spat at them for the 'crimes' done. One by one, 
the accused were pushed forward and each person's 'crimes'
(ranging from blackmail to false accusations of residents 
resulting in their imprisonment or death) read out aloud 
with the final question: 'Does this man deserve death?'
Eye-witness informants said that the crowd present was in 
such a revengeful mood that everybody shouted out 'Death 
sentence, death sentence' to every one of the prisoners.
Each was bayonetted to death and the victims 'squealed 
like pigs being slaughtered'.^
At Fraser's Hill, in the Pahang highlands, well-known as a holiday 
resort, three Sikh policemen were abducted in the night and killed, after 
the MPAJA guerrillas had entered the town. The Sikhs and Malay policemen
94 Thatcher and Cross, Pai Naa, 158-59; Chapman, 316-30.
95 Lawrence Siaw, 'A local history of the Chinese community in Titi, 
Malaysia, 1.870-1960', Ph.D thesis, Monash University, 1975 , 158-59.
96 Ibid.
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had barricaded themselves in the premises of the police station soon 
after the Japanese troops had left in the morning, about 22 or 23 August.
A few hours later the MPAJA guerrillas, some ten or fifteen in number, 
men and women, armed, gaunt, lean and deathly-looking, stalked into the 
town. They surrounded the police station but did not attack it straightaway. 
They ordered the policemen to come out. The policemen inside were so 
terrified that none dared fire a shot. Instead they cried out for mercy.
A few shots were then fired into the police station, followed by an 
announcement from the guerrillas: 'We only want the three Sikh policemen'.
The three Sikhs were alleged to have been brutal in their treatment of 
the local population during the Japanese occupation. Once the targets 
had been identified, the Malay policemen quickly extricated themselves 
from the premises and made good their escape, abandoning the Sikhs to 
their fate. That night, after having waited long enough to scare the life 
out of the three men, the guerrillas walked into the premises, and escorted 
them away. Their mutilated bodies were hung outside the building next 
morning - a macabre sight to the residents of the little town.9?
At Bidor, a town on the main north-south highway in Perak,
immediately after the Japanese had evacuated, the MPAJA guerrillas marched
into the town to the tumultuous cheers of the Chinese population. The
police station was occupied, many of the Malay policemen killed and the
MPAJA's three-starred emblem flown beside the Communist Party's hammer
and sickle flag atop the police station and other buildings. Among local
residents arrested was a communist supporter accused of being a profiteer.
An informant described how this incident occurred:
I was nine years old when the war ended, but I still 
remember vividly what happened in Bidor. I don't think 
I can ever forget the incident. Seif-confident and 
overbearing, the MPAJA guerrillas swaggered about the 
town. Most of the time, they were marching and drilling, 
in response to orders being shouted at them by their 
commanders. A middle-aged woman, the wife of a Kempeitai 
informer, was tied to a lamp-post. Other men and women, 
believed to be informers and police detectives, were 
being paraded around the town, with their hands tied 
behind their backs. I did not see the woman, or the 
other prisoners killed. But I learnt later they were 
killed in a most horrifying manner. Some people pushed
97 H.C. Cheah, interview.
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me out of the way and advised me to go home, 'Children 
should not see these things.'
Later, my father, a proprietor of a provisions shop, was 
also arrested. He was taken away from our house. The 
guerrillas accused him of being 'a capitalist who had 
harmed the people'. Someone had given false information 
against my father. Fortunately, one of our relatives 
was a communist. He immediately spoke to an official 
in the local communist party, and explained that though 
my father was a shopkeeper, he had secretly contributed 
money and food to the resistance movement. The 
guerrillas who arrested him were from another district.
There were witnesses to vouch for my father's record.
The intervention was timely. We thought my father had 
already been executed. But he was freed, and told to 
reform his capitalist attitudes. He was badly shaken when 
he came home.^8
Unlike this informant's father, other Chinese who went through 
a similar experience of walking to the brink of death 'turned over a new 
leaf' and became communist activists. This was what happened to Osman 
China who, though born a Chinese, was reared by a Malay family. He regarded 
himself as a Malay. He rose to become the MCP's chief propagandist in 
the Malay language in Pahang until his surrender to British security forces 
in 1955. This is how he recalled the incident when his life was spared 
during the interregnum:
...when the Japanese surrendered I was working in a 
Japanese office in Kuala Trengganu. I was only 
seventeen years old. 1 was arrested by the communist 
guerrillas and taken with two others into the jungle.
Here we were told that we were Japanese collaborators 
and had been sentenced to death. We were led away from 
the camp and told to dig pur own graves. The other 
two were shot and I, very much shaken, was led back to 
the camp. liiere I was told that I had been spared and 
that if I studied hard and cooperated I would be let 
off, if I refused I would be shot. I was kept in the 
jungle from September 1945 until January 1947 when I 
was led out of the jungle and given a job in the General 
Labour Union offices in Kuantan.99
98 Soong Mun Wai, a librarian, University of Malaya. Interview, Kuala 
Lumpur, January 1977.
99 See Osman China's story in J.B. Perry Robinson, Transformation in 
Malaya, London, 1956, 158.
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Malay stories of the MPAJA’s harsh treatment to Malay policemen, 
detectives, informers and other collaborators were also common. The 
effects of these actions on Malay-Chinese relations will be discussed more 
fully in the next chapter. They all paint the same picture: the MPAJA
guerrillas, or the Bintang Tiga as they were called by the Malays, had 
got in two or three weeks ahead of the BMA and had made the most of their 
opportunity to pay off old accounts. The Malays in Jelebu (Negri Sembilan) 
saw the post-surrender interregnum as 'fifteen days of terror in which the 
communists paid off some of the scores of the Occupation. These two weeks 
under the Three Stars seem to have frightened the Malays more than the 
whole period of Japanese rule.'"^^
At Temerloh, a predominantly Malay rural town in Pahang, Ishak 
Haji Mohammed, a member of the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM), was an eye­
witness to the MPAJA guerrillas' high-handed behaviour. Although he was 
to become active in the Socialist movement after the war and be detained 
by the British for alleged pro-communist activities, Ishak never forgot 
nor forgave what the Chinese MPAJA guerrillas did in his kampung.
After the Japanese forces pulled out, about twenty MPAJA guerrillas 
emerged in Temerloh. Their intention was not merely to mark the Allied 
victory over Japan, said Ishak, but 'to show off their Chinese chauvinism'. 
Soon they led a predominantly Chinese procession through the town. Several 
Chinese carried aloft a roast pig, 'whose sight is repugnant to the eyes 
of the Muslim Malays, who are forbidden by their religion to touch or 
eat it.' There were also several Chinese banners and slogans, and smoking 
joss-sticks to celebrate the event.
After the MPAJA had taken over the reins of local government 
they began arresting a number of Malays and Indians on a variety of charges, 
some considered by the Malays to be extremely petty, such as non-settlement 
of small debts owed to Chinese small traders. Those arrested were detained 
at Temerloh police station. Some were tried, tortured and executed.
Ishak recalls:
100 M.G. Swift, Malay Peasant Society in Jelebu, London, 1965, 85.
101 See article 'Kenangan Hidup Pak Sako' (Memories of Ishak Haji 
Mohamed), No.33, in the weekly Mlngguan Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 
15 August 1976.
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W ith in  t h o s e  seven  days the  l o c k - u p  a t  Temerloh p o l i c e  
s t a t i o n ,  where I  was bo rn  and b r o u g h t  up ,  was f u l l  
o f  Malays and I n d i a n s .  Pak Uda Kia had  been  a r r e s t e d .
Usup Kampar was t h e r e  t o o .  So was Alun ,  the  e l e p h a n t  
h u n t e r  ( h i s  r e a l  name was Harun)  . 102
I s h a k  and o t h e r  Malays i n  t h e  town c o u ld  no l o n g e r  en d u re  what  they
r e g a r d e d  as  t h e  MPAJA's ’ i n j u s t i c e  and c r u e l t i e s ’ . They d e c id e d  to  a c t .
A l a r g e  crowd o f  Malays g a t h e r e d  and marched to  t h e  p o l i c e  s t a t i o n .  T h e r e ,
t o  t h e i r  s u r p r i s e ,  they  were a b l e  t o  g a i n  e n t r y  to  t h e  p o l i c e  s t a t i o n
w i t h o u t  o p p o s i t i o n ,  and s u c c e e d e d  i n  f r e e i n g  e v e r y  one o f  t h e  p r i s o n e r s .
Next day ,  I s h a k  was c a l l e d  by t h e  l o c a l  commander o f  the  MPAJA
to  h i s  o f f i c e .  I s h a k  s u s p e c t e d  a t r a p  t o  k i l l  him b u t  went  n o n e t h e l e s s .
He was asked  t o  e x p l a i n  why he had  o r g a n i s e d  the  p r o c e s s i o n .  I s h a k  r e p l i e d
t h a t  the  MPAJA was n o t  o n ly  c h a u v i n i s t i c a l l y  C h i n e s e ,  b u t  a l s o  u n j u s t
and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  to  the  o t h e r  r a c e s .  I s h a k  s a i d  t h a t  he had r e a d  an
MPAJA n e w s l e t t e r  which u r g e d  M alays ,  C h inese  and I n d i a n s  to  r e g a r d
t h e m s e lv e s  as  b r o t h e r s  and s i s t e r s ,  y e t  why had t h e  MPAJA on ly  a r r e s t e d
Malays and I n d i a n s  and t o r t u r e d  them? Why had t h e  MPAJA s i d e d  w i t h  t h e
C hinese  t r a d e r s ?  The l o c a l  commander, an E n g l i s h - e d u c a t e d  C h inese  who
spoke  Malay,  a p o l o g i s e d  f o r  what  had h a ppe ned .  He s a i d  t h a t  the  a r r e s t s
had been c a r r i e d  o u t  a t  t h e  i n s t i g a t i o n  o f  e l d e r l y  C h inese  who were i n
f a c t  ' i m b e c i l e s  and c h a u v i n i s t s ’ . He hoped t h e  m a t t e r  c o u ld  be s e t t l e d
w i t h  a f e a s t ,  t owards  which th e  MPAJA would c o n t r i b u t e  s e ven  b u f f a l o e s .
The o b j e c t i v e  would be to  promote i n t e r - r a c i a l  good w i l l  and s o l i d a r i t y .
The c e l e b r a t i o n  was h e l d ,  a t t e n d e d  by a l a r g e  number o f  M alays ,  b u t
I s h a k  h i m s e l f  b o y c o t t e d  t h e  f u n c t i o n ,  as  he s t i l l  f e l t  v e ry  b i t t e r  o v e r
t h e  i n c i d e n t .  A Malay h i s t o r i a n ' s  s u r v e y  o f  t h e  MPAJA's ' r e i g n  o f
t e r r o r '  sums up the  Malay memory o f  t h i s  p e r i o d :
W i th in  t h o s e  two w e e ks ,  the  B i n t a n g  T ig a  g u e r r i l l a s  had 
t a k e n  p r i s o n e r s ,  t r i e d ,  s e n t e n c e d  and murdered  anyone 
they  s u s p e c t e d  o f  b e i n g  J a p a n e s e  s u p p o r t e r s  o r  l a c k e y s .
W ith in  t h a t  p e r i o d  many M alays ,  I n d i a n s ,  E u r a s i a n s ,
C h inese  and o t h e r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  members o f  t h e  p o l i c e  f o r c e ,  
were t a k e n  away and k i l l e d  by t h e  MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  i n  a 
c o l d - b l o o d e d  and c r u e l  m a n n e r . . .  The Malay S t a t e s  and
102 I b i d .
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t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  were under  an inhuman reg im e .
There  were no l o n g e r  any p r o p e r  laws and human l i v e s  
no l o n g e r  had any v a l u e .
The MPAJA ' s y s t e m  of  g o v e rn m e n t*
A f t e r  t a k i n g  o v e r  an a r e a ,  the  communist  g u e r r i l l a s '  f i r s t
p r e o c c u p a t i o n  was to  ' a d m i n i s t e r  j u s t i c e ' .  Only a f t e r  t h i s  had been  done
were ' P e o p l e ' s  Com m it tees '  s e t  up and t h e  r e i n s  o f  l o c a l  government  t a k e n
o v e r  by th e  Communist P a r t y .  The communist  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  were g iven
d i f f e r e n t  names.  In  Muar and Ba tu  P a h a t  they  were known as  ' S o v i e t s ' ,
w h i l e  a t  T i t i  i n  N e g r i  Sembilan and o t h e r  towns th e y  were s im p ly  c a l l e d
the  ' P e o p l e ' s  Communist G o v e r n m e n t U s u a l l y  a o n e - s t o r e y  o r  two-
s t o r e y  s hophouse  on th e  main road  was r e q u i s i t i o n e d  as  h e a d q u a r t e r s  o f
th e  Communist P a r t y .  The p a r t y ' s  f l a g  and th e  MPAJA f l a g  would f l y  s i d e
by s i d e  i n  f r o n t  o f  t h e  b u i l d i n g .  S i m i l a r  f l a g s  were d i s p l a y e d  by
s u p p o r t e r s  on t h e  windows o f  s hophouses  and o t h e r  b u i l d i n g s ,  such  as  t h e
p o l i c e  s t a t i o n  which would be n o r m a l l y  o c c u p ie d  by MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  i f
s t i l l  i n t a c t  and n o t  b u r n e d  down. The ' P e o p l e ' s  Com m it tees '  c o n s i s t e d
of  f a r m e r s ,  w o r k e r s ,  s h o p k e e p e r s  and l e a d i n g  c i t i z e n s  w i t h  an u nb lem ishe d
r e c o r d  o f  n o n - J a p a n e s e  c o l l a b o r a t i o n .  U n l i k e  t h e  ' S t a t e  P e o p l e ' s  C o m m i t t e e s ' ,
t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  e v id e n c e  o f  Malays and I n d i a n s  b e i n g  r e p r e s e n t e d  on t h e
town and d i s t r i c t  ' P e o p l e ' s  C o m m i t t e e s ' .  In  d i s t r i b u t i n g  r i c e  and
f o o d s t u f f s  to  the  pe o p le  some 'C o m m i t t e e s '  and MCP c a d r e s  i n  t h e  P e r a k
d i s t r i c t s  were a l l e g e d  t o  have  been  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  a g a i n s t  Malays and
I n d i a n s .  When com pla in s  were made t o  p a r t y  l e a d e r s ,  they  i m m e d ia te ly
106a t t e m p t e d  to  s e t  i t  r i g h t ,  b u t  much damage had a l r e a d y  been done.
Meanwhile ,  some g u e r r i l l a s  were a s s i g n e d  t o  p o l i c e  d u t i e s .
The l o c a l  p o p u l a t i o n  was f r e q u e n t l y  e n t e r t a i n e d  by the  s i g h t  o f  t h e s e  
g u e r r i l l a s  m arch ing  o r  d r i l l i n g  up and down t h e  main s t r e e t ,  w h i l e  a t  b o th
103 l l a j i  Buyong A d i l ,  S e j a r a h  J o h o r  ( H i s t o r y  o f  J o h o r ) ,  Kuala  Lumpur, 
1971, 323-24.
104 See Musak M a n t r a k ,  'Ancaman Komunis (The Communist T h r e a t ) ,  1 9 4 5 - 4 6 ' ,  
i n  the  monthly P l a n , Kota Bha ru ,  N o .96 ,  J a n u a r y  1977,  20.
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(top) A unit of the MPAJA assembled in the main street of one of the 
small towns of Malaya which the guerrilla army entered after 
the Japanese surrender.
(bottom) The first patrol of the Fifth Independent Regiment (Perak) 
of the MPAJA. Place unidentified.
Source: Li Tieh Min, Hu Yu-chin, et.al., Ta-chan yu Nan-ch'ao
(Ma-lai-ya chih pu).
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ends of the street other guerrillas stood guard. Vehicular traffic was 
stopped and checked, and any Japanese-owned vehicle was immediately 
seized. During this time much of the interstate traffic passing through 
such towns was disrupted.Japanese troop convoys passing through 
were subject to sniper fire or ambush. Every person entering or leaving 
the town was checked.
A public gathering would later be held in the town after it was
taken over. This would be in the form of a meeting, or a dinner, at
which party officials delivered speeches. The dinner would be organised
by supporters and the town’s citizens in the ’People's Committees', to
entertain the officials as well as to celebrate the MPAJA’s ’liberation’
of the town. The theme in the speeches was always that it was the
Communist Party and the MPAJA guerrillas, under the guidance of the
former, which had liberated the country from Japanese rule. The people
would then be told that the British were returning to rule Malaya, but
that the Party had grown in strength and the British would find a new
political spirit among the people. The people should be vigilant. It
remained to be seen whether the British intended to carry out democratic
reforms. A few people were unhappy about cooperation with the British.
But generally everyone got the message that the British were to be welcomed
back. However, the ground was to be well prepared by the party’s cadres
10 8in order to build up support among the people.
By the end of the first week after taking over a town, the 
Communist Party would have successfully imposed its authority and 
eliminated all opposition. It asked for the cooperation of all, and none 
dared to refuse. There is evidence that in some areas the communists 
fixed prices of commodities, eliminated all traces of Japanese influence, 
established Chinese schools and took over the properties of profiteers and 
Japanese collaborators. Regulations were also handed down banning 
gambling, opium smoking and prostitution. Public notices in Chinese were 
pasted on walls of buildings, warning that thieves and robbers would be 
caught and punished.
109
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At Kupang, a bou t  f i v e  m i l e s  f rom B a l i n g  i n  Kedah,  r e c a l c i t r a n t  
MTAJA g u e r r i l l a s  took  power.  They r e f u s e d  to  a l l o w  a B r i t i s h  Fo rce  136 
o f f i c e r ,  Major  I l i s l o p ,  to  e n t e r  Kupang, so  t h a t  he  and h i s  group were 
f o r c e d  t o  remain  i n  t h e i r  j u n g l e  camp u n t i l  i n v i t e d  by t h e  J a p a n e s e  f o r c e  
in  B a l i n g  to  t ak e  ove r  B a l in g  t o w n . ^ ^  T en s io n  a r o s e  i n  B a l i n g  i n  t h e  
e v e n i n g  a f t e r  I l i s i o p ' s  a r r i v a l ,  as  news was r e c e i v e d  t h a t  the  Kupang 
g u e r r i l l a s  i n t e n d e d  to  a t t a c k  B a l i n g .  H i s l o p  r a d i o e d  SEAC H e a d q u a r t e r s  
f o r  r e i n f o r c e m e n t s ,  and was t o l d  t h a t  he  c o u ld  e x p e c t  none .  B r i t i s h  and 
J a p a n e s e  f o r c e s  combined t o  d e fend  the  town.  They w a i t e d  b e h in d  d e f e n s i v e  
p o s i t i o n s  u n t i l  d a y b r e a k ,  when i t  was c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  a t t a c k  was n o t  
f o r t h c o m i n g .  in  t h e  morn ing  H i s lo p  d e s p a t c h e d  two KMT t e c h n i c i a n s  i n  
h i s  g r o u p ,  b o th  d r e s s e d  i n  C h in e se  N a t i o n a l i s t  Army k h a k i  u n i f o r m s ,  w i t h  
a s i n g l e  b l u e  s t a r  on t h e i r  c a p s ,  to  Kupang to  p a r l e y  w i t h  t h e  MPAJA 
g u e r r i l l a s .  MPAJA a n i m o s i t y  tow ards  t h e  KMT g u e r r i l l a s  was known, y e t  
t h e  two men were t o  p r e s e n t  t h e m s e lv e s  a s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  C h ine se  
government  o f  Ch iang K a i - s h e k .  I t  was a r i s k y  m i s s i o n ,  b u t  one which  th e  
two men were q u i t e  w i l l i n g  to  u n d e r t a k e .  They were a l l o w e d  i n  a p p a r e n t l y  
on th e  a s su m p t io n  t h a t  t hey  were t h e  advance  p a r t y  o f  C h i a n g ' s  Army 
rumoured due to  a r r i v e  i n  Malaya.
J .M. Tsang ,  one o f  t h e  men, d e s c r i b e s  the  communist  government
which  they  e n c o u n t e r e d  i n  t h e  town:
We drove  in  a c a r  t o  Kupang to  meet w i t h  t h e  MPAJA 
commander. On e n t e r i n g  th e  town,  we saw th e  Communist 
P a r t y ' s  r e d  f l a g ,  w i t h  t h e  hammer and s i c k l e ,  f l y i n g  
on top o f  s e v e r a l  b u i l d i n g s .  Many g u e r r i l l a  p a t r o l s  
were m arc h ing  on t h e  s t r e e t .  A p o s t e r  s t u c k  on the  w a l l  
o f  a C h in e s e  shophouse  p r o c l a im e d  t h a t  a P e o p l e ' s  
Communist Government  had been  e s t a b l i s h e d .  S e v e r a l  
r e g u l a t i o n s  were announced to  e n f o r c e  law and o r d e r .
The ' P e o p l e ' s  Commit tee '  which i s s u e d  t h e s e  d e c r e e s ,  
warned t h a t  t h i e v e s  and r o b b e r s  would be p u n i s h e d .
Gambling and opium smoking were p r o h i b i t e d .
We s to p p e d  o u t s i d e  the  o f f i c e  o f  t h e  Communist P a r t y  
which was i n d i c a t e d  by a l a r g e  s ig n  i n  C h inese  
c h a r a c t e r s .  We met  the  MPAJA commander,  a s t e r n  l o o k in g  
man in  t h e  top  s t o r e y  of  the  b u i l d i n g .  There  were 
two MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  s t a n d i n g  g u a r d .  On h i s  t a b l e  
was d rap e d  t h e  Communist P a r t y  f l a g .  We communicated
111 J.M. Tsang ,  KMT a g e n t  and w i r e l e s s  o p e r a t o r  w i t h  Force  136 group 
under  H i s l o p .  I n t e r v i e w ,  Penang,  November 1976.
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The First Independent Regiment of the MPAJA receives a public welcome as 
it marches through a street in Chenderiang, Perak immediately after the 
Japanese surrender. Note that the slogans in the triumphal arches are 
all in Chinese. The bottom picture shows the 1st Regiment under an arch 
bearing the Chinese characters which mean ’The People’s Autonomous 
Council Welcomes the MPAJA. Whole Heaven is Rejoicing.’
Source: Li Tieh Min, Hu Yu-chih, et.al., Ta-chan yu Nan-ch’ao
(Ma-lai-ya chih pu) (The World War and the Overseas 
Chinese in Nanyang — the Malaya Section), Singapore, 
19W (New Year's Day), issued by the Singapore New 
Nanyang Publications Company on behalf of the General 
Association of Nanyang Overseas Chinese.
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l l i s l o p ' s  r e q u e s t  to  him to  t r y  and m a i n t a i n  o r d e r  u n t i l  
t h e  a r r i v a l  o f  B r i t i s h  t r o o p s .  He s c o f f e d  a t  H i s l o p ' s  
a t t e m p t  t o  impose some measure  o f  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  him.
He would t a k e  o r d e r s  f rom MPAJA H e a d q u a r t e r s  and from 
no one e l s e .  He q u e s t i o n e d  o u r  r o l e ,  and s a i d  we s h o u ld  
have  n o t h i n g  t o  do w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h .
At T i t i  in  N e g r i  S e m b i lan ,  a f t e r  MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  had l i q u i d a t e d
t h e  t h r e e  C h ine se  d e t e c t i v e s  and t a k e n  o v e r  t h e  town, t h e y  r e q u i s i t i o n e d
an empty shophouse  on t h e  main s t r e e t  f o r  t h e i r  h e a d q u a r t e r s .  A l a r g e
s i g n  i n  C h in e se  c h a r a c t e r s  s a y i n g  ' O f f i c e  o f  t h e  Communist P a r t y '  was
d i s p l a y e d  i n  f r o n t  o f  the  b u i l d i n g .  I n s i d e  t h e  o f f i c e  were g a t h e r e d  p a r t y
o f f i c i a l s  and s e n i o r  r a n k i n g  o f f i c e r s  o f  t h e  MPAJA, who c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e
' P e o p l e ' s  Communist Covernment  o f  T i t i ' .  A f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  p u b l i c  t r i a l
and k i l l i n g ,  s p e e c h e s  were made by th e  o f f i c i a l s  d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  T i t i
was now a l i b e r a t e d  a r e a  and t h a t  t h e  ' P e o p l e ' s  Communist Government  o f
T i t i '  was g o ing  to  look  a f t e r  t h e  r i g h t s  and i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  p e o p le
w i t h o u t  i n t e r f e r e n c e  from ' o u t s i d e r s '  (meaning  t h e  B r i t i s h ,  s h o u ld  t h e y  
113r e t u r n ) .  I t  was made c l e a r  t o  a l l  p r e s e n t  t h a t  t h e  new government  i n
T i t i  was a p u r e l y  communist one ,  and t h a t  no r e a c t i o n a r y  f a c t i o n s  c o u ld  
be t o l e r a t e d .  B e fo re  t h e  war  many C h in e s e  b u s in e s s m e n  were known t o  have 
been members o f  t h e  KMT. However , i t  was now o b v io u s  t o  t h e s e  b u s in e s sm e n  
t h a t  t h e  C h in e se  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  T i t i  was c o m p l e t e l y  w i t h  the  communist  
gove rnm en t ,  and t h a t  t h e  w i s e s t  t h i n g  f o r  them t o  do was to  f o l l o w  s u i t .
A ' P e o p l e ' s  Commit tee '  was formed,  w i t h  two r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  f rom each
a r e a .  Most o f  t h e s e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  were Hakka f a r m e r s ,  t i n - m i n e r s  o r
r u b b e r  t a p p e r s .  E duc a te d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  were a p p o i n t e d  as  s e c r e t a r i e s
and t e a c h e r s .  E d u c a t i o n  was g iv e n  top  p r i o r i t y  i n  t h e  new g o v e r n m e n t ' s
r e f o r m  programme. More t h a n  tw en ty  t e a c h e r s ,  most o f  them young men and
women, were employed by t h e  new government  to  t e a c h  c h i l d r e n  and a d u l t s
a l i k e  to  r e a d  and w r i t e .  There were a l s o  c l a s s e s  on communism and
p o l i t i c s .  The Malays i n  t h e  s u r r o u n d i n g  a r e a s  were l e f t  ou t  o f  t h e  programme,
p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  t h e  r e v e n g e  which t h e  MPAJA had  t a k e n  a g a i n s t  s e v e r a l
Malays had  a l i e n a t e d  t h a t  community.  The new government  d i d  n o t  have
t ime to  p r o c e e d  f u r t h e r ,  as  news soon r e a c h e d  T i t i  t h a t  B r i t i s h  t r o o p s
112 I b i d .
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had arrived at the nearby district town, Kuala Klawang, and were due to 
114take over Titi.
At Sungei Patani in Kedah, the MPAJA regiment in charge of the 
town was under an English-speaking commander, Ho Siow Lit, who had about 
twenty armed men. The unit was smaller than the group in the Kupang 
area. They attempted to display their power by marching about town.
A meeting was held In the town cinema, where speeches in support of the 
Communist Party’s programme were made. About 4 or 5 September, following 
despatch of a messenger by Force 136 to the landing force at Penang, 
British troops arrived and the MPAJA was brought under control.
At Fraser’s Hill in Pahang, after MPAJA guerrillas had executed
the three Sikh policemen, they proclaimed a communist government. That
evening, after occupying the town, a public meeting was held at the Rest
House, requisitioned as Communist Party headquarters. All residents were
ordered to attend, including Malays and Indians and workers on the
Government experimental vegetable farms a few miles away. This is an
eye-witness account of the meeting:
I was the highest ranking Government civil servant around.
Ihe Malay District Officer, appointed by the Japanese, 
had fled. A Hainanese house-boy, a friend of mine, came 
with a message from the communists asking me to attend.
As Chief Clerk in the Superintendent’s Office, or 'CC' 
as everyone called me, my presence was regarded as 
important. At the Rest House I saw the guerrillas pale 
and deathly-looking from living in the jungle arrogantly 
basking in their glory. They were cordial but curt to 
me, apparently thinking that I was nothing but a government 
lackey. They knew through the hainanese house-boys that I 
did not support the Japanese. I nearly paid with my life 
for listening to the BBC on the short-wave radio. I was 
saved by my wife who saw a Japanese officer and convinced 
him with the aid of family photographs that she was half- 
Japanese. Her aunt was Japanese.
At the Rest House meeting, the communists declared, ’We 
have freed Malaya from the Japanese. Do not be afraid.
We will look after you all. The British won't be coming 
back. We will set up a communist government throughout 
the country. Give us your whole-hearted cooperation.'
These words were delivered in Mandarin which I do not
114 Ibid., 313
115 J.M. Tsang, interview.
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understand, but they were interpreted to me by the 
Ilninanese house-boy. I don't think the Malays and 
Indians present understood either what was said, but 
their Chinese friends must have explained the meaning 
to them. No speeches were made by the communists in 
Malay or English, but one of the Indian labourers had 
been asked to speak, lie spoke in Malay and said he 
supported the communists and hoped they would improve 
the lot of everyone by distributing enough rice and 
foodstuffs to the people. A few days later, at the 
Selangor Club up on the hill, a dinner was held to 
which every resident was asked to contribute money.
Similar speeches were made by the Communist Party 
officials. This time it was a mainly Chinese affair.
It is clear from the above account that the MPAJA group in 
Fraser's Hill had not yet received the word that the British would be 
returning. This group clearly belonged to the 7th Regiment (East Pahang) 
which had little or no contact with MPAJA Central Headquarters nor any 
liaison with Force 136. For such isolated groups the 27 August statement 
of the MCP's CEC would mark the first evidence of a shift in party policy.
The pro-British sympathies of the informant, an English-educated 
Hokkien, became apparent some days later to the communist guerrillas, who 
visited him in his Covernment office. The guerrillas ordered him to open 
all the cabinet files and the storeroom where stationery was kept. He 
kept telling them it had nothing of importance for the guerrillas.
When the storeroom was opened the guerrillas ransacked it, taking away 
all the available stationery. One of the guerrillas shouted at the 
informant, 'Why do you want to keep all these stuff? Do you want the 
British to have them back?' The Informant's defence was that the guerrillas 
had not made themselves clear that they wanted stationery. He had 
thought they wanted rice and foodstuffs, which were never kept in the 
storeroom. Outside the office, about ten yards in front of the informant's 
house, his eldest son, about seven years old, was playing with a Union 
Jack which the boy had- apparently rummaged among the rags in the storeroom 
of the house. The guerrillas on coming out of the Government office 
caught sight of the flag. One of them angrily turned round towards the 
informant, 'Hey, CC, you are clearly a British supporter. Look at the
116 H.C. Clieah, interview.
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f l a g  yo u r  son i s  p l a y i n g  w i t h . '  The i n f o r m a n t  p l e a d e d  w i t h  t h e  g u e r r i l l a s
t h a t  t h i s  was n o t  t r u e .  One o f  t h e  H a i n a n e s e  h o u s e - b o y s  a l s o  spoke i n
s u p p o r t  of  t h e  ’ CC’ and s a i d  he  had a lw ays  been  k i n d ,  h e l p f u l  and a
s u p p o r t e r  o f  the  w orke rs  d u r i n g  th e  days o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  s u p e r i n t e n d e n t .
The g u e r r i l l a s  wa lked  o f f  towards  t h e i r  c a r ,  which was c o m p l e t e l y  l o a d e d
w i t h  Government  s t a t i o n e r y  and o f f i c e  f u r n i t u r e .
The communist t a k e o v e r  a t  F r a s e r ’ s H i l l  seems t o  have l a s t e d
f o r  a b o u t  t h r e e  weeks a t  t h e  m o s t ,  b e g i n n i n g  most l i k e l y  a b o u t  28 A ugus t .
On a b o u t  15 September  the  f i r s t  c o n t i n g e n t  o f  I n d i a n  t r o o p s ,  t h e
H yd e ra b ad s ,  was s i g h t e d  a t  t h e  Gap, a b o u t  tw e lv e  m i l e s  f rom t h e  town.
A few t r u c k l o a d s  o f  I n d i a n  t r o o p s  unde r  B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r s  soon e n t e r e d
t h e  town to  t h e  e n t h u s i a s t i c  welcome o f  t h e  l o c a l  p o p u l a t i o n .  The u n i fo r m e d
MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  were nowhere i n  s i g h t ,  b u t  communist  f l a g s  were s t i l l
f l u t t e r i n g  on t h e  p o l i c e  s t a t i o n  and p o s t  o f f i c e .  The B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r s
i m m e d ia te ly  o r d e r e d  t h e s e  t o  be t aken  down and t h e  Union J a c k  f lown i n
t h e i r  p l a c e .  Force  136 o f f i c e r  Major  H i s l o p  had done t h e  same t h i n g  when
he saw a Communist P a r t y  f l a g  f l y i n g  a t o p  t h e  f l a g p o l e  a t  the  f o r e s t r y
118o f f i c e  a t  Kampong Weng in  Kedah.  The r e s i d e n t s  were c l e a r l y  w i t n e s s i n g
power chang ing  hands .  The Hyderabads t hen  moved up h i g h e r  i n t o  t h e  h i l l s ,
and t h e r e ,  i t  i s  s a i d ,  they  s to p p e d  and s e i z e d  many v e h i c l e s  d r i v e n  by
MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  a t t e m p t i n g  to  remove p r o p e r t y  f rom Government bunga lo w s .
There were many i n c i d e n t s  as  I n d i a n  t r o o p s  moved to  d i s a r m  th e  MPAJA.
The H a inanese  community a t  F r a s e r ’ s H i l l ,  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  whom were
s y m p a t h e t i c  t o  t h e  communis ts ,  were f o r c e d  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  the
B r i t i s h  had r e t u r n e d  to  r u l e  Malaya.  L a t e r ,  when a F o rc e  136 o f f i c e r
a r r i v e d  a t  F r a s e r ’ s H i l l ,  some of  t h e  MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  were a l l o w e d  to
r e t a i n  t h e i r  arms and were employed on g u a rd  d u ty .  But  t h e  h u m i l i a t i o n
which t h e  Hyderabads  had i n f l i c t e d  on t h e  g u e r r i l l a s  was n o t  l o s t  t o  the
119g u e r r i l l a s  no r  t o  t h e  town r e s i d e n t s .
On 3 S ep tem ber ,  Chapman and t h r e e  o t h e r  Fo rc e  136 o f f i c e r s  
( R i c h a r d s o n ,  Headley  and Leonard)  were t h e  f i r s t  B r i t i s h  t o  e n t e r  Raub,
117 I b i d .
118 J.M. Tsang ,  i n t e r v i e w .
119 II. C. Clieah , i n t e r v i e w .
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the  n e a r e s t  town to  F r a s e r ’ s H i l l .  On t h e  5 t h  t hey  e n t e r e d  Kua la  L i p i s ,
t h e  c a p i t a l  o f  Pahang,  where t h e r e  were  s t i l l  some J a p a n e s e  t r o o p s .
They made an ag reem en t  w i t h  t h e  J a p a n e s e  t h a t  they  would p r o t e c t  the
J a p a n e s e  from the  C h inese  g u e r r i l l a s ,  i f  t h e y  a g re e d  to  s t a y  as
f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e  i n  t h e i r  camps, and h e l p  Force  136 to  guard  c e r t a i n  s u p p l y
dumps i n  t h e  towns .  The MPAJA, on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  were to  keep to  t h e
s m a l l e r  towns and c o u n t r y  d i s t r i c t s ,  and to  p r e v e n t  l a w l e s s n e s s  t h e r e .
On 6 Sep tember  Chapman drove o v e r  t o  Kuala  Lumpur to  meet John D a v i s ,  and
r e t u r n e d  w i t h  a Gurkha S u p p o r t  Group ’ to  add a l i t t l e  p r e s t i g e ’ t o  Force
120136 H e a d q u a r t e r s  i n  the  r e s t h o u s e  a t  Kua la  L i p i s .  On 8 September
he and Headley e n t e r e d  Kuan tan ,  and t h e  n e x t  day met t h e  S u l t a n  o f  Pahang 
a t  Pekan.
Kuantan p r e s e n t e d  a c l e a r  p i c t u r e  o f  ’MPAJA t r u c u l e n c e '  t o  Head ley
and Chapman. I t  had  been t a k e n  o v e r  by th e  7th  Reg iment ,  MPAJA. Excep t
f o r  Chapman, who had met t h r e e  o f  t h e i r  men a t  Mentakab i n  December 1942,
t h e r e  had been  no B r i t i s h  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e i r  u n i t  s i n c e  J a p a n e s e  a r r i v a l .
Even MPAJA C e n t r a l  H e a d q u a r t e r s  had l o s t  c o n t a c t  w i t h  the  7th Regiment
f o r  t h r e e  y e a r s .  These g u e r r i l l a s  had been  a b l e  to  dom ina te  t h e  l o c a l
Malay government  a t  Kuantan  and had grown q u i t e  p o w e r f u l .  The Malay
D i s t r i c t  O f f i c e r ,  Dato Mohamed, was r e p o r t e d  t o  be on th e  v e rg e  o f  m e n ta l  
121breakdown.  The g u e r r i l l a s  had emerged from t h e  j u n g l e  a t  t h e  end o f
Augus t ,  t ak e n  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  town and summari ly  t r i e d  and p u t  t o  d e a th
a number o f  I n h a b i t a n t s  a l l e g e d  to  have  c o l l a b o r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  J a p a n e s e .
Chapman and Headley  were i n i t i a l l y  h e l p l e s s ,  and had to  t u r n  to  Davis
and MPAJA C e n t r a l  H e a d q u a r t e r s  f o r  h e l p  i n  g a i n i n g  any i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  t h e
7th Regiment  in  Kuan tan .  Chapman r e c a l l s :
When we e n t e r e d  t h e  town, the s i t u a t i o n  was r a t h e r  
d e l i c a t e  as  t h e  J a p s ,  who seemed to  c o n s i d e r  the  
c e s s a t i o n  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  a s  a m u tua l  a g re e m e n t  r a t h e r  
t han  s u r r e n d e r ,  were ve ry  t r u c u l e n t  and s t i l l  went 
a b o u t  the  town f u l l y  armed.  The MPAJA were a t  f i r s t  
e q u a l l y  u n c o o p e r a t i v e .  They f e l t  t h a t  t hey  had opposed 
the  J a p s  f o r  so many y e a r s  w i t h o u t  any h e l p  from the  
B r i t i s h  (and t h e  7 th  Regiment  bad k i i J e d  many hundreds
120 Chapman, 419 -20 .
121 I b i d .
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of Japs in large-scale skirmishes in the jungle) and had 
restored order in Kuantan before we arrived. It was not 
until I had taken their leaders over to Kuala Lumpur 
to parley with Davis and members of their own headquarters 
that they would agree to obey my orders.... 122
One by one the communist takeovers collapsed in the face of the 
arrival of British forces. There was no open opposition, the guerrillas 
either withdrawing from the towns or remaining to welcome the British 
forces. In a number of instances guerrillas were immediately disarmed 
and harassed by British troops, who searched their premises and seized 
any printed materials critical of British policies. These acts of 
suppression naturally increased the anti-British mood of the MPAJA.
At Titi in Negri Sembilan, the Chinese population appeared 
unhappy with the news of the impending British arrival. A public meeting , 
debated the question of whether the British should be welcomed back. It 
was decided to send a man to Kuala Klawang, where the British had already 
taken over, to ask them to leave Titi alone. The request was rejected, 
and the following day a jeep carrying BMA officers arrived with a loud­
speaker announcing monetary offers to the MPAJA guerrillas and asking the 
people to cooperate with the BMA to restore law and order. Residents 
recalled that the people in Titi watched in stony silence until the 
officials’ voices were hoarse and the jeep faded into the distance towards 
Kuala Klawang. A day later a number of BMA officers arrived with troops 
and began questioning many people.
This 'survey team' (as the Titi people then called them) 
left the area in disgust for no one had given them anything 
important. The following morning, a whole battalion of 
troops turned out in Titi town and ordered all the town 
residents to come out of their houses. They were to 
assemble at the central open space (site of the present 
police station) and their homes searched. The British 
troops were alleged to have been very rude and rough to 
the residents when they were assembled for questioning 
by some British military officers who questioned 'many 
people' through a Chinese interpreter. In the meantime, 
the soldiers searched the homes (probably for firearms).
The British officers were said to be very hot tempered 
and were often shouting at the ones they singled out for 
questioning. On that occasion, the British authorities 
managed to get 'three or four' former AJA guerrillas to 
sign the form and a couple surrendered their rifles....
122 Ibid.
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It was considered a very humiliating experience and 
many in Titi began to appreciate the local communists' 
anti-British talk and were even prepared to assist the 
MCP financially whenever they needed it....
Unlike the local communists who were sensitive to the 
emotions and characteristics of the Chinese, the British 
military officials had hurt the feelings of the Titi 
residents, and worst of all, by crude questioning of the 
towkays and leading figures of the community in public, 
the British had caused their best allies to turn against 
them.^ 3
It would appear that in Titi the communists had earlier done their 
groundwork well. The high-handed manner of the British officials and 
troops had helped to turn the Chinese population against the British. 
Clearly the majority of the Hakka community in Titi, like those of the 
Hainanese community at Fraser's Hill, were quite opposed to the British 
and extremely sympathetic to the communists.
SEAC's Reaction to the MCP's 27 August Statement
On 28 August a copy of the eight points of the MCP CEC's
statement issued on 27 August was wired by Force 136 officers in Malaya
to SEAC Headquarters. Captain G.A. Garnon-Williams, head of SEAC's
Political Division, commented:
I think this appears to be a very reasonable and 
liberal document. It is a great pity that our own 
Colonial Office did not wake up some weeks ago.
It is presumed that action with SAC [i.e., Mountbatten] 
will be taken by C.P.A. [Chief Political Adviser].124
On 3 September, after consulting Mountbatten, the CPA, M.E.
Dening, wrote to the Colonial Office informing it of the MCP's eight-point
programme and urging it to give 'the speediest and fullest practicable
125publicity' to the Malayan Union policy. Dening feared that unless
this was done 'uncertainty and distrust should lead the resistance 
movements (the great majority of whose numbers are Communists) to adopt
123 Lawrence Siaw, 315-36.
124 G.A. Garnon-Williams to CPA and Director of Intelligence, 29 August 
1945, in WO 203/5642/X/L02339.
125 Dening to Foreign Office, with a request that the message be passed 
to the Colonial Office, 3 September 1945, in Ibid.
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an attitude towards the return of British Administration from which
it might be difficult for them to withdraw and which might unnecessarily
complicate our post-war tasks in Malaya.' He added that it was the view
of Mountbatten and concurred to by General Hone, the CCAO-designate
for Malaya, that an early announcement of the Malayan Union policy ’even
in the most general terms, is necessary if we are not to create for ourselves
126a very difficult situation upon re-entry into Malaya.'
Commenting on the MCP’s statement, Dening said the ’sentiments
expressed in this manifesto are irreproachable’ and added:
It will be seen that the Communist Party have rather 
stolen our thunder and that we have lost that element 
of surprise for our progressive policy which would 
politically have been so valuable. Much of the programme 
could be subscribed to by His Majesty’s Government 
with very little amendment.
The population is of course not yet ready for a full 
electorate system but our policy does envisage a larger 
measure of participation in Government by the people.
The reference 'freedom of societies' reflects anxiety 
of Chinese as to whether societies to which they belong 
will be declared illegal. A decision has already been 
taken on this point and it would be to our advantage 
to make this clear at once.127
Apparently as a coincidence the British Cabinet approved the
Malayan Union policy on 3 September. The Colonial Office informed
Mountbatten of the decision on 17 September - five days after Mountbatten
had accepted the official surrender of the Japanese armed forces in
Singapore. The urgent need for publicity as expressed by Dening soon
receded as more and more areas in Malaya were successfully occupied by
British troops - with little resistance from the MPAJA guerrillas.
The liberal policy of Mountbatten towards the MCP/MPAJA and
the Chinese was immediately put into force by the BMA (Malaya). But
the BMA (Malaya) was not directly under Mountbatten's personal authority
as the BMA in Burma where Mountbatten was responsible for making important
political concessions to Brigadier Aung San and the Burma National Army,
128the counterpart of the MPAJA. In Malaya, the initial liberal policy
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 See the chapter, 'Nationalism in Burma', in Donnison, 343-74.
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of the BMA encountered opposition from British Army field commanders who 
saw the MPAJA guerrillas as a nuisance to their tasks of establishing law 
and order in the country and who were anxious to demobilise the MPAJA 
as'quickly as possible.
Fearing that the MPAJA might challenge British authority, the
British Army quickly ordered all MPAJA units to concentrate at certain
centres and to come under its overall command. Force 136 officers continued
to act as liaison officers. Secondly, the British Army declared the
MPAJA to be no longer operational after 12 September. However, the MPAJA
units were allowed to remain intact and armed, while negotiations proceeded
for their disbandment. They could no longer act on their own without
authority from Army officers. This meant that, while their activities
before 12 September, particularly the arrests and executions of collaborators,
were regarded as justified by military exigency and not to be pressed in
BMA courts such acts were prohibited after 12 September. In the months
thereafter, between five and ten MPAJA guerrillas or commanders were
arrested and arraigned on killings reported to have been committed after 
12912 September.
The most well-known cases were those of Chu Kao, a Johor MPAJA
deputy commander arrested for execution of a collaborator in Kluang on
15 September, and Lai Kam, arrested for a double killing committed in
Bentong on 16 September. Chu Kao was later sentenced to death for murder,
but the charges against Lai Kam were subsequently dropped on the grounds
130that witnesses had disappeared and others were being ’terrorised'.
The arrests and trials of these men (as well as others such as the Selangor 
MPAJU leader, Soong Kwong on charges of extortion and intimidation), 
marked the resumption of conflict between the communists and the British 
administration. This will be discussed more fully in Chapter VIII.
129 34 Indian Corps, SEAC, to Force 136 Headquarters, Memorandum on
'Discipline: The MPAJA', 23 October 1945 in BMA PSD/39 and related
matters in MU Secretariat 1763/46.
130 See Political Intelligence Journal, Malayan Security Service, 
Singapore, issues of 30 April and 15 August 1946 respectively.
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Conclusion
The manner of MPAJA takeovers indicates that the MCP lacked a 
clearly-defined strategic mission during the post-surrender interregnum. 
Several thousand MPAJA guerrillas, well-armed, marching and drilling 
and taking the law into their hands in the countryside, was not worth as 
much as several hundred cadres with previous political experience, 
a sound policy and the ability to take advantage of a given situation.
By failing either to declare the ’Malayan Democratic Republic’, or 
to focus on intensive political proselytising and organisation prior to 
the British return, the MCP’s CEC left the situation very much to local 
MPAJA commanders and their units. Consequently, the main activity of 
MPAJA commanders was to hold ’people’s courts’ and to settle scores 
against Japanese troops, local informers and collaborators.
The MPAJA created a ’reign of terror' with its mass arrests, 
tortures and executions. Unintentionally, these MPAJA actions often 
suggested to the local population that there was little to choose from 
as between MPAJA and Japanese brutalities. Probably for this reason, too, 
many people now began to look forward to the British coming back to rule 
the country. The prewar British system of justice and administration had 
not resorted to such ruthless and cruel methods of punishment.
The MPAJA takeovers also aroused widespread Malay opposition. 
Malays saw MPAJA acts as Chinese attempts at political domination of 
their country. The Malays began to realise that unless they recouped 
the situation they would find themselves without political power. Malay 
and Chinese distrust of one another, which had arisen during the Japanese 
occupation, now developed into full-scale inter-ethnic conflicts following 
the MPAJA takeovers.
It is significant that the most positive response to the MCP/ 
MPAJA takeovers occurred in Titi, a wholly Chinese town, which appeared 
to have met the Japanese surrender in a fairly integrated way, with local 
community leaders or communists able to stop excesses by the MPAJA. More 
ethnically diverse communities appear not to have reacted in the same 
way, nor to have responded so positively.
The above factors clearly suggest that the post-surrender 
interregnum in Malaya and Vietnam, were not comparable. Not only was the 
ICP fully prepared to seize power at the time of the Japanese surrender, 
its cadres and guerrillas were well-trained and knew what to do in such 
a situation. Other factors which differed were the long-term ethnic
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and r e l i g i o u s  d i v i s i o n s  i n  Malaya ,  which d i d  n o t  e x i s t  i n  Vie tnam, and 
t h e  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  communist  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  t h e  A l l i e s .
Once t h e  J a p a n e s e  had s u r r e n d e r e d ,  t h e y  and t h e i r  c o l l a b o r a t o r s  
were o f  minor  p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  What was needed  was an e f f e c t i v e  
p o l i t y  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  r e t u r n i n g  c o l o n i a l  power.  However , a f t e r  
t h e  MCP, under  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  L a i  Tek, d e c r e e d  a c c e p t a n c e ,  even 
end o rs e m en t  o f  B r i t i s h  r u l e  once a g a i n  i n  Malaya ,  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  mass 
p o l i t i c a l  m o b i l i s a t i o n  was u n d e r c u t ,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  momentum l o s t .  I t  
i s  p a r t l y  i n  t h i s  l i g h t  t h a t  one must  s e e  t h e  l o c a l  MPAJA t e n d e n c y  t o  
fo cu s  on s e t t l i n g  s c o r e s  a g a i n s t  o u t d a t e d  e n e m ie s .  They had nowhere e l s e  
t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  t h e i r  e n e r g i e s .
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  t h e  MPAJA t a k e o v e r s  c o l l a p s e d  on a r r i v a l  o f  
B r i t i s h  f o r c e s  i n  t h e i r  a r e a s .  The MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  had n o t  been  p r e p a r e d  
t o  d e fend  t h e i r  t a k e o v e r s  o r  t o  c o u n t e r  t h e  tough  m easu res  which t h e  B r i t i s h  
Army soon a d o p te d  a g a i n s t  them. The a r r e s t s  and d e t e n t i o n s  o f  MPAJA 
g u e r r i l l a s  and l e a d e r s  marked the  b e g i n n i n g  o f  communist d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  
w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h  and l e d  t o  a M C P -B r i t i sh  c o n f l i c t .
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CHAPTER VII
KIYAI SALLEH AND THE SABILILLAH MOVEMENT 
(MAY-AUGUST 1945)
THE first serious inter-racial conflict between Malays and Chinese during 
the Japanese occupation began in the Batu Pahat district of Johor in 
May 1945. The violence spread to other parts of the south-western region 
of the State, increasing in intensity after the Japanese surrender.
A similar outbreak of inter-racial violence occurri c district of
Sungai Manik in lower Perak after the Japanese surrender. The Perak 
clashes were not coordinated with the Johor incidents but they had many 
factors in common. The present chapter deals mainly with local developments 
in two areas of Batu Pahat district in Johor. The Malay struggle took 
on the character of a religious movement, a jihad fi Sabilillah (literally 
War in the Path of Allah), or Holy War.^
The Malay View of the HPAJU/MPAJA
The most bitter Malay experience with regard to the Chinese was
the humiliation, degradation and physical torture which the MPAJU/MPAJA
was said to have inflicted upon them. As one Malay describes it:
The psychological fermentation of mistrust, anger, 
and frustration of the Malays stemming from insults, 
scorn and arrogance thrown upon them, had to reach 
its saturation at a point in time.^
The offensive behaviour of the Chinese in the MPAJU/MPAJA
is said to have taken many forms. They are alleged to have forcibly
collected taxes (such as 'head taxes’, ’commodity taxes') as well as
supplies and intelligence from Malay villagers, as they also did from
Chinese. The local Chinese MPAJU members, sometimes accompanied by armed
Chinese MPAJA guerrillas, would enter Malay villages to recruit young
1 I have used the translation of jihad fi Sabilillah in H.A.R. Gibb 
and J.H. Kramers (ed.), A Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, London, 
1961, 89.
2 See Hamzah bin Mohamed, ’The 14 Days of Terror, Before, During and 
After', B.A. Hons thesis, University rf Malaya, 1969/70, 29.
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and able-bodied Malay men to join them as guerrillas. They would also
demand Malay women for the kitchen work in their camps. Some of the
Chinese men would abduct Malay women, molest them or keep them as
mistresses. All the time the Chinese would use threats and insulting
language, and look down on the Malays. The MPAJA and the MPAJU Chinese
are also said to have slaughtered pigs in the mosques, and forced Malays 
4to eat pork. Without a trial Chinese guerrillas would kill Malays on
the slightest suspicion of being collaborators. Many Malay policemen,
penghulu (district headmen), ketua kampung (village headmen) and
Government officials were said to have been tortured and executed in
a cruel and inhuman manner. Wives and children would also be shot along
with the suspected collaborators. Bodies of victims were said to have
been mutilated beyond recognition, an act which offended the Islamic
religion. Sometimes the victims would be killed in their houses, which
would then be burned down. The Chinese would also prevent the Malays
from congregating and attending Friday prayers, for fear that the Malays
were gathering to attack the Chinese.^ This list of acts which the
Chinese in MPAJA are said to have perpetrated is by no means exhaustive.
These stories have assumed the form of myths. As Burridge has observed:
Insofar as the story is told and retold, cannot be 
checked as a matter of historical fact, and has no 
co-ordinates in space or time, it has the force of 
a myth, a symbol, expressing pertinent points in a 
social relationship. The villain is a Chinese and 
his first and most immediate victims are Malay women.
To the question 'Why should the Chinese kill these
3 This refers to the early period of the Japanese occupation. See
Kamaruddin bin Mohd. Piah, 'Kampung Bekur sejak 1900: satu kajian
tempatan dengan rujukan khas kepada trajedi 6hb. Mac 1946',
B.A. Hons thesis, University of Malaya 1974/75, 22-24.
4 A story was told to Kenelm O.L. Burridge, while he was doing research 
in Batu Pahat, of how a Malay kampung was surprised by the MPAJA 
guerrillas one evening. All the inhabitants were herded together
in the space by the mosque, and then, bringing some pigs, the 
guerrillas slaughtered them in the mosque, cooked them, and forced 
the Malays to join them in a feast. See Burridge, 'Racial relations 
in Johore', The Australian Journal of Politics and History, II, 2, 
1957, 163.
5 See Halinah Bamadhaj, 'The Impact of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya 
on Malay society and politics 1941-45', M.A. thesis, University of 
Auckland, 1975, 206-07.
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women?1 the answer was, 'To obtain their clothing'.
There is no economic issue as between the murderer 
and the Malay. The motive for the murder is seen as 
robbery, a rather ferocious killing for a meagre profit - 
sheer greed. In other words, there is no competitive 
issue as such, merely a unilateral condemnation of the 
Chinese by the Malays for ruthlessly working for their 
own profits to the exclusion of the ordinary human 
interests of others....
Whether these things actually occurred as matters of 
historical fact seems irrelevant in the present context.
Either they were figments used as propaganda which could 
be relied on to touch the Malays most vitally, or, 
assuming them to be untrue, they are stories invented 
after the event which account precisely for the events 
themselves. Thus, if the'Chinese really had done the 
things they are accused of they might reasonably expect 
some kind of rough handling; and since, in fact, there 
were incidents, and many Chinese were killed when they 
occurred, it is logical to explain the killings by 
relating them to actions which would have invited this 
kind of retaliation. In short, certain things are worth 
fighting for.^
Although many of these stories have become myths, even myths have their 
origins in real events. How to distinguish myth from fact in this 
instance is a difficult task - given the fact that either side in an 
intern-racial conflict always blames the other for causing the trouble.
It is sufficient for the purposes of this study to indicate the general 
Malay perceptions of the Chinese in the MPAJU/MPAJA to offset the MPAJU/ 
MPAJA perceptions of Malays given in Chapter III. Such perceptions 
are important to indicate why people decide to fight, and how they justify 
fighting after the fact.
Perceptions of Malay novelists and short story writers also 
reflect popular Malay images of the Chinese in the MPAJU/MPAJA, although 
they are not necessarily identical with fact. To give just one example, 
Muhammad Haji Kidin, in his 1965 novel Kerana Si Kuntum (Because of 
Si Kuntum), does not mention the MPAJA nor the racial identity of the 
villains of his story.^ They are just described as pengganas (bandits) 
and perompak (robbers) who pillage and burn down a Malay kampung near
6 Burridge, op .cit., 162-63.
7 Muhammad Haji Kidin, Amrun, Penang, 1965, 67. See also my short 
essay, 'The Malay literary view of the MPAJU/MPAJA', Appendix E, 
below.
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Kluang in Johor. Nevertheless, in case the reader is doubtful about
the racial identity of these bandits, the author inserts two illustrations
showing them wearing Chinese hats (see the illustrations on p.
Kamaruddin, the hero in the story, is the only survivor of 
the bandits' massacre of the kampung's population of seventy. Most of 
the inhabitants are killed in their sleep, their homes looted and then 
burned down. Kamaruddin vows revenge. Opposed equally to both the bandits 
and to the Japanese administration, he seeks refuge with an aboriginal 
tribe, the Sakais, whom he converts to Islam and trains for warfare.
The story reaches the climax in the clash between the Sakais and the 
bandits. A Japanese Army unit under Lieutenant Yamaguchi arrives in time
gto rescue Kamaruddin and the Sakais.
Stories of the lack of respect shown by these Chinese towards 
Malay customs, religion and Malay women increased Malay hostility 
towards the latter. When Malays saw these actions they failed to distinguish 
between Chinese 'communists' and 'non-communists'. All Chinese were seen 
as the same - the enemy of their race and their religion. Once aroused 
to this point the Malays began to organise themselves and to retaliate.
All that was needed was a misunderstanding or concrete incident to set 
them off.
The Kiyai Phenomenon, or the New Leader
In Chapter I, pp.4-5 above, we noted the emergence in 1928 of 
a peasant Malay Islamic leader in Trengganu during the struggle against 
British rule. .In playing this role he took over from the traditional 
Malay chief. The chiefs had launched a series of abortive uprisings against 
the British between 1875 and 1911, but thereafter no longer attempted to 
lead any opposition to British rule. In all these Malay uprisings the 
religious-mystical elements were prevalent and the Malay military commanders 
were always said to be men in possession of 'secret powers and religious 
knowledge'. It was the uncertain times of Japanese occupation that again 
threw up such Malay leaders with magical qualities.
Under Japanese rule, Malay society continued to rely on the 
weakened Malay aristocracy and the British-trained bureaucratic elite.
8 Muhammad Haji Kidin, ibid.
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At the beginning the KMM non-aristocratic elite had risen to safeguard 
Malay positions in the rural reas, but when they fell from power the 
mantle reverted again to the weakened aristocracy. However, when rural 
Malays found themselves continually harassed and threatened by Chinese in 
the MPAJU/MPAJA, they discovered that neither the Malay aristocracy, 
the Malay police force nor the Malay Giyu Gun were of any help. Every 
strata of Malay society appeared helpless in facing this new foe. Even 
the Japanese found it difficult to suppress the Chinese MPAJU/MPAJA.
It was by turning to their religion, Islam, that the Malays found their 
new leaders. They arose from among the ranks of the alim-ulama (Islamic 
scholars and teachers).
The World of the Sufi Kiyai^
The Malay struggle against the MPAJA/Chinese in Batu Pahat was 
organised mainly by the kiyai who were leaders or members of the Sufi 
mystical orders (tareqah ).^ Islam provides the basic world view and 
action of the Malays through a combination of canon and theological 
instruction from the kiyai. Yet the non-Islamic traditional segment of 
the Malay world view is also obtrusive. Sufi mysticism seems to harmonise 
and accommodate both world views.
9 At the kampung (village) level, a guru is a religious teacher who is 
different from a ehe'gu or guru sekolah (school teacher). The guru 
may be a Uaji who has spent several years in Mecca, yet tok guru, 
tuan guru or kiyai is the form of address the Malay villagers use for 
him. The Javanese have a preference for the term kiyai, the Banjarese 
the term tuan guru. Tok guru is also common, especially in Kelantan 
and Trengganu. Since the inter-racial incidents to be discussed 
occurred in areas in which the Javanese and other Indonesians predominated 
the term kiyai is preferred.
10 The term Sufi means 'mystic', while the term Tasawwuf expresses what
is understood by the word 'mysticism'. There are believed to be nine 
Sufi orders existing in Malaya, of which only three are said to be 
really widespread and popular among the Malays - the Qadiriyyah, the 
Naqshbandiyyah and the Ahmadiyyah . Dr Syed Naguib al-Attas of 
Universiti Kcbangsaan Malaysia (who hails from Batu Pahat) is the leading 
Malay authority on Sufism in Malaya. He writes: 'Although there are
various orders scattered throughout Malaya, there is no single Shaykh
or leader exercising absolute authority over any particular one of 
them. Such being the case, we find there are many Shaykh to a 
single Tareqah, and these are local Shaykh , their leadership being 
recognised by members of their respective Tareqah in particular 
localities....' See Syed Naguib al-Attas, Some Aspects of Sufism:
As understood and practised among the Malays, Singapore, 1963, 1, 33-34.
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It is easy to confuse the Sufi mystic with the shaman because
both profess knowledge of supernatural powers. The occult powers of
shaman such as the pawang and the bomoh^ are not unknown to the Sufi
mystic, who will occasionally perform some of the functions of either the
12pawang or the bomoh, when required to do so. Yet in many ways they are
different from one another. The Sufi mystic is within the newer Malay
world view or system which is Islam, and his role and actions are devoted
to Islam. The pawang or bomoh is of the older Malay world view of animism
and adat or tradition. Spirit worship is frowned upon by Islam, which
sees it as worship of the Devil. Because of this, the office of the
pawang and the bomoh is said to be falling into abeyance, yet they are
still regarded by Malays as a relevant part of their constituted order
13of society, without whom no village community is complete. Local Malay
11 Pawang means 'magician or wizard' and bomoh 'local medicine man or
doctor, versed in traditional medicine.' The pawang was formerly 
required to perform agricultural rites in order to ensure good 
harvests of crops, or fish, or even ore during mining. The bomoh 
usually practise their art for the cure of human disease. Both terms 
are, however, often used as though they are interchangeable. See 
W.W. Skeat, Malay Magic, London (1900), 1965 reprint, 56-57. In 
1955/56, in a village in the mukim of Batu Pahat, only the office of 
bomoh was still in use when Kenelm O.L. Burridge visited it. He 
comments: 'The activities associated with a pawang should be no
concern of a good Muslim; they are, in the main, occult, and the more 
power of this kind a pawang has the further he retreats from the 
community and from Islamic values. He lives alone and 'concentrates' 
on his expertise: only a lesser pawang lives in the village.' A
single man may combine the functions of pawang and bomoh, but Malay 
villagers still seek a bomoh if it is impossible to get a Western- 
educated doctor. See Burridge, 'Managerial influences in a Johore 
village', JMBRAS, XXX, May 1957, 99-100.
12 The late Haji Fadil of Johor (died 1956) , a Shaykh of both the Qadiriyyah 
and Naqshbandiyyah orders, was Sultan Ibrahim's favourite pawang or 
'spiritual man'. He studied in Mecca, was a well-known teacher of 
several Sufi tareqah and was estimated to have 4,000 followers in 
Johor, among whom the most famous was Kiyai Salleh bin Abdul Karim
of Simpang Kiri, Batu Pahat. Haji Fadil lived at the Pasir Plangi 
Mosque which belonged to Sultan Ibrahim. It was said he received 
ample allowance from the Sultan who had 'always patronised and kept 
spiritual men about him'. Naguib, 34-35, 52-54.
13 The standing of the bomoh among the Malays was given a big boost by
Tunku Abdul Rahman when he was Prime Minister of Malaysia (1955-1970).
As a patron of the Malaysian Football Association, he frequently sought 
the services of the bomoh to ensure a rainless day for any big soccer 
matches. The Tunku and his successor, the late Tun Abdul Razak, were 
known to have their personal bomoh and pawang.
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perceptions of the Sufi mystic and the shaman are somewhat complicated 
by the view of the orthodox religious authority of the State, as represented 
by the Jabatan or Majlis Ugama (Religious Department or Council), which 
disapproves of many of the magico-mystical practices of both the Sufi mystic 
and the shaman. The clearest distinction between the Sufi mystic and the 
shaman is that they differ in their 'intention' and in the relationship 
in which they stand to their followers. Naguib draws the distinction well:
'The Magician [shaman] would force the "spirits" to grant 
what is desired, which may be that which guards against 
evil, or that which procures favours from the "spirits".
The Sufi does not demand what is desired, rather he 
submits to the Divine will upon which man feels dependent....
'The Magician's followers, or audience, ask for favours and 
their relation to him is temporary in contrast with the 
more permanent relationship that exists between the Sufi 
and his followers. Further, the authority of the Magician 
is not so much based, like that of the Sufi, upon personal 
charisma.' ^
In the kampung of Batu Pahat, as in many other kampung throughout 
the Malay peninsula, the Sufi kiyai are highly venerated by the local 
Malay population. They command prestige and popularity because of 'their 
charismatic powers, and the alleged miracles they are believed to have 
performed, the depth of their learning, the efficacy of their teachings as 
experienced by their followers and the disciples who will propagate them 
to others'."^ In times of crisis and social turmoil the local Malays 
turn to their Islamic religion and to their kiyai for advice and spiritual 
guidance. The charismatic Sufi kiyai can help them to take measures for 
their own self-protection and, if necessary, will organise and train them 
for battle. It is the Sufi kiyai who can invoke supernatural powers in 
the cause of Islam, such as a jihad (Holy War), and lead his followers 
into battle as the Khalifah, the delegate of the Shaykh
[the founder] of the Qadiriyyah Sufi order. He is invested with certain
X6of the Shaykh's powers and represents him in areas remote from his base.
The 'secret powers' which the Sufi kiyai are said to possess include the 
ilmu batin (spiritual or mystical knowledge), ilmu ghaib (knowledge of
14 Naguib, 49-50.
15 Naguib, 34.
16 See Gibb and Kramers, A Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, 236.
285
becoming invisible and inaudible), ilmu pencak silat (knowledge of martial
arts) and ilmu kebal (knowledge of invulnerability). Among the well-known
Sufi mystics of Johor are the late Kiyai Salleh, whose supernatural powers
and fighting prowess are legendary, Haji Muhammad Shah, former Chief Kathi
of Johor, and Haji Othman bin Haji Muhammad Amin of Mukim Simpang Kiri 
17in Batu Pahat.
A war between Muslims and non-Muslims turns into a jihad only 
if it is so declared by any imam, or religious leader. The imam has 
to consider carefully whether the threat to Muslims and to Islam is so 
great that he has no other alternative but toissue the fatwa (the
summons) that all Muslims in the land should go on a jihad. The Shorter 
Encyclopaedia of Islam puts it as follows:
...if a Muslim country is invaded by unbelievers, the 
Imam may issue a general summons calling all Muslims 
there to arms, and as the danger grows so may the 
width of the summons until the whole Muslim world is 
involved. A Muslim who dies fighting in the Path of 
Allah (fi sabil Allah) is a martyr (shahid) and is 
assured of Paradise.... Such a death was in the early 
generations regarded as the peculiar crown of a pious 
life...any war between Muslims and non-Muslims must be 
a jihad with its incitements and rewards....^°
The Mukim of Tanjong Sembrong and Simpang Kiri
Batu ‘Pahat district in Johor was divided into at least fifteen
mukim before the war. The mukim is the smallest territorial and
administrative unit demarcated by the Land Office. In Johor a mukim
consists of a number of kampung varying in size from about ten square
miles to ninety squares miles, and has a population of from 3,000 to
1935,000. The head of each mukim is the penghulu. Although little 
evidence is available on mukim administration during the Japanese 
occupation, it appears that the Japanese did not alter the division of 
the mukim areas and retained the bulk of prewar mukim administrative officials.
17 Not every Sufi kiyai would possess all this knowledge, but he who 
does would emerge the charismatic leader. Naguib, 34-35.
18 Imam generally refers to both the congregational prayer leader or 
any Islamic religious leader. Gibb and Kramers, 89.
19 Burridge, 'Managerial influences in a Johore village', 94.
286
The inter-racial clashes first started in Tanjong Sembrong
known as Mukim VII, and these were followed by clashes in Simpang Kiri,
or Mukim IV (see map on p.287)* In both mukim Indonesians heavily
outnumbered indigenous Malays. In Tanjong Sembrong, Banjarese (from
Banjarmasin in Indonesian Kalimantan) were said to have constituted
about 40 percent of the Malay population, while in Simpang Kiri Javanese
constituted the majority. Other Indonesian elements found in both areas
20were Bugis and Acehnese. The Banjarese, Bugis and Javanese have a
reputation in Malaya for being quite belligerent when aroused. The
Javanses especially are noted for millenarian movements and Sufism, and
21have a tendency to throw forth leaders with magical qualities. Most,
if not all, of the Sufi mystics in Johor were of Indonesian stock.
Kiyai Salleh was locally believed to be of mixed Javanese and Indian Muslim
parentage, although a British report described him as being of Sumatran 
22Malay extraction.
The Chinese population of both mukim in 1945 was reported 
to have been fairly equal to the Malay population, although demographic 
figures in the mukim for 1945 are not available. The 1947 British- 
conducted census of Malaya, which includes mukim population statistics, 
has to be used with caution to establish the demographic picture of the two 
mukim in 1945 . The inter-racial clashes in 1945 caused many Malays and 
Chinese to become displaced from their homes. In areas where their ethnic 
group constituted a tiny minority before, most Malays or Chinese did not 
return even af,ter the area had been pacified. Only areas where Malays 
and Chinese were of roughly equivalent numbers was it likely that both 
groups would remain, stand their ground and fight.
The 1947 census gives the total population of Tanjong Sembrong
20 Musak Mantrak, 'Sejarah masyrakat majemuk di Mukim VII, Batu Pahat 
(History of the plural society in Mukim VII, Batu Pahat), Johor, 
1900-1945', B.A. Hons thesis, University of Malaya, 1974/75, 2.
21 A.B. Ramsay, 'Indonesians in Malaya', JMBRAS, 29, May 1956, 120.
22 Halinah Bamadhaj, 'The Impact of the Japanese occupation of Malaya 
on Malay society and politics, 1941-45', M.A. thesis, University of 
Auckland, 1975, 210. See also Hqs Malaya Command WIR No.14, 'Malay 
religious activity', in W0 172/9773.
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MUAR
1 Tangkak
2 Bukit Seram pang 
(Jem entah)
3 Bukit Kopong
4 I nngn
5 Gerr.ek
6 Jorak
7 Ayer H itam
8 Serom
9 Sungm Tornp
10 Sungei Raya
11 Baku
12 Pant Jnw a
13 Sri Menanti
14 Sungei Bnlang
15 Kundang
16 Kesang
17 Bandar M aharani
18 Parit Bakar
BATU PAHAT
1 Bandar Fcnggaram
2 Sungei Pmggan
3 Benut
4 S impang Kiri
5 S impang Kanan
6 Linau
7 Tanjong Sembrong
8 Sri Gading
9 M inyak Beku
10 Kampong Bahru
11 Sungei Punggor
12 Sungei Kiuang
13 Peserai
14 Kampong Bagan
15 Lubok
16 Chnah Bahru
17 Sri M edan
In te rn a tio n a l boundary
S ta te  boundary
D is tr ic t boundary
M uk im  boundary
M ovom onts of tho  Rod Bands 
o f tho  S a b ilillah  A rm y
M ovom onts d u rin g  in to r racia l 
c lashes and in the  period 
a fte r th e  Japanese surrender
T e rr ito ry  o f the  4 th  R egim ent 
M P A JA
Map illustrating the mukim of Muar and Batu Pahnt and the separate 
movements of the 3rd and 4th Regiments, r^AJA, and the Red Bands of 
the Sabilillah Aimy during the period May-August 1945.
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as 14,170 of which the Malays numbered 8,674 and the Chinese 5,147. In
Simpang Kiri the total population was reported to be 10,715 of which
23the Malays comprised 10,320 and the Chinese 284 persons. It is clear 
that the Simpang Kiri figures cannot be taken to reflect the situation 
in 1945, as it shows that the whole mukim ended up practically 100 percent 
Malay. Simpang Kiri was the military stronghold of Kiyai Salleh and the 
1947 statistics reflect Malay supremacy in the fighting. On the other 
hand, the figures of Tanjong Sembrong can probably be taken to indicate 
that the .demographic picture had remained roughly unchanged despite 
violent inter-racial clashes. The resilient Chinese presence in the 
mukim in 1947 was probably due to both their ability to withstand Malay 
attacks in 1945, and to the efforts of the BMA to encourage large numbers 
of Chinese settlers to return to their homes in Tanjong Sembrong after 
the British had regained administration of the area.
The Sabilillah Movement
Malay self-defence measures in Batu Pahat district, and later
in Muar district, finally coalesced into the Sabilillah movement. I
prefer to use the term Sabilillah, meaning the Holy War, to describe the
movement because there is evidence to indicate that it was so-called at
the time. Halinah Bamadhaj, who has studied the racial clashes in Mukim IV
Simpang Kiri, Batu Pahat, calls it the Muhammadiah movement. It is said
to have got its name from the Muhammadiah organisation formed by the
24Penghulu of Simpang Kiri, Mohd. Kari.
23 M.V. del Tufo, Malaya: A Report on the 1947 Census of Population,
London, 1947, 150.
24 Bamadhaj, 205-14. Musak Mantrak uses the expression berjihad fi 
sabilillah to describe the Malay religious movement in Batu Pahat 
in his article, 'Ancaman Komunis (The Communist threat), 1945-46’, 
in the magazine Dian Diges, Kota Bharu, January 1977, 21, and in 
his more detailed thesis, op.cit., 66, 70. Hairi Abdullah also uses 
the term Sabil frequently in his article, 'Kcbangkitan dan Gcrakan 
Tentera Selendang Merah dalam sejarah daerah Muar dan Batu Pahat’ 
(The emergence and development of the Army of the Red Bands in
the local history of Muar and Batu Pahat), in Jebat, journal of 
the Historical Society, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1973/75,
9—10. Another source which clearly calls it the 'Sabilillah' is 
the British military intelligence report entitled 'Malay religious 
activity' in WTR No.14, Hq. Malaya Command, 2 February 1946 in 
WO 172/9773.
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The Sabilillah was not an organisation but a loose religious
25movement based on Sufi mysticism. Its objects were basically to arouse 
the Malays, encourage them to overcome Chinese domination and to strengthen 
Malay self-confidence. These teachings naturally fostered widespread 
antagonism towards Chinese and encouragement to kill Chinese. In short, 
its object was purely and simply anti-Chinese. It was religious because
the best way to arouse and to unite the Malays was through their Islamic
, . . 26 religion.
The Sabilillah teachings took the form of congregating Malays to
recite verses of the Koran, as a result of which they were supposed to
27become invulnerable during warfare. Charms were also used to confer
invulnerability, the chief one being a gold needle or a piece of stone
known as delima, which was blessed and then pierced into the forearm of 
2 8the convert. Drinking a potion blessed by the imam or kiyai was also 
said to give the convert invulnerability. These teachings had a great 
effect on Malays in Batu Pahat, even though many Malays were killed in the
25 Naguib confirms that the Sufi tareqahs (orders) played a role in 
the Malay struggle in Batu Pahat. Although the Sufi tareqahs
in Malaya have been peaceful and non-militant, yet they are said to 
have definitely influenced the outlooks of the Malays with regard to 
their system of political and social order. Naguib adds, ’They [the 
Sufi orders ] have never been known to exhibit a religious militarism 
except perhaps during the Batu Pahat uprising which threatened the 
whole of Malaya with communal strife.' However in some countries, 
the Naqshbandiyyah and Ahmadiyyah orders have exerted their political 
role and tended towards militarism. In Sumatra, for example, the 
Naqshbandis are said to have shown themselves capable of tending to 
militance or aggressiveness whenever the circumstances permit.
Naguib, 64, 99. For Naqshbandiyyah activity in Java in the 19th 
century, see Sartono Kartodirjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888, 
's-Gravenhage, 1966. They were also thought to be a militant factor 
in Minangkabau in the mid-19th century.
26 See WIR No.14, Hq. Malaya Command, article 'Malay religious 
activity', in WO 172/9773.
27 Hairi Abdullah, op.cit., 11, gives an elaborate description of the 
ritual. See also WIR No.14, Hq. Malaya Command, 'Malay religious 
activity'.
28 The use of the stone delima was told to me by Ahmad Jais, First 
Secretary (Information) Malaysian High Commission, Canberra, 
interviewed 15 October 1977.
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29fighting which ensued. The method practised by the legendary Kiyai
Salleh and his followers, was said to consist of the recitation, several
hundred times repeated, of certain verses of the Koran after each of the
five prayers obligatory every twenty-four hours. Disciples were warned
that attainment or failure of invulnerability depended on their own behaviour
and that success would only be achieved if they faithfully followed the
teachings. Above all, they were forbidden to steal, rape, torture or kill
anyone innocent, or to provoke action. They were only to defend themselves.
The disciple who failed to follow these instructions scrupulously would
30lose his invulnerability.
Kiyai Salleh first came into prominence in May/June 1945 when
he organised Malay resistance effectively in his Simpnng Kiri area and led
Malays in attacking Chinese. His fame began to spread throughout the entire
Batu Pahat district. Malays were particularly impressed by the real or
exaggerated stories of his supernatural powers. lie is said once to have
subdued, single-handed, a group of about 200 Chinese. At another time,
to the amazement of his men, he alone lifted two huge coconut trees which
31barred his line of advance. A BMA intelligence report has described
his other known supernatural powers:
Che'gu [Teacher] Salleh himself - it is popularly claimed 
- cannot be killed by bullets; he can walk dryshod across 
rivers; he can burst any bonds that are put upon him; his 
voice can paralyse his assailants, making them drop their 
weapons; and were Chinese to take him and set him in a 
cauldron of boiling water he would emerge alive and 
unharmed. 32
These powers Kiyai Salleh had also delegated to two principal assistants
who, together with himself, had the ability to confer 'invulnerability'
upon devotees who faithfully observed the ritual he had laid down. The
power', however, lasted 'only as long as the Faith of the Initiate in his
33own safety is firm’.
29 WIR No.14, 'Malay religious activity', WO 172/9773.
30 Hairi Abdullah, 11.
31 These two stories are cited in Naguib, 48.
32 See WIR No.31, article 'Che Salleh and his Red Bands', up to 11 June 
1946, in WO 172/9773.
33 Ibid.
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Kiyai Salleh is said to have been born in Parit Jawa, a few 
miles south of Muar town. He was a disciple of Kiyai Haji Fadil, a Shaykh 
of both the Qadiriyyah and Naqshbandiyyah Sufi orders and the pawang of 
Sultan Ibrahim. He was believed to have been a leader of gangs of robbers 
before the war, for which he spent a period in prison.34 Naguib describes 
him as an enigmatic personality, of short stature and dark complexion, 
who sported a goatee and had small beady eyes that could ’at times glow 
with boyish mischief, or glare with a fury that has been known to strike 
terror into the hearts of his enemies’.35 During the height of the 
fighting in Batu Pahat he is said to have had constant visisions of Shaykh 
Abdul-Qadir Jilani, the Founder of the Qadiriyyah order, who warned him 
of imminent dangers and aided him many times in overcoming his enemies in
various supernatural ways. Naguib records a story which Kiyai Salleh told 
him:
One day in the month of Ramadhan [fasting month], he had 
a vision of Shaykh 'Abdul-Qadir Jilani who appeared dressed 
in black. The Shaykh warned him of imminent attack by the 
Chinese Bandits', revealing to him their position and their 
line of advance. The Panglima [Kiyai Salleh] at once rounded 
up his men and surprised the 'Bandits' whom he found exactly 
as described in the vision, and who were preparing to launch 
their attack. It was reported that the Chinese 'Bandits' 
feared Panglima Salih very much.36
During the interview he showed Naguib his famous sword (parang panjang), 
which had claimed 172 heads. Despite his known exploits, Kiyai Salleh 
was never arrested after the British returned. The reason will become 
evident later in this chapter.
— lentera Sabil Selandang Merah, or Holy War Army of the Red Bands
(
This was the military organisation of Kiyai Salleh, which took 
its name from the selendang merah (a band or sash of red cloth) worn on
34 Halinah Bamadhaj, 210-11.
35 Naguib , 4 7.
36 36id., 48. The month of Ramadhan refers to August/September 1945. 
The title of Panglima means Chief Warrior or Commander-in-Chief.
37 This is the full title given in Hairi Abdullah, 9.
292
t h e  arms o f  t h e  f o l l o w e r s ,  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  whom were  s a i d  t o  be J a v a n e s e  
38and B a n j a r e s e .  K i y a i  S a l l e h  and h i s  commanders wore a w i d e r  r ed  band
a c r o s s  t h e i r  c h e s t s .  The weapon which  he  and h i s  men u s u a l l y  c a r r i e d
was th e  lo n g  sword o r  machete  known as  t h e  p a r a n g  p a n j a n g , though  o t h e r
39known weapons used  were t h e  l e m b i n g , k r i s , pedang  and tombak. The
Red Bands a t t a c k e d  on ly  w i t h  t h e s e  weapons ,  w h i l e  t h e  MPAJA would meet
them w i t h  guns and b u l l e t s .  C h inese  a c c o u n t s  c o n f i r m  t h a t  w h i l e  few o f
t h e i r  Malay a t t a c k e r s  were armed w i t h  a u t o m a t i c  weapons ,  y e t  they  were
a b l e  t o  i n f l i c t  heavy c a s u a l t i e s  among th e  C h in e s e .  Th is  a t t e s t s  t o  t h e
f i g h t i n g  cou ra ge  and r e l i g i o u s  f a n a t i c i s m  o f  t h e  S a b i l i l l a h  Army. In
f a c t ,  t h e  C h inese  commonly c a l l e d  t h e  Malay bands  which a t t a c k e d  them
shou  dao (Long K n i v e s ) , r e f e r r i n g  c l e a r l y  t o  t h e  p a ra n g  p a n j a n g . The
S a b i l i l l a h  Army u n d e r  K iy a i  S a l l e h Ts l e a d e r s h i p  had n o t  come i n t o
e x i s t e n c e  when t h e  Malays began  t h e i r  a t t a c k s  on t h e  C h inese  i n  May 1945.
I n d e p e n d e n t  Muslim groups  had  a r i s e n  f i r s t  i n  Tan jong  Sembrong.  One
g r o u p ,  t h e  B a r i s a n  I s l a m  (The Muslim F r o n t )  unde r  Tuan Guru (T e ac he r )
H a j i  Mokhtar  o f  Tan jong  Semberong, was s a i d  to  have l e d  t h e  i n i t i a l
40a t t a c k  on t h e  C h ine se .
Due to  h i s  p o p u l a r i t y ,  K i y a i  S a l l e h  was u rged  to  b r i n g  t h e  v a r i o u s  
g roups  i n  Batu  P a h a t  unde r  h i s  c e n t r a l  command, and th e  S a b i l i l l a h  Army 
came i n t o  b e i n g  p r o b a b l y  i n  June  o r  J u l y  1945.  I t  became most  a c t i v e  
d u r i n g  t h e  i n t e r r e g n u m  a f t e r  the  J a p a n e s e  s u r r e n d e r  b u t  b e f o r e  t h e  
a r r i v a l  o f  B r i t i s h  t r o o p s  i n  the  a r e a .  Most Malay a c c o u n t s  focus  on i t s  
a c t i v i t i e s  d u r i n g  t h i s  i n t e r i m  p e r i o d ,  r e g a r d i n g  i t s  a p p e a r a n c e  as  t h e  
r i v a l  o f  t h e  MPAJA. I t  meted o u t  r e t a l i a t i o n  f o r  t h e  w i d e s p r e a d  MPAJA 
a b d u c t i o n s ,  t o r t u r e s  and e x e c u t i o n s  o f  Malays as  i n f o r m e r s  and c o l l a b o r a t o r s .
38 I b i d .
39 These a r e  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  Malay k n i v e s  and s p e a r s  u sed  d u r i n g  
Malay w a r f a r e  i n  the  p a s t  wh ich  were a p p a r e n t l y  r e v i v e d  f o r  u se  o f  
t h e  S a b i l i l l a h  Army. For  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  each  o f  t h e s e  weapons ,  
s e e  Donn F. D r a e g e r ,  Weapons and F i g h t i n g  A r t s  o f  the  I n d o n e s i a n  
A r c h i p e l a g o , Tokyo, 1972.
40 Tuan Guru H a j i  Mokhtar was s a i d  t o  have  assumed the  Commander 's r o l e  
o f  K h a l i f a h  i n  t h e  Holy War. See Musak M a n t r a k ,  ' S e j a r a h  m a s y a r a k a t  
majemuk d i  mukim V I I ,  Ba tu  P a h a t ' ,  64 ,  68;  and h i s  a r t i c l e ,  
'Anchaman Komunis,  1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 6 ' ,  21 -22 .
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The s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  S a b i l i l l a h  Army and i t s  K i y a i  commanders d u r i n g  the  
i n t e r i m  p e r i o d  was s a i d  to  be as  f o l l o w s :
Commander - in -C hie f  K i y a i  S a l l e h  Abdul  Karim
G e n e r a l  comm iss ioner  
South J o h o r
E a s t  J o h o r
N or th  J o h o r
K i y a i  Wak Joyo
N o . l  commander, 
N o .2 commander, 
N o . 3 commander,
K i y a i  Kusin 
K i y a i  Mashudi  
K i y a i  Mayor (Moh)
N o . l  commander, 
N o .2 commander,  
No.3  commander ,
N o . l  commander, 
N o .2 commander, 
N o . 3 commander,
K i y a i  Saud i  
K i y a i  Maskam 
K i y a i  S a r b i n i
K i y a i  M u s ta h i r  
K iy a i  H a j i  Shamsuddin 
K i y a i  H a j i  S h u k o r ^
The I n t e r - r a c i a l  C la s h es
The o r i g i n s  o f  t h e  i n t e r - r a c i a l  c l a s h e s  i n  Tan jong  Sembrong and 
Simpang K i r i  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  w i t h  any c e r t a i n t y .  Th is  i s  due 
to  n  p rob lem  o f  s o u r c e s .  There a r e  more Malay than  C h inese  a c c o u n t s  o f  
t h e s e  c l a s h e s .  These and o t h e r  s o u r c e s  -  e s p e c i a l l y  J a p a n e s e  and MPAJA -  
a r e  a l s o  so c o n t r a d i c t o r y  t h a t  i t  i s  b e s t  t o  i n t r o d u c e  each  a c c o u n t  
s e p a r a t e l y  as  r i v a l  p e r c e p t i o n s  of  t h e  same i n c i d e n t s ,  and t h e n  t o  a t t e m p t  
a judgm en t .
(a)  The Malay v e r s i o n
T r o u b le  i s  s a i d  to  have begun i n  A p r i l  1945 i n  t h e  mukim o f  Tan jong
Sembrong,  when a p a r t i c u l a r  k e t u a  kampung (headman) named Daud was a b d u c te d
by t h e  MPAJA w h i l e  t r a v e l l i n g  to  Yong Peng.  He was b e l i e v e d  to  have  been
k i l l e d ,  b u t  h i s  body was n e v e r  r e c o v e r e d .  The d i s a p p e a r a n c e  o f  t h r e e
more Malays i n  t h e  mukim, one a f t e r  a n o t h e r ,  began  to  c a use  r e a l  c o n c e r n
t o  t h e  Malay p o p u l a t i o n .  I t  was b e l i e v e d  t h a t  th e y  had each  been
a b d u c te d  s e c r e t l y ,  and were e i t h e r  t o r t u r e d  o r  k i l l e d  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h
t h e i r  f a i l u r e  t o  c o l l e c t  t h e  v a r i o u s  ’ t a x e s ’ wh ich  t h e  C h inese  MPAJU
42o f f i c i a l s  had imposed on th e  Malays .
The mukim had a mixed M ala y -Ch inese  p o p u l a t i o n .  The Malays were  a l l  
o f  I n d o n e s i a n  s tock,< t h e  m a j o r i t y  b e i n g  B a n j a r e s e .  Each a d u l t  i n  t h e  
v i l l a g e  was a s k ed  t o  pay a c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  $3,  which  was r e g a r d e d  by t h e  
Malays as  e x c e s s i v e .  The penghu lu  and k e t u a  kampung were h e l d  r e s p o n s i b l e
41 l l a i r i  A b d u l l a h ,  10.
42 Musak M a n t r a k ,  ' S e j a r a h  m a s y a r a k a t  majemuk d i  mukim V I I ,  Ba tu  P a h a t ' , 
70.
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for collecting the money every month from the Malays. The Chinese villagers
were also forced to contribute, but apparently paid up with little protest.
MPAJII threats were frequently issued to those who refused to contribute
money or to provide other needs such as supplies, intelligence and 
43recruits.
The head of the Chinese MPAJU in the mukim was named Seng Nga, his 
assistant Ah Koi, and their headquarters was in Kangkar Serom. As 
early as 1942 they had tried to persuade the Malays in the mukim to 
join the MPAJU, and finally succeeded in getting several Malays to 
establish the Malay section. A schoolteacher, Chik Gu Jamain b. Abdul 
Hamid, was appointed president of the section. The ’Justice of the 
Peace' was Shahran bin Abdul Ghani, and the treasurer Salleh bin Yunus.
The Malay section would work with the penghulu and ketua kampung to raise 
contributions among the villagers towards financing the activities of 
the MPAJU and MPAJA. Race relations were said to have been relatively 
peaceful until the Chinese MPAJU officials began behaving arrogantly towards 
Malays in the latter part of the Japanese occupation. By April 1945, the 
Malays found MPAJU insults and harassment so unbearable that the Malay 
section refused to cooperate any longer.
Soon after this there was an incident in which two Sumatran Malays 
were abducted by the MPAJU/MPAJA. One escaped back to his kampung 
with the news that his friend had been killed. It was then that the Malays 
realised what the fate of the other missing Malays must have been. This 
discovery most angered the Banjarese, who had suffered more than others 
and who could no longer bear the Chinese harassment. The Malay section 
enquired of the MPAJU headquarters the whereabouts of the 'missing men', 
but drew evasive answers. The penghulu of Tanjong Sembrong reported the 
disappearances to the Japanese authorities, but no immediate action was 
taken. This soon led to the abduction and killing of the president of 
the Malay section of the MPAJU, Chik Gu Jamain. A group of armed Chinese 
guerrillas appeared at his house one night in April 1945, bundled him 
into a gunny sack and carried him away. The incident was witnessed by 
other Malays. Although he screamed for help, no one dared to go to his 
rescue. There had been a struggle in the house, as evidenced by bloodstains
43 The account that follows is taken mainly from Musak Mantrak, 42-82.
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on the walls and broken property all over the place. He was never seen 
again.
On 3 May a group of MPAJA men appeared at Parit Khalid to abduct two
more Malays. Again, one of the Malays escaped and fled to the home of
a ketua kampung, Haji Talib, who was a disciple of the Sufi mystic Tuan
Guru Haji Mokhtar. This led to resistance against the MPAJU/MPAJA being
organised. Haji Mokhtar immediately assumed leadership and began
preparations to train and form a fighting group with himself at the
head. The news also spread that the MPAJU had ordered a ban on gatherings
for Friday prayers. Apparently the ban was imposed to prevent the Malays
coming together with those in other districts to organise any resistance.
The MPAJU must have learnt that some organisation of resistance was already
under way. Tuan Guru Haji Mokhtar issued the fatwa jihad (the call to
wage the Holy War). On 5 May Malays reported to the District Officer
(DO) of Batu Pahat, Ismail bin Dato Abdullah, and also to the Japanese
authorities, rumours of MPAJU/MPAJA plans to attack the Malay population.
The DO discounted the rumours, but the Japanese took the reports seriously
this time. They decided that the Malays and the Japanese would coordinate
their attacks on the MPAJU/MPAJA. At 11 p.m. the Malays attacked an MPAJA
detachment in Asam Bubok, and during the skirmish killed the MPAJU leader
Seng Nga. On 6 May, Japanese Kempeitai officers and troops, assisted by
two Malay youths, arrived In the mukim and rounded up a lorry load of
Chinese. The MPAJA carried out reprisals against the Malays in
retaliation. Malay attacks were said to be well-planned, each group
comprising forty men from a particular kampung, but most of the Chinese
who fell victim to the blades of the parang pnnjang were believed not to
44have been involved in the MPAJU at all. No Chinese or Malay in the mukim
could any longer escape from the conflict.
The clashes soon spread to Mukim IV Simpang Kiri, whose penghulu
Mohd. Kari, invited Kiyai Salleh to lead the Malays against the Chinese.
He also formed an organisation, the Muhammadiah, to unite Malays against
the MPAJA. It included all influential local officials, religious and 
45secular. In other mukim, trouble had also started over misunderstandings
44 Ibid., 74.
45 Halinah Bamadhaj, 209-11.
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between  Malays and the  MPAJA/Chinese. The MPAJA/Chinese b e h a v io u r
was r e g a r d e d  a s  a r r o g a n t  and u n b e a r a b l e .  R e p o r t s  o f  communist  a t r o c i t i e s
s p r e a d .  The MPAJA was s a i d  to  have b u t c h e r e d ,  gunned clown o r  beheaded
Malays and a d m i n i s t e r e d  t h e  ' w a t e r  t r e a t m e n t ’ -  t h a t  i s ,  pumping w a t e r
i n t o  t h e  v i c t i m ' s  body u n t i l  t h e  b e l l y  s w e l l e d ,  im m ers ion  i n  a tub o f
w a t e r  u n t i l  drowned ,  or  s c a l d i n g  w i th  h o t  w a t e r .  MPAJA/Chinese ' r e v e n g e '
k i l l i n g s  were s a i d  to  have t ak e n  t h e i r  t o l l  o f  Malay o f f i c i a l s  -  DO,
46k e t u a  kampung, penghu]u and p o l i c e m e n .
On 10 J u n e ,  t h e  MPAJA k i l l e d  t h e  DO o f  Ba tu  P a h a t , I s m a i l  b i n  
47A b d u l l a h ,  a t  Benut .  The MPAJA i s  s a i d  to  have made a  d e te r m in e d
e f f o r t  to  t r a c k  him down. A d r a m a t i c  a c c o u n t  o f  Lhe a s s a s s i n a t i o n  by
an e y e - w i t n e s s  r e v e a l s  t h a t  b e s i d e s  the  DO, a Ce y lone se  d o c t o r  and a
J a p a n e s e  o f f i c e r  were a l s o  gunned down a t  a p u b l i c  f u n c t i o n :
The k i l l i n g  o f  ou r  D i s t r i c t  O f f i c e r ,  I n c h e  I s m a i l  and 
Dr Woodhull  by MPAJA t e r r o r i s t s  i n  Benut  in  J u l y  1945 
was a t r a g e d y .  Inche  I s m a i l  was a b r i l l i a n t  o f f i c e r  who 
had bo rne  t h e  w e i g h t  o f  o f f i c e  t h ro u g h  th e  t r y i n g  and 
d i f f i c u l t  y e a r s  o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  O c c u p a t io n  w i t h  
c o n s p ic u o u s  s u c c e s s .  Dr Woodhull  was a J a f f n a  Tamil  and 
was my f r i e n d  and n e ig h b o u r .  He had accompanied  I s m a i l ,  
the  D i s t r i c t  O f f i c e r ,  Dr Ng Giolc Seng and two J a p a n e s e  
o f f i c i a l s  t o  Benut  to  do r e l i e f  work among f l o o d  v i c t i m s .
The v i s i t  was w i d e ly  a d v e r t i s e d  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  a t t e n d a n c e  
o f  a s  l a r g e  a number o f  d e s t i t u t e s  as  p o s s i b l e  f rom the  
i n t e r i o r  and t h u s  a f f o r d e d  t h e  MPAJA t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  to  
l a y  an ambush. I t  would a p p e a r  t h a t  Dr Woodhull  had a 
p r e m o n i t i o n  t h a t  he would n o t  r e t u r n  a l i v e  and d i d  n o t  
want  to  go a t  f i r s t  b u t  l a t e r  changed h i s  mind and went .
A f t e r  t h e  p a r t y  a r r i v e d  in  Benut  t hey  were e n t e r t a i n e d  
to  a r e c e p t i o n  by the  Chinese  Chamber o f  Commerce. Soon 
a f t e r  t h e  e n t e r t a i n m e n t  s t a r t e d ,  someone r an g  a b e l l  and 
the  b u i l d i n g  was s u r r o u n d e d  by a d e ta c h m e n t  o f  t h e  MPAJA.
D e s p i t e  Dr Ng Giolc Seng’ s p l e a  t o  t h e  D i s t r i c t  O f f i c e r  
and Dr Woodhull  n o t  to  run  away, t hey  f o l l o w e d  t h e  
J a p a n e s e  o f f i c e r s  and t r i e d  to  run  t h e  g a u n t l e t  o f  g u n f i r e  
which g r e e t e d  t h e i r  e f f o r t .  The D i s t r i c t  O f f i c e r ,  Dr 
Woodhull  and one o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  o f f i c e r s  were s h o t  and
46 Anwar A b d u l l a h ,  Dato Onn. P e t a l i n g  J a y a ,  1971, 9 6 -97 .
47 Two s o u r c e s  which  g ive  10 June  as  t h e  d a t e  o f  t h e  k i l l i n g  a r e
Musak M a n t r a k ,  ’ S e j a r a h  m a s y a r a k a t  majemuk d i  mukim V I I ,  Ba tu  P a h a t ’ , 
60,  72 and Zabha,  Tan S r i  l l a j l  Mohamod Noah (A b i o g r a p h y ) , Kua la  
Lumpur, 1976.
48 See Anwar A b d u l l a h ,  Dato Onn, 95 -100 .
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and k i l l e d  i n s t a n t l y  w h i l e  t h e  s o l e  s u r v i v i n g  J a p a n e s e  
d iv e d  i n t o  t h e  Benut  R i v e r  and swam to  s a f e t y .
Dr Ng Giok Seng was t a k e n  t o  a j u n g l e  h i d e o u t  where he 
rem a ine d  t i l l  the  l i b e r a t i o n  o f  Malaya.  I t  was he who 
gave me an a c c o u n t  o f  the  i n c i d e n t  r e c o u n t e d  above and 
s a i d  t h a t  h i s  c a p t o r s  had  t o l d  him t h a t  Dr W o o d h u l l ' s  
l i f e  would have been s p a r e d  had he n o t  a t t e m p t e d  t o  run 
away. Th is  was c e r t a i n l y  t r u e  f o r  soon a f t e r  Dr W oodhu ll ’ s 
d e a t h ,  h i s  widow r e c e i v e d  a l e t t e r  f rom t h e  MPAJA e x p r e s s i n g  
r e g r e t  f o r  k i l l i n g  h e r  husband  and f o r w a r d i n g  a sum of
money by way o f  c o m p e n s a t i o n . ^
I t  was t h i s  type  o f  ’v e n g e a n c e '  k i l l i n g  o f  Malay o f f i c i a l s  which  i n c i t e d  
Malay r e l i g i o u s  l e a d e r s  to  c a l l  on t h e i r  f o l l o w e r s  to  b e r j i h a d  and 
t o  d e fe n d  t h e m s e l v e s .
(b) The J a p a n e s e  v e r s i o n
There  i s  a l s o  a J a p a n e s e  newspaper  a c c o u n t “*^  o f  how Malays i n  t h e
kampung o f  S e r i  Medan (Mukim 17) i n  Ba tu  P a h a t  d i s t r i c t  took  up arms
a g a i n s t  ' c o m m u n i s t i c  b a n d i t s '  on 11 May 1945.  S e r i  Medan i s  15 m i l e s
n o r t h e a s t  o f  Batu  P a h a t  town, o r  Bandar  Penggaram as  t h e  Malays p r e f e r
to  c a l l  i t .  The Penang Shimbun, t a k i n g  what i t  c a l l e d  a ' g r a n d  s t a n d
v iew '  o f  t h e  i n c i d e n t ,  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  t r o u b l e  had s t a r t e d  as  e a r l y  as
15 F e b r u a r y  1945,  when t h e  MPAJA h e l d  a b i g  m e e t in g  a t  S e r i  Medan
which  a l l  v i l l a g e r s ,  Malays and C h i n e s e ,  were f o r c e d  t o  a t t e n d .
T h e r e a f t e r  t h e  MPAJA l e v i e d  'commodity t a x e s ' ,  ' h e a d  t a x e s ' ,  and
’p r o p e r t y  t a x e s ’ , n o t  on ly  on M alays ,  b u t  a l s o  on C h in e s e .  The g u e r r i l l a s
a l s o  a l l e g e d l y  commit ted  ' a l l  k i n d s  o f  m i s c h ie v o u s  a c t s  i n c l u d i n g
a s s a u l t s  on m osque s ’ i n  ' B a r i s a n  Bubok' (Asam B u b o k ) :
Enraged  by t h e s e  a s s a u l t s  [on th e  mosques]  a Malay l e a d e r  
i n  S e r i  Medan c a l l e d  on t h e  v i l l a g e r s  t o  arm. He t o l d  
them o f  the  b a n d i t s '  a s s a u l t  and they  s t a r t e d  a campaign 
to  conque r  them. They k i l l e d  a few b a n d i t  l e a d e r s  and 
d e p r i v e d  them of  t h e i r  arms and ammunit ion .  A g a i n s t  t h i s  
r e t a l i a t i o n ,  t h e  b a n d i t s  a t t e m p t e d  t o  r ev e n g e  th e m s e lv e s  
and on 11 May, a b o u t  100 o f  them were s e n t  to  the  kampong 
to  t e r r o r i s e  t h e  v i l l a g e r s .  Th is  s t a r t e d  a g e n e r a l  
c o n f l i c t  be tw een  the'  i n n o c e n t  v i l l a g e r s  and b a n d i t s .
49 Tan S r i  S. S h e l v a s i n g a m - M a c l n t y r e , a fo rm er  M a la y s ia n  High C our t  
j u d g e ,  i n  h i s  memoirs ,  Through Memory L a n e , S i n g a p o r e ,  1973,  116-17.
, Of C ey lon -T am i l  o r i g i n ,  M acIn ty re  was a l aw ye r  who p r a c t i s e d  i n  
Batu P a h a t  d u r in g  the  war .
50 Penang Shimbun, 22 June  1945.
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The v i l l a g e r s  w i th  t h e  ' R i s i n g  Sun ’ f l a g  a t  t h e  head 
o f  t h e i r  p r o c e s s i o n  and c a r r y i n g  p a ra n g s  s u c c e e d e d  i n  
c a r r y i n g  o u t  d e a t h - d e f y i n g  a t t a c k s  on t h e  communists .
Thus,  t h e  c ry  o f  ' K i l l  t h e  B a n d i t s  once f o r  a l l '  
movement was r e l a y e d  t o  a l l  t h e  n e i g h b o u r i n g  d i s t r i c t s ,  
and on 14 May in  B a r i s o n g  th e y  k i l l e d  two among t e n  
a t t a c k e r s .  The i n n o c e n t  i n h a b i t a n t s  i n  P a r i t  T iga  then  
began t o  t a k e  r e f u g e  i n  o t h e r  d i s t r i c t s  and c o n s e q u e n t l y  
became s e p a r a t e d  from t h e  hands  o f  Communist ic  b a n d i t s .  I
Soon a f t e r  t h i s  i n c i d e n t ,  t h e  r e p o r t  s a i d ,  the  J a p a n e s e  Army i n t e r v e n e d
and l a u n c h e d  a t t a c k s  on t h e  MPAJA i n  c o o r d i n a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  J o h o r  J i k e i d a n
and t h e  Batu  P a h a t  P o l i c e  F o r c e .  The J a p a n e s e  were c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  what
they  d e s c r i b e d  as  ' f a l s e  p r o p a g a n d a '  s p r e a d  by t h e  MPAJA t h a t  the
i n c i d e n t  was ' a  r a c i a l  c o n f l i c t '  f o s t e r e d  by th e  J a p a n e s e .  To r e b u t  t h e s e
a c c u s a t i o n s ,  t h e  J a p a n e s e  ' c a r r i e d  o u t  such  schemes as  would calm t h e
s i t u a t i o n ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  h e l p i n g  th e  i n n o c e n t  r e f u g e e s  by p r o v i d i n g
them w i t h  homes,  e t c . ' .  The t e n s i o n  was s a i d  t o  have e a s e d  s u b s e q u e n t l y
and ,  i m p r e s s e d  by t h e s e  schem es ,  t h e  p u b l i c  s t a r t e d  to  r e c o n s t r u c t  t h e i r
homes, ' v o i c i n g  a t  the  same t ime t h e i r  f i r m  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t o  c o o p e r a t e
w i t h  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s ' .  The J o h o r  ' S e i c h o '  ( A d m i n i s t r a t o r )  gave a
d o n a t i o n  o f  $200,000 to  b o th  Chinese  and Malay r e f u g e e s ,  w h i l e  ' h a v i n g
52g iv e n  s t r i c t  o r d e r s  t o  t h e  J i k e i d a n  t o  smash t h e  b a n d i t s ' .  In  t h e  
meant ime,  ' Chokan Kakka '  ( t h e  Governor)  a l s o  s e n t  h i s  view of  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  o f f i c i a l l y  to  t h e  ' p r o  J a p a n e s e '  Batu P a h a t  Overseas  C h inese  
A s s o c i a t i o n  p r o c l a i m i n g  t h a t  ' t h i s  c o n f l i c t  was n o t  a r a c i a l  one ,  b u t  
one be tween  th e  b a n d i t s  and t h e  good p u b l i c ' . At the  same t ime th e  
S u l t a n  o f  J o h o r ,  ' f r o m  the  r e l i g i o u s  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ' ,  was s a i d  to  have 
g iven  s t e r n  o r d e r s  to  h i s  f o l l o w e r s  ' t o  d e s t r o y  t h e  enemy o f  r e l i g i o n  
once f o r  a l l ' .
D e s p i t e  t h e  J a p a n e s e  moves,  Penang Shimbun c o n t i n u e d ,  ' b a n d i t s '  
c o n t i n u e d  to  be a c t i v e ,  so t h a t  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  c o u ld  no l o n g e r  s t a n d  by ,  
and ' f i r m l y  d e t e r m i n e d '  in  l a t e  June  t o  c a r r y  o u t  a b i g - s c a l e  a n t i ­
communist  o p e r a t i o n  from t h r e e  d i r e c t i o n s  -  Muar,  Ba tu  P a h a t  and Ke luang -  
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y .  The main body o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  Army moved n o r t h  from
51 I b i d .
52 I b i d .
53 I b i d .
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t h e  Batu  P a h a t - P o n t i a n  highway t h ro u g h  j u n g l e s ,  w h i l e  a u n i t  f rom t h e  
Yong P e n g - B a tu  P a h a t  highway marched e a s t w a r d s .  T h i s  was t o  be a 
' p i n c e r  m o v e m e n t ' , which would  c l o s e  i n  and d e s t r o y  an e s t i m a t e d  
' 1 , 0 0 0  b a n d i t s '  in  P a r i t  Ta ja . .  The n o r t h e r n  J a p a n e s e  Army u n i t  had l i n e d  
up a l o n g  t h e  Muar-Yong Peng highway as  a b l o c k i n g  e l e m e n t ,  w a i t i n g  to  
c u t  o f f  any o f  t h e  g u e r r i l l a s  f l e e i n g  from th e  d r a g n e t .  The J a p a n e s e  
were so c o n f i d e n t  t h a t  t h e y  had th e  MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  t r a p p e d  t h a t  a g r e a t  
d e a l  o f  p u b l i c i t y  was g iv en  to  the  o p e r a t i o n .  They were s u r e  t h a t  i t  
was o n ly  a m a t t e r  o f  t ime b e f o r e  t h e y  had  a l l  t h e  g u e r r i l l a s  c a p t u r e d  
o r  k i l l e d .  The Army's  P ropa ganda  Corps f o l l o w e d  up i n  t h e  r e a r  o f  
t h e  f i g h t i n g  u n i t s  ' w i t h  a l l  means o f  p u b l i c i t y  t o  h e lp  e a s e  t h e  l i v i n g  
c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t  he r e a r '
The o p e r a t i o n  began on 22 J u n e ,  and was r e p o r t e d  t o  have  g a in e d  
some ' s u c c e s s e s ' .  A f t e r  m arch ing  f o r  a few days t h ro u g h  j u n g l e s  which  
had become an awfu l  muddy swamp owing to  heavy  r a i n ,  t h e  J a p a n e s e  t r o o p s  
swooped on t h e  MPAJA b a s e .  'Taken  o f f  t h e i r  g u a r d ' ,  a n o t h e r  newspaper  
r e p o r t e d ,  ' t h e  enemy b a n d i t s  d i s p e r s e d  i n  a l l  d i r e c t i o n s  i n t o  t h e  j u n g l e ,  
l e a v i n g  b e h i n d  AO c o r p s e s  and a l a r g e  amount o f  p r o v i s i o n s ' . " ^
The r e p o r t  went  on:
A f l y i n g  p a r t y  which  s t a r t e d  from Api  Ap i ,  w e s t  o f  P o n t i a n ,  
s u c c e e d e d  i n  s u r p r i s i n g  th e  enemy on a h i l l  n o r t h  o f  the  
S o u t h e r n  h ighway ,  and t a k i n g  t h e  commander o f  t h e  second  
s e c t i o n  p r i s o n e r ,  c a p t u r e d  many w eapons ,  i n c l u d i n g  one 
a u t o m a t i c  13 m i l l i m e t r e  gun m a n u f a c t u r e d  i n  E ng la nd ,  as  
w e l l  a s  c l o t h e s .  M oreover ,  t h e  n o r t h e r n  u n i t s  which 
had o c c u p i e d  an e s s e n t i a l  l i n e  i n  t h e  n o r t h ,  s e i z e d  enemy 
b a n d i t s  who f l e d  n o r t h w a r d ,  a l o n g  t h e  l i n e  o r  s u r r o u n d e d  
th e  r e s t  i n  t h e  j u n g l e .  They a l s o  a t t a c k e d  t h e  b a n d i t s  on 
th e  S o u t h e r n  h i l l ,  midway between Yong Peng and Ayer Hi tarn, 
as  a r e s u l t  o f  wh ich  they  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  19 enemy c o r p s e s ,
20 p r i s o n e r s ,  and a bo o ty  o f  weapons and much ammunit ion .
M eanwhil e ,  the  w e s t e r n  u n i t s  s u r p r i s e d  and d e s t r o y e d  t h e  
b a n d i t s  on the  n o r t h - w e s t  h i l l  o f  S e r i  Medan (1A m i l e s  
from Yong Peng)  e a r l y  on t h e  m orn ing  o f  2A J u n e ,  and 
l a u n c h e d  an a t t a c k  a g a i n s t  t h e  enemy who f l e d  wes tward  
on t h e  Yong P e n g - B a tu  P a h a t  h ighway.
S i m u l t a n e o u s l y  w i t h  t h e s e  b i g  s u c c e s s e s  o f  o u r  u n i t s ,  
t h e  Syu B o e t a i  [L oca l  Peace P r e s e r v a t i o n  U n i t  s p e c i a l l y
5A I b i d .
M a la i  S i n p o ,  Kuala  Lumpur, 6 J u l y  19A5.55
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t r a i n e d  f o r  f i g h t i n g  and combing o u t  c o m m u n is t s ] ,  which 
was formed by t h e  i n h a b i t a n t s ,  ha s  o c c u p i e d  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  
e a s t e r n  l i n e ,  and a u n i t  f rom t h i s  body i s  g u a r d i n g  th e  
B a tu  P a h a t - A y e r  I tam highway.
I t  l o o k s  as  i f  t h e  b a n d i t s  have  c o m p l e t e l y  l o s t  t h e i r  
s p i r i t  t o  f i g h t ,  and h a v i n g  thrown away t h e i r  weapons 
a r e  e s c a p i n g  t h ro u g h  our  r a n k s ,  w e a r i n g  p l a i n  c l o t h e s .
For  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  t h e  armed b a n d i t s  have  d i s a p p e a r e d  i n  
t h i s  a r e a ,  and a l u l l  p r e v a i l s ,  b u t  ou r  u n i t s ,  
d e t e r m i n e d  t o  c o n t i n u e  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s ,  a r e  p r e p a r i n g  t h e i r  
n e x t  s t r a t e g y .
The r e s u l t s  a c h i e v e d  by o u r  s i d e  wTh i c h  have  been  c on f i rm e d  
a t  p r e s e n t  a r e  as  f o l l o w s : -
Enemy c o r p s e s  abandoned :  64
Enemy t a k e n  p r i s o n e r :  28
Booty :  One a u t o m a t i c  13 m i l l i m e t r e  gun,  seven  r i f l e s ;
1 ,273 rounds  o f  a m m uni t ion ,  21 a u t o m a t i c  
p i s t o l s ;  142 rounds  o f  am m unit ion ;  17 
h u n t i n g  guns ;  87 rounds  o f  ammuni t ion ;
180 rounds  o f  ammunit ion  f o r  a u t o m a t i c  r i f l e ;  
f o u r  hand  g r e n a d e s ,  15 e x p l o s i v e s ,  and many 
t y p e s  o f  b a y o n e t s ,  s p e a r s ,  b i c y c l e s ,  p a r t s  
o f  w eapons ,  p r o v i s i o n s  and c l o t h i n g . 5®
Anxious to  show t h a t  t h e  i n c i d e n t s  i n  t h e  Batu  P a ha t  d i s t r i c t  were 
n o t  r a c i a l ,  and t h a t  the  J a p a n e s e  Army had n o t  gone i n t o  t h e  a r e a  m ere ly  
t o  h e l p  the  M a lays ,  Mala i  Sinpo  a l s o  r e p o r t e d  an i n c i d e n t  o f  10 J u n e  1945» 
i n  which t h e  MPAJA had a t t a c k e d  Benut  i n  Ba tu  P a h a t  d i s t r i c t ,  a town 
w i t h  a p r e d o m i n a n t l y  Chinese  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  3 ,0 0 0 .  The g u e r r i l l a s  were
a l l e g e d  to  have  r a i d e d  t h e  v i l l a g e  and k id n a p p e d  ’a b o u t  2 ,000  i n n o c e n t
p e o p l e ,  m o s t l y  women and c h i l d r e n ,  i n c l u d i n g  th e  w i f e  and c h i l d  o f  Mr Yu
J i n  Nim, S ib u ty o  ( b ra nc h  cha irman)  o f  t h e  O v e r s ea s  Chinese  A s s o c i a t i o n
as w e l l  as  l o o t e d  t h e i r  p r o p e r t i e s ' .  The r e p o r t ,  which made no m en t ion
of  t h e  k i l l i n g  o f  t h e  DO, c o n c lu d e d :
T h i s  w icked  deed i s  c l e a r  p r o o f  t h a t  the  comm unis t ic  b a n d i t s  
da re  t o  v i o l a t e  t h e i r  own c o m p a t r i o t s  and as  a r e s u l t  even 
th e  Chinese  i n h a b i t a n t s  in  t h e  Ba tu  P a h a t  and P o n t i a n  a r e a s ,  
who h i t h e r t o  were s a i d  t o  be n o t  c o o p e r a t i n g  w i t h  Nippon 
a u t h o r i t i e s ,  a r e  now e x t r e m e l y  ang ry  w i t h  them.
The O ve r sea s  C h inese  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  Ba tu  P a h a t ,  i s  a l s o  
f u l l y  c o o p e r a t i n g  w i t h  t h e  S t a t e  Government i n  a f f o r d i n g
56 I b i d .
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relief to the evacuees by means of controlling prices, 
collection and transportation of provision, and 
endeavouring devotedly to restore public peace.
Under the present strained war situation, it is 
evident that this trend should have a great influence 
on the 2,000,000 Overseas Chinese in Malai.^7
(c) The MPAJA version
The MPAJA's 4th Regiment (South Johor) claims that the Japanese,
after their plan 'to provoke racial discord had back-fired on them',
changed their plans and launched a 'systematic offensive' against the 
58Regiment. It confirms that the Japanese Army successfully carried out
operations between June and July 1945 against its headquarters, in which
the Regiment lost 'some of our best commanders - equal to half our
59losses in the past’. On 17 June, the Japanese were reported to have 
mobilised more than 1,000 troops and attacked the regiment's main base 
from three directions. The Japanese advanced along 'four lines of 
encirclement', in an attempt to destroy the whole regiment 'at one stroke'.
But the MPAJA combatants 'bravely crushed the enemy plot and broke through 
the encirclements'. The heroes of this campaign were Sieh-pai and Cheng 
Wen, whose courage and fighting ability were regarded as 'noble and 
exemplary' in the face of enemy fire. One of them was seriously injured.
Both managed to fight their way out of the encirclements.^^
The Regiment appears more concerned with describing its military 
engagements with the Japanese and with canonizing its 'heroes' than with 
the racial clashes in Johore. The record of the Central Military Headquarters 
of the MPAJA is equally reticent, making only a brief reference to the 
racial clashes. The Headquarters claims that because the war was going 
badiy for Japan in 1945, the Japanese decided to retaliate locally by 
attacking the Chinese anti-Japanese movement in Malaya, i.e., the MPAJA.
In Johor the Japanese resorted to stiring racial ill-will. They armed
57 Ibid.
58 See Su-ssu (ed.) K'ang Jill ying hsiung tsai Jou-nan (The Anti- 
Japanese Heroes in Southern Johor), Singapore, 1945, 25-26.
Ibid., 25.59
60 Ibid., 26.
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the Malays and instigated them to attack the Chinese, thereby making
61Malays and Chinese fight and kill one another.
(d) The Chinese version
Very few Chinese accounts provide details of how the racial clashes
in Batu Pahat started. It is usually stated that the Malays were instigated
by the Japanese into attacking and slaughtering Chinese. The Chinese
Government, in a post-war memorandum to the British Government, claimed
that it had received reports that between May and August 1945 there were
several occasions when Malays in Johor, ’instigated by the Japanese Army,
massacred Overseas Chinese there, the victims numbering over 4,000 and
6 2refugees 20,000 and losses of property being very large.’ It gave no
details of the incidents. However one Chinese account, when explaining
the Japanese motive for instigating the Malays, alleged that it was a part
of the 'grand design’ of the Japanese Military Administration to carry
out anti-Chinese operations in the country. It said the decision was
taken in 1944, on the eve of the German collapse (Germany surrendered
unconditionally on 8 May 1945), to fan anti-Chinese feelings among the
Malays and then to instigate them to attack the Chinese. It was believed
that the Malays would obey the Japanese because the former always followed
6 3those in authority. Another Chinese account claims that anti-Chinese
hatred among Malays was whipped up by the Kempeitai and its Malay informers
in Johor a week or so before the Japanese surrender:
The Malay mitays [informers] were instructed to return to 
their kampung and warn their people of a Chinese take-over
61 Hqs. Ex-MPAJA Servicemen's Association, Ma-lai-ya ren min K ’ang Jih 
zi chun chan ji (The diary of the MPAJA’s battles), in Li Tieh Min, 
et.al., Ta-chan yu Nan-Ch'iae (Ma-lai-ya chih pu), Singapore, 1947,
20.
62 The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy in 
Nanking, 7 February 1946, in MU Secret 346/46, Kuala Lumpur. The 
Ministry expressed concern that most of the 'criminals' were not 
punished after the British Army reoccupied Malaya, and noted that there 
was an outbreak of further incidents when Malays massacred Chinese
(in November 1945) .
63 Shih Ming (Anonymous), 'Jih kuo chai Jou-fou shou shan Ton bu ren 
chi liua zhi shi shih' (Japanese instigation behind the anti-Chinese 
activities of the Malays in Johor), in Li Tieh Min, et.al., op.cit♦, 169.
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of their country. They should stir up a Holy War against 
the 'pig-eaters' who would rob them of their heritage.
Whether the Holy War against the Chinese would succeed 
or not was secondary. The important thing was to hit back 
at the Chinese and discomfort them.
Once the first clashes were known, the communists in the 
MPAJA alerted the Chinese in the villages and towns all 
over the country, to be ready for the Malay rampage. The 
cry was: 'The Malays are out to kill - so, kill before you
are killed'. This created fear in the hearts of the people 
and made them dependent on the MPAJA for their safety.^
According to Chinese accounts, the first Malay attack on Chinese in
Batu Pahat was said to have occurred on 10 May 1945, when a car carrying
6 5Chinese was stopped on the Batu Pahat-Pontian road. The driver was
killed instantly, while the owner of the car escaped with some injuries.
The Malays rifled the contents of the car, and then set fire to it.
At the Senggarang police station, the Chinese survivor made a report in 
which he alleged Malay villagers, assisted by Malay policemen, had 
committed the crime. A Chinese detective from this police station 
subsequently leaked the information to some Chinese that the Malay 
officers at the police station had not passed the report up to their 
Japanese superiors, but instead had fabricated a report in which they 
claimed that the robbers and assailants were 'communists'.
This was the beginning of a series of attacks and massacres of Chinese 
by Malays in the Batu Pahat district. The Chinese seemed to have been 
caught entirely by surprise and were baffled by the tenacity of the Malay 
attacks. Derogatory terms used to describe their Malay attackers, such 
as 'rascals' and 'gangsters', are not very helpful in establishing the 
true identity of the latter. However, many Chinese identified the 
presence of Malay policemen within each attacking group, and claimed 
that the police station was frequently used both as 'the army headquarters' 
and as a place of refuge for their attackers. It was noticed that 
policemen seldom used their weapons, and seemed to have been content to
64 Chin Kee Onn, the writer, pers. comm., 26 July 1977.
65 Shih Ming, 'Japanese instigation behind the anti-Chinese activities 
of the Malays in Johore', op.cit., 169. The following narrative
is based mainly on this account.
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remain at the rear to cover the attackers whenever the latter charged
forward. The policemen would intervene and open fire only if they saw
MPAJA guerrillas. The attacking Malays, wielding only long knives (the
parang panjang) and spears, hurled themselves into Chinese homes and
settlements, screaming and killing men, women and children in their path
who could not escape or resist them. After pillaging Chinese houses,
the Malays usually set them on fire. The massacres were also reported
in Parit Gumong, Parit Kecil and Parit Kali.
It was at Parit Kali that the Chinese first put up resistance.
But one night the Malays gathered there in great strength and attacked.
Chinese resistance collapsed and the Chinese suffered huge losses. It
became impossible for Chinese to remain in any settlement where the Malay
attacks did not cease. Hence many Chinese settlers burned their houses
down and moved to seek refuge in the nearest town or settlement with a
larger Chinese population. The MPAJA appeared briefly on the scene.
The guerrillas captured a few Malay 'gangsters', told them Malays and
Chinese should live in peace and released them, so that they could return
to their kampung with the message. But the MPAJA was rebuffed, and Malay
attacks continued. At Parit Raja, about 200 Chinese were believed to have
been massacred. The Malays began to strike terror into the hearts of the
Chinese and the latter were forced to retreat from town to town.
One reason for the high casualties suffered by the Chinese was said
to be the initial Chinese reluctance to abandon their homes and move
immediately out of the rural areas:
Because the Chinese were tied down by their families and 
love of property, they were not united together to resist 
the Malays and therefore suffered great losses in lives...
On the other hand, the Malays abandoned their occupations 
and turned into murderers, all led by headmen in each 
district. As they went from one district to another district, 
they rallied more and more Malays, saying to one another,
'The Chinese are powerless to resist us. We have the Japanese 
forces to back us. Soon we shall be able to share the Chinese 
property amongst ourselves'. Some Malays took the attitude of 
'wait-and-see', while others participated including many 
Malays who had been good friends of Chinese.^
By 23 May the Malays had swept through all the mukim of Batu Pahat and were
66 Ibid.
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beginning to march into the Muar district. More Chinese settlers fled 
to the bigger towns. Unconsciously the Malays had applied the Maoist 
guerrilla strategy of the ’countryside surrounding the cities’. The 
Malays were said to be 'very happy'. Whenever they saw Chinese refugees 
they made the gesture of chopping heads. The Malays began to control all 
the key highways and roads, 'making trouble everywhere, killing Chinese 
at will’. If the Chinese thought they had escaped death by running 
to the towns, they still had to suffer starvation, as very few Chinese 
supplies could now get through. The countryside was dotted with the 
charred ruins of hundreds of Chinese houses and the corpses of Chinese.
The only Chinese who dared to move about in the rural areas were armed
groups or the guerrilla bands of the MPAJA. They attempted to go to the 
rescue of Chinese stranded in isolated farming settlements. These groups 
began to wage guerrilla warfare on the Malays. They avoided strong 
Malay areas, and attacked the weak and isolated ones. As a result, the
Malay toll began to rise. It was a retaliatory attack on Benut on 10
June that was said to have killed the DO of Batu Pahat, Ismail bin Dato 
Abdullah.
It was also the retaliatory attacks of the MPAJA, the Chinese believed, 
which forced the Japanese to intervene militarily on the side of the 
Malays. Both Japanese and Malays regarded the Chinese counter-attack as 
the work of the 'communist bandits'. The Japanese organised a large-scale 
campaign, using their own armed forces together with the Johor Jikeidan 
(Self-Defence Corps) and the Batu Pahat Police Force. The Japanese 
troops were said to have been more courageous than the Malays because 
they dared to penetrate deeper into the jungles to search for the MPAJA.
Any highway that had a side track would be penetrated by a Japanese Army 
detachment, using Malays as guides. Before committing their own forces 
the Japanese had thrown in several reinforcements of Malay police from 
Perak and Malacca, but their performance had been unsatisfactory. A 
stalemate continued for more than a month, until the beginning of August 
when the Japanese resumed operations. A week later, however, they were 
forced to cease their attacks because the Japanese Emperor had surrendered.
67 Ibid., 170.
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Even after the surrender the Malay-Chinese clashes continued, but soon 
contacts were established between both sides, during which the 'Malay 
chief', i.e., Datuk Onn Jaafar, asked for peace and so ended the 
fighting.
(e) The British version
The Malay massacres of Chinese in the Batu Pahat area had not only
alarmed the Japanese authorities and struck terror in the hearts of the
local Chinese population, but also caused concern to Mountbatten's SEAC.
The news was conveyed to SEAC by Force 136 officers in the field. SEAC
leaflets (bearing an emblem of the British flag) were airdropped into
the affected area, urging people to stop fighting. The leaflet, dated
20 July, was in Malay and English. The Malay text carried the heading
Jaga Baik-Baik (Take heed), and said that it had come to the attention
of the British that certain people in the villages of Benut, Senggarang,
Rengit, Pontian Kechil, Yong Peng and Parit Jawa had 'attacked and oppressed
their neighbours in accordance with the wishes of the Japanese who are
69trying to turn one race against another'. It warned that the BMA would 
severely punish the guilty persons. The inhabitants were urged to 
remember the names and misdeeds of these people. The leaflet in Malay 
read:
Macham mana pun Kerajaan British Dapat tangkap orang 
salah.
Jaga baik-baik orang di-Johore! Hari balasan nanti 
sampai!70
Directing its appeal at the Malays, SEAC circulated another leaflet
dated 25 July, in the Malay Jawi script, entitled 'Bersatu Melawan Jepun'
(Unite Against the Japanese). It was written in the form of an appeal
from a Malay individual. The English translation reads:
Before the treacherous Jap attack on our country we 
Malays lived at peace like brothers with the other 
races of Malaya and the Government looked after the 
people of every race, even the Japanese barbers and 
shopkeepers, without oppression and cruelty.
69 See the leaflet P.W. SMA/40 in file 'Malaya-Psychological Warfare 
leaflets, 1945 June-July', in WO 203/4015.
70 Ibid. The English translation reads:
'No one can escape British justice.
Take heed People of Johore!
The Day of Repayment will come.'
307
How different under the Jap oppressors! They do not 
care who starves as long as Japanese bellies are full.
They try to make us Malays hate our fellow Asiatics 
and to turn one race against another. They do this 
because they hope that while people dispute the Japanese 
will remain on top.
Do not be deceived my brothers.
We Malays must join with people of every race who are 
prepared to assist. All races must unite to free Malaya.
The Day of Repayment will come.
Whoever helps to free my country is my friend.^
The meaning of these propaganda leaflets was clear to Malays in Batu 
Pahat who read them. There would be British punishment for those Malays 
involved in the racial clashes. It also meant that the British had taken 
the side of the MPAJA and the Chinese in the conflict.
From all these different accounts the following conclusions emerge. 
It is clear that some MPAJU/MPAJA actions, such as abductions of Malays 
and attacks on mosques, were initially responsible for arousing Malay 
hostility and resistance in Tanjong Sembrong and other mukim in Batu 
Pahat district. Although this picture emerges largely from Malay sources, 
it conforms to the general known picture of MPAJU/MPAJA behaviour throughout 
the Japanese Occupation (see Chapters II and III). As some Malay accounts 
admit, the MPAJU/MPAJA actions were not gratuitous, but represented 
reprisals for Malay non-cooperation and hostility.
Chinese, MPAJA and British accounts blame the Japanese for 
starting the inter-racial clashes, but there is no real evidence to 
substantiate this. It is possible that the Japanese did instigate Malays 
and give backing to the Sabilillah movement after the trouble had started. 
Certainly they added their own military support to the Malay onslaughts, 
inflicting great suffering on the Chinese in the Batu Pahat district.
15 August; The Japanese Surrender
The combined Malay and Japanese onslaughts on the MPAJA and 
the Chinese reduced the Chinese population in south-western Johor to a 
state of fear and despair. The Chinese were now haunted by the prospect
71 See P.W. leaflet SMA/41 in WO 203/4015.
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of starvation, as food supplies dwindled rapidly because of strict Japanese 
controls. The movement of goods, vehicles and people on the highways 
of south-western Johor was curtailed in order to prevent foodstuffs from 
falling into guerrilla hands. Armed Malays roamed the countryside and 
their attacks were unceasing.
The news of Japanese surrender was most welcome to the Chinese
population in south-western Johor, who were now confident that relief would
arrive soon. Before long the guerrillas of the 4th Regiment (South Johor)
came down from the hills and emerged from the jungles to enter and to take
over most towns in the region. Japanese troops either withdrew from the
towns or were confined to barracks, which left the MPAJA guerrillas with
virtually a free hand. The appearance of the Chinese guerrillas, in their
green uniforms supplied by SEAC, with the three-red-star emblem on the
crest of their five-cornered caps, and with guns strapped to their bodies,
was greeted lustily by the Chinese population, who came out into the streets
in large numbers to show support, to welcome the guerrillas as ’liberators' 
72and 'saviours'. MPAJU supporters erected triumphal arches along the 
main streets through which the guerrillas marched. It was a great moment 
of jubiliation for the Chinese, whose morale was further boosted by rumours 
that Chiang Kai-shek's Army would soon arrive with the British Army to 
help reoccupy Malaya temporarily.
The feeling rapidly gained ground among the Chinese in South­
western Johor that the situation had changed to their advantage already.
The MPAJA in particular, and the Chinese in general, now began to take 
the law into their own hands. After taking over the government in most 
of the towns, they began savagely to settle some old scores among the 
Malay police and others who had worked under the Japanese. The assumption 
of political authority by Chinese, and their lack of respect for Malays, 
immediately produced further deterioration of race relations. The 
political power exercised during this interim period and the brutal nature 
of communist and Chinese vengeance was to be the last straw for the 
Malays. Malay attacks had, in fact, ground to a complete halt, just 
like the Japanese military operations. Their driving impetus seemed to
72 Chin Kee Onn, Malaya Upside Down, Singapore, 1977 reprint, 183.
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have been lost momentarily with the news of the Japanese defeat. The
British, who had airdropped leaflets to them warning against massacres
of Chinese, were soon to return. Speculation spread that the Chinese and
the MPAJA would be pampered by the Britisn and would become 'more superior
73and more arrogant than ever'. The Malays in south-western Johor began 
to come under a cloud of uncertainty and despair.
Revenge was the operative principle during this transitional 
period. Anyone suspected of collaboration with the Japanese became a 
'public enemy'. Charges of 'traitors', 'informers' and 'running dogs' 
were hurled at all those in authority and all those who had served the 
Japanese Kempeitai - Malays, Chinese and Indians. In Batu Pahat, however, 
it was predictable that the MPAJA and the Chinese would exact revenge on 
the Malays. The Malays from the interior of the district were slowly 
coming into the towns to discover the situation for themselves. Apparently 
they considered that, without Japanese support, they needed to re-establish 
contacts with other areas and to collect food supplies which were being 
discharged rapidly from Japanese stores and food dumps. The guerrillas 
had taken over control of the main interstate trunk roads, checking, 
seizing or destroying any vehicle that belonged to the Japanese. Malays 
who entered MPAJA and Chinese-dominated towns came instantly under attack. 
As no truce in the racial clashes had been declared, Chinese and the MPAJA 
considered the fighting still on. MPAJA guerrillas and armed Chinese also 
attacked surrounding Malay villages, abducted and killed many penghulu, 
ketua kampung, police officials and Kempeitai informers. The Chinese 
'reign of terror' now began.^
To retaliate against the MPAJA, the Tentera Sabil Selendang Merah 
(Sabilillah Army of Red Bands), under command of Kiyai Salleh, began to 
carry out reprisals on Chinese and the MPAJA guerrillas. Batu Pahat 
again witnessed terrible bloodshed during this interregnum. The Malay
73 A Malay journalist of Javanese extraction. Name withheld. 
Interviewed Kuala Lumpur, September 1977.
74 See Hamzah bin Mohamed, 'The Fourteen Days of Terror, Before, During 
and After', 11-22; and also Musak Mantrak, who also uses the 
expression 'regime of terror' in 'Sejarah masyarakat majemuk di 
mukim VII, Batu Pahat', 87.
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attacks were said to be more ferocious than those of the Chinese, and 
surpassed their earlier level. They fought more determinedly and with 
greater religious fanaticism.^ The Red Bands launched numerous raids, 
attacking in groups, chanting prayers, and wielding parang, kris, bamboo 
spears and iron rods (some bearing Koranic verses). For the second time 
in the racial clashes, Chinese and the MPAJA could neither stop them nor 
understand the drive behind them.
The intensity of the Malay resistance was now partly due to 
Malay fears that the Chinese would seize political power in Johor 
and throughout the country. Rumours had spread among the Malays, and 
were generally believed, that the British Government had promised the 
Chinese and the MPAJA that Malaya would be ’handed over to them’ after 
the Japanese surrender.^ Apparently the Malays began to realise that if 
they did not fight back the Chinese would get whatever political rights 
they wanted from the British. At this critical moment the Sultan of Johor 
is believed to have turned to Kiyai Salleh as the Malays' ’saviour’.
Kiyai Fadil, the pawang of the Sultan and guru of Kiyai Salleh, arranged 
for the Sultan to meet his now famous student. During the meeting at Pasir 
Plangi palace the Sultan embraced Kiyai Salleh, kissed his hand and thanked 
him for his deeds. He asked Kiyai Salleh to ’menjaga negeri kita’ (guard 
our country). The Sultan then sat down and shared a meal with Kiyai 
Fadil and Kiyai Salleh.^
Datuk Onn bin Jaafar - the Peacemaker
Datuk Onn returned to Johor Bahru from the KRIS conference on 
18 August aboard a Singapore-bound train which also carried three other 
KRIS delegates from Singapore - the KRIS secretary-general Hassan Manan, 
lawyer Sardon Haji Zubir and journalist A. Samad Ismail (see Chapter IV, 
189). At Labis, Johor, their train was derailed as a result of an MPAJA
75 Ibid., 16-17.
76 See ’A Note on the Invulnerability Cult', in Journal of Political 
Intelligence, Malayan Security Service, Singapore, 15 July 1946, in 
J.W. Dailey Tapers, Rhodes House Library, Oxford.
77 Halinah Bamadhaj, 230.
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ambush, during which gunfire was exchanged between Japanese troops and
the guerrillas. Later that day a train from Singapore arrived to pick
up the passengers, and Datuk Onn and Sardon Ilaji Zubir alighted at Johor 
7 8Bahru. There are no recorded accounts of Datuk Onn's thoughts or plans
at that moment, but in the next two weeks he was to emerge as a brave,
astute and far-sighted Malay leader. Soon after his return, Datuk Onn
was appointed by Sultan Ibrahim as DO of Batu Pahat. The post had
remained vacant since the assassination of the last incumbent Ismail bin
Datuk Abdullah in June. It is said that the Japanese authorities had
repeatedly asked for Datuk Onn to fill the post, but Sultan Ibrahim
79had reiused because he required Datuk Onn at court.
Why did the Sultan finally agree to Datuk Onn's appointment at
this late hour (after the Japanese surrender had become known)? No
evidence on the Sultan's considerations is available, but the most probable
reason seems to be that the communal violence in the Batu Pahat and Muar
districts had assumed serious post-war implications for the Malay aristocracy
in Johor. The British bad already warned in their air leaflets that they
would investigate and take action against Malays responsible for instigating
the racial clashes. The implication was that the Malays were culpable.
There was therefore a need among the Johor aristocracy to disavow any
responsibility in the matter. It would look good if Daruk Onn, whose son
80Hussein was in the British Army in India, was seen by the returning 
British administration as the DO appointed to settle the communal dispute.
If he succeeded in his efforts as a peacemaker, it would redound to his 
Ruler's credit.
On or about 2.1 August, when the MPAJA guerrillas were .taking 
over Muar and Batu Pahat towns, Kiyai Salleh's Tentera Sabil Selendang 
Me rah launched widespread attacks on Chinese in the towns and neighbouring
78 See Chapter IV, above,
79 Anwar Abdullah, 95.
80 Hussein Onn (who is the present Malaysian Prime Minister) was 
educated at the Military Academy, Dehra Dun, in India. He had
joined the Johor military forces as a cadet in 1940 and was commissioned 
in the Indian Army, seeing service in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Iraq 
and India where he served at general headquarters in New Delhi. After 
World War II on attachment to the BMA, he became commandant of the 
police depot at Johor Bahru.
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areas. Kiyai Salleh himself led attacks on the Chinese strongholds around 
Ayer Hitam, while his commanders attacked Chinese in the area around Batu 
Pahat town.
The Sabilillah Army planned its biggest attack on Parit Jawa,
a predominantly Chinese town a few miles south of Muar town. It was agreed
that all the commanders including Kiyai Salleh himself, Kiyai Mashudi and
81Kiyai Wak Joyo would lead their regiments into attack. The majority 
of commanders picked a certain Saturday, probably 25 August, as the most 
auspicious day for the attack, that being the month of Ramadhan. But 
disagreement appeared in the form of Kiyai Mashudi, who argued that the 
day of attack should be the Wednesday before the Saturday suggested.
When the other commanders demurred, Kiyai Mashudi said he and his army 
would carry on alone. His conduct is inexplicable unless he was setting 
himself up as a rival to Kiyai Salleh. On Tuesday night, the eve of 
Mashudi's attack, Mashudi and his forces assembled at Parit Gantong, a 
quarter mile from Parit Jawa. They spent the whole night chanting 
prayers and reciting verses from the Koran. But the Chinese in Parit Jawa 
heard about his planned attack, and before dawn a large number of Chinese 
families evacuated to Muar town. Those who remained behind in Parit Jawa 
were armed with guns and knives and supported by an MPAJA force well- 
equipped with machine guns. Mashudi attacked at 9.00 a.m. but his force 
was repulsed. What was worse for him, none of the other Sabilillah Army 
commanders came to his rescue. He was forced to order his men to withdraw 
from the town. It was generally concluded by both sides in Muar and Parit 
Jawa that Mashudi's offensive had been an abysmal failure. The Malays 
attributed it to his arrogance. In retaliation the MPAJA and the 
Chinese counter-attacked Malays in a nearby area, taking ten Malay lives.
Mashudi's failure strengthened the need for Malay unity and 
reaffirmed faith in Kiyai Salleh's leadership. It was Kiyai Salleh himself 
who now picked the next target for attack — Batu Pahat town (or Bandar 
Penggaram), which was the largest Chinese stronghold in south-western 
Johor. He would lead the attack. The Red Bands gathered in the mukim 
of Kampung Bagan and then marched in columns into the mukim of Peserai,
81 Hairi Abdullah, 'Kcbangkitan dan Gerakan Tentera Selendang Merah',
op.cit., 12-14. The following narrative is based mainly on this source.
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bordering the mukim of Bandar Penggaram. The Red Bands were on the march
when Datuk Onn bin Jaafar, who was accompanied by Datuk Abdul Rahman, an
Prang Kaya (local chief), caught up with them to stop the attack.
Before he appeared in Peserai, Datuk Onn had taken office as
DO, was living in Malay territory and was seen as identified with the
Malay side. He took the initiative of going personally to MPAJA
(or Blntang Tlga) headquarters in Bukit Pasir to parley for peace. Datuk
Onn rationalised that since it was the MPAJA that had caused the racial
trouble, the MPAJA had to agree to a truce first. His role was only to
play the intermediary. One morning, with great fortitude, he climbed on
83his bicycle and rode towards Bukit Pasir. He had arranged with Kiyai
Salleh Lo follow him a short distance behind and had instructed the
latter that if he (Datuk Onn) succeeded in reaching MPAJA headquarters,
Kiyai Salleh should join him inside. Kiyai Salleh did not fully concur
with Datuk Onn's mission, but he agreed to go along in order to protect
him.^' After meeting two shocked Chinese and introducing himself as the
DO, Datuk Onn was taken to MPAJA headquarters. Soon after, Kiyai Salleh
himself appeared beside Datuk Onn. The 'peace’ talks lasted the whole
day. They agreed on a truce and that further talks be held to iron out
85any misunderstandings between the Malays and the MPAJA/Chinese. It was
82 There are conflicting accounts of where the meeting took place. Anwar 
Abdullah, 110-11, says Kampong Bagan; Hairi Abdullah, 14, mentions 
Peserai. Halinah Bamadhaj, 213, does not disclose where the meeting 
took place, but says that Datuk Onn brought two Chinese who were 
prominent businessmen and had been leaders of the Overseas Chinese 
Association during the occupation. Peserai seems the most likely 
place as it lies between Kampong Bagan and Bandar Penggaram.
83 Anwar Abdullah, 100-01.
84 Ibid. Anwar Abdullah describes it as an extremely dangerous journey. 
No Malay dared to travel alone in the Batu Pahat-Bukit Pasir Road. 
Kiyai Salleh was said to have advised Datuk Onn not to embark on the 
mission, but Datuk Onn was extremely determined and headstrong. He 
was prepared to go even if Kiyai Salleh did not accompany him. Datuk 
Onn was then aged 50.
85 Musak Mantrak, 'Sejarak masyarkat majemuk di mukim VII, Batu Pahat', 
86. He quoLes as his source, 'Batu Pahat Bergolak' (Batu Pahat in 
crisis), from Kebudayaan1972 Kenangan 75 Tahun Bandar Penggaram, Batu 
Pahat, 1972 (The 1972 Cultural Souvenir commemorating the 75th 
anniversary of Batu Pahat), 52.
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the month of Ramadhan, when Muslims go on a daily fast, and for Datuk
Onn this was regarded as a most auspicious achievement.
While the talks went on, violence continued in other parts
of the district. In fact, not long after returning home from the talks,
Datuk Onn received news that the followers of Kiyai Salleh had gathered
86in Kampong Bagan and were about to attack Batu Pahat town. Datuk Onn 
began to suspect that he had been betrayed by Kiyai Salleh. He immediately 
contacted Datuk Abdul Rahman Musa, a Johor chief, and together they 
rushed to Kampung Bagan. Datuk Onn feared that he might be too late, and 
that his peace settlement with the MPAJA had been shattered.
There are various accounts of what actually took place during
the confrontation. Anwar Abdullah's account says that it was with some
trepidation and anger that Datuk Onn caught up with the columns of the
Red Bands and singled Kiyai Salleh out. The confrontation was charged 
8 7with tension. Datuk Onn was determined to stop Kiyai Salleh's attack
at all costs, even in the presence of Salleh's 1,600 armed supporters
8 8who had already worked themselves into a frenzy. Anwar Abdullah gives 
an account of how his hero, with great courage and skilled oratory, 
administered a public rebuke to Kiyai Salleh, the 'folk hero', and subdued 
the tempers of his followers. The confrontation is said to have taken 
place as follows:
Datuk Onn discovered Kiyai Salleh in the crowd and walked 
up to him. 'What is the meaning of this, Salleh,' Datuk 
Onn asked of him. You can't do this sort of thing. Such 
an action is against the law. You should have consulted 
with me first. I am the District Officer here. This 
gathering has been inspired by you'.
After he had confronted Kiyai Salleh, Datuk Onn began to 
appeal to all the Malays present to desist from carrying 
out their acts of vengeance. He challenged Kiyai Salleh 
to kill him first if he persisted in carrying out his 
dangerous plan.
86 Anwar Abdullah, 109-10. Hairi Abdullah, 14, claims it was several 
Chinese who had begged Datuk Onn to use his good offices to stop 
Kiyai Salleh from carrying out his proposed attack. Musak Mantrak, 
ibid., 87, says it was a Chinese community leader who asked Datuk 
Onn to intervene and stop the attack.
87 Anwar Abdullah, 111.
88 The figure of '1,604 followers' is given by Musak Mantrak in 
'Sejarah masyarakat rnajemuk dl mukim Vi I, Batu Pahat', 87.
315
'Here is my breast’, Datuk Onn offered him. 'Plunge your 
dagger into it if you do not wish to obey me. After you 
have struck me down then you may do what you wish. So 
long as there is life in this body, I shall stop you. I, 
as the DO and the representative of the Sultan and the 
ra'ayat [the people] am responsible for what happens in 
this district. I do not want to be held responsible later 
for any major mishap such as you have planned.' 89
Kiyai Salleh was reported to have looked glum as he listened to Datuk
Onn's speech. He did not say a word, but his followers were swayed by
Datuk Onn’s oratory. Spontaneously they cried out their readiness to
obey his advice, to cease their warfare against the Chinese and to help
, . 90him restore peace.
Another account of this confrontation is that Datuk Onn arrived
at the scene with two leaders of the Batu Pahat Chinese. Datuk Onn is
said to have recognised Kiyai Salleh's authority and flattered him; he
warned the crowd that British troops would soon arrive, and that if order
were not restored by then Malay blood would flow; and he indicated that
the Malays had achieved their goal, when he forced the Chinese
leaders to promise the crowd that no more Malays would be killed. Kiyai
Salleh promised the Chinese that if another Malay was killed all the
91Chinese in the town would be slaughtered. Another account has Datuk
Onn telling the crowd that they had succeeded in their objectives by
teaching the Chinese an unforgettable lesson. He assured them that the
92Chinese would not commit any further attacks on the Malays.
Such assurances by Datuk Onn would have seemed necessary to 
soothe the heated tempers of the crowd, and Datuk Onn's flattery of Kiyai 
Salleh might seem to have been appropriate, given the latter's reputation 
and standing. It seems that Anwar Abdullah, by omitting these points, 
has taken a raLher critical view of Kiyai Salleh. He also fails to 
mention that soon after the incident, Kiyai Salleh became a faithful 
supporter of Datuk Onn. In the next few days Kiyai Salleh and Datuk Onn 
travelled around the various Selendang Merah areas in Muar and Batu Pahat,
89 Anwar Abdullah, 111.
90 Ibid.
91 Halinah Bamadjah, 213, 232.
92 Hairi Abdullah, 14.
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93to appeal for calm and peace, and to attend kenduri (feasts).
Racial peace had been achieved before the arrival of British troops
in Johor. The peace settlement probably occurred on either 1 or 2
September (Mari Raya Puasa), the Muslim festival. The first Civil Affairs
officers of the BMA arrived in Johor Bahru on 8 September, and a few days
later extended their detachments to Batu Pahat and Muar, where they found
944,000 and 10,000 refugees respectively. British security officials
investigating the Batu Pahat incidents were anxious to take Kiyai Salleh
into custody, but their efforts were successfully blocked by Datuk Onn.
He interceded on Kiyai Salleh's behalf, and is said to have sought and
obtained Sultan Ibrahim's authority. Datuk Onn is reported to have told
the British Resident Commissioner: '...Salleh has now been accepted and
acknowledged leader of every Malay in the mukim of Simpang Kiri before
and since the commencement of the trouble between Malays and Chinese in 
9 A <ithe kampungs.' Datuk Onn did this because he had come to realise that
he could secure Kiyai Salleh's support for his own future ambitions. When 
the penghulu of Simpang Kiri died in September, Datuk Onn had Kiyai Salleh 
appointed the new penghulu. Kiyai Salleh reciprocated with political 
support. When in January 1946 Datuk Onn formed his own political party, 
Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung (The Peninsular Malay Movement), the president 
of the Simpang Kiri branch was Kiyai Salleh. He continued as president when 
this organisation merged with UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) 
to follow Datu Onn who had become president of UMNO in June.
The Sungai Manik Incidents (15 August-15 September 1945)
Events in the mukim of Sungai Manik (Lower Perak) following 
the Japanese surrender ensured that the racial violence there would continue 
sporadically into the BMA period. Unlike Batu Pahat, where a peaceful 
settlement was finally arrived at by the three .parties involved - the 
Malays, Chinese and the MPAJU/MPAJA - no truce was reached at Sungai 
Manik because Malay attacks had cleared all Chinese settlers from the 
area before the British returned.
The Sungai Manik incidents are linked to the incidents in Batu 
Pahat . The majority of Malays in the mukim of Sungai Manik are Banjarese,
93 Halinah Bamadhaj, 213.
94 Major-General Ralph Hone, Report on the British Military Administration 
of Malaya, September 1945 to March 1946, Kuala Lumpur, 1946, 40. The 
report does not state whether the refugees were Malays or Chinese,
but it would seem likely that the majority were Chinese.
94a Stockwell, 274, quoting the Johor Resident Commissioner's file 
RCJ No.549/46.
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many of them related to the Banjarese in several mukim of Batu Pahat
district. When the racial trouble in Batu Pahat raged between May and
August, the news quickly reached Banjarese brethren in Sungai Manik, who
themselves- were experiencing similar problems with the Chinese in the
MPAJU/MPAJA. The MPAJU's attempts to recruit young Malay men and women
in Sungai Manik to work in nearby MPAJA camps had been rebuffed. When
the MPAJU suggested to the Banjarese headmen that they should change
their Friday prayers to Sunday (as was done also by the MPAJU in Mukim
VII of Batu Pahat), this was deemed an unpardonable insult and a sacrilege
95to the Islamic religion. Spurned by the Banjarese, the MPAJU stepped
up their harassment by making demands for cash contributions and supplies 
of rice and foodstuffs. Stories of MPAJU/MPAJA abductions and murders 
of recalcitrant Malays filtered through the Banjarese population. It 
soon became necessary for the Banjarese to organise themselves for self- 
defence. Several alim ulama emerged who were prepared to teach the 
silat and the ilmu kebal.
A gathering of all the Banjarese men in the mukim took place 
one day at the house of Imam Haji Bakri at Parit (Irrigation canal)
8B, Sungai Manik. Prominent village religious men present were Haji Shukor, 
Imam Haji Bakri and Haji Marzuki, the last two having been appointed by 
the congregation as their'khalifah, each thereby empowered to issue the 
fatwa (the call to wage Holy War). Haji Shukor was deputy khalifah 
to Imam Haji Bakri. The ilmü kebal classes became known to other areas 
in the Banjarese basin of Lower Perak, and a deputation of men from 
Telok Banjar, ten miles away, came to Sungai Manik to learn the 
martial arts and the magico-mystical powers.
The Japanese surrender on 15 August fell during the month of 
Ramadhan (the Muslim fasting month). When news of the surrender became 
known the MPAJU/MPAJA became more open in their activities and attempted
95 Information on the Sungai Manik incidents is drawn mainly from
Chazali Basri, ’Hilir Perak: Sejarah hubungan ras zaman Pendudukan
Jepun sehingga Pemerintahan Inggeris 1942-46', (Lower Perak: the
history of race relations from the Japanese Occupation until the 
BMA, 1942-45), BA thesis, University of Malaya, 1974/75, passim.
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to establish power in Sungai Manik, as they had done in other smaller
towns in Lower Perak. When the penghulu and ketua kampung refused to
cooperate, attempts were made to abduct them. The penghulu, Sidang Haji
Hassan Ibrahim, was an adept exponent of the silat, and when a group of
armed Chinese MPAJU/MPAJA men came to take him away he attacked them first.
With powerful blows and kicks he is said to have floored three men, who 
96died instantly. The other Chinese fled, and Hassan gave chase, killing
one more. He decapitated the four dead men and carried their heads in a
sack to the nearest Japanese military office in Telok Anson. After
narrating his story he asked the Japanese for arms. The senior Japanese
officer was not in, but two soldiers accompanied him to the Japanese
military headquarters in Ipoh, where permission was given him to obtain
arms. He was provided with four rifles, a pistol and a box of ammunition.
The Japanese sent a patrol of twenty-four soldiers to accompany Hassan
back to his house, where they engaged in a firing session with the
97communists which lasted three days.
This incident emboldened the Banjarese to launch reprisals on 
the MPAJU/MPAJA hideouts and Chinese settlements in Sungai Manik and in 
the neighbouring mukims as well. Finally, all Chinese settlers in these 
areas were forced to flee to Telok Anson, which had a larger concentration 
of Chinese. When the British troops arrived in Telok Anson, much of the 
countryside in Lower Perak, especially the Banjarese basin, had been 
denuded of Chinese who had become refugees in Telok Anson.
The organisation and pattern of Malay attacks in Sungai Manik 
was very similar to those in the Batu Pahat and Muar areas of Johore. It 
had all the characteristics of the Sabilillah movement, although the 
initiative, planning and organisation was not coordinated with those in 
Johor. Stories of the MPAJU/MPAJA takeover in Batu Pahat in the interim 
period brought by Banjarese relatives did, however, fan the flames of 
violence. The BMA succeeded temporarily in controlling the trouble, but 
in early March 1946 it erupted again.
96 Ibid., 46.
97 Ibid., 46-48.
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Conclusion
The ulama provided the leadership and Islam the force behind 
the anti-MPAJA and anti-Chinese struggle of the Malays in the south-western 
districts of Johor. The local Malays turned to the ulama because the 
latter had charisma and supernatural powers to train and lead them into 
battle. The emergence of fighting Red Bands of the Sabilillah Army, 
and their leader, Kiyai Salleh, was a spontaneous grass-roots movement 
in no way inspired by the Japanese. The Sabilillah Movement was purely 
anti-Chinese and anti-MPAJA in its objective. It was a Malay struggle 
to: (a) protect and safeguard the Islamic religion whose sacred principles
allegedly had been violated by the Chinese and the MPAJA; and (b) to 
avenge the many Malays who had been humiliated, abducted, tortured and 
killed as suspected japanese collaborators. Kiyai Salleh's fighting 
prowess and supernatural powers grew into a legend among the Malays, and 
he inspired them further to unite and fight the Chinese/MPAJA. Under 
his leadership the Malays successfully repulsed the MPAJA and broke down 
Chinese resistance.
The MPAJA showed clearly they were a Chinese organisation, when 
they came to the defence of Chinese settlers under attack by the 
Sabilillah Army. This demonstrated their alienation of Malay support, and 
demolished their claim to represent multi-racial unity. The bloodbath 
which the Chinese endured, showed that the Chinese had no idea that such 
a holocaust could fall upon them, and that when it did, they were not able 
to deflect the Malay challenge successfully. In fact, the Malay attacks 
demonstrated that the religious/mystical nature of the Sabilillah »
Movement was a peculiarly unique and successful Malay way to counter the 
Chinese threat. The Malays had now discovered their strength and ability 
to withstand the MPAJA/Chinese challenge and to inflict serious casualties 
on the Chinese. There was a portent of worse things to come for the 
Chinese in the future: a challenge represented in the patron-client
alliance forged between Datuk Onn Jaafar, a member of the Malay aristocracy, 
and Kiyai Salleh, the populist leader.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE MCP-BMA-MALAY CONFLICT
SOON after the British Army reoccupied Malaya, three intergroup conflicts 
arose. The conflicts were: (a) the communists began to oppose British
policies with a campaign of demonstrations and industrial unrest;
(b) inter-racial clashes between Malays and Chinese resumed throughout 
the country in November 1945; and (c) the Malay rulers and their subjects 
began a struggle to fight off British attempts to remove their residual 
prerogatives and annex their states. The present chapter will examine 
the causes of these inter-related conflicts.
The MCP-BMA Conflict
One of the first policies adopted by the BMA was the granting 
of the fullest freedom of speech, publication and association in the 
country - one of the eight demands of the MCP ’ s manifesto of 27 August 1945. 
By also adopting the policy that the prewar Registration of Societies 
Ordinance would not be reimposed, the BMA extended the official recognition 
which had been accorded at the last minute by the Governor of the Straits 
Settlements, Sir Shenton Thomas, in December 1941 to the MCP, the KMT 
and other Chinese associations which had previously been illegal.^
It also meant that Chinese labour organisations could now be freely 
organised, whereas before the war they had been hindered and checked at 
every stage. Even the criminal Chinese secret societies could now come out 
into the open.
Although Victor Purcell, the Chief Chinese Affairs Adviser to
the BMA, was to make several speeches declaring that the BMA allowed
2freedom of speech, publication and association, he did not specifically 
state that the MCP, the KMT and other banned prewar organisations could
1 See H.R. Hone, Report on the British Military Administration of 
Malaya, September 1945 to March 1946, Kuala Lumpur, 1946, 38.
2 See typescript of broadcast by Victor Purcell, entitled ’Malaya in
Crisis’, over Radio Singapore, 12 November 1945, in which he merely 
states: 'We came back to Malaya with the policy of free association
and free speech’, in Sei. CA 238/45.
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now operate freely. The fact that they were allowed to exist without any 
police hindrance was meant to be taken by those organisations and the 
public as an indication that such freedoms were permitted. Consequently, 
although the MCP had many branches established throughout the country during 
the BMA period, it did not emerge completely into the open and maintained 
a semi-underground status. An apparent reason was that they could never 
be sure when unstated freedoms might be taken away again.
The BMA's policy towards societies, in particular, was determined
by several considerations: (a) the fact that the MCP had been recognised
by the Governor during the Japanese invasion; (b) that the Supreme Allied
Commander, Mountbatten, had made an agreement with the MPAJA which was
under the control of the MPAJU; (c) that the MPAJA would continue to be
in existence on the British return and would not be disbanded until some
time later; and (d) that Chinese public opinion, if not the MCP and the
MPAJA, would have been alienated by any premature restriction of the
3rights of freedom of speech and of association. The most important 
consideration was that Mountbatten had found the MCP's eight-point manifesto 
of 27 August 1945 unobjectionable. The MCP had made promises of 
'cooperation' which he accepted at their face value. Mountbatten personally 
attached considerable importance to the MCP and Chinese questions.
The favourable attitude of Mountbatten towards the Chinese 
and the MCP was immediately transformed into policy by the BMA. Although 
the BMA in Malaya was not directly under Mountbatten's personal authority, 
as.it was in Burma, he maintained a personal interest in Malayan affairs 
and kept in close touch with Hone, the CCAO, whose Chief Chinese Affairs 
Adviser, Victor Purcell, saw things very much in Mountbatten's liberal 
way. The upshot of this was that at the beginning of the BMA period 
Chinese affairs assumed a far greater importance than Malay affairs within 
the BMA.
But the BMA staff did not have it all their own way. The MCP 
had begun making a determined bid for political influence, the young 
militants in the MCP were restless and indulged in various forms of
3 See the resume of BMA policies in Memorandum, 'Control of Societies:
Proposed Introduction of Legislation', by W.L. Blythe, Acting 
Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Malayan Union, n.d. (1946?), 
in MU 266/46 Vol.I Secret.
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agitation against the BMA, and the MCP seemed unable or unwilling to
control these militants and appeared to be vacillating between cooperation
and non-cooperation with the BMA. On the other hand, the British field
commanders and their officers were 'anti-communist1 in their attitudes
and intolerant towards the MPAJA guerrillas and the MCP elements, whom
they regarded as a 'nuisance' and a threat to law and order. Disagreements
arose between the BMA staff and the military commanders as to the best
way to deal with the Chinese guerrillas and political activists. The
latter resorted to tough and coercive measures such as shootings, arrests
and detentions, while the BMA staff used diplomacy and negotiations. On
the side of the BMA staff were the Force 136 officers, who were
allowed by both the BMA and the military commanders to continue liaison
4with the guerrillas. Eventually, first Hone, then the Force 136
officers and finally Purcell himself became disillusioned with the 
communists and agreed totally with the tough measures of the military to 
deal with the communists.
As we have seen in Chapter III, the MCP's CEC had announced 
very moderate policies on 27 August 1943 to deal with the return of the 
British administration. Most of the MCP's eight demands were found 
unobjectionable by the British, except the demand for an elected National 
Assembly and the right to vote, for which the British had no immediate 
plans. Throughout the BMA period the MCP's ultimate goal of an independent 
'Democratic Republic' would not be mentioned at all by the party's moderate 
leadership under Lai Tek. Whether this was a temporary tactic, a reflection 
of honest expectations of British support, or an anti-party manipulation 
by Lai Tek is difficult to say. It may have been all three simultaneously. 
As a programme, however, the 27 August manifesto proved inadequate and 
short-sighted. Consequently, the Party's leadership was forced to issue, 
in piecemeal fashion, a variety of specific demands to the British 
administration.
This is evident by the MCP's statement on 7 November 1945, when 
the party put six proposals to the British government, including the demand 
for self-government, which had not been one of the eight demands in the
4 Minutes of meeting held at BMA (Malaya) Hqs, Singapore, on 29 
September 1945, BMA/PSD/39.
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27 August statement, although the latter statement had expressed the hope 
that the British would consider granting self-government to Malaya. In 
the 7 November statement the MCP asked that Malaya be granted the right 
to determine her own administration, judiciary and legislature, as well 
as the right to solve her political and economic problems, national 
defence and foreign relations. The other proposals related to demands 
for less government interference with the people's freedoms of speech, 
publication and assembly, general increases in wages, and abolition of 
restrictions relating to trade, travel and transportation.^
Successive policy statements were largely repetitive in their 
emphasis upon raising living standards, improving working conditions, 
granting freedoms of speech, publication, and assembly, and demanding 
a representative form of government. The party would add increasingly 
detailed demands. Later statements reflected reactions of the communists 
to the Malayan Union plan, their growing awareness of the United Nations, 
and their support of the Republics of Indonesia and Vietnam. The MCP 
had adopted Mao's 'New Democracy' as a slogan and set up one or two 
organisations with the words 'New Democratic' in their names, such as 
the New Democratic Youth League and the newspaper Sin Min Chu (New 
Democracy). MCP propaganda continued to be anti-imperialistic. On 
questions of foreign policy the party's propaganda emphasised support 
for Soviet foreign policy and world peace.
Between August 1945 and January 1946, the MCP worked towards 
certain interim goals, i.e., the organisation of labour unions and 
political pressure groups and the political education of the masses.
The MCP's actions were very much dictated by the local situation, such as 
riots and workers' strikes which broke out spontaneously throughout the 
peninsula due to rice shortages, gross inflation and low wages. The 
communists immediately stepped in to take over these grievances and to 
organise the dissatisfied local population and workers. In the tasks 
of organisation, young militants of the MCP were very much to the fore. 
Frequently they made matters worse for the MCP's moderate leadership by 
taking to the streets and inevitably clashing with the British military.
5 Sin Min Chu, Singapore, 8 November 1945.
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While the pressure of militancy was building up against the 
MCP's leadership, moves were under way to expose Lai Tek, the secretary- 
general. One move took the form of an article in a Penang Chinese news­
paper in September 1945, which denounced him as a traitor to the party 
during the occupation. It was written by Wong Yeh Lu, who had been the 
party's representative in 1941 and had been a known agent of the Kempeitai.^  
Although the allegation was regarded as incredible and ignored by the 
Central Executive Committee, it led party members to begin to rethink 
certain past episodes. The rumours continued and gained in strength 
when they came to the attention of Yeung Kuo, a member of the Central 
Standing Committee from Selangor who had been virtually banished to Penang 
by Lai Tek. Apparently as a result of consultation between Yeung Kuo and 
other Central Committee members Lai Tek found himself relegated to the 
Political Bureau and barred from the Organisation Committee which, under 
Yeung Kuo, became responsible for the organisation of the Party.^
Lai Tek fought back. In a campaign at the end of 1945 his role 
as supreme leader of the Party was made public and he was hailed as 
saviour and preserver of the MCP. Beginning at the end of November and 
extending throughout December, letters and telegrams addressed to Lai 
Tek or Light or Wright (his aliases) were published in the local press, 
all expressing admiration for his leadership of the party in the past 
ten years. . On 27 November the Negri Sembilan Women's Union, in its 
published letter to Lai Tek, exhorted him to greater efforts and assured 
him that members would unite under the leadership of the MCP to work for
g
the liberation of the people and the emancipation of women.
6 Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 39.
Miller, Menace in Malaya, 62, mentions that the denunciation by 
Wong Yeh Lu gave Lai Tek a fright. The story of how Yeh Lu 
tried to get his story to expose Lai Tek published in 1945 is 
told in Chuan Hui Tsuan, 'Wo shou zhi dao de Lai Te/Yeh Lu'
in the weekly Guo Ji Shi Pau (International Times), Singapore,
July 1968, 19-20. See also Chapter III, 129.
7 Short, 39, mentions Yeung Kuo as the main investigator of Lai's 
past and present activities. However, McLane claims it was Chin 
Peng, subsequently the MCP's secretary-general. See McLane, 311. 
Both Short and McLane had access to Government reports and Special 
Branch files.
8 Min Sheng Pau, Kuala Lumpur, 28 November.1945.
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At a tea party organised by the Perak branch of the MCP
in Ipoh on the same date, the State MCP representative, Miss Eng Ming
Chin, attacked the 'conspirators’ against Lai Tek as being 'remnant
Fascists' who were against the MCP. She urged public bodies to send
letters and telegrams giving him their support and to enquire after
9his health. One telegram which best reflects the orchestrated campaign
to boost Lai Tek's standing was sent in December 1945 by thirteen Chinese
public bodies in Singapore and Southern Johor. After a warm salutation
to Lai Tek, the telegram said:
We the people in Southern Johor have in the past been 
considered backward politically, economically and 
culturally with an equal lack of unity and understanding.
Today we are known as 'a strong force in the emancipation 
of the anti-Fascist people of Malaya’. At the same time, 
we have set up in a short period after the Japanese surrender 
the Southern Johor People's General Committee, the highest 
organ representing the sentiments of the people.
Truth tells us that we are indebted to your able guidance 
for this success. In other words, we realise that had 
there been no MCP, we would not have been united today.
Continuous growth in strength of the MCP, therefore, is 
the best guarantee for the emancipation of the Malayan 
races and its existence represents our most necessary 
weapon.
As leader of the MCP as well as the saviour of the five 
million people of Malaya to win democratic freedom, your 
life and your health are of deep concern to all.
Existing side by side with the New Democratic movement 
in Malaya are remnants of reactionary Fascists now in 
the stage of their last struggle. But we are firmly 
resolved to exterminate them with racial unity. We 
give our support to the Eight Points and the Six Proposals 
of the MCP, and we request you to give us more guidance 
and encouragement towards their realisation.10
This campaign was most timely, as it took place just before the
Central Committee met for its Eighth Enlarged Plenum from 21 January to
3 February. At this meeting, which he chaired, Lai Tek was re-elected
secretary-general, and a new Central Committee was also elected. However,
the seven-man Central Standing Committee now included both Chin Peng
and Yeung Kuo, who had combined to start their investigations
9 Kin Kwok Daily News, Ipoh, 27 November 1945.
10 Sin Min Chu, 21 December 1945.
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into Lai Tek's past and present activities.^  Lai Tek was still too 
strong to be dislodged, and no one had yet dared raise any criticism of 
him at the meeting. It was not until March 1947 that Chin Peng and Yeung 
Kuo amassed sufficient information to unmask him. They then convened a 
special session of the Central Committee in Kuala Lumpur. But Lai Tek, 
who had learned of their intentions, failed to appear and was never 
seen again.^
The campaign to boost Lai Tek's standing attracted the attention 
of the British intelligence services, which immediately began investigations 
into his war-time conduct. The scanty evidence in the official records 
in London suggested that it was not until late December 1945 that the 
British intelligence authorities realised that their pre-war agent was 
still alive and leading the Malayan communist movement. Probably because 
he was unsure of British attitudes towards him, Lai Tek had not immediately 
re-established contacts with them and had ingeniously concealed his true 
identity.
He had appeared in Singapore on 24 September at a meeting with 
the DCCAO Singapore, Brigadier McKerron, and other senior BMA officers, 
apparently arranged by Force 136 Headquarters. Lai Tek had introduced 
himself as 'Chang Hong', the name he had used as one of three members of 
the Supreme MPAJA Headquarters who had negotiated and signed the MCP-SEAC 
anti-Japanese 'cooperation' agreement with John Davis of Force 136 in 
January 1944."^
At this meeting, 'Chang Hong' expressed his desire to assist 
the BMA in Malaya. He referred to his connections with the MPAJU and the 
MCP, both of which had supported the MPAJA in the field during the 
"occupation. However, he emphasised that he was not in a position to speak 
for either the MPAJU or the MCP, as both were quite separate organisations
11 Yap Kong Kuan, 'Perak Under the Japanese, 1942-45', BA thesis, 
University of Malaya in Singapore, 1957, Appendices X and XI.
12 McLane, 310.
13 ISUMNo .50, Hqs, 14th Army, 6 October 1945, 8, in BMA PSD/39. 
In none of these reports is Lai Tek's name mentioned. I have 
identified Chang Hong as Lai Tek mainly on the strength of the 
information given by John Davis, formerly of Force 136, in an 
in Kent, June 1976.
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from the MPAJA, their only connection being that they had all been anti- 
Japanese and had mutually supported one another during the occupation. 
’Chang Hong' agreed to use his influence to bring about a meeting between 
the BMA and responsible leaders of the MPAJU and the MCP. A later 
meeting with the Commissioner of Police was regarded by Force 136 
Headquarters as having achieved little, but it was considered that ’Chang 
llung’ would use his influence with the Chinese communities to prevent 
'arrests’ and abductions by Chinese societies which were taking the law 
into their hands On the same day, ’Chang Hong’ introduced the Singapore 
AJU leader, Lee Soong, and the local MCP leader, Wu Tian Wang, to the 
DCCAO. Both promised the BMA their whole-hearted cooperation. It should 
have been obvious to Force 136 and to the Field Security Section that the 
influential 'Chang Hong' who displayed such authority was none other than 
their old friend Lai Tek. But Lai Tek's ingenuity in disguising himself 
and concealing his identity had been masterly.
However, it has now come to light that in late December a
Major R.J. Isaacs of Field Security Section began to interrogate several
MCP witnesses to establish the identity and whereabouts of Lai Tek.^~*
It transpired that one important witness in what was described in the
confidential file as the ’Wright case' committed suicide in Isaacs' house
on 21 December. The fear arose that Isaacs and other witnesses would be
put in the box at the inquest, in which case there would be serious danger
of exposure of British investigations into Lai Tek's activities. SEAC
Headquarters was informed, and in a message to Headquarters Malaya
Command said: ’If this occurs probably we shall be forced to arrest him
16[Lai Tek] and make a case.' Isaacs was reported to be seeking legal 
advice to determine the best way to minimise the exposure of British 
activities. This message was addressed 'personal' to four 
top officials in the BMA. They included Major Blades of the Malayan 
Security Service, who subsequently became Commissioner of Police, and 
Victor Purcell, the Chief Chinese Affairs Officer. The availability of
14 Force 136 field intelligence report, 24 September 1945, in BMA PSD/39.
15 See Top Secret telegram from SACSEA to Hqs Malaya Command 
(SAC 2180), 22 December 1945, in WO 172/1795.
16 Ibid.
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this important evidence in the opened files can only be regarded as 
an oversight, because no more was to be found about the ’Wright case' 
in the subsequent correspondence.
Probably some time in January Lai Tek resumed his contacts
with the British Special Branch in Singapore. The Special Branch records,
including the reports of Lai Tek seen by Anthony Short, while they
appeared to him unsatisfactory, categorically confirmed Lai Tek's role
as a Special Branch agent:
One could hardly expect a formal record of all the 
subsequent transactions; but the ones that exist are 
curiously impalpable and remote: hardly what one would
expect of a highly efficient and presumably ruthless 
double agent. It can only be assumed that material facts 
transmitted were never committed to paper. Even so, the 
air of mystery in which he thrived, indeed that was 
essential for his survival, is hardly dispelled by the 
record of his dealings with the Special Branch.^
Probably after contacts had been re-established with the Special
Branch, Lai Tek attended the Eighth Enlarged Plenum of the Central Working
Committee which began on 21 January 1946. This meeting was important in
two respects. It re-elected Lai Tek as secretary-general, and it adopted
the new policy which he had formulated and called the 'Malayan Democratic
United Front' policy, whereby the MCP was to seek alliances with other
political parties while at the same time building up its mass organisations
X 8such as trade unions and youth movements. The meeting adopted a nine-
point 'democratic' programme to establish the basis of the United Front.
This programme was a more specific repetition of earlier principles,
such as the demands for self-government, an elected National Assembly,
and guarantees for basic civil rights. The united front against imperialism
and for the advance of democratic principles of government was part of
the communist prewar programme. During establishment of the united front
19the participating parties were to preserve their political independence.
^7 Short, p.40.
18 Gene Z. Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle in Malaya, New York,
1954, 51.
19 Lai-T'e, Wei-mln-tsu t'uan chieh mln-chu tzu-yu min-sheng kai-shan 
erh t-ou-cheng (Struggle for National Unity, Democracy and Liberty 
and Improvement of People's Livelihood), report to the Eighth 
Enlarged Plenum, 22-27 January, 15; see also Hanrahan, 51.
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In fact, this United Front policy had already been put into practice a
few months earlier when the MCP sponsored formation of two political
parties as 'fronts’- the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) in November and
20the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU) in December.
Lai Tek in his 22-page report to the Plenum had in fact
pre-empted criticism from the militants by declaring that he was in
favour of revolutionary struggle, but urged the party to prepare for it
by adopting the United Front policy, which he considered most suitable
for the present phase of struggle. In his analysis of the colonial problem
and the world situation, Lai Tek said he saw two ways of resolving the
problem: (a) to use bloodshed and revolutionary struggle, as in Vietnam
and Indonesia; or (b) to use the United Front of the whole nation,
through an alliance with all parties and coordinated with the peace forces
21of the world, including the United Nations. When he discussed the
Malayan situation, Lai Tek noted that British imperialism had become
repressive again since the British return to Malaya. The struggles of the
Vietnamese and Indonesian peoples were influencing the Malayan people,
and the bitter conflicts between the MCP and the BMA were now preparing
the MCP and the people for a 'revolutionary high tide' and a Malayan
nationalist movement. In view of this, the MCP must stand for.revolutionary
struggle, but the correct line for the present situation was for the MCP
to establish a 'national United Front' to unite the people and to fight
for democracy. As Lai Tek expounded it:
Today the basic demands of the people have still not been 
fulfilled. The Malayan people are under colonial rule.
The struggle of the Malayan revolution remains - complete 
liberation and complete independence of the country.
Therefore, we the MCP must continue to propose the 
revolutionary struggle for national liberation and we the 
MCP must carry on a 'New Democratic' movement. Based on 
this basic task, and under the new historical circumstances 
of today, the MCP and the Malayan people must, firstly, carry 
on the correct line for a national liberation movement to 
establish the National United Front for democracy based on 
the common interests of all parties and alliances, and act 
together on a common democratic programme, and oppose
20 See Cheah Boon Kheng, 'The Malayan Democratic Union, 1945-48', 
MA thesis, University of Malaya, 1975, 34-35, 41.
21 Lai-T'e, 15.
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British colonial rule and fight for democracy and a better 
livelihood.^2
In other words, Lai Tek had now agreed that a return to armed
struggle in the future was inevitable, but prior to launching the armed
struggle the MCP should prepare the people by means of struggle for
particular concessions within the British system. Lai Tek himself
admitted that the eight-point manifesto of 27 August 1945 and the six
proposals of 7 November 1945 were ’partly out of date’. For the present
new circumstances, he said, the Central Committee 'had taken back' the
eight-point programme and introduced the nine-point ’democratic' programme
23which was adopted at its Eighth Plenum. These moves by Lai Tek should 
be understood as concessions to the militants, who were mounting increasing 
pressure on him to adopt a more revolutionary line.
Communist Activities, September Through January 1946
Following surrender of the Japanese, the MCP and the 
MPAJU/MPAJA acted quickly to consolidate their
position as a leading force in postwar Malaya and to organise popular 
support to try to force the returning British to grant the people a 
democratic form of government. Communist propaganda corps travelled 
extensively, particularly in the States of Perak and Johor, urging the 
various races to unite in the cause of a 'New Democratic' Malaya. The 
MPAJU and the MPAJA had tiiken over most of the small towns evacuated by 
the Japanese troops. Force 136 officers worked with those guerrillas 
with whom they had contact to maintain law and order, while attempting 
to bring outside groups of guerrillas under their influence.
Communist-sponsored committees were established by the MCP/ 
MPAJU/MPAJA alliance to run local administrations in the towns until 
British troops arrived. Many different types of associations were formed, 
controlled either directly or indirectly by the communists. Among them 
were cultural and social clubs, people's associations, self-governing 
committees, women's unions, and labour unions. The various associations
22 Lai T'e, 15-16.
23 Ibid.
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formed were not necessarily staffed by MCP workers, but the ties were 
such that communist policies provided political guidance. These and 
other activities were designed to gain for the communists recognition 
by the British and a voice in the postwar government of Malaya.
The Selangor State Committees of the MCP, the MPAJU and the 
MPAJA took the lead and jointly called a 'Selangor State Congress of 
People's Representatives' on 25 September, at Kuala Lumpur. This 
Selangor Congress, the largest and most successful of several state and 
district congresses, apparently represented an effort to set up a 
representative assembly that would then obtain recognition from the 
British authorities. A call was sent out to all racial communities to 
send delegates, but response was unenthusiastic except from the Chinese, 
who therefore had a disproportionately large number of delegates. The 
ostensible purpose of the meeting was somewhat vague. The congress was 
to form the 'Selangor People's State Committee', but this committee, 
said the organisers, 'neither serves as a government nor a corporation but 
is a public body to express public views represented by peoples of all
nationalities and all caste [sic] thereby protecting the interests of
u n » 24the people .
An executive committee composed of ninety-one members was chosen, 
and from this body a working committee of forty-five, the real governing 
body, was appointed. Twenty-three resolutions were passed by the 
congress and sent to the BMA. Most of these were of an economic or
social nature, intended to improve the livelihood of the people, to lower
prices, and to establish better labour conditions. Others were of a 
political nature, such as those requesting the BMA to:
1. Put into effect the Atlantic Charter with regard 
to self-government and democracy.
2. Support the programme of the Malayan Communist 
Party.
3. Realise self-government in Malaya and establish
central and regional representative organisations 
for the exchange of people's ideas. These ideas
were to be expressed through the medium of the
Anti-Japanese Union.
24 See 'Proclamation for convening the Selangor Peoples' Representatives' 
Conference and forming the Selangor Peoples' State Committee', n.d., 
August 1945?) in Sei. CA162/45.
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4.  G u a r a n te e  a b s o l u t e  f reedom of  s p e e c h ,  p r e s s ,  
p u b l i c  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  p u b l i c a t i o n ,  b e l i e f ,  and 
c o n g r e g a t i o n .
5 .  L e g a l i s e  and enc o u ra g e  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  a n t i -
J a p a n e s e  o r g a n i s a t i o n . 23
The S e l a n g o r  C om m it te e ' s  s t r u c t u r e  was t h e  most  e l a b o r a t e  and
i t s  work t h e  most w i d e ly  r e p o r t e d  o f  a l l  t h e  s t a t e  c om m i t t e e s .  I t  had
s e v e r a l  d e p a r t m e n t s  such  as  c u l t u r e ,  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  and g e n e r a l  a f f a i r s .
The chairman, was Phang Sau Choong, a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  S e n a lg o r  S t a t e
Commit tee .  There  were  a l s o  a few Malays and I n d i a n s  on th e  Commit tee
b u t  t h e y  d i d  n o t  h o l d  any key p o s t s .  They were  m ain ly  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
of  t h e i r  comm unit ies  who were r e q u i r e d  to  a t t e n d  m e e t in g s  w i t h  BMA
o f f i c i a l s ,  and to  t r a n s l a t e  c e r t a i n  d e c l a r a t i o n s  i n t o  Malay and Tamil .
The o f f i c e s  o f  t h e  Working Committee  and t h e  S e l a n g o r  Congress  were s i t e d
a t  t h e  C h in e s e  Assembly H a l l  i n  Kuala  Lumpur. The Upper Pahang ,  N e g r i
Sembil an  and S o u t h e r n  J o h o r  S t a t e  Commit tees  were t h e  o t h e r  com m it t ee s
t o  be s e t  up ,  e ach  t a k i n g  i t s  cue from t h e  S e l a n g o r  Commit tee .  But  i n
a l m o s t  e v e r y  town i n  each  S t a t e  t h e r e  was a l r e a d y  a s m a l l e r  ' P e o p l e ’ s
Commit tee '  o r  ' P e o p l e ' s  A s s o c i a t i o n ' ,  unde r  t h e  dominance o f  communis ts .
The BMA r e c o g n i s e d  t h e  c om m it t ee s  by welcoming t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  t hey
made on v a r i o u s  p rob le m s  a f f e c t i n g  th e  p e o p l e ' s  l i v e l i h o o d .  The c o m m it t ee s
*26o p e r a t e d  as  i f  they  were an a l t e r n a t i v e  government  to  t h e  BMA.
The month o f  September  p a s s e d  w i t h  t h e  o v e r a l l  p o l i t i c a l  
s i t u a t i o n  g e n e r a l l y  q u i e t ,  though c o n d i t i o n s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  c o u n t r y  were 
f a r  from s t a b l e .  W idesp read  l o o t i n g ,  b a n d i t r y  and o t h e r  c r im e s  were 
r e p o r t e d ,  a s  w e l l  a s  numerous c a s e s  o f  a b d u c t i o n  and murder  o f  c o l l a b o r a t o r s .
The f i r s t  week o f  O c tobe r  p a s s e d  v e ry  much i n  t h e  same f a s h i o n ,  
b u t  i n  t h e  second  week s e v e r a l  i m p o r t a n t  d e ve lopm en ts  took  p l a c e .  On 
10 O c t o b e r ,  t h e  Malayan Union p o l i c y  was announced  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  P a r l i a m e n t  
by t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  t h e  C o l o n i e s .  The f o l l o w i n g  day ,  when th e  
l o c a l  ne w spa pe rs  r e p o r t e d  t h e  announcem en t ,  S i r  H a ro ld  MacMichael a r r i v e d
25 Sin Min Chu, 2 November 1945.
26 See t h e  BMA's ' R e p o r t  o f  the  M i l i t a r y  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  Region  Four
( S e l a n g o r )  f o r  O c t o b e r  1 9 4 5 ' ,  14,  i n  MU C / 1 / 1 / 4 ,  which r i d i c u l e s  
MPAJA a t t e m p t s  a t  government  a s  f o l l o w s :  'W ha te ve r  was t h e i r  s u c c e s s
in  t h i s  m i l i t a n t  and a d v e n tu r o u s  p r o j e c t  i t  ha s  n o t  q u a l i f i e d  them 
[MCP/MPAJU/MPAJA] f o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  more i n v o lv e d  s p h e r e  o f  
g o v e rn m e n t . '
27 ISUM N o.50 ,  Hqs 1 4 th  Army, 6 O c to b e r  1945,  i n  BMA PSD/2 9 .
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i n  Malaya  t o  b e g i n  h i s  m i s s i o n  to  i n t e r v i e w  t h e  Malay R u l e r s  and t o  o b t a i n  
t h e i r  s i g n a t u r e s  to  new t r e a t i e s .  The r e a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e s e  B r i t i s h  
moves d i d  n o t  h i t  t h e  l o c a l  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  a l l  r a c e s  and p o l i t i c a l  
p e r s u a s i o n s  u n t i l  a few weeks l a t e r .  M eanwhi le ,  10 O c to b e r  o r  t h e  
’Double T e n t h ’ (R e p u b l i c  o f  C h i n a ’ s N a t i o n a l  Day) was c e l e b r a t e d  on a 
n a t i o n a l  s c a l e  w i t h  l a r g e  C h inese  p r o c e s s i o n s  and mass m e e t in g s  j o i n t l y  
o r g a n i s e d  by t h e  communists  , C h inese  g u i l d s  and o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and 
t h e  Malayan Kuomintang.  The l e a d i n g  p a r t  p l a y e d  by t h e  MCP/MPAJU/MPAJA 
i n  t h e s e  c e l e b r a t i o n s  a t t e s t e d  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  were s e en  by C h inese  
and by t h e m s e l v e s  as  Chinese  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and C h inese  p a t r i o t s  owing a 
l o y a l t y  t o  Ch ina .
On 12 O c t o b e r ,  the  S e l a n g o r  AJU l e a d e r ,  Soong Kwong, was a r r e s t e d  
by t h e  Roya l  A i r  Fo rce  P o l i c e  on a c h a rg e  o f  e x t o r t i o n  f o r  an o f f e n c e  
comm it ted  on 10 September  -  b e f o r e  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  t h e  BMA -  w i t h o u t  
p r i o r  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  BMA P o l i c e .  B e fo re  t h i s  a r r e s t  n i n e  minor  l a b o u r  
and MPAJU/MPAJA o f f i c i a l s  had been  a r r e s t e d  by t h e  B r i t i s h  Army on a v a r i e t y  
o f  c h a r g e s ,  some w i t h  and some w i t h o u t  BMA a p p r o v a l .  The r e s u l t  o f  Soong 
Kwong' s  a r r e s t  was a l a r g e  p r o t e s t  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  a t  t h e  Kuala  Lumpur padang 
( p u b l i c  f i e l d )  on 15 O c t o b e r .  The DCCAO (Malaya)  B r i g a d i e r  W i l l a n ,  
met a d e l e g a t i o n  and i n  r e p l y  t o  q u e s t i o n s  e x p l a i n e d  t h a t ,  w h i l e  t h e  
c h a r g e s  a g a i n s t  t h o s e  a r r e s t e d  were a m a t t e r  f o r  t h e  c o u r t s ,  a l l  e x c e p t  
two had been  r e l e a s e d  and th e  o t h e r  two,  i n c l u d i n g  Soong Kwong, had
been  g r a n t e d  b a i l .  The d e l e g a t e s  were n o t  s a t i s f i e d ,  b u t  a f t e r  a w h i l e  
2 8d e p a r t e d .  In  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  two weeks t h e r e  were  s p o r a d i c  l a b o u r  
s t o p p a g e s ,  s t r i k e s ,  p o l i t i c a l  m e e t i n g s ,  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  and minor  d i s t u r b a n c e s  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  p e n i n s u l a .  The immedia te  c a u s e s  o f  t h e s e  d i s t u r b a n c e s  
were s h o r t a g e s  o f  food ,  l a c k  o f  work and i n a d e q u a t e  wages ,  b u t  t h e  BMA 
a u t h o r i t i e s  were u n s u re  w h e th e r  t h e r e  were any l i n k s  be tw een  t h e s e  
d i s t u r b a n c e s  and Soong Kwong's a r r e s t .
The c h a r g e s  a g a i n s t  Soong Kwong a r e  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  b e c au s e  
t h e y  r e l a t e d  t o  an i n c i d e n t  wh ich o c c u r r e d  b e f o r e  B r i t i s h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
was r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  on 12 September .  Soong Kwong, t h e  g e n e r a l  s e c r e t a r y  
o f  t h e  MPAJU i n  S e l a n g o r ,  was a l l e g e d  to  have a t t e m p t e d  on 10 September
28 V i c t o r  P u r c e l l ’ s ' M a l a y a ' s  P o l i t i c a l  C l i m a te  I I ’ , 1-19 O c t o b e r ,  
1945,  5 ,  i n  WO 2 0 3 /5 3 0 2 .
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t o  e x t o r t  money from a C h in e s e  named Chan Sau Meng, who was s e i z e d  by
t h e  MPAJU and k e p t  t i e d  up i n  a room f o r  a week.  Soong Kwong i n t e r v i e w e d
him and a c c u s e d  Chan of  p r o f i t e e r i n g  and e x t o r t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e
o c c u p a t i o n .  The pun i shm en t  f o r  t h i s  was d e a t h  f o r  h i m s e l f  and h i s
f a m i l y ,  Soong Kwong s a i d ,  b u t  Chan would be r e l e a s e d  on payment  o f
$ 3 00 ,000 .  A p r o m i s s o r y  n o t e  was s i g n e d ,  Chan was r e l e a s e d  and i n  due
c o u r s e  b r o u g h t  $32 ,000  i n  c a s h ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  j e w e l l e r y  and o t h e r  p r o p e r t y
The BMA’ s a t t i t u d e  on such  c a s e s  a r i s i n g  from any i n c i d e n t s  b e f o r e  12
Sep tember  was t h a t  t h e y  would n o t  be  t a k e n  u p ,  a s  t h e  MPAJU/MPAJA was
t o  be r e g a r d e d  a s  o p e r a t i o n a l  up to  12 Sep tem ber  and i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  b e f o r e
29t h a t  d a t e  were  t o  be r e g a r d e d  a s  j u s t i f i e d  by m i l i t a r y  e x i g e n c y .
I t  was i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  t h a t  t h e  a r r e s t  by t h e  RAF P r o v o s t ,  w i t h o u t
r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  BMA P o l i c e ,  c o m p l i c a t e d  m a t t e r s  f o r  BMA o f f i c i a l s .
O th e r  MPAJU/MPAJA members had been  a r r e s t e d  on c h a r g e s  o f  a l l e g e d l y
commandeering m i l i t a r y  v e h i c l e s  o r  t r e s p a s s i n g  on p r o h i b i t e d  a r e a s  w i t h o u t
p r o p e r  a u t h o r i t y ,  o r  p o s s e s s i n g  s t o l e n  p r o p e r t y .  These c h a r g e s  were
c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  what  P u r c e l l  h a s  d e s c r i b e d  as  t h e  ' c h a n g e - o v e r  f rom a 
r , , 30war t o  a pe ace  f o o t i n g  .
By J a n u a r y  1946,  a b o u t  t h i r t y  members o f  t h e  MPAJA had  been  
a r r e s t e d  i n  S e l a n g o r ,  J o h o r  and e l s e w h e r e ,  on c h a r g e s  r a n g i n g  from 
i l l e g a l  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  s t o l e n  p r o p e r t y  t o  m urde r .  B e s id e s  Soong Kwong, two 
o t h e r  we l l -known c a s e s  which  a r o u s e d  w i d e s p r e a d  l e f t i s t  a g i t a t i o n  were 
t h o s e  c o n c e r n i n g  Choo Kow, who was a r r e s t e d  on 1 J a n u a r y  on a c h a r g e  o f  
m u rd e r in g  a J a p a n e s e -e m p lo y e d  S p e c i a l  P o l i c e m a n  a t  Kluang on 13 Sep tem ber  
1945,  and Lai  Kim, d e s c r i b e d  i n  an i n t e l l i g e n c e  r e p o r t  a s  one o f  t h e  
’n o t o r i o u s  MPAJA e x e c u t i o n e r s ’ who was a r r e s t e d  on ly  in  Augus t  1946 i n  
Bentong f o r  a doub le  m urder  comm it ted  on 16 Sep tem ber  1945. MPAJU/MPAJA 
o f f i c i a l s  a c c u s e d  the  BMA of  i n j u s t i c e  i n  a r r e s t i n g  AJA members i n s t e a d  
o f  s t e p p i n g  up a r r e s t s  o f  c o l l a b o r a t o r s  w i t h  t h e  J a p a n e s e .  T h i s  l i n e  
was echoed by t h e  MCP's s e m i - o f f i c i a l  new s p a p e r  Sin Min Chu;
A r r e s t s  of  A n t i - J a p a n e s e  e l e m e n t s  a r e  h a p p e n in g  in  o t h e r  
p l a c e s .  In  view o f  t h e i r  f r a n k n e s s  i n  s p e e c h  and t h e i r  
a n ta g o n i s m  towards  e v i l - d o e r s ,  t h e s e  e l e m e n t s  a r e  h a t e d
29 ' The Soong Kwong C a s e ' ,  i n  MU S e c r e t  1 7 6 3 / 4 6 ; s e e  a l s o  D onn i son ,  394.
30 P u r c e l l ,  The C h inese  i n  Malaya ,  267.
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by the BMA and the Chinese collaborators of the Japanese, 
and consequently their life is in danger. The British 
are treating the Japanese collaborators leniently, while 
they make arrests of anti-Japanese elements who ought to 
be well-treated. This must be rigorously opposed.
On 21 October began what became known as the week-long ’Perak
disturbances' associated with the shortage of rice. These were organised
through the People's Committees. Following is the reported chronology of
events based on British intelligence reports
21 October: At Ipoh, a large demonstration was held on the padang,
consisting of 3,000 people, mostly women. A talk was given by leaders 
of the People’s Committee and demands were formulated for five gantangs 
of rice and a dole of $20 per person. The meeting dispersed quietly.
At Sungei Siput (25 miles east of Taiping), there were 
similar demonstrations by a crowd of 5,000. The British liaison officer 
of Force 136 was surrounded, and two other BMA officers, Colonels Harvey 
and de Crespigny, who came to the scene, were also prevented from leaving 
by the crowd and were roughly handled. After the crowd had been warned 
to disperse, the troops were ordered to open fire. As a result one person 
was killed and three wounded. Order was finally restored the next 
morning.
At Parit Buntar (15 miles north-east of Taiping), there 
were similar demonstrations of 7,000 people demanding rice and work.
Fifty people were arrested and detained in Taiping gaol.
22 October: fairly successful general strike and closing of shops
occurred throughout Perak. At Ipoh, another demonstration of 1,000 people
gathered outside the Civil Affairs offices, armed with staves, and
inaugurated a sitdown strike. On arrival of a company of troops the crowd
was given thirty minutes to disperse, followed by two periods of five
minutes grace. The leaders of the crowd persuaded them not to disperse,
and six shots were fired. Three in the crowd were killed, three wounded.
33The crowd dispersed and the 'ringleaders’ were arrested.
31 Sin Min Chu, 12 December 1945.
32 Director of Intelligence, Report, ’Strikes and Disturbances in Malaya’,
8 November 1945, in W0 203/4381, and ’Review of Internal Situation’,
1 December 1945, in WO 203/5642. What follows is based mainly on 
these two reports unless otherwise stated.
33 Victor Purcell's 'Malaya's Political Climate III’, - 19 October-
9 November 1945, in WO 203/5302.
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At T a i p i n g , a l a r g e  crowd g a t h e r e d  and demanded r e l e a s e  
o f  t h o s e  a r r e s t e d  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  d a y ’ s d e m o n s t r a t i o n .  Troops  opened 
f i r e .  Four  p e r s o n s  were k i l l e d .
C o l o n e l  Harvey,  t h e  C i v i l  A f f a i r s  O f f i c e r ,  met  a P e o p l e ' s
Commit tee d e p u t a t i o n  from Ipoh which  s u b m i t t e d  f i v e  demands a s  f o l l o w s :
( i )  An i s s u e  o f  f o u r  g a n t a n g s p e r  head f o r  November 
(once  and f o r  a l l ) ; ( i i )  a c a sh  payment  o f  $20 p e r  
h e a d ;  ( i i i )  c a n c e l l a t i o n  o f  o r d e r  r e s t r i c t i n g  movement 
o f  f o o d s t u f f s ;  ( i v )  e xem pt ion  from payments  o f  w a t e r  
and l i g h t  dues f o r  O c t o b e r ,  November and December;  and 
(v) r a i s i n g  o f  r u b b e r  and t i n  p r i c e s  t o  a r e a s o n a b l e  
l e v e l .
Fo rce  136 o f f i c e r  C o l o n e l  Broome u n d e r t o o k  to  r e t u r n  to
Kua la  Lumpur to  g e t  B r i g a d i e r  W i l l a n ' s  r e p l i e s  t o  t h e s e  demands,  b u t  i n
34t h e  meant ime t h e  l a t t e r  came t o  Ipoh  h i m s e l f .
23 O c t o b e r : B r i g a d i e r  W i l l a n  a d d r e s s e d  a m e e t i n g  on t h e  padang a t  I p o h .
B e fo re  h i s  a r r i v a l ,  t h e  crowd o f  a b o u t  3 ,000  was worked up by s p e e c h e s  
and t h e  s i n g i n g  o f  communist  s o n g s .  B r i g a d i e r  W i l l a n  made a s peech  i n  
which he  d e a l t  w i t h  e v e ry  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  and made t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
r e p l i e s  to  t h e  demands:
( i )  There  would be a f r e e  i s s u e  f o r  O c t o b e r  o f  one 
g a n ta n g  o f  r i c e  p e r  he a d ;  ( i i )  t h e r e  would be r e l i e f  
f o r  a l l  d e s t i t u t e s  and work f o r  a l l  a b l e - b o d i e d  men a t  
p r e - w a r  wages ;  ( i i i )  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  t h e  movement 
o f  f o o d s t u f f s  was f o r  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p e o p le  a g a i n s t  
p r o f i t e e r s .  I t  would n o t  be c a n c e l l e d .  ( i v )  No l i g h t  
o r  w a t e r  c h a r g e s  would be made f o r  O c t o b e r .  I f  and when 
c h a r g e s  were made t h o s e  g e n u i n e l y  u n a b le  to  pay would 
be l e t  o f f ;  (v) no p r i c e  was f i x e d  f o r  t i n .  The r u b b e r  
p r i c e  was f i x e d  a t  t h e  h i g h e s t  l e v e l  which  would e n a b l e  
Malaya t o  compete w i th  t h e  s y n t h e t i c  a r t i c l e .
A f t e r  h i s  s p e e c h ,  t h e  l e a d e r s  e x p r e s s e d  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n .  
B r i g a d i e r  W i l l a n  and h i s  s t a f f  now l e f t .  In h a l f  an hour  t h e  crowd 
d i s p e r s e d .
At F a r i t  B un ta r  and S i t i a w a n  t h e r e  were  a l s o  d i s t u r b a n c e s .  
In  t h e  l a t t e r  town th e  BMA C i v i l  A f f a i r s  o f f i c e r  was s u r r o u n d e d  and 
made to  s i g n  a document  a g r e e i n g  t o  demands.  In  Bagan S e r a i  t h e r e  was 
an i n c i d e n t  i n  which s h o o t i n g  o c c u r r e d .
34 I b i d .
35 I b i d .
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At Kuala Kangsar, eighteen arrests were made when a crowd
collected.
At Batu Gajah (10 miles south of Ipoh), a crowd of 5,000
collected outside the Court House. Some penetrated the building and
destroyed files before being ejected. The leaders later saw the SCAO,
who had to be rescued by troops, while being stoned.
24-26 October: Minor disturbances at various places in Perak.
27 October: 14th Army reported that it was rumoured the strikes might
36spread to Selangor coincident with the imminent trial of Soong Kwong.
Elsewhere between 21 and 31 October, strikes and minor
disturbances also occurred: a dockers' strike in Singapore over complaints
of inadequate pay started on 21 October, followed by strikes of the
city's municipal and bus workers on 25 and 27 October; a strike by 6,000
workers at the Batu Arang (Selangor) coalmines began on 13 October and
continued until mid-November; minor disturbances also took place in
Pahang, Johore and Malacca. But by 2 November the situation had improved
considerably, with the exception of the dock and municipal workers, who
were reported to be returning to work slowly.
The verdict of the BMA on the situation of 30 October was that
the main cause of the recent disturbances was the lack of rice. The
food situation was not yet satisfactory, and rice stocks were not large.
In some areas there was widespread malnutrition. Coupled with that was
the fact that in many areas wages were still low despite a shortage of 
37labour. In assessing the part played by the MCP in these disturbances,
the BMA concluded that the MCP's influence had been present in varying
degrees in most areas, and was probably strongest in Selangor and North
Perak. In Perak, it observed, incidents had been centrally controlled,
but the central agency had not yet been detected. However, on 1 December
1945 the BMA established for the first time that, despite propaganda put
out by the communists, the MCP, its many associations, the MPAJU and the
MPAJA were in fact all one. The general headquarters were believed to
38be at Lintang, between Ipoh and Taiping (Perak). The controlling
36 Director of Intelligence, 'Strikes and Disturbances in Malaya', 
8 November 1945 in WO 203/4381.
37 Ibid., 3.
38 Ibid.
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i n f l u e n c e  in  C h inese  p o l i t i c s  was u n d o u b t e d l y  t h e  MCP. I t  became c l e a r  t o
the  BMA t h a t  t h e r e  was now a nee.d f o r  some o f f i c i a l  c o n t a c t s  w i t h  the
MCP's r e a l  l e a d e r s h i p .  V i c t o r  P u r c o . i l  i n t e r v i e w e d  t h e  P e rak  communist
l e a d e r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  the  f i e r y  and a t t r a c t i v e  Miss  Eng Ming Ch ing ,  be tw een
4 and 6 December,  a f t e r  hav in g  e a r l i e r  met t h e  S in g a p o re  MCP o f f i c i a l ,
Wu Tian  Wang. But  t h e s e  i n t e r v i e w s  c o n v in c e d  P u r c e l l  t h a t  none o f  t h e s e
39p e o p le  was t h e  ge nu ine  c o n t r o l l i n g  a u t h o r i t y .
The La i  Tek p e r s o n a l i t y  c u l t  a p p e a r e d  i n  t h e  C h inese  new spape rs
a round  t h i s  t i m e ,  and i t  i s  my b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  BMA's a t t e n t i o n  was now
drawn f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t ime to  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  fo rm er  B r i t i s h  a g e n t .
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  m i l i t a r y  i n t e l l i g e n c e  u n i t s  t h r o u g h o u t  the  p e n i n s u l a  were
a l e r t e d  to  look  o u t  f o r  him,  f o r  h e n c e f o r t h  r e p o r t s  f r e q u e n t l y  a p p e a r e d
i n  t h e  week ly  i n t e l l i g e n c e  summaries  o f  a p e r s o n  who f i t t e d  h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n
b e i n g  s e e n  i n  many p l a c e s  as  f a r  a p a r t  a s  J o h o r  and t h e  n o r t h e r n m o s t
40Tha i -M alay  b o r d e r  r e g i o n s .  A c c o rd in g  t o  one r e l i a b l e  s o u r c e ,  L a i  Tek
r e g a i n e d  c o n t a c t  w i t h  B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s  i n  e a r l y  1946 and was p e r i o d i c a l l y
i n t e r r o g a t e d  in  1946 and 1947.  One month i n  which  ' i n t e r r o g a t i o n s ’ o f
La i  Tek were s a i d  to have been h e l d  was O c to b e r  1946,  b u t  i t  i s  n o t  known
41w h e t h e r  t h i s  was the  f i r s t  t ime s i n c e  the  war .  i t  i s  most p r o b a b l e  
t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  c o n t a c t  w i th  t h e  S p e c i a l  Branch was r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  some 
t im e in  J a n u a r y  b e f o r e  the  E i g h th  E n l a r g e d  Plenum o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  Committee  
which began on 21 J a n u a r y .
The se m i -u n d e r g ro u n d  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  MCP t h r o u g h o u t  BMA r u l e  
makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  a s s e s s  p r o p e r l y  the  p a r t y ' s  a c t i v i t i e s  d u r i n g  
t h i s  p e r i o d .  The MCP m a i n t a i n e d  t h i s  s t a t u s  b e c a u s e  i t  was d i s t r u s t f u l  
o f  B r i t i s h  i n t e n t i o n s .  In  the  few r e p o r t s  i t  p u b l i s h e d  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  
t h e  MCP was e x t r e m e l y  guarded and r e t i c e n t  a b o u t  i t s  r o l e  i n  t h e  l a b o u r  
movement. i t  d id  n o t  i n d i c a t e  w h e t h e r  i t  e n c o u ra g e d  any o f  t h e  s t r i k e s
39 V i c t o r  P u r c e l l ' s  'M a l a y a ' s  P o l i t i c a l  C l i m a te  V ' ,  1-20 December 
1945,  5 - 7 ,  in  WO 2 0 3 /5 3 0 2 .
40 An example o f  such a F i e l d  S e c u r i t y  r e p o r t  i s  d a t e d  28 November 1945:  
'L o i  Tik o r  Loi  To. B e l i e v e d  R u s s i a n  t r a i n e d  exFIC [French  I n d o c h i n a ]  
now i n  J o h o r e .  Penang r e p o r t s  l e a d e r  MCP an Armenian rumoured 
moving, n o r t h  from S i n g a p o r e . '  Sec s i g n a l  from llqs Malaya Command
to  SACSEA, i n  W0 1 7 2 /1 7 93.
41 McLane, 307,  310.
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o r  d i s t u r b a n c e s ,  n o r  what  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  m igh t  be f o r  c r e a t i n g  such
s o c i a l  and economic u n r e s t .  However , s u b s e q u e n t  r e p o r t s  i s s u e d  by t h e
MCP as  a  p o s t - m o r t e m  on the  p o s tw a r  s i t u a t i o n ,  a f t e r  t h e  rem oval  o f  L a i
Tek i n  1947 ,  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  MCP unde r  L a i  Tek had  made a m i s t a k e  i n
n o t  f u l f i l l i n g  i t s  r o l e  as  t h e  v a n g u a rd  o f  t h e  p r o l e t a r i a t  and had i n  a
s e n s e  b e t r a y e d  the  t r a d e  u n io n s  by n o t  ac know ledg ing  l e a d e r s h i p .  T h i s
c o n f i r m s  my view t h a t  the  s t r i k e s  and d i s t u r b a n c e s  in  O c t o b e r ,  f a r  f rom
b e i n g  i n s p i r e d  by t h e  MCP's m odera te  l e a d e r s h i p  unde r  L a i  Tek w e re ,  i n
f a c t ,  i n i t i a t e d  by t h e  MCP’ s young m i l i t a n t  e l e m e n t s .  A 14 th  Army
i n t e l l i g e n c e  r e p o r t  h a d ,  in  f a c t ,  s a i d  t h a t  many o f  t h e  O c to b e r  1945
i n c i d e n t s  were the  work of  ’h o t - h e a d e d  yo u th  e l e m e n t s  who a r e  a c t i n g  w i t h
42more i m p e t u o u s i t y  t han  o l d e r  men would a d v i s e ' . The m i l i t a n t  wing o f  
t h e  MCP, l e d  by Yeong Kuo and Chin Peng ,  had  begun i t s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  
and was a p p a r e n t l y  e n c o u r a g in g  communist  a g i t a t i o n  and l a b o u r  u n r e s t  
i n  o r d e r  to  o u s t  La i  Tek o r  make him change  h i s  m o d era te  p o l i c i e s .
Meanwhile ,  t h e  p a r t y  a c c e p t e d  i n v i t a t i o n s  from t h e  BMA to
a p p o i n t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  to  s e r v e  on t h e  A d v i s o ry  C o u n c i l s  b e i n g  s e t  up
t h r o u g h o u t  the  c o u n t r y .  These c o u n c i l s  were formed a t  the  s u g g e s t i o n  o f
M o u n tb a t t e n  t o  e n a b le  t h e  BMA o f f i c i a l s  t o  c o n s u l t  and d i s c u s s  p rob lems
of  each  t e r r i t o r y  w i th  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  l o c a l  communit ies  and i n t e r e s t s .
There  were u s u a l l y  two l e f t - w i n g  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o u t  o f  a bou t  f i f t e e n
members in  t h e  c o u n c i l  -  one from t h e  MCP and a n o t h e r  f rom one o f  i t s
a s s o c i a t i o n s  such a s  the  CLUs o r  t h e  New D e m o c ra t i c  Youth League.  O th e r
members o f  the Counci l  were from the  KMT, MNP, b u s i n e s s  a s s o c i a t i o n s  and
p r o f e s s i o n a l  g roups .  These c o u n c i l s  p a r a l l e l e d  t h e  p rewar  S u l t a n ' s  S t a t e
E x e c u t i v e  C o u n c i l s  o r  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l  e x c e p t
t h a t  t hey  had no l e g i s l a t i v e  powers .  The f i r s t  m e e t in g  o f  t h e  S in g a p o re
A dv iso ry  C ounc i l  was h e l d  on 14 November and i t  was i n a u g u r a t e d  by G e n e r a l
Hone. Because o f  t h e  u n p r e c e d e n t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  g iv en  to  t h e  MCP and
o t h e r  p o l i t i c a l  g roups  i n  t h e  S in g a p o re  A d v i s o ry  C o u n c i l ,  P u r c e l l  r emarked
43in  h i s  d i a r y  t h a t  i t  'm arked  an epoch i n  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  S i n g a p o r e ' .
42 D i r e c t o r  o f  I n t e l l i g e n c e ,  ' S t r i k e s  and D i s t u r b a n c e s ' ,  8 November 
1945,  in  WO 2 9 3 / 4 3 8 1 .
43 V i c t o r  P u r c e l l ,  ' M a l a y a ' s  P o l i t i c a l  C l i m a te  I V ' ,  10-30 November 
1945,  in  WO 2 0 3 /5302.
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He n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  communist members p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i d  good work d u r i n g
t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  which  ’ c ove re d  e v e r y t h i n g  from s u p p l y ,  t r a d e  and i n d u s t r y ,
and p r o s t i t u t i o n  to  e d u c a t i o n  and t h e  P r e s s . ’ The c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e
c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  C ou n c i l  by t h e  MCP r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  Wu Tian  Wang, and
h i s  comments on BMA a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  were s a i d  t o  be ' u s u a l l y  to  t h e  p o i n t ’ .
As a r e s u l t ,  s t a n d i n g  com mit tees  were a f t e r w a r d s  s e t  up on which  t h e
v a r i o u s  members o f  t h e  C ou n c i l  were a sked  to  s e r v e .  However , t h e  o f f i c i a l
a t t i t u d e  o f  t h e  MCP towards  t h e  C o u n c i l  was q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  -  t h a t  t h i s
f e l l  s h o r t  o f  t h e  p a r t y ' s  demand f o r  d e m o c r a t i c a l l y - e l e c t e d  L e g i s l a t i v e
C o u n c i l s .  P u r c e l l  o b s e r v e d :
The L e f t i s t  P r e s s  took  a c a r p i n g  and condemna tory l i n e  
r e g a r d i n g  t h e  C ou n c i l  b u t  g e n e r a l l y  among th e  C h inese  
t h e  r e c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  m e e t in g  and o f  t h e  
Deputy C h i e f  C i v i l  A f f a i r s  O f f i c e r ' s  [ B r i g a d i e r  
McKerron] sp e ec h  were f a v o u r a b l e .^4
The d i sbandm en t  o f  t h e  MPAJA c a r r i e d  o u t  on 1 December 1945
p r e s e n t s  a n o t h e r  example o f  t h e  c o n f l i c t  be tw een  L a i  Tek and t h e  m i l i t a n t s
i n  t h e  MCP. When t h e  p r o p o s a l  f o r  d i sbandm en t  was p r e s e n t e d  by Force  136
on b e h a l f  o f  t h e  BMA and the  B r i t i s h  Army, as  e a r l y  as  Sep tem ber ,  t h e
S t a n d i n g  E x e c u t i v e  Committee  d e b a t e d  t h e  i s s u e .  L a i  Tek was i n  f a v o u r
45of  t h e  p r o p o s a l ,  b u t  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  Committee  s t r o n g l y  opposed i t .
Yet  i n  t h e  end La i  Tek g o t  h i s  way. I t  can o n ly  be assumed t h a t  L a i  Tek 
a g r e e d  t h a t  t h e  MCP, h a v in g  op ted  f o r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u g g l e ,  was now i n  
t h e  i n v i d i o u s  pos i t ion  o f  h a v in g  a s t a n d i n g  army w i t h o u t  a r o l e .  To d e fy  
t h e  B r i t i s h  meant  c o n f r o n t a t i o n .  A b e t t e r  s t r a t e g y  was to  d e c e i v e  t h e  
B r i t i s h .  Not a l l  weapons s h o u ld  be s u r r e n d e r e d ,  an ex-MPAJA s e r v i c e m e n ' s  
a s s o c i a t i o n  s h o u l d  be formed so t h a t ,  i f  n e c e s s a r y ,  d e m o b i l i s e d  men 
c o u ld  be e a s i l y  m u s t e re d  f o r  armed s t r u g g l e .  These  measures  w e r e ,  i n  f a c t ,  
p u t  i n t o  e f f e c t .
The n e g o t i a t i o n s  be tween  John Davis  o f  Fo rce  136 and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
of  t h e  MPAJA Supreme H e a d q u a r t e r s  were long  and d r a w n -o u t .  O r i g i n a l l y ,  
i t  was f i x e d  by t h e  14th Army t h a t  t h e  MPAJA s h o u ld  be d i sb a n d e d  on 
1 November,  b u t  when t h i s  d a t e  app roa c he d  t h e r e  was s t i l l  no ag reem en t  
in  s i g h t .  The t a l k s  bogged down o v e r  t h e  payments  o f  g r a t u i t i e s  to  t h e
44 I b i d .
45 S h o r t ,  43;  Hanrahan ,  50-51.
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g u e r r i l l a s .  The MPAJA g u e r r i l l a s  w i t h i n  and o u t s i d e  Fo rce  136 i n f l u e n c e
were c a l l e d  t h e  ' o l d  g u a rd '  a n d . t h e  'new g u a rd '  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The i d e a
o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  commanders was t h a t  Force  136 s h o u l d  p e r s u a d e  t h e  'new
g u a r d '  t o  b r i n g  t h e i r  weapons i n  and j o i n  t h e  ' o l d  g u a r d ' .  Both would
t h e n  be d i s b a n d e d .  An inducemen t  was to  pay th e  g u e r r i l l a s  i n  t h e  ' o l d
g u a r d '  a m on th ly  s a l a r y  of  30 Malayan d o l l a r s  p l u s  r a t i o n s  from 15 Augus t
t o  t h e  d a t e  o f  d i sbandm en t .  In  November i t  was p r o v i s i o n a l l y  a g r e e d
be tw een  t h e  MPAJA and the  14 th  Army t h a t  t h i s  f o r c e  would be d i s b a n d e d
on 1 December and t h a t  members would hand i n  t h e i r  arms on d i sb a n d m e n t .
A g r a t u i t y  o f  350 Malayan d o l l a r s  was t o  be p a i d  t o  ea ch  man i n  two
i n s t a l m e n t s :  $250 on d i sbandm en t  and a f u r t h e r  $150 t h r e e  months l a t e r .
Each d i s b a n d e d  p e r s o n  was f r e e  to  e n t e r  c i v i l i a n  employment  o r  t o  choose
46s e r v i c e  w i t h  t h e  p o l i c e ,  V o l u n t e e r  F o r c e s ,  o r  t h e  Malay Regiment .
On 1 December t h e  MPAJA was f o r m a l l y  d i s s o l v e d ,  b u t  i t  was
rumoured t h a t  o n l y  a p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  MPAJA had be e n  d i s b a n d e d .  The main
f o r c e ,  B r i t i s h  i n t e l l i g e n c e  e x p e c t e d ,  would remain  in  the  j u n g l e s  o r
c o n t i n u e  o p e r a t i n g  unde r  t h e  g u i s e  o f  c l u b s  and s i m i l a r  o r g a n i s a t i o n s .
A f t e r  t h e  d i sbandm en t  f o r m a l i t i e s ,  c a r r i e d  ou t  w i t h  much ceremony,  i n
which B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  commanders took  t h e  s a l u t e s  and p a i d  t r i b u t e s
t o  t h e  MPAJA's s e r v i c e s ,  i t  was r e p o r t e d  t h a t  o n ly  o l d - t y p e  weapons had
been t u r n e d  i n ;  i t  seemed l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  newer weapons had been  c o n c e a l e d
i n  t h e  j u n g l e s . ^  I t  was l a t e r  r e p o r t e d  i n  e a r l y  May 1946 t h a t  two
r e g i m e n t s  -  one in  P e r a k ,  t h e  o t h e r  i n  J o h o r  -  s t i l l  a p p ro x im a te d  a s t a t e
o f  m o b i l i s a t i o n .  I n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  communist  arms dumps began to  a p p e a r
i n c r e a s i n g l y  i n  m i l i t a r y  i n t e l l i g e n c e  r e p o r t s ,  and s e a r c h e s  were o r d e r e d
t o  be c a r r i e d  o u t .  In one r a i d  on an o l d  MPAJA h i d e o u t  a t  Bekor  (P e ra k )
th e  B r i t i s h  Army came a c r o s s  a C h inese  v i l l a g e  'commune ' ,  dom in a ted  by
a S e l f - G o v e r n i n g  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  f l y i n g  a r ed  f l a g  and c om ple te  w i t h  d r i l l i n g
ground and a ' p e o p l e ' s  m i l i t i a ' .  The v i l l a g e r s  opened  f i r e  a t  t h e  s i g h t
o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  t r o o p s ,  and i n  t h e  exchange  o f  f i r e  one man was s h o t  dead
48by th e  Army. The v i l l a g e  was t hen  s e a r c h e d .  Seven men were d e t a i n e d .
46 Te legram  g i v i n g  th e  te rms  o f  ag re e m e n t  f rom Rear  SACSEA to  War O f f i c e ,  
6 November 1945, i n  WO 1 7 2 /1 7 9 0 .
47 S h o r t ,  35 -36 ;  M i l l e r ,  60-61 .
48 See 'The  Bekor  R a id ,  7, in  WIR 25 I n d i a n  D i v i s i o n ,  28 November 1945,  
i n  MU 335/46 V o l . l .
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S e v e r a l  KMT g u e r r i l l a  g roups  i n  P e r a k  and K e l a n t a n  had  a l s o  r e f u s e d  t o
l a y  down t h e i r  arms on 1 December,  a s  a g r e e d  by t h e i r  l e a d e r s  i n  t a l k s
w i t h  Force  136.  One o f  t h e  r e a s o n s  g iv e n  was t h a t  they  needed  th e
arms t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  C h i n e s e ,  a s  M a la y -C h inese  t e n s i o n s  had  been  i n c r e a s i n g
i n  t h e i r  a r e a s .  By May 1946,  t h e  KMT g u e r r i l l a s  were s t i l l  r e p o r t e d  t o
49be h o l d i n g  o u t  a t  t h e  Tha i -M alay  b o r d e r .
F o l lo w in g  f o r m a l  d e m o b i l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  MPAJA, a s s o c i a t i o n s  f o r  
d e m o b i l i s e d  p e r s o n n e l  were formed i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  a r e a s  where r e g i m e n t s  
had o p e r a t e d .  A C e n t r a l  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  o t h e r w i s e  known as  t h e  Pan-Malayan  
F e d e r a t i o n  o f  A n t i - J a p a n e s e  Army E x - S e r v i c e m e n ’ s A s s o c i a t i o n s ,  was 
e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  Kua la  Lumpur on 8 December. Area b r a n c h e s  were e s t a b l i s h e d  
i n  S e l a n g o r ,  N e g r i  S e m b i l a n ,  n o r t h e r n  J o h o r ,  s o u t h e r n  J o h o r ,  P e rak  and 
i n  Kedah.  I t  was a l s o  p l a n n e d  to  e s t a b l i s h  b r a n c h e s  f o r  Upper  and Lower 
Pahang.  In  a d d i t i o n ,  numerous s u b - b r a n c h e s  were  e s t a b l i s h e d .  The 
p r e s i d e n t  and v i c e - p r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  
p r e s i d e n t s  o f  t h e  e i g h t  a r e a  b r a n c h e s ,  c o n s t i t u t e d  the  Working Commit tee 
o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  and w e r e ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  the  same men who had 
commanded the  h e a d q u a r t e r s  and t h e  e i g h t  r e g i m e n t s  o f  t h e  MPAJA. ^
Thus t h e  top  l e v e l  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  e x - g u e r r i l l a  c l u b s  p a r a l l e l e d  t h a t  
o f  t h e  fo rm er  MPAJA. The s t a t e d  aims o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  i n c l u d e d  
c u l t i v a t i n g  t i e s  o f  f r i e n d s h i p  among e x - g u e r r i l l a s ,  recommending work 
t o  them, a s s i s t i n g  them i n  t h e i r  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  and im prov ing  s t a n d a r d s  
o f  e d u c a t i o n .  The o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  a im s ,  v iews  and p r o g r e s s  o f  t h e s e  
e x - g u e r r i l l a  a s s o c i a t i o n s  were p u b l i c i s e d  i n  a n e w s p a p e r ,  Cham Yew Pau 
( C o m b a t a n t ' s  F r i e n d ) ,  which a p p e a r e d  unde r  t h e  s p o n s o r s h i p  o f  the MPAJA 
E x - S e r v i c e m e n ' s  A s s o c i a t i o n  and was p r i n t e d  a t  t h e  communist-owned 
Min Sheng Pau p r e s s .  In  g e n e r a l  t h e  tone  o f  t h e  newspaper  was p r o ­
communist ,  a n t i - K u o m in t a n g  and a n t i - i m p e r i a i i s t .
A lthough  t h e r e  i s  no d i r e c t  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  a l l  t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  
e x - g u e r r i l l a  a s s o c i a t i o n s  were members o f  t h e  MCP, o r  t h a t  d i r e c t i v e s  were 
i s s u e d  t o  them by t h e  p a r t y ,  t h e i r  p o l i c i e s  were p a r a l l e l  and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
49 See 'The  KMT i n  Kota B ha ru '  i n  WIR, 25 I n d i a n  D i v i s i o n ,  12 December 
1945,  In  I b i d .
Uni Shang On, Mn - l a i - y a  j e n - m in g  k ’ ang j i h  j i n  (The MPAJA), S i n g a p o r e ,  
December 1945,  56 -57 .
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(Top) Disbanding of the MPAJA, December 1945. March past of its 
Fourth Regiment (South Johor ) at Port Dickson, Negri 
Sembilan.
(Bottom) Brigadier J.J. McCully of the British Army inspecting 
men of the MPAJA’s Fourth Regiment (South Johor ) at 
Port Dickson, Negri Sembilan.
Source: Arkib Negara Malaysia (Malaysian National Archives),
Kuala Lumpur.
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of ex-guerrilla associations participated in meetings with various communist- 
sponsored groups that passed political resolutions. Some sort of working 
agreement had certainly been reached before the 1 December demobilisation, 
when communist influence was dominant in the MPAJA. These ex-guerrilla 
associations provided a potentially well-organised military arm for the 
MCP, which would be ready for use, whenever necessary, as happened in 
the MCP's insurrection in June 1948.
On 6 January, at an impressive military ceremony on the Singapore 
public field, Mountbatten presented campaign medal ribbons to eight 
MPAJA commanders, including Chin Peng, Chen Tien and Lau Yau. Surprisingly, 
'Chang Hong', alias iai Tek, like Lau Yau one of the three top MPAJA 
commanders, was not among those decorated. Evidently he was still 
keeping out of sight.
Events were now moving quickly towards a showdown between
the MCP and the BMA. The militant elements of the MCP found the social
and economic situation in the country to their advantage and were
resolved on further agitation. There was increasing evidence during the
months October to December 1945 of a determined campaign by these elements,
waged through the trade unions and other MCP-controlled organisations,
to cause embarrassment to the BMA and to the MCP's moderate leadership.
Every move was designed to stir up conflict between the commmunists
and the BMA, and it appeared to the BMA that the communists were attempting
52to bring the government down.
The conviction of MPAJU leader Soong Kwong and of Perak GLU
officials, in January 1946, on charges of extortion and sedition respectively,
53were held up by the communists as typical examples of British injustice.
51 See report, 'Campaign ribbons for guerrillas,' 7 December 1945 in 
MO 172/1794; see also Miller, 60.
52 Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, 270.
53 The way the trial of Soong Kwong was conducted lent itself to 
criticism. Soong Kwong had been charged with intimidation and 
extortion, but, for lack of evidence, had not been convicted until 
3 January, although he had had more than one-retrial. A British 
judge had presided over the court with two Malayan assessors, but 
there was a split verdict. The judge found him guilty, but the 
assessors voted for his acquittal. A second trial had the same 
result, and it was deemed that the assessors were intimidated.
At the third trial an entirely British panel convicted him and he 
was sentenced to four years' imprisonment. Cf. Donnison, 389; 
Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 
London, 1973, 50.
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British Army officers taking the salute at the march-past of a MPAJA 
regiment (top). The place is not identified. Pictures at the centre am 
bottom show a gathering of the people- and MPAJA troops at a meeting to 
celebrate the Japanese surrender in Klang, Jcinng' r.
Source: Li Ton Min, Hu Yu-chih , et.al., T a-^ p an ;/ u II a n - c h M
(Ma-lai-ya chih pu,.
There  was c o n t i n u e d  c r i t i c i s m  i n  the  C h inese  P r e s s ,  and a t  many m e e t in g s
h e l d  d u r i n g  t h e s e  months ,  o f  t h e  BMA's f a i l u r e  to  c o n s i d e r  t h e  w e l f a r e
o f  t h e  p e o p l e ,  i t s  r e f u s a l  to  implement  p r o m is e s  made unde r  t h e  U n i t ed
N a t i o n s  C h a r t e r ,  i t s  i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i t h  f reedom of  sp e ec h  and a s se m b ly ,
th e  r u t h l e s s  b e h a v i o u r  o f  B r i t i s h  t r o o p s  to wards  t h e  l o c a l  p o p u l a c e ,
and ' i m p e r i a l i s t i c  d e t e r m i n a t i o n '  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  to  impose t h e  r e a c t i o n a r y
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  fo rm er  c o l o n i a l  r u l e .  A c c u s a t i o n s  were even  made t h a t
c o n d i t i o n s  were  worse  th a n  t h e y  had  been  u n d e r  t h e  J a p a n e s e .  Because  o f
such c r i t i c i s m s  t h e  BMA s u spende d  t h e  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  s i x  l e f t i s t  
54n e w s p a p e r s .
Th is  a g i t a t i o n  r e a c h e d  i t s  c l i m a x  when t h e  m i l i t a n t  communist  
e l e m e n t s ,  w o rk in g  th rough  the  S i n g a p o re  GLU, d e c id e d  to  c a l l  a g e n e r a l  
s t r i k e  i n  J a n u a r y ,  u n l e s s  t h e i r  demands f o r  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  r e l e a s e  o f  
the  f o rm e r  MPAJU l e a d e r  Soong Kwong and o t h e r  p a r t y  and l a b o u r  o f f i c i a l s  
r e c e i v e d  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  a nsw e r .  M o u n tb a t t e n ,  who had moved h i s  o f f i c e s  
to  S i n g a p o r e ,  was b r i e f e d  by Hone and h i s  s e n i o r  s t a f f  on Soong Kwong's 
c a s e .  He c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  i n  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  Soong Kwong s h o u ld  be  s e t  
a t  l i b e r t y ,  l e s t  h i s  c o n t i n u e d  d e t e n t i o n  c o n s t i t u t e  p r e v e n t i v e  a r r e s t ,  
which was c o n t r a r y  to  M o u n t b a t t e n ' s p o l i c y . I n  f a c t ,  M o u n tb a t te n  
was c r i t i c a l  o f  Hone f o r  t h e  way he d e a l t  wiLli the  communists  i n  O c t o b e r ,  
which had r e s u l t e d  i n  c a s u a l t i e s . Moun t ba t t e n  now gave o r d e r s  f o r  
Soong Kwong's r e l e a s e .  But  when i t  was b r o u g h t  to  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  t h a t  
the  t h r e a t e n e d  g e n e r a l  s t r i k e  was co u p le d  w i t h  t h e  demand f o r  Soong Kwong's 
r e l e a s e ,  M o u n tb a t t e n  p rom p t ly  c a n c e l l e d  the  r e l e a s e .  ' I  c o n s i d e r e d  he 
[Soong Kwong] s h o u ld  be s e t  f r e e ' ,  r e c a l l e d  M o u n tb a t t e n ,  ' b u t  I  was n o t  
p r e p a r e d  to  e n c o u ra g e  l a w l e s s n e s s  by a l l o w i n g  th e  i n s t i g a t o r s  o f  d i r e c t  
a c t i o n  to  suppose  t h a t  t h e i r  t h r e a t  to  p a r a l y s e  t h e  l i f e  o f  S in g a p o re  
had i n  any way c o n t r i b u t e d  to  h i s  r e l e a s e . ' J ^
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54 Among the  newspapers  p r o h i b i t e d  were t h e  Min Sheng Pau o f  Kuala  
Lumpur and the  Min Pao o f  Seremban.  See t h e  l i s t  in  MU 3 9 5 / 4 6 .
55 M o u n t b a t t e n , P o s t - S u r r e n d e r  T a s k s , 304.
56 L e t t e r  f rom A s s i s t a n t  C h i e f  o f  S t a f f  to  C h ie f  o f  S t a f f  e n t i t l e d
' D i s t u r b a n c e s  i n  M a l a y a ' ,  26 O c to b e r  1945,  s a i d :  'SAC f e e l s  t h a t
Hone i s  n o t  h a n d l i n g  Malaya as  s u c c e s s f u l l y  as  Ranee [CCAO] h a n d l e d  
Burma, and c o n s i d e r s  t h a t  i t  i s  a g r a v e  r e f l e c t i o n  on the  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  Malaya t h a t  i t  s h o u ld  be n e c e s s a r y  to  i n f l i c t  
c a s u a l t i e s  on l o c a l  d e m o n s t r a t o r s  when no such  a c t i o n  was e v e r  
c o n s i d e r e d  n e c e s s a r y  i n  Burma. '
57 M o u n tb a t t e n ,  P o s t - S u r r e n d e r  T a s k s ,  304.
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A General Strike of twenty-four hours took place on 29 January. 
It was estimated that 170,000 came out in Singapore alone. In the 
peninsula sympathetic strikes of one day’s duration were staged and 
also met with a considerable measure of success. In certain places 
such as Ipoh, however, where a strong line was taken by the authorities 
in advising shops to remain open and promising protection in the form 
of police and military patrols, the strike was broken. The extent of 
the strike, Mountbatten observed, 'bore witness to the efficiency and 
the ramifications of the directing organisation [the MCP]'.58 Qn 3 
February the review of Soong Kwong's sentence was published, and he was 
released on sureties.
It might not have been sheer coincidence that the first 
trial of strength with the BMA chosen by the militant communist elements 
coincided with the fourteen-day meeting of the Eighth Enlarged Plenum 
of the MCP's Central Committee. It had been apparent that Lai Tek's 
policy of moderation was unpopular with the militants, but also that 
they had not been able to change it, as he was well-entrenched within 
the CEC. Lai Tek’s general authority during much of this period was 
nevertheless tenuous. Militance was a form of revolutionary activity 
permitted by the party, within the context of its 'peaceful and legal' 
struggle, and to curb or dampen such activity was 'unrevolutionary'.
At the conference, Lai Tek briefly noted the widespread agitation 
throughout the country and flattered the militant elements by regarding 
such agitation as the prelude to 'a high tide of anti-imperialism'.
He added:
During these past four months in Malaya, there has been 
an outbreak of strikes, demonstrations, and economic 
struggles of the 500,000 peasants, workers, youths and 
intellectuals, manifesting their desires and demands for 
a democratic system and a better livelihood. The Malayan 
workers are asking for higher wages, democracy and 
protesting against the arrests of anti-Japanese elements.
During these struggles, Chinese and Indians formed two 
friendly alliances [apparently a reference to Indian 
labour in the GLUs] in this democratic movement.
58 Ibid.
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Therefore, Malaya's revolutionary movement of today 
is preparing conditions for a high tide of anti­
imperialism, and the MCP is calling all people to 
unite together to defeat the plot of imperialism.^9
A second General Strike was called for 15 February. The day 
chosen was the anniversary of the fall of Singapore; the reason given 
that the strike would commemorate the abandonment of the city to the 
Japanese. The intention to discredit the BMA was clear.
In anticipation of this trouble, the British field commanders,
BMA officials and Mountbatten met on 9 February to discuss the situation.
Differences arose between Mountbatten and the other officials on
appropriate counteractions. As the BMA historian Donnison describes it:
...Admiral Mountbatten was reluctantly persuaded by 
the DCCAO Singapore [Brigadier McKerron], supported 
by Lieutenant-General Sir Miles Dempsey, the 
Commander-in-Chief, ALFSEA, and the Chief of Staff,
South East Asian Command, Lieutenant-General Sir 
Frederick Browning, that this was a serious challenge 
which must be met if British administration was to 
continue at all, and that the only way to meet it 
was to strike at the Communist leaders. He refused 
to act by preventive arrest, but agreed, still 
reluctantly, to expel the leaders who, being alien 
Chinese, were liable to banishment under the prewar 
Banishment Ordinance. His reluctance proceeded not 
only from his personal conviction of the advantages 
to be gained from a liberal approach but from the 
knowledge that it was at that time a part of the 
British Government's policy for the future of Malaya 
that the power to banish should not be used...60
On 13 February Mountbatten ordered a ban on all processions or 
meetings and issued an official statement, repeated throughout the country, 
that defiance of this order would not be tolerated and that aliens who 
flouted the order would be liable to repatriation to their places of 
birth or citizenship. On the night of 13 February, some hours after 
the warning had been issued, twenty-four MCP members and officials, ten 
of whom were Chinese nationals, were arrested in several raids in 
Singapore in connection with the proposed General Strike.
59 Lai T'e, 15.
60 Donnison, 391.
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The names o f  t h e  t e n  Chinese  n a t i o n a l s  were s u b m i t t e d  to
M o u n tb a t t e n ,  w i t h  t h e  recommendat ion  t h a t  they  be r e p a t r i a t e d  t o  China
as  p ro m in e n t  o r g a n i s e r s  and t r o u b l e m a k e r s .  M o u n tb a t t e n  r e f u s e d  to  do
t h i s ,  how ever ,  b e c a u s e  he d i d  n o t  c o n s i d e r  t h a t  t h e s e  t e n  men ' c o u l d
r e a s o n a b l y  be h e l d  to  have  had  t im e  to  p r o f i t  f rom t h e  w a r n in g  which
had be e n  i s s u e d ;  n o r  t h a t  th e y  c o u ld  s i n c e  t h a t  w a r n in g  have commit ted
61any misdemeanour  which would q u a l i f y  them f o r  e x p u l s i o n . 1 The 
Com m ander - in -C h ie f ,  ALFSEA and M o u n t b a t t e n ' s C h ie f  o f  S t a f f  s t r o n g l y  
r e p r e s e n t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  s h o u ld  be  no r e l e a s e  o f  t h e  a r r e s t e d  men.
M o u n tb a t t e n  was f i r m  i n  h i s  r e f u s a l  t o  e x p e l  w i t h o u t  t r i a l  i n  c o u r t ,  
b u t  e v e n t u a l l y  a g re e d  to  t h e  l e a d e r s  b e i n g  k e p t  i n  c u s to d y  u n t i l  t h e  
r e t u r n  o f  c i v i l  government  on 1 A p r i l  1946 .62  The t e n  were  t hen  p ro m p t ly  
d e p o r t e d  w i t h o u t  l e g a l  p r o c e e d i n g s  to  China  w h e re ,  i t  was l a t e r  c l a i m e d  
by t h e  communis t s ,  t hey  were s u b j e c t e d  t o  s e v e r e  pun i shm en t  by Chiang 
K a i - s h e k ' s  government .
In  s p i t e  o f  t h e  a r r e s t s ,  on t h e  morn ing o f  15 F e b r u a r y  a p u b l i c  
m e e t in g  took  p l a c e  i n  f r o n t  o f  S t  J o s e p h ' s  I n s t i t u t i o n ,  S i n g a p o re  and  a 
p r o c e s s i o n  formed.  When t h e  p o l i c e  t r i e d  to  d i s p e r s e  t h e  p r o c e s s i o n ,  
they  were r e s i s t e d  and a l l e g e d l y  a t t a c k e d  by a crowd armed w i t h  c r o w b a r s ,  
s t i c k s  and b o t t l e s .  The p o l i c e  opened  f i r e ,  and two p e o p le  were k i l l e d .
In  t h e  p e n i n s u l a  d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  a l s o  took  p l a c e .  A s e r i o u s  i n c i d e n t  
o c c u r r e d  a t  L a b i s  ( J o h o r )  where  f i f t e e n  p e o p le  were  k i l l e d  when t h e  
p o l i c e  opened f i r e  on a crowd which  was a l l e g e d l y  a t t a c k i n g  them. At 
Penang a crowd was d i s p e r s e d  w i t h  a f i r e  h o s e .  A few days l a t e r  a 
d e m o n s t r a t i o n  a t  Mers ing  ( J o h o r ) , i n  sympathy w i t h  t h e  v i c t i m s  o f  t h e  
L a b i s  i n c i d e n t ,  r e s u l t e d  i n  a f u r t h e r  c l a s h  w i t h  t h e  p o l i c e  and f u r t h e r  
f a t a l i t i e s .
On t h e  whole t h e  m i l i t a n t s  were  b a d ly  t r o u n c e d  i n  t h e  ' showdown' .  
Not on ly  were more MCP l e a d e r s  a r r e s t e d  and f a c e d  w i t h  t h e  p r o s p e c t  of  
b a n i s h m e n t ,  b u t  t h e i r  a c t i o n s  had c aused  t h e  d e a t h  o f  a t  l e a s t  tw en ty  
s u p p o r t e r s .  The MCP e le m e n t s  now r e a l i s e d  t h a t  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
61 I b i d . , 392-93 ;  M o i i n t b a t t e n , P o s t - S u r r e n d e r  T a s k s ,  304-05 .
62 Donnison ,  345.
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intended, and had the means, to take a strong line to maintain order.
The lesson was learnt. The MCP's militants withdrew into the background.
The party was forced to devise a new strategy and to reorganise itself,
based on three major considerations: (a) the party was to take greater
measures to ensure security by not exposing too many of its organisations
and officials and to reduce its open activities; (b) the United Front
organisations were to be the only ones to step up their activities as
a cover for the party’s underground activities; and (c) the party was
to prepare for the eventuality of armed struggle, the timing of which
was to be determined by the extent of further Government repressive 
6 3measures. Thus, for most of March through August 1946, the party was
involved in closing all its twelve open branches and ordering them
underground. The party was to have only two open offices, one at Kuala
Lumpur and the other at Singapore. This was the situation until the
government's declaration of an Emergency in June 1948 pre-empted the
MCP into launching its uprising.
Victor Purcell, the Chinese Affairs Adviser in the BMA, had
now reached the end of his patience as far as the MCP was concerned.
The 15 February incident convinced him that no other course remained
than to adopt a tough policy. As he noted in a memorandum:
We must accept the fact then that no compromise can be 
made with the MCP. Its aims and those of the British 
Government are in ineluctable opposition....What we are 
confronted with at present is the threat of small but 
resolute elements to terrorise the entire community 
with the undermining of the administration as their sole 
end...
Therefore, on due consideration, I recommend that all 
the leaders or any other persons who have directly or 
indirectly conspired to create the recent disorders 
and to defy the administration shall be pursued and 
dealt with with all the resources at our disposal. When 
any of them are liable to expulsion under the existing 
law an expulsion order should be made and carried out....
We cannot honour our trusteeship if we are unable to 
maintain the authority of the administration whether 
it be military or civil and we cannot move towards
63 See Appendix C, ’Malayan Communist Party Policy and Organisation', 
WIR, Hqs Malaya Command, 2 April 1946, in WO 172/9773.
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universal education and representative government while 
we are under the threat of .a group of gangsters and 
thugs.64
Purcell, however, argued for the retention of the Advisory Councils
but suggested that the BMA should only appoint Left-wing representatives
65on remaining councils who would cooperate and ’obey the law'.
Inis was an apparent attempt to split the communists and play them 
against each other.
Malay-MCP/Chinese Conflicts
The extent of Malay-Chinese ill-will and conflicts in the 
country throughout the BMA period suggests once again that the MCP 
had failed to analyse the political situation in Malaya correctly.
The MCP was aware of the existence of racial tension between September 
and December, as indicated by reported attempts of Chinese 
communists in various areas to foster goodwill between Malays and Chinese 
in order to get Malay support to fight British colonialism.66 However, 
these attempts were uncoordinated and unsustalncd. In any case, British 
military intelligence observed that the Malays rebuffed such communist 
overtures because they doubted communist intentions and feared they would 
only be used as tools of the communists. Soon after this the MCP 
shifted its interests and paid maximum attention to the BMA and to its 
interim goals, such as the organisation of labour, the formation of 
United Front bodies and presentation of specific demands on human rights, 
improvement of wages and the raising of living standards. The effects,
64 Victor Purcell, 'The Issues Before Us', a report on Chinese 
affairs, 18 February 1946, in SCA/FM/A/7/1.
65 Victor Purcell, Memorandum on 'Advisory Councils', 21 February 
1946, in MU Secret 158/46.
66 See Malaya Command intelligence telegram, 29 November 1945, 'Subject
MCP activity: Klang. Village headman ordered by Chinese to enrol
all Malays into Chinese fighting force.' Another intelligence 
report, ISUM No.28, Hqs Malaya Command to SACSEA, 3 December 1945: 
'Ipoh meeting. MCP representatives made speeches urging Malays
to unite with Chinese.' Enclosures in BMA PSD/29.
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both in the long and short term, of racial ill-will between the Malays 
and the Chinese, were just ignored or regarded by the MCP as ephemeral.
The causes of the prolonged racial ill-will and conflict must 
be traced again to the high-handed bearing of the MPAJA guerrillas and 
to their relentless pursuit of Malay collaborators in particular.
Before 15 August collaboration with the Japanese was of primary political 
importance, but after the Japanese surrender its importance had receded 
and become secondary. So long as the communist vendettas lasted no 
meaningful Malay cooperation could be obtained by the MCP. The situation 
was somewhat aggravated by British policies, especially the BMA's 
extension of preferential treatment to the Chinese and to the MCP/MPAJA 
to the detriment of Malay interests. Consequently, the Malays found 
their role, status and institutions in decline, if not suppressed by 
the BMA. In contrast, the Chinese seemed to be in the ascendancy and 
to have everything their way. The latest British threat to Malay rights 
was represented by the British Government's announcement of the Malayan 
Union policy on 10 October which aimed at taking away the Sultan's 
sovereignty and granting equal citizenship rights to the Chinese. The 
disclosure of the Malayan Union plan and the beginning of MacMichael's 
mission to strip the Malay Rulers of their sovereignty promoted further 
Malay hatred of the Chinese, and built up resentment against the British. 
The Malays decided to resort to further violence against the Chinese.
The struggle again took the form of the Sabilillah (Holy War), based on 
the teachings of the Sufi mystics which combined Islamic religious fervour 
with the Malay martial arts.
Racial tension and minor clashes were reported in Malacca,
Johor, Pahang, Kedah and Kelantan in September and October. A Force 136 
field intelligence report of 11 September disclosed that the situation in 
the vicinity of Batu Pahat was difficult. The Malays were still active.
An eye-witness had reported thirty Chinese killed and their houses burning 
at Simpang Lima, while the Chinese population in Batu Pahat was panicking. 
However, the first report received by telephone at Hqs 5th Indian 
Division had said 500 Chinese were killed. An investigation showed that 
the figure was exaggerated, but confirmed there had been trouble. A
6 7column of British troops was despatched to Batu Pahat to restore order.
67 See Force 136 field intelligence report, 11 September 1945, in 
BMA PSD/39.
353
Meanwhile, other Force 136 reports indicated that the Malay population 
in several areas was terrified of the MPAJA. One unconfirmed report 
said that the Malay District Officer (DO) at Mersing was executed by 
Chinese on 2 September. Another quoted a senior Malay police officer 
at Kluang as saying that the area's DO and Police Chief had been arrested 
by the MPAJA and were believed killed. The Malay officer appealed for
6 8protection for the remaining police as Kluang, as he feared disturbances.
On 19 September, Malays in Kota Bharu (Kelantan) petitioned
the Sultan to prevent an outbreak of violence against the Malay population.
The KMT guerrillas who controlled the town were said to be massing for
an attack, and there was a reported plot (apparently by the KMT) to
kill the deputy Mentri Besar of Kelantan, Datuk Nik Ahmad Kamil. Two
Gurkha support groups were immediately despatched to Kota Bharu. At
Kuala Krai, in spite of the promises made to the Force 136 officer
attached to the Malay Resistance unit, the MPAJA tried eleven Malays
and sentenced three to death. The MPAJA leader Wong Lit was warned that
while the BMA had no objection to his apprehending suspects, he was on
, 69no account to try or execute them.
On 26 September, Malay-Chinese clashes occurred in Alor Gajah 
(Malacca), in which one Malay was killed and two Chinese seriously 
injured. The following day armed Malays were reported attacking 
Chinese in Senggarang (Johor), one of the areas of racial violence during 
May to August 1945. Two Chinese were reported killed, but the trouble 
was quickly localised. After this incident, Force 136 considered that 
it would be better for the Army to use regular British troops rather 
than the MPAJA to suppress any trouble there.
On 29 September, Force 136 reported that frightened Malays were 
arriving in Pekan (Pahang) with stories of MPAJA killings and intimidation. 
On 12 October, a Malay chief of Negri Sembilan, the Datuk Mentri of Jelebu, 
was arrested by the MPAJA on charges of instigating the Japanese to kill 
Chinese and British troops found sheltering in his village. On 26 October, 
tension was reported between Malays and Chinese in Merbok village (Kedah).
68 Force 136 reports, 15 and 16 September 1945, in ibid.
69 Force 136, 26 September 1945 , in ibid.
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Although these racial incidents were assuming serious proportions, 
neither the MCP, the BMA, nor Malay leaders did much to defuse the overall 
tension. On 6 November there occurred the worse racial incident subse­
quent to the BMA takeover: at about 6.00 a.m. a party of Malays armed with
parang and kris descended on the Chinese settlement at Padang Lebar, 
near Kuala Pilali, and killed thirty-five women and children and five men. 
According to Victor Purcell, who rushed to the spot with the SCAO,
Colonel Calder, the Malay attackers had buried the bodies except for 
those of the children, which they threw down the well. Ten Malays 
were arrested immediately and seven others later. They said during 
interrogations that they had been coerced to join the Communist Party 
by the Chinese , and that threats were used to obtain subscriptions.^
A Malay view of the incident was that the BMA failed to 
contain these racial clashes because it was too weak in its early 
phase. This same source revealed that the Sabilillah movement of Batu 
Pahat was directly involved in the Padang Labar massacre. Kiyai Selamat, 
of Batu Pahat, one of the chief disciples of Kiyai Salleh, was said 
to have led 1,000 Malays on the rampage from Batu Kikir to Padang Lebar, 
killing about 170 Chinese. British military intelligence subsequently 
found that Kiyai Selamat had been to Segamat, to Lenggeng and as far 
afield as Mantin in Negri Sembilan to spread the teachings of Kiyai 
Salleh and to recruit followers. He was thought to be of North Borneo 
origin.^
live next day there was a clash at the nearby village of Batu 
Kikir between Malays and MPAJA guards posted there to restore order.
Four MPAJA guards were killed, while Malay casualties were six killed 
and two injured. On 8 November, Purcell and Calder toured Kuala Pilah 
and Bahau, towns in the neighbourhood, to comfort Chinese refugee 
families who had been placed under military protection. Both assured 
the refugees, especially the women, that the situation was in hand,
70 Victor Purcell's Malaya's Political Climate III', 19 October-
9 November 1945, in WO 203/5302; see also Purcell, The Chinese 
in Malaya, 268.
71 Hamzah bin Mohamad, 'The Fourteen Days of Terror, Before, During 
and After', B.A. thesis, University of Malaya, 1969/70, 17-20.
See also ISUM, Hqs Malaya Command, 2 February 1946, in WO 172/9773.
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enumerated the places where troops were stationed, explained that
tanks and soldiers were patrolling, and told them that a meeting to
prevent further bloodshed was to take place the next day to which the
72Malay and Chinese headmen had been summoned.
At Batu Kikir Colonel Calder addressed a large crowd of Malays 
in the course of which he rebuked those who had committed the massacre.
As Purcell reported it:
Colonel Calder made them assemble in one spot and made 
a long and eloquent speech to them in Malay. He told 
them, with several references to their own proverbs, 
that they had lost in one day the reputation it had 
taken years to build. He rebuked them as cowards and 
criminals who had slaughtered innocent women and 
children. They listened intently and were now 
obviously sobered. When asked by Colonel Calder to do 
so they signified their intention of keeping the 
peace according to the Koran of which he reminded 
them.7 3
Purcell said he spotted one Malay among the crowd carrying a parang in 
a sheath. The man was seized and disarmed, and his case was used as 
an object lesson to the crowd. 'Others no doubt carrying concealed
74parangs or knives edged to the outside of the crowd', Purcell added.
The firm action taken by the BMA, such as arrests of ringleaders, 
brought the situation temporarily under control.
On 7 November, the MCP held a meeting in Seremban, the
of Negri Sembilan State, to discuss the situation. The communist
leaders were obviously shaken by the events, and among the resolutions
passed was one that they should change their attitude regarding
Malays to one of conciliation.^^ The Chinese reaction generally was panic.
Chinese settlers from Padang Lebar and the outlying areas were reported 
* 76to be pouring into Seremban. The situation in the local areas was 
so bad that in talks with the CAO Malay villagers in the Ulu Berenang
72 Victor Purcell, 'Malaya's Political Climate III'.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 See Report, 'Situation in Malaya', 14 November 1945, in WO 172/1791.
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area stated that the Malay-Chinese feud was of too long standing for them 
to guarantee their own good behäviour to allow the evacuated Chinese 
to return to their village.^
Chinese in Singapore and elsewhere in the country viewed the
Padang Lebar massacre with horror and alarm and urged the British authorities to
take steps to prevent Malays from attacking Chinese. ' The Nanyang Siang Pau,
a Singapore daily, reported that the KMT party in the city and its branches
had jointly despatched telegrams to British Premier Attlee, appealing for
an order to the BMA to protect effectively the lives and properties
of Chinese. The newspaper noted that for the last few months cases
of wholesale massacre of Chinese by Malays had flared up in rapid
succession in Johor and Negri Sembilan, resulting in enormous loss of
7 8Chinese lives and property. As an indication of the desperate plight
the Chinese were now in, on 20 November a joint telegram was sent to
Mountbatten by the Southern Johor branches of the MCP, the KMT, the
People's Committee and Chinese associations of Johor, to express Chinese
concern over the Padang Lebar massacre, to put blame on the BMA for
allowing it to happen and to demand protective measures from the local
79garrisons for the Chinese population.
The Padang Lebar massacre had repercussions not only in 
the whole of Negri Sembilan and the neighbouring state of Malacca,- 
but also in Selangor, Kedah, Pahang and Johor. It encouraged Malays 
to step up attacks on Chinese. According to military intelligence 
reports, Malay over-confidence was based on exaggerated Malay accounts 
of the Padang Lebar incident. At Gemas (Johor), Malays boldly staged
, 80a procession through the Chinese quarter, but no incidents were reported.
All Malays now seemed united in their struggle to prevent Chinese political
77 SACSEA to War Office on Malaya, 17 November 1945, in WO 172/1792.
78 Nanyang Slang Pau, 17 November 1945.
79 Telegram from Johor Bahru to SACSEA, 20 November 1945, in 
WO 172/1792.
80 BMA (Malaya) Monthly Report No.3 for November 1945, 3, in 
Confidential BMA PSD/39/45.
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domination of their country. A BMA intelligence report indicated
Malay thinking behind the struggle:
...there appears to be an appreciable concern among 
educated Malays regarding the future status of 
Malays in Malaya [following publication of the Malayan 
Union policy] and there is a fairly widespread belief 
that the Chinese are securing an economic grip of 
the country which, if unchecked, may eventually lead 
to political control. Thus any movement designed to 
rouse Malays to take greater interest in securing 
their position is sure of support and reports from 
all regions refer, in a lesser or greater degree, 
to the prevalence of inter-racial feeling.81
In view of the increasing inter-racial conflicts, the proposed
disbandment of the MPAJA and KMT guerrilla movements on 1 December was
naturally viewed with much disfavour by the Chinese population, and
conversely, welcomed by the Malays, even though a few Malay guerrilla
units such as the Wataniah were also being disbanded. The ratio of
Chinese guerrillas to Malay guerrillas was somewhere in the region of
twenty to one. In Alor Star and Sungei Patani, both in Kedah, the local
Chinese population was reported to be unwilling to let the MPAJA disband
because it regarded the MPAJA as protection against possible trouble 
82from the Malays. The MPAJA Supreme Headquarters was also not happy
to disband, but since the MCP had taken a decision in favour of it, it
agreed to carry it through. In Kota Bharu, the KMT guerrillas refused
to disband on 1 December, giving as their reason Chinese demands for
protection against attacks from Malays. Several groups of KMT guerrillas,
totalling about forty people, fled the town with their arms and withdrew
to the Malay-Thai border. The BMA had rejected the KMT guerrillas’
8 3request to be allowed to keep their arms. A few days later, however,
Malay-Chinese trouble broke out in the State. The KMT guerrillas in Upper 
Perak also refused to disband and absconded with their arms to the Thai-Perak
81 BMA Monthly Report for November 1945, Confidential SCA9/45, 3.
82 WIR, No.61 Hqs SACSEA, 10 December 1945, 307, in WO 172/1794.
83 WIR, 25 Indian Division, 12 December 1945, 4, in MU Secret 335/46.
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border, where they teamed up with their Kelantanese comrades and 
terrorised Malays in the countryside. KMT guerrillas, now termed 
'bandits' by the military, held sway at the Thai-Malay border for eight 
months. They did this mainly by obtaining the tacit support of Thai 
border police and military through suitable inducements and a share of 
their spoils gained by highway robberies, kidnappings, murders and raids 
on helpless Malay, Chinese and Thai farmers and settlers on both sides 
of the border. It was only in July 1946, after several fruitless attempts 
to negotiate with the leaders of the KMT guerrillas, and the intervention 
of the Chinese Consul-General in Malaya, that the British authorities 
finally succeeded in inducing a large portion of the KMT guerrillas to 
disband and disarm.
Throughout December, inter-racial tension increased in every 
State throughout the country. It was thought by British military 
intelligence that the areas of greatest danger were those where the Malays 
were smaller in numbers or of equal proportion with Chinese. Areas 
and states where the Malays were in overwhelming majority, such as Kelantan 
and Trengganu, reported relatively fewer inter-racial clashes, although 
tension existed. But after the Padang Lebar incidents, there were reports 
of Malays in Trengganu and Kelantan attacking Chinese. The Kin Kwok 
Daily News of 19 December reported Malay attacks on Chinese in Besut 
(Trengganu) and urged the BMA to protect Chinese lives and property.
There were reported cases of inter-racial friction in Kota Bharu (Kelantan), 
culminating in a clash on 20/21 December. Three Chinese were killed 
and one wounded, while one Malay was killed and three wounded. The 
friction was attributed to reaction by Malays to the arrogance of the 
Chinese before disappearance of the KMT guerrillas.^
In Perak inter-racial trouble erupted again. It started 
with the murder of four Chinese women at Ayer Tawar on 27 December, 
followed the next day by the murder of a further six women at Layang 
Layang Kiri, which is northeast of the Perak River. These clashes 
reached serious proportions when forty-one Chinese were killed, thirty- 
two others reported missing and thirty-two Malays killed. The centre of
84 Min Sheng Pau, 20 December 1945.
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the trouble was Bruas. Counter-action was taken by about 
100 Chinese, on 30 December, attacking the Malay village of Lambor 
Kanan, further down the Perak River. Casualties in this clash amounted 
to nearly fifty, more Chinese than Malays being killed. The Chinese 
also attacked another riverside village nearby on the following day
and killed sixteen Malays, including seven children who were deliberately
- , , , 85burned to death.
Chinese residents in the area began evacuating south
to Telok Anson for fear of Malay reprisals. South of the Bernam River,
thirty Chinese families living near the Malay village of Bagan Nakhoda
Omar left their homes and withdrew into a local Chinese settlement.
The general state of tension was indicated when one of the British
patrols visited Kampong Gajah, on the Perak River north of Telok
Anson, and reported Chinese having been cut up by Malays in the market.
They found the whole Malay population armed with parang, sword and spears.
They remarked that though Chinese reports claimed that the Malay gangs
had carried firearms and even automatic weapons, all Chinese casualties
86had been inflicted with cold steel. Chinese newspapers reported that 
because of the inter-racial clashes Chinese traders in Sitiawan and the 
Dindings had suspended business.
For the remaining period January through March 1946, only a 
brief summary of the major inter-racial incidents is necessary to show 
the deteriorating situation throughout the country. The summary is 
taken from a BMA report:
...there were later outbreaks in various parts of 
the country, especially in Lower Perak where in 
the first three weeks of January, the death roll 
amounted to approximately sixty Chinese and thirty 
Malays, and in the Raub district of Pahang where 
on the 11th of February the Malays made a sudden 
attack on the Chinese and killed thirty and wounded 
sixteen, two of themselves being killed and ten 
wounded. The first big incident in which the Chinese 
were the aggressors was at Bekor, on the Perak-River,
85 lSUMHqs Malaya Command No.10, up to 5 January 1946, in WO 172/9773.
86 Ibid.
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on the 2nd of March when seventy-six Malays were 
massacred in a surprise attack made at dawn.87
In the Raub incidents the Sabilillah was very much in evidence. 
The disbanded elements of the war-time Malay guerrilla force Wataniah 
were said to be involved. Trouble between the MPAJA and Wataniah was 
of long standing, but as usual innocent people were the chief sufferers 
in the clash. On the date of the incident, 11 February, the Acting DO, 
Encik Annuar, arrived at the village of Batu Malim, wartime headquarters 
of Wataniah, to collect rent due on state lands. He found racial
88trouble brewing and 'religious fanatics' inciting a mob to violence.
Annuar tried repeatedly to persuade the hostile gathering to disperse.
But members of the mob who were in various stages of religious ecstacy
that led them to believe they were invulnerable, refused to be calmed.
The following account narrates what occurred:
A few minutes after he [Annuar] had returned to the 
area headman's house to send off a messenger to 
collect reinforcements of police, Annuar heard the 
frenzied beating of the mosque drum, followed almost 
immediately by terrified shouts and screams. When 
he tried to break up the riot that was then raging 
he was resisted, and as he had too few police available 
to help him, drove off to collect a more effective 
force. By the time that he returned with an adequate 
party of armed policemen, however, the fighting had 
ended and thirty Chinese and two Malays lay dead, 
while sixteen Chinese and ten Malays had been wounded.
His own career was an extra casualty.89
More signs of the Sabilillah appeared in the Malay attacks on
Chinese in Telok Anson in early March. The Chinese reported that the
attacks were well-planned, well organised and very extensive, marked by
vigorous bell-ringing in mosques from the 13 milestone to the 28 milestone
90of the Bagan-Natul Road.
87 H.R. Hone, Report on the British Military Administration in Malaya, 
September 1945-March 1946, 41.
88 William Shaw, Tun Razak: His Life and Times, Kuala Lumpur, 1976,
58. The account is believed to be based on interviews with the 
late Malaysian Prime Minister.
89 Ibid.
90 Nanyang Siang Pau, 12 March 1946.
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After the incidents in March Malay attacks suddenly ceased,
and calm was gradually restored' throughout the country. There are
two reasons for this. Firstly, the British authorities had finally
started to use the Sultans to restrain their subjects. In mid-December,
the Sultan of Selangor came out exhorting his subjects to restrain
themselves and to maintain inter-racial harmony. The Sultan attributed
91blame for the trouble on war-time conditions created by the Japanese.
In January and February, the Sultans of Perak and Pahang toured the 
affected areas in their respective States, urging their subjects to 
remain calm. The Sultan of Perak helped the BMA to set up goodwill 
committees. The MCP also joined in with the Chinese Chambers of Commerce 
to appeal to Chinese to keep calm. Secondly, the Malay anti-Malayan 
Union campaign had now reached its climax on 1 March, with the meeting 
of the All-Malay Congress at the Sultan Suleiman's Club at Kampung Bahru 
in Kuala Lumpur. This congress decided to form a national Malay 
political organisation, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) 
to rally Malays throughout the country to 'crush' the Malayan Union plan. 
Henceforth this campaign was to take top priority over all other matters, 
and it was now neither the Chinese nor the MCP but the British Government 
which became the main target of Malay hostility.
The Malay-British Conflict
Under the BMA the whole of Malaya, including the nine Malay 
states, came under one direct and unified administration identicial 
to what the Japanese had established during their occupation. The 
British had failed to introduce such a system of administration in Malaya 
before the war. Although martial law was not declared, the BMA operated 
in much the same fashion as if this had been done. All legislative, 
executive and Sultan's state councils were suspended. The Sultans 
also could not function until civil government was reintroduced.
Rights and properties acquired during the Japanese Occupation, however, 
were subject to investigation and to such action as the BMA considered
91 Seruan Raayat, Kuala Lumpur, 12 December 1945.
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92necessary.
One of the first acts*of Brigadier Willan, the DCCAO (Malaya)
was to contact the Malay Sultans and to check on their records
during the Japanese Occupation. The British Army’s Field Security
Unit had been supplied with the lists of 'principal suspects' which
included the Sultans, but none of its officers were empowered to deal 
93with the Sultans.
Of the British-appointed Sultans, only five had survived - 
the Sultans of Johor, Selangor, Perak and Pahang, and the Yam Tuan of 
Negri Sembilan. In Trengganu the Sultan had died on 25 September 1942 
and his eldest son, Raja Ali, had been appointed by the Japanese to 
succeed him. In Perlis the Raja died on 1 February 1943 and was succeeded 
by his half-brother, Tengku Syed Hamzah. The Japanese chose Tengku Syed 
Hamzah, although Tengku Syed Putera had been the heir apparent elected 
by the State Council of Perlis in April 1938 with British approval.
In Kedah the Regent, Tengku Badlishah, had been appointed Sultan in 
place of the Sultan who died in 1943. He had been Regent since 1938 
owing to the illness of the Sultan. In Kelantan, Tengku Ibrahim, whose 
title was Rajah Kelantan, the heir apparent and brother of the Sultan, 
was installed as Sultan on 25 June 1944, the day of the Sultan's death.
The Thais with Japanese consent, had allowed Tengku Badlishah and Tengku 
Ibrahim respectively to take their places
92 See 'Extracts of SAC's policy for Military Administration in Malaya',
n.d., Appendix K, 320, in Mountbatten, Post-Surrender Tasks: Section
E of the Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1943-1945, London, 1969.
93 See 'Classification of Suspects' Appendix C, dated 6 August 1945, 
in Principal Civil Affairs Directives for BMA of Malaya, in
WO 203/5406.
94 Information on the Japanese-appointed Sultans is based mainly on 
Willan's reports of his interviews with the Sultans, between 12 and 
30 September 1945, in WO 203/5642, and Sir Harold MacMichael's 
'Report on a Mission to Malaya (October 1945-January 1946), Kuala 
Lumpur, 1946' which appears as Appendix C., J. de V. Allen, The 
Malayan Union, Yale University, 1967, 154. Most scholars have 
tended to regard MacMichael's mission as more important than Willan's, 
and consequently have paid minimum attention to the former's reports.
See Allen, 30, and M.N. Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore 
Separation, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, 27-28, fn.
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One interesting fact was that the Japanese had deposed 
the Sultan of Selangor, Tengku Sir Hishamuddin Alam Shah, on account of
his being a British favourite, and in his place had installed his eldest
brother, Tengku Musa-Eddin, whom the British had previously debarred 
95from succession. Tengku Sir Hishamuddin was removed by the Japanese
on 15 January 1942 soon after their forces overran Selangor. Probably
out of gratitude to the Japanese for recognising his claim to the title,
Tengku Musa-Eddin became the most outspoken royal supporter of the
Japanese regime. He was also one of the Sultans who patronised the
KMM leader Ibraham Yaacob. British Army intelligence described him as
'Black’ (a term meaning 'a security risk') and marked him down to be
detained on reoccupation of Malaya. Likewise, Tengku Syed Hamzah was
considered 'pro-Japanese or otherwise of ill-repute', but the latter
96was not ordered to be arrested. This was apparently because the
British regarded Tengku Musa-Eddin as a usurper whom the Japanese had
supported by supplanting the British favourite.
Willan asked each of the pre-war Sultans questions to determine
their attitudes towards the Japanese. The attention paid to the question
of collaboration can be established from the following extract of Willan's
report of his interview with Sultan Ibrahim:
The Sultan went on to say that whatever speeches he had 
made during the Japanese Occupation had been done on their 
orders. They always composed his speeches and he had merely
95 For an account of how Tengku Musa-Uddin was passed over, see 
Yeo Kim Wah, 'The Selangor Succession Dispute, 1933-38', in 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, September 1971, 169-84.
96 SAC's memorandum, 'Initial relations with Malay Sultans', loc.cit.
The security classifications used by the British Army were as 
follows: 'Whites' were those who were considered to be of no security
danger and therefore did not require to be detained; 'Operational 
Blacks' were those who, though 'White', were not allowed to return
to their homes because they had unavoidably seen or might see Allied 
dispositions, which information would be of value to the enemy;
'Greys' were those considered to have been imbued with enemy 
propaganda to an extent which would be a liability to security if 
released; 'Blacks' were irreconcilables who were a danger to 
security and must be locked up. See 'Classification of Suspects', 
in Principal Civil Affairs Directives for BMA of Malaya, 6 August 
1945, in WO 220/565.
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been used as a mouthpiece as ordered by them... All 
the Sultans had been forced by the Japanese to contribute
10.000 dollars to the Japanese cause and they had done 
so on orders, not voluntarily. To sum up, Col. Hay [the 
Senior CAO for Johor] and myself came away with the 
impression the Sultan was delighted that the British 
had come back, and that he had disliked the Japanese 
Intensely. He appeared to have no guilty conscience 
when the question of collaboration with the Japanese 
was mentioned. He was undoubtedly satisfied with the 
setting up of the BMA.97
Extremely satisfied with the interview he had had with the
Sultan, Willan remarked in the same report that he did not think
MacMichael's future mission would face any problem from Sultan Ibrahim:
'I would say that if the policy of the British Government is to proceed
with the new constitution and the necessary new treaties, the sooner
the Sultan of Johor is approached in his present state of mind the 
98better.' In a later telegram to SEAC and to the Colonial Office,
Willan said that he had forgotten to mention that during the interview
Sultan Ibrahim was 'very nervous' of the Chinese Resistance Forces in
his State. They were said to be causing 'a lot of trouble' to the
Malays. Willan's telegram continued:
It is obvious from the way he spoke that he had no idea 
that the Force 136 element of the Chinese Resistance 
Forces is officered by British officers. He [the Sultan] 
said that if the BMA would authorise him he would arm
20.000 Malays to quell the Chinese. I informed him that 
he should do nothing.™
Willan interviewed Sultan Abu Bakar of Pahang on 28 September. 
He described the Sultan as 'being nervous' when he was encouraged to 
talk of his experiences during the Japanese Occupation. The Sultan 
stated that he had kept aloof from the Japanese as much as possible 
and had only contacted them upon orders which lie could not refuse.
97 Willan's report of his interview with Sultan Ibrahim, 8 September 
1945, in WO 203/564.
98 Ibid.
•99 Willan's confidential telegram to CCAO (Malaya) and SAC, 11 
September 1945, in WO 203/5642. In raising the issue of the 
Chinese resistance forces, Sultan Ibrahim appears to have been 
testing Willan's attitude on the Ma.lay-Chine.se conflict which was 
not raised during the interview.
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From all reports that he had received, Willan said that the Sultan had
in no way actively collaborated with the Japanese.
Force 136 during the time they were operating in 
Pahang spoke well of the Sultan's conduct during the 
Occupation. The Sultan said his speeches had been 
composed by the Japanese. He was genuinely pleased 
at the British return.
When Willan had satisfied himself that each of the pre-war 
Rulers whose legitimacy was not in doubt had not ’actively collaborated' 
with the Japanese, he extended nominal recognition to each Ruler. In 
this way he extended nominal recognition to first the Sultan of Johor, 
then the Yam Tuan of Negri Sembilan, the Sultan of Selangor, the Sultan 
of Perak and the Sultan of Pahang. Each Sultan was told that as a result 
of the BMA, neither he nor his State Council could function, but each 
would be paid a monthly allowance at pre-war levels.
On 14 September, at the royal town of Kelang, just before 
he interviewed the pre-war Sultan of Selangor, Tengku Sir Hishamuddin, 
Willan arrested the Japanese appointee, Tengku Musa-Eddin, and exiled 
him to the Cocos Islands. In order to counter rumours which he feared 
would spread quickly, he released a terse press communique on the 
arrest, in which he explained that Tengku Musa-Eddin had been installed 
by the Japanese, but had already been passed over before the war in 
the succession of the Sultanate of Selangor with the approval of the 
British Government. When Willan met Tengku Sir Hishamuddin, the latter 
was so overcome with joy that he had tears in his eyes and could not 
express himself for a few moments. After receiving Willan’s warm 
regards, he disclosed that some of the Malay notables had been loyal 
to him. On discovering that Musa-Eddin had possession of the crown, 
Willan promised to recover it. Willan, in extending nominal recognition 
to Tengku Sir Hishamuddin as Sultan told him he could not carry out any 
of his royal functions during the BMA. The Sultan said he understood 
and was pleased that the British had returned.101
100 .Confidential telegram from Willan to ALFSEA, 10 October 1945, 
in WO 172/1787.
101 See Willan’s report of interview with Sultan of Selangor, 
18 September 1945, in WO 203/5642.
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Willan's encounter with, and treatment of, the remaining
four Japanese-appointed Rulers was somewhat different. The Raja of
Perlis, Tengku Syed Hamzah, voluntarily relinquished his office after
encountering hostility from Willan during their meeting in Perlis on
17 September. Willan’s attitude towards him, as much as his attitude
towards Tengku Musa-Eddin, was influenced by the pre-war British policy
of favouritism. His handling of Tengku Syed Hamzah reveals this clearly:
There had been adverse reports about Syed Hamzah by 
successive British Advisers in Perlis. I asked Major 
Burr [Force 136 officer in Perlis] the whereabouts of 
Syed Putera, who in April 1938 was, on proposal of the 
Raja, nominated as Bakal Raja, i.e. heir or prospective 
successor of Raja, by votes of all members of the 
State Council except Syed Hamzah who did not vote but 
pressed his own claims in opposition to those of Syed 
Putera. Major Burr said Syed Putera was living in a 
small shack near the railway station...
Syed Hussein, younger brother of Syed Hamzah, then told 
me that Syed wished to write a letter stating
he had abdicated from the position of Raja. I replied 
that if Syed Hamzah wished to write a letter I would 
take it back with me but it must be understood that 
he did so of his own volition and not by any request 
or order of mine. I added that in any view Syed Hamzah 
could not in any case abdicate from a position he had 
never legitimately occupied.
When he had found and interviewed Tengku Syed Putera, Willan extended 
the BMA's nominal recognition of him as the 'Regent of Perlis'. Willan 
sanctioned that he be paid the pre-war Raja's full monthly allowance of 
$6,000. He described Tengku Syed Putera as 'an intelligent young man 
and pro-British
Willan told Sultan Ibrahim of Kelantan and the other Rulers 
that the BMA could not recognise any Sultan who had been appointed during 
the period of the Japanese Occupation. He also instructed them to cease 
flying their personal royal flags. When Willan met the Sultan of Kedah, 
Tengku Badlishalj he addressed him as 'Regent', the title he held before 
the war. As further indication that he approved of him, Willan sanctioned 
that he be paid the pre-war Sultan's allowance of $6,000. However, Willan
102 Willan's report of his interview with the 'Regent of Perlis', 
17 September 1945, in WO 203/5642.
.103 Ibid.
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adopted a hostile attitude towards the Sultan of Trengganu, Raja Ali, 
because of military intelligence reports describing him as ’grey’ and 
alleging that he had committed certain ’discreditable’ acts (not 
specified) during the Japanese Occupation. But since Willan was not 
empowered to remove him, he was granted nominal recognition. Sultan 
Ali was deposed by his State Council on 5 November 1945, however, just 
before MacMichael visited the State. The reconvening of the State 
Council was improper, as it had already been suspended by the BMA 
proclamation, yet its decision was recognised by the BMA and by MacMichael 
later. The decision to remove Sultan Ali was clearly believed to have 
been inspired by the BMA, but the State Council explicitly denied any 
BMA interference. It gave the reason for his removal as ’certain
crimes’ committed by Sultan Ali during the Japanese Occupation which 
rendered him unfit to be Sultan. He was replaced by his younger brother, 
Tengku Ismail, or the Tengku Raja Paduka, younger brother of the dead 
Sultan.104
The Malay Elite Demoralised
The confidence of the Malay aristocracy was badly affected by 
the BMA's suspension of State Councils and the interviews Willan had 
conducted with the Sultans. As Willan moved from State to State, 
uncertainty developed among the Malay aristocrats with regard to their 
Ruler's position. At each interview Willan had forbidden the Sultan's 
court advisers to attend. Willan’s confirmation or deposition of a Ruler 
led to divisions within court circles. Sultan Ibrahim of Johor, before 
being confirmed ruler by Willan, made the most surprising comment to 
Willan that 'the only person he knew who had collaborated with the 
Japanese' was his Mentri Besar, Ungku Aziz, whom he described as
104 The State Council statement, dated 13 January 1948, gives 5 November 
1945 as the date of its meeting which decided to depose Sultan 
Ali, but the Malay historian Haji Buyong Adil claims the Council's 
first meeting was held some time in September 1945 and it was 
widely believed by the Malay public that the move had been sponsored 
by the British. See Haji Buyong Adil, Sejarah Terengganu (History of 
Trengganu), Kuala Lumpur, 1974, 202-04, for the full text of the 
Council's statement, which first appeared in Cermin Malaya (Malayan Mirror 
Information Services Department, Federation of Malaya. No reason 
is given as to why the Council issued its statement so late. It is 
probable that the matter had become controversial in 1948. Tengku 
Ismail was not crowned Sultan of Trengganu until 6 June 1949.
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'90 percent pro-Japanese'. He also told Willan to watch his brother
Ruler, the Japanese-appointed Sultan of Selangor, Tengku Musa Uddin. 
Sultan Ibrahim was reported tohave said that Sultan Musa-Uddin had been 
asked by the Japanese to kill his brother, Tengku Sir Hishamuddin, but 
'the only good thing about Musa-Uddin was that he refused to do so'.^^ 
Sultan Ibrahim's behaviour, if correctly reported by Willan, should be 
understood as either an attempt to win official favour from the BMA, 
or a continuation of his frequent disagreements with his volatile Mentri 
Besar. In Selangor, and in Perlis, a realignment of loyalties followed 
within court circles. In Trengganu, Willan's hostility to Sultan Ali 
soon led to court intrigues, and the State Council met, apparently under 
the inspiration of the BMA, to oust him.
The Malay aristocracy was clearly divided and weakened by the 
stigma of collaboration which hung over the heads of Rulers and Malay 
notables who held high office. In addition to Ungku Aziz of Johor, 
the Mentri Besar of Kelantan, Datuk Ahmad Nik Kamil, was another under 
a cloud of suspicion. Investigations into the conduct of other Malay 
aristocrats were reported from time to time.
Like the Malay aristocracy, the Malay bureaucracy was also 
badly affected by the BMA's attitude towards collaboration. Willan had 
told Sultan Ibrahim during their interview:
...it would be one of the duties of the BMA to enquire into the conduct of Government servants and
State notables during the Japanese Occupation. Their 
continued employment would depend on whether they had 
collaborated with the Japanese. I explained that a 
policy of clemency would be adopted but, at the same 
time, ringleaders of collaborationists would be brought 
to justice and punished.108
105 See Willan's report of his interview with Sultan of Johor, 8 
September 1945, in WO 203/5642.
106 Ibid.
107 MU Secret 64/46, 'Situation Reports, Kelantan', 3 May 1946.
108 Willan's report of his interview with Sultan of Johor, 8 September 
1945, in WO 203/5642.
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As a result of the investigations a reaction set in, and senior Malay
civil servants came to feel rebuffed and disillusioned. The wounding
enquiries prescribed for the detection of those who had collaborated with
the Japanese, and the resultant delay in making full and immediate use
of recovered officials, were felt to spring from an under-estimate of
109Malay loyalty and ability.
Thirdly, the Malay Police Force had disintegrated. A BMA 
enquiry revealed that the force was ’the only public service of Government 
which has completely fallen down as a result of their activities under 
the Japanese rule’."^^ Since the post-surrender
rise of power of the Chinese guerrillas, all manner of reprisals had been 
carried out against active members of the Police Force. Many Malay 
policemen had been killed and others kidnapped. As a result of these 
retaliatory actions by the Chinese the Police Force was utterly discredited 
and demoralised. Most members of the Police were afraid to show 
themselves outside stations or barracks, and police work and duties 
generally were non-existent. The BMA concluded that this state of 
affairs was likely to continue for some time, and that the Police could 
not resume their normal duties until the situation altered and the 
animosity that the Chinese community had for the Malays lessened. The 
BMA realised that they had to build up the police force quickly, because, 
without it, law and order at the local level would not prevail. It 
was decided to act in two ways: (a) to raise public confidence by 
weeding out suspected collaborators and appointing new officers under 
British officials; and (b) to instil self-confidence and self-respect 
in the police officers and men by making transfers of State police 
personnel. For instance, officers and men drafted into the police depot 
from Perak were to be sent to Negri Sembilan or one of the other states 
in which they had not served for some years.^ ^ However, there did 
not seem to be any systematic recruitment of Chinese into the Police.
109 Donnison, 156.
1.10 DCCAO's Report on the Military Government of the Malay Peninsula 
for the period 12-30 September 1945, in MU Secret C/1/1/4.
Ill Report by Major J.M. MacLcnn, Officer in Charge of Police, Johor 
Bahru, 21 September 1945, in BMA PSD 1/3 .
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Investigations began in Bahu Pahat, Muar and Johor Bahru on 
suspected Malay police personnel involved in the racial clashes. It 
was decided that until all the ’bad hats' had been weeded out, the
i
Police would not be re-armed. Major A.J.A. Blake, the Civil Affairs
(Police) Officer in Batu Pahat, reported on his investigations:
I have found the feeling against the Malays here was so
strong that I had to make a plunge and do something about
it. I held an identification parade of all the Police
and one by one the people whose husbands, father, etc.
had been slaughtered by the Police including one
Sergeant were picked out on specific charges of Murder
so I have them all in custody. I hope to finish brief
details against each charge by tomorrow morning and
bring the accused down to Johor Bahru in the afternoon 
1 1?for trial there.
Such arrests were being carried out following widespread public demand
for action against collaborators, especially from leftwing Chinese
newspapers and organisations. Special courts were set up in Singapore
and in major towns in the Malay peninsula to deal with collaboration 
113offences. Suspects were not confined to Malays. But prosecution,
as had been foreseen by the BMA, was a difficult problem. A large
proportion of cases had to be withdrawn for lack of sufficiently reliable
evidence. Many accused persons had to be released when it was established
that accusations were being made with little foundation and frequently
for motives of personal spite. By January 1946, complaints of
collaboration under investigation in the Peninsula numbered 1,393,
though roughly half the cases which came up before the Special Courts for
114investigation were dismissed.
Politically, the Malays were in limbo. Many KMM activists 
during the Japanese Occupation were apprehended, such as journalists
112 See letter from Major A.J.A. Blake, Senior Officer, Batu Pahat, to 
Major MacLean, Johor Bahru, 20 September 1945, in BMA PSD1/3.
113 These Special Courts were set up because in the early months, the 
police could not cope even with ordinary crimes. If the Special 
Courts found that a prima facie case was established, a further 
preliminary enquiry was held before a District Court, after which 
the accused could be committed for final trial by the appropriate 
Superior Court. Donnison, 303.
114 Donnison, 303-04.
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A. Samad Ismail and Ramli Haji Tahir in Singapore, and others like
115Idris bin Hakim and Mohamed Sidek in Kuala Lumpur. Ishak Haji
Muhammad, Mustapha Hussein and other KMM leaders who had gone into
hiding appeared on 'arrest on sight' lists of the Field Security Section:
Look out for the following members of the KMM.
Hassan bin Abdul Manan. Javanese-born, Selangor 
Malay language teacher. Believed in Java. Ishak 
bin Haji Mohamed born Pahang some time in Malay 
Administrative Service, former editor Warta 
Malaya. Believed in Temerloh, Pahang. Mustapha 
bin Haji Hussein vice-president of KMM, born 
Perak lecturer Serdang Agricultural School.
Believed In J.poh 20 August under protection of 
Professor Itagaki. . . H 6
Mustapha Hussein was subsequently taken into custody, but several months
later after petitions were made to the BMA from former members of the
Malay Regiment whose lives he had saved from the Japanese, he was
released. Ishak Haji Mohamed, however, went into hiding and was
able to emerge two months later without being a r rested.Ibrahim
Yaacob's name also appeared on the wanted lists, but the Field Security
Section had learnt from the Kempeitai that Ibrahim, accompanied by his
wife, brother-in-law Onan Haji Siraj and Hassan Manan, had escaped in
a Japanese military aircraft to Java, where it was believed that he had
118contacted the Indonesian leader Sukarno. The KRIS movement,
115 Isum No.32, Hqs Malaya Command, Kuala Lumpur, 20 October 1945; 
and also Arena Wati, Cherpen Zaman Jepun (Short Stories of the 
Japanese Occupation period) , Kuala Lumpur, 1968, 25 fn.
116 Isum No.32.
117 Ishak Haji Mohamed. Interview, Kuala Lumpur, January 1977.
See also his article, 'Kenangan Pak Sako (Memories of Pak Sako, 
alias Ishak Haji Muhammad)', in the weekly Mlngguan Malaysia,
4 July 1976.
118 Isum No.6, 8 December 1945, Hqs Malaya Command in MU Secret 
335/46 Vol.l, which gives a lengthy background of the KMM's wartime 
activities. It was feared that, even though Ibrahim Yaacob had 
left the country in August, lie was likely to remain in contact 
with his comrades in Malaya by means of couriers. There had
been several reports of small parties of Indonesian agitators 
from Sumatra infiltrating into Singapore, Malacca and Taiping.
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inaugurated on 17 August with Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy as chairman, had 
gone underground. The leaders of this movement were quietly surveying 
the political situation to see how far the BMA would 'go in punitive 
action against collaborators. They would be the first Malay group 
to make a re-entry into politics - with the assistance of the Chinese- 
led MCP.
The Resurgence of Malay Nationalism
On 10 October 1945 the Secretary of State for the Colonies
announced In the British Parliament the details of the Malayan Union
policy. The statement was carried in full in the local newspapers
the following day. Briefly, the British Government proposed to
negotiate fresh agreements with the Sultans for the purpose of creating
the Malayan Union, which would consist of the nine Malay states and the
British settlements of Penang and Malacca. Singapore would be governed
separately as a Crown Colony. The new agreements would enable the
British monarch to 'possess and exercise full jurisdiction' in the Malay 
119states. The British government appointed Sir Harold MacMichael as
its Special Representative to conduct negotiations with the rulers for
this purpose. When the British monarch possessed jurisdiction, it was
intended by Order-in-Council to constitute the Malayan Union. It was
also announced that while Malays would automatically become Malayan
Union citizens, non-Malays could be eligible for it on the basis of
birth or a suitable period of residence. As citizens, they would
120enjoy equal rights with Malays.
The statement in the British Parliament was timed so that 
MacMichael arrived in Malaya the day after it was made. On 18 October 
he held his first interview with the Sultan of Johor, virtually following 
the same route Brigadier Willan had traversed the previous month.
Like Willan's interviews, MacMichael's also followed a pattern. He 
sounded out each Sultan for his views on the Malayan Union policy.
119 See The Straits Times, Singapore, 11 October 1945.
120 Ibid.
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When he was satisfied that the Sultan would sign the new agreement,
MacMichael handed him a secret memorandum from the Secretary of State
for the Colonies, explaining the Malayan Union plan in greater detail.
The memorandum gave assurances that the Malays would not be
submerged by the other races. Side by side with the Malays, it said,
the other races whose real identification was with Malaya, would
be able to reap the reward of their loyalty, for Malayan Union citizenship
would carry with it the qualification for public and administrative
service in the Union. *This will strengthen the Malays and the country’,
the memorandum reassured. 'Great Britain has learnt the richness of
such an infusion of new blood and talent and it is one of the foundations
121of her strength.' The Malayan Union would have a Legislative
Council, which would include, besides the Governor of the Union,
official and unofficial members, nominated by the Governor. There would
also be an Executive Council. In deciding to establish this system,
the British Government had constantly borne in mind ’the special
position of the Malay Rulers as traditional and spiritual leaders of
122the Malay people'. Each Ruler would be provided with an Advisory
Malay Council to be presided over by the Ruler. It would not only have
the task of reviewing all legislation relating to the Islamic, religion
but also on other matters with the agreement of the Governor. The
dignity and prestige of the Rulers would be fully maintained; so too
would the policy to ’safeguard the rights of the Malay people in
matters of land reservation and in their facilities for education and 
123progress .
MacMichael gave each ruler two days to digest the document 
and make comments. They were asked not to reveal the details of the 
document to anyone. Each ruler was also made to understand that at 
their next meeting he was expected to sign the new treaty transferring
12.1 See Annex I, ’Draft of Memorandum which Sir Harold MacMichael
will hand to the Malay Rulers in explaining to them His Majesty's 
Government's intentions as regards the future of Malaya', attached 
to 'Policy in regard to Malaya', CP (45) October 1945, in 
CO 273/675/50823 Pt.I.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
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jurisdiction in his State to the British Crown. If he refused, 
MacMichael was empowered to refuse him official recognition. When 
each ruler had signed the new treaty, he was asked to promise that 
he would not disclose to anyone privately or publicly what he had done. 
This disclosure was to be the prerogative of the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies.
It is clear that MacMichael had used, and was authorised to
use, coercion to achieve the purpose of his mission. The Secretary
of State for the Colonies, G.H. Hall, in a secret memorandum to the
British Cabinet, had stated that he would accept nothing less than full
compliance from the Sultans in transferring their jurisdiction to the
British Crown. Hall said:
...we cannot allow ourselves to be deterred by an 
obstinate attitude on the part of any or all of the 
Malay Rulers with whom Sir Harold MacMichael will have 
to deal in his forthcoming mission. I regard it, 
however, as very essential, quite apart from the matter 
of publicity, that His Majesty’s Government should now 
affirm their intention to carry through, in spite of 
obstruction on the part of any particular Malay Ruler, 
the policy which they have approved [i.e., the Malayan .
Union plan]. All our plans for the Malay States depend 
upon the success of Sir Harold MacMichael’s efforts to 
secure jurisdiction in each and all of the States...125 •
Although MacMichael did not raise the question of British
recognition of each ruler at every interview, the rulers themselves knew
of the threat that hung over their heads. Willan had already done his
ground work well. The impact of Tengku Musa-Uddin's arrest and
deposition, the voluntary resignation of Tengku Syed Hamzah as the
Raja of Perlis and the Trengganu State Council’s moves to oust Raja
Ali were all examples of BMA power and manipulation, which could be
applied to any recalcitrant ruler. Most of the rulers later claimed
that they were intimidated and, fearing to lose their thrones, had
126signed the new treaty MacMichael presented.
124 See telegram from MacMichael to Secretary of State for Colonies, 
20 October 1945, in CO 273/675/50823/Pt.I .
125 See Memorandum by Secretary of State for the Colonies, ’Policy in 
regard to Malaya' to Cabinet, October 1945, in CO 273/675/50823.
126 Allen, 31-33.
375
With the exception of the Sultans of Johor and Selangor, 
the other rulers were tough going for MacMichael. The most opposition 
came from the Regent of Perlis, the Sultan of Kedah and the Sultan 
of Kelantan - the rulers who had yet to be officially recognised by 
the British government. It is significant that MacMichael sought 
Colonial Office approval on the appointment of Sultans only in regard 
to four states - Tengku Badlishah, the Regent of Kedah; Tengku Ibrahim, 
the Raja Kelantan; Tengku Syed Putera of Perlis; in the case of Trengganu,
MacMichael considered the incumbent, the Japanese-appointed Raja Ali, as
127unsuitable and favoured Tengku Paduka, brother of the late Sultan.
This request for Colonial Office advice and approval indicates that 
conferring of official recognition as a means of manipulation was to 
apply only to these four rulers and not to the others. In the end, 
MacMichael found that he needed to formalise only two appointments - 
the election of Tengku Syed Putera by his State Council on 3 December 
and the installation of Tengku Paduka as Sultan of Trengganu on 
19 December. Willan's appointment of the Regent as the Sultan of Kedah 
and his nominal recognition of the Raja Kelantan as the Sultan of 
Kelantan were accepted as facts. It would seem that the question of 
extending formal recognition was a very arbitrary one - to be used 
whenever convenient to suit MacMichael’s purposes. During the stormy 
session he had with the Sultan of Kedah who refused to sign the agreement 
MacMichael presented him, MacMichael reminded the Ruler that he had not
yet been recognised. ’Perhaps’, MacMichael is reported to have said,
128’Your Excellency would prefer to return to your friends in Siam?'
Visibly upset, the Ruler signed, under protest. After that, the 
question of recognition was not raised again.
MacMichael accomplished his mission by collecting the signatures 
of all the nine Malay Rulers. The behind-the-scenes pressures and 
arm-twisting that he had resorted to were not immediately known to the
127 MacMichael to War Office, 25 October 1945, in WO 203/5293.
128 Allen, 32, also notes that the. appellation 'Your Excellency' 
was used instead of 'Your Highness’ to mean that the Regent had 
not been formally recognised, and also that the reference to Siam 
meant that he could be replaced and exiled. - ,
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Malay subjects of the Rulers. However, on 15 December, a week before 
he concluded his interviews with the Rulers MacMichael was met in 
Kota Bharu by a peaceful demonstration of Malays opposing the Malayan 
Union. As news of some of his methods of coercion on the Rulers 
spread, the Malay demonstrations increased in size and force. The 
Malay campaign against the Malayan Union will be dealt with again after 
the following discussion of the Malay Nationalist Party.
(a) The Malay Nationalist Party
It was in the wake of the inter-racial clashes and the announcement 
of the Malayan Union plan that the wartime radical pro-Indonesian groups 
were invited by the MCP to come out into the open and enter into a 
'united front' alliance. These groups, still obsessed with the idea 
of Indonesia Raya, were keen to continue with their unfinished struggle 
at the end of the Japanese occupation. The Indonesian Revolution was 
now under way, and these Malay radicals were hoping that they could 
arouse widespread Malay support for their cause. The MCP appears to 
have become aware, too, of its need to rally some Malay support in view 
of the increasing Malay-Chinese clashes throughout the country.
Some time in early September, the MCP through a Malay or Indonesian
communist named Moktaruddin Lasso, initiated efforts among a group of
non-communist Malays on the staff of the Ipoh newspaper Suara Rakyat
(Voice of the People) to form a Malay political party. The newspaper's
editor, Ahmad Boestamam, was asked to convene a meeting for this
purpose by Moktaruddin, who had earlier contributed some money towards
the newspaper on behalf of the MCP. Moktaruddin did not tell the editor
and his s.taff where the money came from, but the latter guessed it was
129from the MCP because Moktaruddin was in the MPAJA.
To this meeting Moktaruddin brought his leftist friends Arshad 
Shaari, Baharuddin Tahir, Rashid Maidin and Abdullah C.D. Arshad 
Shaari proposed the name of the new party as Partai Sosialis Malaya 
(The Socialist Party of Malaya). Ahmad Boestaman suggested the Partai 
Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (The Malay Nationalist Party of Malaya), the
129 Aliinnd Boestaman, Merlntis Jalan Kepunchak, Petaling Jaya, 1973, 
23-30.
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name -bearing a similarity with Partai Nasional Indonesia (The Indonesian 
Nationalist Party) of Sukarno, whom Boestaman admired greatly.
Boestamam's proposal won the day. The meeting elected Moktaruddin as 
protern chairman, Dahari Ali, a friend of Boestaman, as secretary-general 
and Arshad Ashaari as treasurer.
The MNP' s inaugural congress was held on 30 November 1945 at Ipoh.
There the party’s eight-point programme was produced and adopted. It
was similar to the MCP's eight-point programme of 27 August except that
in addition to the MCP’s demands for the basic freedoms of speech and
the press, the raising of the people's livelihood, increased wages and
reforms in education, the MNP urged the fostering of friendly relations
among the races, equal rights for all races, emphasis on the development
of agriculture and the abolition of land taxes, and support of the
130Indonesian nationalist movement.
The tone of the speeches was leftist. Many shades of Malay 
opinion were represented, however. There were even some members of 
Malay royalty, although all the Rulers had declined invitations to 
attend. An official of the MCP-dominated People's Association,
Chen Tian Wah, and a representative of the MPAJA, 5th Regiment (Perak), 
addressed the delegates during the speeches of welcome, each urging 
Malays and Chinese to unite in the interests of the country’s political 
advancement. These speakers also referred to the recent Malay-Chinese 
clashes, and said Malay-Chinese differences should be resolved amicably. 
The Malay communist, Abdullah C.D., also stressed the need for unity of 
all races in the fight against colonialism. It was reported, too, that 
one of the points made by a speaker (not identified) was that to 
maintain that Malaya belonged only to the Malays was to disseminate 
narrow nationalism. A greater front incorporating other races was^urged 
Moktaruddin, who had been nominated as chairman, did not turn up.
Dr Burhanuddin, the acting chairman, made a strong speech advocating 
support for the independence movements in India, Indonesia and Indochina 
and proclaimed that Malaya must be considered a part of Indonesia, for
130 Victor Purcell's 'Malaya’s Political Climate V', 1-20 December 
1945, in WO 203/5302.
131 WIR, 25 Indian Division, 27 November 1945, in MU 335/46 Vol.I.
Tliis intelligence report claims Moktaruddin was not present, while 
subsequent reports say he was. I accept the original claim for 
reasons which will become plain shortly.
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the ultimate independence of which everyone was urged to work whole- 
132heartedly. The congress adopted the Indonesian flag as the MNP's
banner. Resolutions passed by the delegates said they ’appreciated' 
the principles behind the British Government's Malayan Union policy, 
affirmed that the MNP desired to cooperate with all races in Malaya 
and declared that 'Malaya is a division of the Indonesian state'.
Within the MNP’s Executive Committee Moktaruddin was elected chairman,
Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy (formerly of KRIS) vice-chairman and Dahari Ali, 
secretary-general.
There appeared to be two themes running through the congress.
One was the theme of racial harmony and racial unity and the lack of
any anti-Chinese or anti-MCP criticisms, which was presumably due to
the MCP influence behind Moktaruddin. The other was the strong propaganda
links with the Indonesian nationalist movement. It was reported that
considerable communist propaganda had been disseminated during the
congress which was not favourably received by Malays present. Many of
the MNP's supporters were former members of Ibraham Yaacob's KMM and
KRIS movement, which had advocated Indonesia Raya as the ultimate Malay
ideal to check Chinese economic and political domination in Malaya.
It therefore is difficult to see how the MCP could reconcile its own
long-term aims with those of the MNP. There is no evidence to show that
the predominantly Chinese MCP had given any support to the idea of a
proposed union with Indonesia. In fact, after the congress, there was
reported to be pronounced uneasiness amongst Chinese, who regarded the
proposed union with Indonesia with much disfavour, as it would place
them in the undesirable position of being a small minority in an
133Indonesian-dominated state.
The MNP's support of the Malayan Union policy seems a curious 
aberration in Malay thinking when one realises that that policy was in 
favour of the Chinese. There are two possible explanations for the 
MNP's support of the Malayan Union. One is the radical and republican 
nature of the MNP leadership. Yet, they knew that the Sultans retained
132 Ibid., see also Isum No.6 Hq. Malaya Command, 8 December 1945. f
133 Isum No.6, Hqs Malaya Command, 8 December 1945.
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the traditional loyalties of most Malays, which was presumably why 
they had extended invitations to the Rulers to attend the congress.
It was possible that these radicals thought the KMM connections 
with some of the Rulers during the Japanese Occupation should be 
exploited. It was also possible that they regarded the British removal 
of the Sultan's sovereignty as facilitating the creation of a republican 
state. The other reason was probably tactical, to make their re-entry 
into local politics by supporting a British policy which seemed 
favourable to them, thereby preventing any British action against them.
It was soon reported that the Klang (Selangor) branch of the MNP
134decided on 8 December to sever all connections with the MNP at Ipoh.
The reason given was the strong communist influence at the Ipoh congress,
which was not allowing the party to be truly representative of Malay
opinion. Another reason probably was the MNP's support for the British
Malayan Union policy, which, as we have seen had become increasingly
unpopular with the Malay ruling class. A proposal to form a new party,
the Malay Nationalist Party of Selangor (MNPS), was carried at the Klang
branch meeting on 8 December, despite strong opposition from one
participant, Abdul Latiff, and from others with communist sympathies
who had organised the original Klang MNP branch. It was intended that
the MNPS would be a political and social body covering the whole of
Selangor State with the following objectives: to protect the traditional
rights and religious dignity of the Sultan as the sovereign Muslim ruler;
to encourage political and social reforms; to safeguard the privileges
of the Malays; and to cooperate with the BMA in working for the
development of ultimate self-sufficiency in Malaya. The branch committee
included individuals from aristocratic and Islamic groups with strong
135anti-Chinese and anti-communist views.
While this incident did not help the MNP's image, the role of 
Moktaruddin himself was a shadowy one. Moktaruddin appeared to be 
working for the MCP, but he was also at heart an ardent Indonesian
134 Isum No.7, Hqs Malaya Command, 15 December 1945, in MU Secret 
335/46 Vol.I.
135 Ibid.
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nationalist. It was said he constantly expressed a strong desire to
136go to Sumatra to help the Indonesian guerrillas fight the Dutch.
Known as Lang Lang Buana (Javanese for the traveller) by his close MNP
colleagues, he was described by British military intelligence as a
former schoolteacher, a Moscow-trained communist, a disciple of Sukarno,
the leader of the Malay section of the MPAJA and a member of the MCP
137for the past three years. Soon after the congress Moktaruddin
disappeared and was not seen again in Malaya. His position as MNP
chairman was taken over by Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy. In July 1946,
British intelligence revealed that Moktaruddin was, in fact, the
138’notorious* Indonesian communist Tan Malaka. It was believed that
after the KMM leader Ibrahim Yaacob escaped to Indonesia, his proposed
plan for the secession of Malaya to Indonesia after the latter had
proclaimed its independence, was still to be pushed through. After
Sukarno had proclaimed the republic, contact with Malaya was lost. Tan
Malaka, however, visited Malaya and, in conference with the MCP,
139organised the MNP. There is a gap in information concerning the
whereabouts of Tan Malaka in late September. He is known to have
disappeared suddenly from Jakarta at this time, having met Sukarno,
140Sjahrir and others during August-September 1945.
The limited evidence available tends to confirm that Tan Malaka 
was in fact Moktaruddin Lasso. ’Lang Lang Buana' and 'Moktaruddin 
Lasso' are among his known aliases in the Party Murba (Tan Malaka's
party).141 If one accepts this information, then the fact that
Ibrahim Yaacob had made contacts with Tan Malaka in Jogjakarta
142after escaping to Java, would have acquainted Tan Malaka with his
136 Dahari Ali, former MNP secretary-general, Kuala Lumpur, January 1974.
137 Isum No.6 Hqs Malaya Command, 8 December 1945.
138 Political Intelligence Journal, Malayan Security Service, Singapore, 31 July 1946, 2.
139 Ibid.
140 Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, 278-80.
141 Soeyatno of Gajah Madya University, who is presently studying 
Tan Malaka's activities in connection with the 'social revolution 
in Solo' for his Ph.D degree at the ANU.
142 I am grateful to Professor Shinichi Nagai of Horishima University for 
this information, which he obtained from Major Karim Rashid, a former 
colleague of Ibrahim Yaacob in the KMM, in an interview at Jakarts
in January 1978.
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aborted plan for union with Indonesia. Tan Malaka took the opportunity 
to visit Malaya, to renew many contacts he had there and to help 
Ibrahim’s KMM comrades revive the KMM or KRIS in another form. Probably 
through Sutan Djenain, the Indonesian communist exile in Malaya, he 
re-established contacts with the MCP, and obtained their support to 
form the MNP.
(b) The Formation of UMNO
After MacMichael's return to London with the signatures of the
Sultans on the new treaties, the Secretary of State for the Colonies
presented to the British Parliament on 23 January a White Paper outlining
complete details of the plan, which included most of the points in the
143secret memorandum MacMichael had earlier handed to each ruler.
It was the publication of this White Paper which ’changed the affair
144from a private conflict to a much-publicised open controversy.’ It
is not proposed to go over all the details of the anti-Malayan Union 
campaign, as this has already been adequately done in several studies.
It is intended to present some details of Malay (and, later, Chinese) 
perceptions of the Malayan Union which set Malays and Chinese on different 
political directions.
The White Paper announced that MacMichael had successfully concluded 
treaties witli the Sultans in which they ceded full jurisdiction to the 
British monarch to enable the latter to legislate in their states. The 
purpose of MacMichael’s mission had already been disclosed on 10 October, 
and therefore did not come as a surprise. What was a surprise to the 
Malays was that the whole mission had been a fait accompli and had been 
done secretly and, in some cases, without proper consultations and 
approval of the respective Sultan's State Councils.
The deep resentment felt by the Malay elite throughout the Malay 
States to the Malayan Union plan was aroused by two main factors:
(a) objection to transfer of jurisdiction to the British Crown and to 
creation of the Malayan Union; and (b) the offer of equal status of 
Malayan Union citizens to Chinese and other races.
143 See the White Paper, Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement of
Poiicy on Future Constitution, Cmd. 6724, January 1946, London.
144 Allen, 33.
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The Malay Press generally reflected violent resentment to the 'fait 
accompli', i.e., transfer of jurisdiction by the Malay Rulers to the 
British Crown. Utusan Melayu of 24 January described it as 'a blow for 
the Malay Rulers and their subjects'. It refused to believe that the 
new agreements between the Sultans and the British Government were made 
in a friendly spirit. In Kelantan, Kedah, Trengganu, Johor and 
Selangor, thousands of Malays demonstrated and strongly protested 
against the Malayan Union plan.
Clearly, the second reason for the Malay dislike of the plan was
the granting of equal citizenship rights to Chinese and other races in
Malaya. Seruan Ka'ayat of 25 January 1946 declared, 'The British Labour
Government must realise that the giving of citizenship rights to all
those domiciled in the proposed Malayan Union is an act of injustice
to the Malays, the native inhabitants of Malaya'. On 25 January a
big demonstration occurred at Alor Star, which affirmed that Malays
did not want a Malayan Union if it would mean 'sharing their inheritance
145with alien races'. This same point had been made by the Seruan Ra ayat
on 24 January in a leader which energetically urged all Malays to do 
their best to preserve 'our children's birthright so that they can 
hand it on to posterity as our forefathers handed it down to us'.
Seruan Ra'ayat said that this legacy was now more seriously endangered 
than it had ever been in the past and exhorted the Malays to strive 
'with all their might and main to preserve it'.
Between September and December 1945 the Malay traditional . 
leadership in the country had been weak and incapable of leadership.
The Malays could only turn to the rural religious leaders like 
Kiyai SalIch in their struggle against the Chinese and the MPAJA guerrillas. 
The reasons for the weakened state of the traditional Malay leadership 
were the stigma of collaboration with the Japanese, the terror 
activities of the MPAJU/MPAJA guerrillas and Willan's and MacMichael's 
actions against some of the Rulers. Even the non-aristocratic urban 
political elites in the KRIS were in hiding and did not dare to 
emerge until the end of November, when they formed the MNP with the 
assistance of the Chinese dominated MCP.
145 The Malay Mall, Kuala Lumpur, 26 January 1946.
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In late December and early January, however, most of the prewar
state associations, such as the Fersatuan Melayu Selangor and the
Persatuan Melayu Johor, were being revived by the traditional State
146leaders in response to the Malayan Union policy. Although these
associations basically pandered to Malay state parochialism, their 
revival was due to a realisation that the strength of the Malays lay 
in their unity. With the exception of the radical MNP, which had 
attempted a peninsular-wide appeal to Malay nationalism, no other group 
had yet done so. Just before the war the various state associations had 
discussed the idea of a pan-Malayan federation, but separate state 
feelings were too strong to be submerged and the attempt foundered. 
Disgusted with this parochial bickering, the radical Malays led by 
Ibrahim Yaacob had formed the KMM which attempted instead a peninsular­
wide, if not an Indonesia-wide, appeal to the Malays.
The more recent failure of the MNP to win any widespread Malay 
support to its pro-Malayan Union policy opened the door to rival groups 
of Malays to make a peninsular-wide attempt. In late November Datuk 
Onn and his small circle of friends discussed the causes of Malay 
weakness. Their conclusion was that the Malays were split by too 
many differences - ethnic, State, self-interest and faction.. What was 
required they argued was a national association which could submerge 
all these differences in the interests of unity of the Malays. His 
friends were convinced that Datuk Onn was the man to lead the Malays.
On 3 January they set up the Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung Johor
147(PMSJ or the Peninsular Malay Movement of Johor). It only required
an opportune moment for Datuk Onn to make his entry into the national 
political limelight.
While there were two other Malay associations in Johor - the Lembaga 
Melayu Johor and the Persatuan Melayu Johor - the PMSJ specifically 
aimed at higher goals than Johor interests. Its constitution stated
146 Ishak Tadln, ’Dato Onn and Malay Nationalism, 1946-1951', in 
Journal of Southeast Asian History, I, 1, March 1960, 59.
147 Anwar Abdullah, Dato Onn, Petaling Jaya, 1971, 118-23; see also 
Zabha, Tan Sri Ha.ji Mohamed Noah, Kuala Lumpur, 72-74.,
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that its aims were to unite the Malays, and to strive for and defend
the special position and privileges of the Malays, so that they would
'cultivate a love for their country, and cooperate with the Government
148and among themselves'. Within Johor, the Movement would attempt
to assure the security of Malays, as sporadic Malay-Chinese clashes
were still reported in Batu Pahat and other areas.
British military intelligence, which was interested in this new
party, reported that the aims of the PMSJ were, in fact, to unite the
Malays of Johor to counter the policy of the MNP and to achieve the
betterment of conditions of peninsular Malays. It said the party was
gaining a strong following in Batu Pahat, as Datuk Onn's influence
149there as the DO was wide. A later report said his influence had
now spread to neighbouring parts of Johor, chiefly the districts of 
Muar, Pontian and Johor Bahru. Though no direct connections could be 
proved, British military intelligence attempted to identify a similarity 
of views and aims between Datuk Onn's party and a number of other parties 
which had recently sprung up among Malays in other States. It began 
to appear that the Movement, under various names, was of very considerable 
extent. In Pontian and Johor Bahru it was known as Persatuan Melayu; 
in Pahang the Wataniah was thought to conform to Datuk Onn's.party, and 
he had conversations with its leader, Major Yeop Mahidin.^^
After formation of the PMSJ, Datuk Onn openly broke with his former 
KMM colleagues in the MNP. As we have noted in Chapter V, Datuk Onn 
had been critical of the KRIS movement and its cause of Malay independence. 
Although he had been a member of KMM, he is said to have refused to join 
KRIS. British intelligence was doubtful of his anti-British tendencies, 
even though he had joined the KMM and had been editor of Ibrahim Yaacob's 
prewar newspaper Warta Malaya. During an interview with British intelligence, 
Datuk Onn said he was opposed to both the MCP and 'Indonesian interests' 
in M a l a y a . H e  said he had refused to join KRIS and that there was
148 Ishak Tadin, 59.
149 Isum No.12 Hqs Malaya Command, 19 January 1946, in WO 172/9772.
150 Isum No.14, Hqs Malaya Command, 2 February 1946, in WO 172/9773.
151 Ibid.
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no question of independence in his programme, lie regarded the Malays
as 'unfit at the present to maintain a separate existence outside the
152sphere of British protection'. Datuk Onn stated:
My plan is to get Malays to put their own house 
in order and to keep away from communists and 
Javanese. Their affairs are no concern of ours.153
British intelligence was quite impressed by his statements, and
thereafter was to urge for complete support of Datuk Onn and his party
as a counter to the MNP. Their comments were:
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his 
[Datuk Onn's] intentions. He wishes to improve 
the conditions of the Malays and their position 
in the country, and his plan is to start in the 
kampungs by persuading people to help themselves 
and to work for their own improvement. His 
opposition to communisn and Indonesian interest 
is clear...154
Although attempts were made by MNP officials, such as Ishak Haji Mohammed, 
to get Datuk Onn to work with them, his party, the PMSJ, did not come 
together with the MNP.
The publication of the White Paper on 23 January, and the outcry 
which immediately followed, gave Datuk Onn the chance he had been waiting 
for. He wrote a letter to the leading daily Utusan Melayu and to 
other Malay newspapers, which appeared on 24 January. In it, Datuk Onn 
said that he appreciated and supported the idea advocated by the Warta 
Negara several weeks earlier, that a congress of Malays be held as early 
as possible not only to resolve differences which existed between the 
Malay associations themselves but also to discuss the fate of the 
Malays in the peninsula.
The idea was very timely. Not only did it receive wide support 
from all shades of Malay opinion, including the MNP, but the convening 
of the congress helped to check further divisions from taking place 
within Malay society. On 1 February a meeting of Johor Malays called
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Zabha, 73.
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by the Persatuan Melayu Johor met at Sultan Abu Bakar Mosque to condemn 
Sultan Ibrahim for his unilateral signing of the treaty with MacMichael 
that ceded the State’s jurisdiction to the British monarch. Johor, like 
Trengganu, had written constitutions expressly forbidding the Ruler 
to surrender the State to any other power or country. The anti-Sultan 
Ibrahim meeting was punctuated with cries of 'Down With the Sultan!', 
a cry which had never been heard before within the living memory of most 
Malays. It was spearheaded by a close friend of Datuk Onn, Datuk 
Abdul Rahaman bin Mohamed Yassin. Datuk Onn had been invited, and had 
originally said he would not attend. But suddenly, when the meeting was 
under way, he appeared and rose to his ruler's defence. He criticised 
the move to denigrate Sultan Igrahim. His eloquent speech, however, 
failed to sway the gathering from voting in favour of the resolution to 
send a protest to the British Government and also a protest to the Sultan 
for accepting the Malayan Union on behalf of the people. But soon the 
momentum was lost. It is believed by one of the 'conspirators', Dr 
Awang bin Hassan, that Datuk Onn must have been intercepted by 
M.C. Hay, the Johor Resident Commissioner, and came to
Johor Bahru with instructions to save Sultan Ibrahim's throne for him.^J  ^
Seven leading Johor Malays, all civil servants, who took a leading part 
in the anti-Sultan Ibrahim movement, were thereafter suspended from 
government service by Hay, and barred from leaving Johor without Hay’s 
permission. Elsewhere, in Selangor, Perak and other States similar 
Malay rumblings and protests were heard criticising the Rulers for ceding 
their respective State's jurisdiction to the British Crown, but in none 
did the movement reach the level it did in Johor.
On 1 March 1946, forty-one Malay associations, including the MNP, 
from all parts of Malaya including Singapore, came together at the Sultan 
Sulaiman's Club in Kuala Lumpur. The ceremony was opened by the Sultan 
of Selangor and attended by senior BMA officials. It was an emotional 
ceremony, and the conference which followed proved an unqualified success.
156 Allen, 34, 35.
157 See the full list of participating associations, in Mohamad Yunus 
Hamidi, Serjarah Pergerakan Politik Melayu, Semenanjung (The History 
of the Peninsular Malay Political Movement), Kuala Lumpur, 1961, 
17-24.
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Datuk Onn was elected chairman, and one of the resolutions adopted was 
to form a pan-Malayan Malay political organisation to organise a country­
wide Malay opposition to the Malayan Union. It was to be called the 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), which was duly set up at 
the next meeting of the congress in Batu Pahat on 11 May. With the 
All-Malay Congress, Malay unity was achieved with the single purpose of 
frustrating the Malayan Union; and with the creation of UMNO this unity 
was consolidated and strengthened. For the first time the Malays had 
a genuine mass political movement which combined all the necessary 
ingredients based on traditional patron-client relationships. It was 
a movement supported by every key group of Malay society - the aristocrats, 
the radicals in the MNP, the lower rural leaders such as the penghulu 
and ketua kampung, the Islamic groups, businessmen and the police and 
ex-servicemen.
The MNP had been forced by the tide of Malay resentment against 
the Malayan Union plan to attend the All-Malay Congress and to affiliate 
itself to UMNO. The MNP became preoccupied with promoting race 
consciousness among the Malays, and in resisting the growth of Chinese 
political influence in Malaya. Symptomatic of this was its emphasis on 
Malay language, Islam, Malay special privileges, the position of the 
Rulers, and also the adoption of the Indonesian red and white flag, the 
last because the MNP considered Malaya a part of a Greater Indonesia.
It was over the issue of UMNO's flag, which consists of a kris within 
a circle set against the colours of yellow and green, that the MNP 
withdrew from UMNO. The MNP leaders wanted the Indonesian flag to be 
UMNO's banner. It was in fact the MNP leaders' own political style and 
commitment to the Indonesian Revolution which made them break with the 
conservative, aristocratic UMNO leadership under Datuk Onn. Their source 
of weakness was that the MNP's programme and its ideal of a Greater 
Indonesia was too radical, too republican and too far above the heads 
of the Malay peasant, while Datuk Onn 'and UMNO's appeal was set very 
much in terms of the traditional Malay society and current fears of 
Chinese domination, and hence was more successful.
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Chinese and MCP perceptions of the Malayan Union Policy
The offer of Malayan Union citizenship as outlined in the
White Paper would benefit roughly about 1,600,000 local-born Chinee,
or 62.5 percent of the total Chinese population in Malaya, who would
automatically become citizens. Although this is based on the figures
158of locally-born Chinese in the 1947 census, which were not published 
until 1949, the British Government must have roughly estimated the 
percentage of local-born Chinese in Malaya, based on projections of 
the 1931 census. Of the remaining 980,000 Chinese, or 37.5 percent, 
who were b o m  in China or elsewhere, many could qualify residentially 
for Malayan Union citizenship. It was this lot of 37.5 percent Chinese 
whose case was to be championed by the MCP and various Chinese guilds 
and associations. Otherwise, the Chinese population was generally 
quite satisfied with the Malayan Union citizenship provisions, as indicated 
by Chinese Press reactions.
The Chinese newspapers had no objections to voice against 
equal citizenship for all. In fact, they welcomed it whole-heartedly. 
Chinese Press comments - Sin Chew Jit Poh and the pro-communist Sin Min 
Chu (New Deomcracy) of 24 January and the Hua Ch'iao (Overseas Chinese) 
of 26 January - ranged between scepticism of the Malayan Union’s 
practicability and expressions of satisfaction about the proposed 
citizenship rights. Resentment over the separation of predominantly- 
Chinese Singapore from the Malayan Union was voiced by all Chinese 
newspapers. The Sin Min Chu of 24 January, however, stood out from 
the others as the White Paper’s most vehement critic. It argued that 
far from enhancing the political status of Malayan people, the White 
Paper would only 'consolidate Britain's hold on Malaya and Singapore'.
The Hua Ch’iao of 26 January, was jubilant over the intention of granting 
equal citizenship rights to all. The Penang Chung Hua (China Press), 
however, was cautious in its attitude. In its issue of 24 January it 
said that the Chinese would have to make up their minds now about the 
question of their citizenship. Malaya is 'the second mother country' 
of the Chinese but before they could apply for Malayan citizenship they
158 M.V. Del Tufo, Malaya: A Report on the 1947 Census of Population,
London, 1949, 84.
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had to recognise Malaya as their only mother country. It continued:
If we want to have rights of citizenship in Malaya, 
we must either openly declare or quietly consent 
that we are separated from our mother country. We 
are still doubtful about the detailed contents of 
the White Paper, whether the people of Malaya are 
allowed to legislate their own laws or be allowed time 
to determine their status as to where they stand.
We hope that such detailed contents of the White Paper 
can be made clearer in connection with these two points 
on the rights of citizenship, affecting Overseas 
Chinese.
In short, the problem for most Chinese appeared to be simply
a matter of choice. The Malayan Union proposals were favourable to the
Chinese and had aroused sufficient interest among them. They were now
eager to obtain further details of the scheme. Certainly, there were
mixed feelings and doubts about what ’Malayan Union citizenship meant -
160a similar attitude also emerged in local Indian Press reactions.
Many of the proposals of the Malayan Union were so ambiguous that it
was impossible for the non-Malays to be really enthusiastic about the
plan as a whole. Some scholars have described the general non-Malay
attitude vis-a-vis the Malayan Union as apathy and indifference, in
comparison with the outspoken and militant opposition of Malays to the
plan. It is said that had the Chinese been more warm and outspoken
in their support for the Malayan Union, they might have been able to
161salvage many of the liberal citizenship terms offered therein.
It is debatable whether such Chinese support could have stopped the 
British giving in to Malay demands. More pertinent to an understanding 
of the political crisis of that time, however, is an understanding 
that both Malays and non-Malays were dissatisfied with various aspects 
of the Plan. This situation reflected a plural society in which each 
community jealously sought and fought for its own rights and was 
indifferent to the claims and rights of others.
159 Chung Hua, 24 January 1946.
160 See the report, Malayan Press Comment on the White Paper on Malayan 
Union ln SCA 26/46 CC/1/2.
161 M.N. Sop lire, 37-38; A l len ,  66-7.1.
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At the time of the British return the leadership of the Chinese 
community in Malaya had passed, temporarily at least, to the MCP and 
to the MPAJU/MPAJA leaders. The old Chinese business leader or towkay 
had been discredited during the Japanese occupation. With the gradual 
return of some of the former Chinese business and community leaders, 
such as Tan Kah Kee, Lee Kong Chian and Aw Boon Haw, who had been refugees 
in India, Indonesia and Thailand, the prewar Chinese associations were 
revived. Attempts were now made by these returned Chinese leaders to 
consolidate the strong bonds of ethnic unity which had developed among 
the Chinese in Malaya when they faced the common Japanese threat. In 
these efforts the MCP was to lend its support.
Besides its conflict with the BMA, the MCP continued to pay
attention to Chinese interests over those of Malays and Indians. On
24 October a Singapore MCP official, Wu Tian Wang, expounded the MCP's
position on the question of Chinese unity and multi-racial unity. He
said that the party believed in multi-racial unity, but felt that each
race in Malaya should build up its unity first. At the same time
they should also work towards inter-racial unity, cooperation and
Malaya’s progress and prosperity. He welcomed the return of Tan Kah
Kee from Indonesia and expressed the hope that 'Tan Kah Kee will continue
162to be our leader in our present fight for democratic freedoms.’
He continued to vacillate between Chinese unity and multi-racial unity 
by saying:
The Overseas Chinese [Hua Ch'iao] contribution towards the 
liberation of Malaya can be said to be the greatest, for 
they have not only fought and sacrificed their lives but 
have also suffered most enormous losses materially and 
culturally. But they have now been almost excluded from 
the proposed constitution of self-government in Malaya.
Overseas Chinese must all realise that the constitution 
for self-government will decide the future of the interests 
of the Chinese economically, politically and culturally.
Today, the interests of the Overseas Chinese are 
inseparable from those of the Malay and Indian brethren.
Therefore only through the strengthening of co-operation
162 Sin Min Chu, Singapore, 15 October 1945.
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and complete unity amongst the five million people 
of the different Malayan races could the establishment 
of a true and democratic self-government be guaranteed.-^3
The MCP’s ambivalent position on multi-racial unity meant that 
it still had not resolved the question of how to make its struggle a 
truly Malayan one. By using the term 'Overseas Chinese' (Hua Ch'iao) 
instead of the term 'Malayan Chinese' (Ma Hua), which the MCP had 
preferred in 1940, Wu was pandering to the nationalism of the Chinese 
in Malaya. Apparently the movement towards Chinese unity, which had 
arisen during the Japanese occupation, and had been further consolidated 
in mid-1945 when racial conflict was so strong, that the MCP had to 
come to terms with it. Soon, however, the growing CCP-KMT conflict 
in China was to be reproduced in Malaya and to cause a political rift 
among the Chinese.
The idea of Chinese unity in Malaya crystallised with the
formation of the General Association of Overseas Chinese in Singapore
on 24 February 1946. Its constitution declared that it would take a
strong interest in China's politics and strive to check the civil strife
between the CCP and the KMT and help them bring about peace and democracy.
Locally, its major objectives were to promote racial harmony, eliminate
the barrier of regionalism among Chinese, help the local government
164and safeguard the interests of the 'Overseas Chinese’. Although
the White Paper had appeared on 29 January, the association had no 
comments yet to make on its details.
On 7 February, a week before the party's second showdown with
the BMA, Lai Tek, the MCP's secretary-general, sent a telegram to the
British Communist Party condemning the White Paper for perpetuating
British colonial rule instead of granting self-government as demanded
by the MCP. He asked that the British Government be urged to carry
out the following measures:
Establish the Pan-Malayan Unified Self-Government 
with Singapore as the centre of control 
administratively and commercially.
Formulate Pan-Malayan and unified democratic
163 Ibid.
164 Sin Min Chu, Singapore, 25 February 1946.
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constitutions granting absolute freedoms of speech, 
publication, organisation, assembly, strike, 
demonstration, belief and civic liberty.
Safeguard and promote Malayan national economy and 
culture.
Stipulate Malayan citizenship on absolute equality 
enabling all domiciled peoples in Malaya above 
18 years of age to become Malayan citizens.
Grant equal rights of vote, election and 
administration and equal opportunity in social and 
economic reconstruction to all irrespective of period 
of domicile, property, social status, education, 
sex and belief, with only the following two exceptions:
(a) Those who collaborated with and assisted the 
Japanese Fascists in administrative control;
(b) Those immigrants who came to Malaya during 
the Japanese Fascist regime.165
The details of this letter did not become public until 9 March, 
when Lai Tek’s letter appeared in the party’s English-language publication, 
The Democrat. By then the positions of the MCP and BMA had become 
totally irreconcilable. Although the party’s militants were badly trounced 
by the BMA, Lai Tek's moderate policies had also proven to be unsuccessful. 
According to a 1948 MCP document, Lai Tek’s 1945-1946 efforts to postpone 
the revolution to overthrow the British in Malaya led to his being 
unmasked and deposed. 'His directing policy gave rise to dissatisfaction 
by his comrades, and at two meetings he was severely criticised', it 
said. 'He was forced to escape because the postwar environment no 
longer afforded him the opportunity of putting his deceptive and traitorous
cc ,166tactics into effect.
Postscript: British Government Gives in to the Malays
As the anti-Malayan Union agitation spread, gathering support 
not only among Malays in Malaya but also among MPs and former British 
civil servants who had served in Malaya - the 'ex-Malayans' in Britain - 
the decision was taken to drop the Malayan Union plan. In taking
165 The Democrat, Kuala Lumpur, 9 March 1946.
166 Miller, Menace in Malaya, 69, quotes the MCP Document, 'Statement 
on Wright', dated 28 May 1948.
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this decision, the Colonial Office in London had also been influenced 
by the Malayan Union Governor, Sir Edward Gent, who took office on 
1 April when the BMA came to an end. Gent had said there was absolutely 
no prospect of Malay cooperation so long as the Union plan stood. He 
advised London that it was possible to reach agreement with the 
Sultans. He regarded the MCP and the MNP, as well as the Chinese and 
Indians in general, as being of little consequence.
The full details of the considerations which led the Colonial
Office to drop the Malayan Union are still not known, as the official
records are not yet available. Certainly there was fear, from the
security point of view, that if the Malay campaign failed, the Malays
might turn to Indonesia for leadership and thereby help the MNP to
16 8recover from its weakened position. Between the traditional Malay
aristocracy and the Malay radicals in the MNP, the British evidently 
preferred the former. Apparently the MCP’s militant agitation had 
disillusioned the British. The MCP was considered to be only interested 
in coming to power. Lukewarm support for the Malayan Union proposals 
among Chinese in general was interpreted as indifference or a lack of 
interest in Malayan affairs. Like the Chinese, the Indians were also 
considered to be too committed to a homeland focus. Only the Malays 
as a race appeared to be more concerned with developments in Malaya.
On 24 and 25 July the British Governor-General, Malcolm 
MacDonald, and Gent jointly held private conversations with the Malay 
Rulers and UMNO representatives on the latter's joint draft 
constitituional proposals. During these secret talks both sides made 
key concessions. The British Governors agreed to restore sovereignty 
to the Rulers, recognise the special position and rights of the Malays 
and guarantee prospects of ultimate self-government to Malaya. In return, 
the Malays agreed to the British demand for a strong Central Government 
to ensure economical and effective administration of the country and to 
discuss a common form of citizenship 'which would enable political
167 Allen, 50-51.
168 Allen, 65-66.
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rights to be extended to all those who regard Malaya as their real home
169and as the object of their loyalty’. These principles formed the
basis of discussions of a 12-man Working Committee, which the three 
parties set up. The committee comprised five British government 
representatives, four representatives of the Malay Rulers and two 
representatives of UMNO, including its president Datuk Onn bin Jaafar.
The committee was authorised to examine the constitutional proposals 
put forward by the Malay Rulers and UMNO and to work out in detail 
'fresh constitutional arrangements in the form of a provisional scheme 
which would be acceptable to Malay opinion’ In short, the British 
Government had given in to Malay demands to abandon the Malayan Union 
plan. All that remained to be done was for the Working Committee to 
work out the details.
Conclusion
The MCP found the adjustment from the wartime armed struggle 
of the Japanese Occupation to peacetime politics in BMA-administered 
Malaya to be extremely difficult. The MCP was unable to control its 
own men who were allowed to do virtually whatever they liked. This 
was due mainly to the lack of new, clearly-defined objectives and to 
the continuing focus on wartime enemies of the party - the local 
Kempeitai informers and collaborators. The pursuit of revenge and rough 
justice led to the continuation of the inter-racial clashes between 
Malays and Chinese. The guerrillas and MCP members continued to regard 
Malays with distrust, if not with hostility.
Clearly, for the post-war period, the MCP lacked a comprehensive 
and far-sighted programme suited to Malaya’s peculiar conditions, one 
which could enable it tactically to deal with the British. The lack 
of such a programme resulted in the party dealing in piece-meal fashion 
with specific developments as they occurred. The 27 August policy had 
dropped the goal of a 'Malayan Democratic Republic' and pressed for 
basic freedoms and the raising of living conditions. In November 1945 the
169 See Report of the Working Committee, Constitutional Proposals 
for Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1946, p.6.
170 Ibid.
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party did press for self-government but ignored national independence.
It was always one or two steps behind political developments. This 
meant that it was bound to fail to make any headway in its professed 
policy of 'cooperation' with the British.
Dissatisfaction over the party's policies led to internal 
divisions. The party’s militant elements refused to cooperate with 
the British as British suppression of MPAJA and MCP activities increased 
and became more overt. The moderate and ambivalent leadership of 
Lai Tek came under attack. Although he managed to hold onto his 
leadership at the re-election of the CEC in January 1946, the militants 
had started to push the party down the road of revolution. The 
confrontations with the British in January and February convinced the 
party that British and MCP policies were irreconcilable, and that there 
was no alternative policy to that of the militants.
Although the MCP had temporarily taken over leadership of 
the Chinese community after the Japanese surrender, the Chinese were 
not yet clear about their goals in Malaya. The immediate aim of Chinese 
community leaders who returned from abroad was to strengthen the bonds 
of ethnic unity which had developed among Chinese in Malaya during the 
Japanese occupation. But this unity was soon to be shattered by the 
civil war breaking out in China between the Communists and Nationalists.
The Malays recovered from their state of despondency, frustration 
and outrage to fight back against the MCP, the Chinese and the British. 
Earlier setbacks and humiliations had only awakened their spirit 
of nationalism and resistance. They realised that they were in danger 
of losing their political rights, and probably sensed that the Chinese 
opposition was more vulnerable and fought back. The Malays discovered 
the need to sink their differences and to build up their unity. With 
this unity they were able to take on successfully first the Chinese 
and MCP challenge, and then the British challenge in the form of the 
Malayan Union plan. UMNO was the key to their new unity. In contrast, 
the MNP's crusade for Indonesia Raya struck a wrong chord in the political 
temperament of the Malays, and therefore seemed irrelevant to the more 
urgent Malay need to fight off the threat posed by the Malayan Union.
The Malay-Chinese clashes showed that the Malays would resort 
to widespread extremist violence if pushed. The long-term implications 
of this extremism were very great: the overall Malayan polity might
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always be held subject to ultimate Malay recourse to mass bloodshed. If 
so, then the Chinese would have to either accept this threat perpetually 
and make concessions whenever demanded, or develop their own capability 
to at least make the violent Malay option very debilitating. Otherwise, 
talk of pan-ethnic cooperation would usually be at Chinese expense.
The privileged status of the Malays before the war had always been 
taken for granted by everyone. But after the war it was challenged 
for the first time by the non-Malays and the Malays had to fight back 
to protect these rights. The Malay triumph meant that there could be 
no political concessions to non-Malays in the future without the approval 
of Malays. This principle was unmistakably asserted in the Anglo- 
Malay accord which led to the dissolution of the Malayan Union plan.
The British administration appears to have been divided over 
how far they should accommodate MCP demands. The ’liberals’ such as 
Mountbatten and Purcell were prepared to make genuine political 
concessions to the MCP, but were clearly obstructed by the ’anti-communist’ 
field commanders. The latter, by conducting widespread arrests and 
detentions and bringing to court many MCP and MPAJA members, undermined 
any possibility of an amicable relationship being established between 
the BMA and the MCP. British policy concerning the inter-racial 
clashes was apparently one of stepping in where needed to restore order 
but the fact that these clashes were allowed to drag on for so long 
(at least six months) casts some doubts about British intentions to 
suppress the disturbances. Malay and Chinese at each other's throats 
was not a pretty sight, but the idea of Malays and Chinese continuing 
to resist the colonial system may have been even more distasteful 
to some British policymakers. Finally, British support was crucial 
in determining whether the Malays or Chinese would emerge victorious 
in the political contest for post-war Malaya. By throwing their weight 
behind the Sultans and UMNO, the British ensured that the Malays would 
retain political primacy when they granted independence to Malaya in 
the future.
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CONCLUSION
THE eventful period covered by this study - 15 August 1945 to March 
1946 - is central to an understanding of postwar Malayan political 
attitudes and actions. It was during this time that the die was cast. 
This period marked the first real contest for political power in 
Malaya between Malays and Chinese - the two major races in the country. 
The privileged status of Malays as the indigenous people, an assumption 
which had been taken for granted before the war and even during the 
Japanese occupation, was now challenged by Chinese communists, Chinese 
guerrillas and supporters.
The period was, in fact, a time in Malaya's political 
history when anything seemed possible. The Japanese surrender led to 
an interregnum of nineteen days or more before the British returned.
It gave the people of all races an opportunity to determine what form 
of political and social system they wanted. Democracy, independence, 
revolution, were within their grasp, for as the Japanese order collapsed 
in vast areas of the countryside a vacuum emerged which could have 
been filled by any group with an effective national and local 
organisation. But no such group, either Malay or Chinese, had any 
reasonable plan to seize power. Neither the KMM nor the MCP had a 
programme to come to power by relying on their own strength and 
initiative. The KMM leaned too heavily on the Japanese and the 
Indonesians to realise its goal of Malay independence within Indonesia 
Raya. The MCP, tied by a pact to the British, was unable to forestall 
British return and British reimposition of colonial rule although its 
guerrilla force, the MPAJA, was in a position to give effective 
resistance and raise the banner of its 'National Liberation struggle'.
These were missed opportunities for the Malay nationalists 
in the KMM and the Chinese communists and guerrillas to strike out 
on their own paths to national independence. Nevertheless, if either 
movement had made a definite move for national independence, it is 
doubtful that the other group or race would have accepted the fait 
accompli. There was bound to be Chinese resistance to Indonesia Raya, 
just as it was certain the Malays would have resisted a communist 
Republic. Neither the KMM nor the MCP had the vital ingredient -
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Malay-Chinese unity or multi-racial unity as a whole - to forge a 
combined spirit of struggle for independence and national liberation. 
Ibrahim Yaacob's belated offer to the MCP (if his account is correct) 
for both groups to join their forces, the Giyu Gun and the MPAJA, 
in an armed struggle to oppose the returning British had been spumed 
by the MCP secretary-general Lai Tek. The reason was clearly Chinese 
distrust of Malays as much as it was the MCP's decision not to challenge 
the British. Instead of a Malay-Chinese joint struggle against the 
British, there occurred inter-racial clashes between Malays and 
Chinese, initially in Johor and Perak and later throughout the country.
Events during the Japanese occupation had, in fact, set 
the stage for the political contest between Malays and Chinese for 
postwar Malaya. Japanese repressive measures against the Chinese had 
led to a mainly Chinese resistance movement, the MPAJA, dominated by 
the Chinese-led MCP; their 'pro-Malay’ policy created an undercurrent 
of resentment and distrust among Chinese towards Malays. Malay 
cooperation made the Malays appear a chosen instrument of the Japanese. 
Consequently, inter-racial conflicts developed as the MPAJA became 
distrustful of Malay villagers, government officials and policemen and 
collaborators - just as they did too against those Chinese and other 
groups who collaborated with the Japanese.
The post-surrender interregnum allowed the MPAJA guerrillas 
to take over numerous small towns and villages throughout the country 
after Japanese troops had withdrawn from outlying areas. Although 
the MCP had decided against forming a communist government and 
declaring a republic, the MPAJA guerrillas in many localities seem to 
have wanted to exercise the prerogatives of new power. In most cases 
they did it in a very crude and counterproductive fashion, focussing 
on settling scores against Japanese informers and collaborators, 
brandishing weapons, threatening people, and generally creating a 
mood of fear, even a reign of terror. Local MPAJA guerrillas thus 
expended their energies on secondary objectives and wasted precious 
political capital. Their short administration left an indelible 
impresson on the minds of most people of how frightening communist rule 
might be. For the Malays especially, distrust of Chinese and distrust 
of communism were now intertwined.
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The inter-racial clashes show that the Malays were capable 
of resisting the MPAJA guerrillas effectively by their own peculiarly 
unique methods of warfare which combined traditional Malay martial 
arts, Islamic religious fervour and faith in supernatural powers.
The Malays successfully withstood the guerrilla attacks and launched 
their own reprisals against Chinese communities. They were able to 
slaughter and terrorise the Chinese villagers without check until 
remnants of Chinese settlements fled to larger Chinese towns for 
refuge. Neither the Chinese villagers nor the MPAJA guerrillas could 
stop them nor understand the fanatical force which drove the Malays.
The inter-racial clashes which occurred from May to August in Johor 
and Perak and which extended to other parts of the country from 
September to March 1946 suggest that the Malays had effectively 
countered the MCP/MPAJA's attempts at political domination in the 
country.
The postwar period under the BMA also shows that the MCP and 
the Chinese were incapable or unprepared for political leadership in 
Malaya. The MCP had not shed its Chinese character or 'Malayanised' 
its organisation and programme. It still paid greater attention 
to the interests of Chinese over those of Malays and Indians. Further­
more, it was unable to effect cooperation with the British because of 
internal divisions. As a result, its militant elements forced an 
MCP-British conflict for which the party’s moderate leadership was 
unprepared. The Chinese in Malaya still clung to a homeland focus 
of politics, while the British Government's Malayan Union policy 
required them to shift their political orientation from China to 
Malaya. They were not yet ready to do this. For this reason, they 
did not give enthusiastic support to the policy, although they stood 
to gain from the full implementation of this policy.
The Malays saw the Malayan Union policy as a threat to their 
privileged status in Malaya and strongly opposed it to prevent the 
British from taking away their rulers' sovereignty and giving equal 
citizenship rights to Chinese and other non-Malays. Although the 
anti-Malayan Union movement was largely organised by the Malay elite, 
the latter successfully presented the British move to the Malay 
masses as one favouring the Chinese to the detriment of Malay interests 
as a whole. The Malay-Chinese clashes helped to make clearer this threat.
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The British decision to give in to the Malay anti-Malayan 
Union campaign meant that the Malays would inherit political power when 
the British finally left the country. One of the considerations which 
led to this. British decision was disillusionment with the MCP's 
failure to fulfill its promises of cooperation during the BMA period, 
as well as surprise at the less than total enthusiasm of Chinese for 
the Malayan Union policy. In the first instance, one may say that 
the willingness of many British administrators to cooperate with the 
MCP was only skin deep, as indicated by Mountbatten's lack of success 
in liberalisation. In the second instance, the British failed to 
appreciate the reasons why the Chinese might give only qualified 
endorsement to Malayan Union. In any event, British agreement to 
restore the Malay rulers’ sovereignty and curtail citizenship rights 
to non-Malays ensured that the prewar privileged status of the 
Malays would be preserved.
The record of the MCP during this period clearly reveals 
that its greatest weakness was its lack of Malay support. Being 
predominantly Chinese, it failed to reorientate the perceptions of its 
Chinese cadres to the Malayan situation and to the realisation that 
without Malay support its Malayan revolution would remain an essentially 
Chinese revolution. Although the MCP attempted a ’Malayanisation’ 
of its policies and reorganisation from 1946 onwards, it is still seen 
in Malay eyes as a Chinese organisation on the grounds that its cadres 
continue to be mainly Chinese for lack of Malay support.
The need for the different races to think of Malaya as one 
nation and to regard themselves and one another as ’Malayans' did not 
come easily. It was only after a period of conflict and resolution 
that some began to think of and understand one another and what being 
'Malayans' meant. It was in the wake of the 1945-1946 conflict that 
a pan-ethnic Malayan nationalist movement was born. The first such 
movement for self-government was the united front forged between the 
MNP and the MCP which grew into the AMCJA-PUTERA during 1946-1948. 
Between 1946 and 1955 the various races in Malaya, especially the 
Malays and Chinese, would seek various formulae to achieve pan-ethnic
AMCJA, which stood for All-Malaya Council of Joint Action, consist^ 
of non-Malays, whilst PUTERA was a Malay organisation.
Cooperation and independence. Among those who would rise to champion such 
a cooperation was Datuk Onri bin Jaafar, who made the considerable personal 
sacrifice of resigning his presidency of UMNO following its refusal to open 
its doors to Chinese and non-Malays. He formed the multi-racial Independence 
of Malaya Party to seek independence for Malaya, but it met with limited 
success. Eventually it was to be the Alliance of UMNO, the Malayan Chinese 
Association and the Malayan Indian Congress under the leadership of Tunku 
Abdul Rahman who would successfully negotiate with the British Government 
in 1955 for Malaya to be granted independence. Both UMNO and the MCA 
made compromises in 1955 under what has been described as the 'historic 
bargain' - Malay recognition of citizenship for qualified Chinese in return 
for Chinese recognition of Malay special privileges, Malay as the national 
language and the position of the Malay rulers as constitutional monarchs. This 
agreement had become necessary to form a united front to demonstrate to 
the British that pan-ethnic cooperation was viable. The communist 
insurgency which began in 19^8 was costing the British Government a lot 
of money (in 1953 alone it was reported to have cost the British Government 
M$253 million), and the British sought to cultivate the non-communist elites 
of the three major races in order to deprive the communists of any political 
victory which might otherwise ultimately accrue to them. In 1955 the 
communist leaders were still in the jungle as hunted men trying to gain a 
foothold in the independence talks but rebuffed. On 31 August 1957 the 
UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance Government which was elected into' office in 
1955 obtained independence for Malaya from the British Government.
Obtaining independence was one thing. Building a truly 
pan-ethnic society and nation was quite another, an effort that is still 
far from complete. The May 1969 inter-racial clashes demonstrated once 
again that a Chinese political challenge could result in bloodshed. The 
clashes were caused by a stalemate in the Selangor Legislative Assembly 
elections because opposition Chinese strength equalled UMNO's. The May 
1969. clashes also put into question whether the UMNO-MCA 'historic 
bargain' can form the basis of Malaysian politics and society indefinitely.
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APPENDIX A
T r a n s l a t i o n  o f  Memorandum e n t i t l e d  'M a ra i  d o k u r i t s u  m o n d a i1 
[On the  p rob lem s  o f  Independence  f o r  M a laya ] 
by th e  P o l i t i c a l  A f f a i r s  S e c t i o n ,
M i n i s t r y  o f  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s ,  Tokyo , d a t e d 20 F e b r u a r y  1945
1. I t  i s  e x p e d i e n t  t o  g r a n t  in d e p e n d e n c e  t o  Malaya ,  B r i t a i n ' s  fo rm e r  
t e r r i t o r y  ( e x c e p t  t h e  f o u r  s t a t e s ,  K e l a n t a n ,  T rengganu ,  Kedah and P e r i l s  
which  were i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  T h a i l a n d ' s  t e r r i t o r y  by th e  J a p a n - T h a i l a n d  
T r e a t y  o f  20 th  A u g u s t ,  1943) by th e  most  e f f i c i e n t  m easu res  t a k i n g  i n t o  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  the  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  i t s  p o p u l a t i o n  and the  fo rm er  sy s te m  o f  
r u l e ,  e t c .  A c c o r d in g l y  p rob lem s  c o n c e r n i n g  M a la y a ' s  in d ep e n d e n c e  a r e ,
i n  b r i e f ,  as  f o l l o w s :
2. Com pos i t io n  o f  P o p u l a t i o n
A c c o r d in g  to  1936 e s t i m a t e s  the  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  
t e r r i t o r y ,  Malay P e n i n s u l a  ( i n c l u d i n g  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s l y  
m e n t io n e d  f o u r  p r o v i n c e s  which  were i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  t h e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  
T h a i l a n d  i n  1943) was 4 ,6 9 4 ,1 6 6  and t h e  r a c i a l  c o m p o s i t i o n  i s  a s  f o l l o w s :
M alays :  2 ,0 9 5 ,2 1 7  (a  l i t t l e  o v e r  44.6%)
C h in e s e :  1 ,8 2 1 ,7 5 0  (a  l i t t l e  o v e r  38.8%)
O t h e r s :  777,299 (a  l i t t l e  unde r  16.6%)
T ak ing  t h i s  y e a r ' s  p o p u l a t i o n ,  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  w i t h o u t  t h e  
f o u r  p r o v i n c e s  which were i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  T h a i l a n d  i s  as  f o l l o w s :
M a l a y s : 1 , 2 1 0 , 7 1 8  (a  l i t t l e  o v e r  34.3%)
C h in e s e :  1 ,6 9 9 ,5 9 4  (a  l i t t l e  o v e r  47.7%)
O t h e r s :  6 51 ,948  (a  l i t t l e  o v e r  18%)
A c c o rd in g  to  t h e  above f i g u r e s ,  a p p a r e n t l y  t h e  main r a c e  in  
M alaya ,  e x c l u d i n g  f o u r  p r o v i n c e s  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  T h a i l a n d ,  i s  C h inese  
r a t h e r  t h a n  Malay and i t  I s  p resumed t h a t  the  o l d  r a c i a l  c o m p o s i t i o n  has  
changed  l i t t l e ,  even  t a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e s .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  i n  g r a n t i n g  i n d e p e n d e n c e  t o  Malaya i t  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  i g n o r e  
t h e  C h in e se  on p o p u l a t i o n  grounds  a l o n e ,  even  w i t h o u t  t a k i n g  i n t o  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t h e i r  economic  a c t i v i t i e s .  Out o f  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  
Malaya i n  1936, Malays and C h inese  show a r a t i o  o f  57% t o  a l i t t l e  o v e r  
43% and i n  t h e  1941 c e n s u s ,  a r a t i o  o f  a l i t t l e  o v e r  54% t o  a l i t t l e  
unde r  46%. T ha t  i s ,  t h e  r a t i o  o f  r a c i a l  c o m p o s i t i o n  has  h a r d l y  changed  i n  
t h o s e  f i v e  y e a r s  so t h a t  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  i n  the  l a s t  e i g h t  y e a r s  f rom 
1937 up t o  the  p r e s e n t ,  t h e  f i g u r e s  have h a r d l y  changed o r  a t  l e a s t  the  
r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  of  t h e  Chinese  i s  g r e a t e r  t han  t h a t  o f  the Malays .  These 
d a y s ,  t h e  p r e s e n t  Malayan m i l i t a r y  government  i s  s t a r t i n g  to  show s i g n s  o f  
ch a n g in g  the p o l i c y  e n f o r c e d  i n  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  m i l i t a r y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
and which had been c la im ed  t o  s t a n d  f o r  p r i n c i p l e s  e m p h a s i z in g  the p o s i t i o n  
o f  M alays ,  b e c a u s e  i t  has  become i m p o s s i b l e  t o  i g n o r e  the  power o f  o v e r s e a s  
Chinese  m e r c h a n t s  in  v a r i o u s  a r e a s  such as  commerce, i n d u s t r y  and l a b o u r .
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3. The s y s t e m  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  u n d e r  B r i t i s h  r u l e
B r i t a i n  d i v i d e d  Malaya i n t o  t h r e e  p a r t s ;  t h e  d i r e c t  c o n t r o l  
a r e a  ( t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s ) ,  F e d e r a t e d  Malay S t a t e s  and U n f e d e r a t e d  
Malay S t a t e s .  She r u l e d  t h e  S t r a i t s  S e t t l e m e n t s  as  h e r  t e r r i t o r y  and t h e  
F e d e r a t e d  Malay S t a t e s  and U n f e d e r a t e d  Malay S t a t e s  a s  h e r  p r o t e c t o r a t e s .  
The d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  t h e  above i s  n o t  so c l e a r  b u t  i t  seems to  be  a 
d i f f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  l e v e l  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  so  t h a t  i n  r e c e n t  t im e s  Malaya has  
n o t  be e n  r e a l l y  i n d e p e n d e n t .  A cco rd ing  to  t h e  above c o n d i t i o n s ,  i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  g r a n t  in d ep e n d e n c e  t o  Malaya by r e p e a l i n g  the  p r e s e n t  m i l i t a r y  
government  and r e p l a c i n g  i t  w i t h  a  new s y s te m  o f  government .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
i n  c o n c l u s i o n ,  t h e  on ly  a l t e r n a t i v e  methods  which  can be a d o p te d  a r e  as  
f o l l o w s :
(a)  To i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e  f o u r  p r o v i n c e s ,  K e l a n t a n ,  Trengganu ,
Kedah and P e r i l s  i n t o  T h a i l a n d  and t h e  r e s t  i n t o  China .
(b)  Rule  t h r o u g h  the  c r e a t i o n  o f  a p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
w i t h  t h e  c o - o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  C h i n e s e ,  t h e  main r a c e  i n  
M alaya ,  and Malays .  (For  i n s t a n c e ,  l i k e  S ino -M alaya  
Mixed A d m i n i s t r a t i o n )
(c)  To make Malaya a s t a t e  o f  a F e d e r a t e d  I n d o n e s i a .
S ou rce :  M i c r o f i l m  N o . 16-30 i n  t h e  N i s h i j i m a  C o l l e c t i o n ,  Waseda
U n i v e r s i t y ,  Tokyo. Also  a p p e a r s  as  Ms. F i lm  50,  
i t e m  n o . 5 i n  t h e  Wason C o l l e c t i o n ,  C o r n e l l  U n i v e r s i t y ,  
New York.  T r a n s l a t e d  by Mr Shun I k e d a  o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  
D e p a r tm e n t ,  A.N.U.
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APPENDIX B
The S t a t i s t i c s o f  C a s u a l t i e s  d u r i n g  the  R e s i s t a n c e  Campaigns 
( a c c o r d i n g  t o  GSI HQ 29 J a p a n e s e  Army)
(a)  Under the  J a p a n e s e  7th Army
J a p a n e s e  t o t a l  400 a b o u t  175 k i l l e d
P o l i c e  " 1 ,000
R e s i s t a n c e  Army " 2 ,200  700 dead and 1,500 a r r e s t e d
(b) Under 29 Army: F e b ru a ry  1944 t o  14 Augus t  1945
Dead Wounded M is s i n g T o t a l
J a p a n e s e 15 20 5 40
P a r a - M i l i t a r y ---------- 16 — - 16
56
P o l i c e -------- 350 100 450
506
K i l l e d A r r e s  t e d
R e s i s t a n c e  Army 150 400 550
From the  s u r r e n d e r  t o 31 Augus t 1945
Dead Wounded M is s in g T o t a l
J a p a n e s e 63 54 4 121
P a r a - M i l i t a r y 3 - 11 14
135
P o l i c e ---------- 31 — 35 7 388
523
K i l l e d A r r e s  t e d
R e s i s t a n c e  Army 78 48 126
C o n s o l i d a t e d  T o t a l s
J a p a n e s e a pprox 600 c a s u a l t i e s
P o l l c e f t 2,000 I I
R e s i s  t anc e I f 2 ,900 I I
S ourc e :  25 I n d i a n  D i v i s i o n  Weekly I n t e l l i g e n c e  Review N o .11,  d a t e d
28 November 1945,  e n c l o s u r e  i n  MU S e c r e t  335/46 V o l . l .
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APPENDIX C
The S t a t i s t i c s  o f  A t t a c k s  made by the  Chinese  
R e s i s t a n c e  Army (Between 15 Augus t  1945-31  Augus t  1945) 
( a c c o r d i n g  t o  GSI Hq 29 J a p a n e s e  Army)*
S t a t e
A g a i n s t
t h e
Army
A g a i n s t
t h e
P o l i c e
A g a i n s t
t h e
Rai lway
A g a i n s t
Cars
A g a i n s t  
F a c t o r i e s  
& S t o r e s
Misc . T o t a l
P e r a k 28 40 6 17 3 27 121
S e l a n g o r 10 5 3 10 5 5 38
Negr i
Sembil an - 7 1 7 - 5 20
Pahang 3 5 - 1 1 4 14
Kedah 1 4 1 1 - 3 10
Malacca - 4 - 2 - - 6
Trengganu - - - - - 1 1
Ke l a n  t a n - - - - - 1 1
Penang - 1 - - - - 1
TOTAL 42 66 11 38 9 46 212
S ourc e :  25 I n d i a n  D i v i s i o n  Weekly I n t e l l i g e n c e  Review N o .11,  d a t e d
28 November 1945,  e n c l o s u r e  i n  MU S e c r e t  335/46 V o l . l .
The s t a t i s t i c s  f o r  J o h o r  a r e  n o t  i n c l u d e d  b e c a u s e  J o h o r  f e l l  
w i t h i n  t h e  command o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  7 th  Area Army b a s e d  i n  S i n g a p o r e .
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APPENDIX D
Statement of the Selangor State Committee 
The Communist Party of Malaya
A manifesto to the compatriots of the various nationalities of 
Selangor to celebrate the glorious victory of the Anti-Fascist struggle 
in the Far East and to materialize the present 8 principles of the 
Communist Party of Malaya.
Dear compatriots of all nationalities of Selangor.
On the 9th of August, Soviet Russia declared war on Japan, 
and on the 15th of the same month, Japan surrendered unconditionally to 
the Allies.
Hence, the Far-Eastern Anti-Fascist struggle has now achieved 
complete victory. The period of war and its horrors and atrocities has 
now passed. Pe.ace prevails today in the Far East and in the whole world.
Let us celebrate this inestimably bright and glorious victory 
with our greatest jubilation. Let us applaud with loud cheers of joy 
and with zealous sentiments, welcome the arrival of peace and freedom.
This grand victory is achieved through the merits of the 
Governments, Armies and Peoples of Soviet Russia, China, Britain and 
United States respectively; through the merits of the Japanese peoples, 
who are Anti-Fascist and Anti-war; and also through the merits of the 
Far Eastern Communist Parties, the Anti-Japanese armies and the peoples 
of the Far Eastern small nations. Therefore we must extend our highest 
and most respectful salute to those countries and peoples, who in these 
few years, have been ever persistent in the Anti-Fascist struggle. We 
must also bemoan deeply those fallen warriors who sacrificed their lives 
in the Anti-Fascist struggle.
The victory of the Far Eastern Anti-Fascist struggle is of great 
historical significance:-
(1) Wiping out the chief perpetrators of the Far Eastern War - 
The Japanese Fascists; ending the Far Eastern war totally; reducing the 
sacrifices and losses of the Far Eastern peoples and eliminating the 
calamities, pains and hardships of the Far Eastern peoples; all of which 
result in the Far Eastern peoples attaining peace and happiness as well 
as freedom and democracy.
(2) This is the first time that the domination of the barbarous 
Japanese has been overthrown. This will greatly encourage the struggling 
sentiments of the huge masses, strengthen their confidence of victory, 
and help and propagate the liberation movements of the Far Eastern small 
nations. These will make the liberation movements achieve victory easier, 
a victory both absolute and secure.
(3) Russia's entry into the Far Eastern war is the cause of 
Japan's unconditional surrender. This makes a change to the nature or
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characteristic of the Far Eastern situation, whence all the Far Eastern 
small nations are running along the path towards New Democracy, just the 
same as in Europe. The Far Eastern problem is not the singular affair of 
one particular country. It has become an international affair. Therefore, 
the Far Eastern problem will be settled in the forthcoming Far Eastern 
Conference.
\
Now the world situation has greatly changed: War has ended
completely and absolutely; the era of fear and senseless slaughter has 
passed and mankind has achieved freedom, peace and happiness. Those 
evil perpetrators of war, who are instrumental in causing the destruction 
of the civilization of the world have now been liquidated. The peoples 
of the world are on the preliminary step towards establishing a New 
Society and a New World. The slave system of Fascism has been completely 
abolished. The peoples of every country of Europe, Asia, Africa-and America 
had surged on the roaring tides of New Democratic Movements. New Democratic 
countries have been set up one after another. Small nations have achieved 
liberation and the peoples have attained freedom, peace and democracy.
Old generations have gone and passed. The history of mankind 
is on the threshold of a new generation. The peoples of the world have 
never before experienced such a day as today, so grand and glorious, so 
free and happy. This is the newest page in the history of mankind.
More than 3 years have come to pass, we, the five-million 
compatriots of Malaya had suffered indescribable calamities, hardships 
and pains under the barbarous domination of the brutal Japanese. Innumerable 
compatriots had been tortured and imprisoned, robbed, slaughtered, passed 
semi-starving and death-struggling lives, and rendered homeless.
Innumerable aunties and sisters have been outraged, molested and raped and 
still more brothers had been driven to the battle-fronts to serve as cannon- 
fodders. However, every of these blood debts has now been settled. The 
tyranny of the Fascists has thereby ended.
Today Malaya is located in a new situation and in a new generation. 
New Democratic movements of the world have been widely circulated, and the 
new International Organisation has approved the principles of democracy, 
self-government and human rights. The problem of Malaya has become a part 
of the International problem. All advanced countries of the world and 
their peoples will certainly help us. On the other hand, in these several 
years, the Communist Party of Malaya has from the very beginning been 
persistent in their struggle. Their capabilities and intelligence as 
leaders in the Anti-Japanese struggles have greatly won the zealous support 
of the compatriots. In these three odd years of painful struggle, the 
compatriots of all nationalities of Malaya have greatly elevated their 
struggling spirits and strengthened the unity of all the people.
As a result, the National Liberation of Malaya has obtained more 
beneficial terms, and is certain to be successful and victorious in the 
end. The future prospect of Malaya is unlimitedly bright.
In these three odd years, under very extremely painful and 
difficult conditions the Communist Party of Malaya, the Malayan Peoples’
Anti-Japanese armies and the Anti-Japanese Unions have suffered undescribable 
pains, but for the welfare of all the compatriots of Malaya, they have 
never for a moment relaxed in their duty.
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In  t h e s e  t h r e e  odd y e a r s ,  The Communist P a r t y  o f  Malaya has  
l e d  t h e  c o m p a t r i o t s  o f  Malaya i n  i n n u m e rab le  s t r u g g l e s ,  f r u s t r a t i n g  e v e ry  
impuden t  i n t r i g u e  o f  t h e  enemy. The P e o p l e s '  A n t i - J a p  Armies  have on 
s e v e r a l  h u n d r e d  o c c a s i o n s ,  e ngaged  the  enemy i n  b i g  and s m a l l  b a t t l e s ,  i n  
which the  enemy s u f f e r e d  s e v e r a l  t h o u sa n d  c a s u a l t i e s .  The A n t i - J a p a n e s e  
Unions have  e d u c a t e d  and u n i t e d  t h e  c o m p a t r i o t s  on a v a s t  s c a l e ,  and have  
h e l p e d  them to  s e t t l e  many d i f f i c u l t i e s  and d i s p u t e s  and have  m a i n t a i n e d  
the  o r d e r  o f  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  p l a c e .  A l l  t h e s e  a r e  w e l l  known to  t h e  
c o m p a t r i o t s  o f  Malaya .
Now t h a t  t h e  J a p a n e s e  have  s u r r e n d e r e d ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  Government  
w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  dom ina te  Malaya .  Under t h i s  new s i t u a t i o n ,  we must  c l a r i f y  
and s t r e s s  to  t h e  c o m p a t r i o t s  o f  a l l  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  o f  Malaya t h a t  WE, THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA WILL CERTAINLY SERVE THE NATION LOYALLY. WE 
WILL CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO LEAD THE COMPATRIOTS TO STRUGGLE FOR THE 
REALIZATION OF THE DEMANDS OR WISHES OF THE PEOPLE.
For  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  s a f e - g u a r d i n g  the  i n t e r e s t s  o f  the  c o m p a t r i o t s  
and s t r u g g l i n g  f o r  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  of  t h e  new D e m oc ra t i c  System o f  Malaya ,  
t h e  C e n t r a l  Committee  of  t h e  Communist P a r t y  o f  Malaya unde r  t h e  new 
s i t u a t i o n ,  h e r e b y  s u g g e s t s  the  p r e s e n t  8 P r i n c i p l e s  to  t h e  c o m p a t r i o t s  o f  
a l l  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  o f  M a la y a : -
(1) S u p p o r t  t h e  D em ocra t i c  A l l i a n c e  o f  S o v i e t  R u s s i a ,  Ch ina ,  
B r i t a i n  and Am er ica . -  S u p p o r t  t h e  new I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Peace  O r g a n i z a t i o n .
(2)  M a t e r i a l i z e  the Malayan D e m o c ra t i c  p o l i c y .  E s t a b l i s h  o r g a n s  
o f  p e o p l e s '  w i sh  f o r  the whole o f  Malaya as  w e l l  as  die  r e s p e c t i v e  S t a t e s  
by u n i v e r s a l  s u f f r a g e  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  and A n t i - J a p a n e s e  
o r g a n i s a t i o n s  o f  Malaya .
(3)  A b o l i s h  the  p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  formed by the  d o m in a t i o n
of  t h e  J a p a n e s e  F a s c i s t s  i n  Malaya .  A b o l i s h  a l l  J a p a n e s e  laws and d e c r e e s .
(4) P r a c t i s e  the  a b s o l u t e  f reedom o f  s p e e c h ,  p u b l i c a t i o n ,  
o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  p u b l i c  m e e t in g  and b e l i e f .  Assu re  t h e  l e g a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  a l l  
p a r t i e s  and o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
(5)  R e l i n q u i s h  t h e  o l d  s y s te m  o f  e d u c a t i o n  and e x e r c i s e  d e m o c r a t i c  
e d u c a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  n a t i o n a l  l a n g u a g e s .  Expand n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r e .
(6) Improve t h e  l i v i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  p e o p l e ;  d e ve lop  
I n d u s t r y ,  A g r i c u l t u r e  and Commerce; r e l i e v e  the  unemployed and r e f u g e e s ;  
i n c r e a s e  wages u n i v e r s a l l y  and p r a c t i s e  the  ' 8  h o u r s '  work s y s t e m 1.
(7) Reduce t h e  p r i c e s  o f  goods to  the  l e v e l ;  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  
l i v i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  p e o p l e ;  p u n i s h  c o r r u p t  o f f i c i a l s ,  p r o f i t e e r s  
and h o a r d e r s .
(8) T r e a t  t h e  A n t i - J a p a n e s e  a rm ies  k i n d l y ,  and h e l p  t h e  f a m i l i e s  
o f  t h e  f a l l e n  w a r r i o r s .
We had s u g g e s t e d  b e f o r e  ’ E s t a b l i s h  Malaya i n t o  a D em ocra t i c  
R e p u b l i c ' .  Today we a r e  n o t  d e v i a t i n g  from t h i s  programme,  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  
the o b j e c t  o f  o u r  s t r u g g l e .  We have  been  p e r s i s t e n t  f o r  20 y e a r s ,  b e c a u s e
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we want Malaya to be established into a Democratic Republic. But in order 
to cope with the demands of the present situation, we again suggest the 
present 8 Principles. These 8 principles are to realize, the preliminary 
steps of the Democratic Republic, because they are part of the requirements 
of the Democratic Republic.
Consequently we hereby zealously exhort:
Compatriots of all classes who love peace, protect the interests 
of the people with national conscientiousness. Strengthen the unity of 
all nationalities on a more wider scale and establish a new juggernaut 
force. Support vehemently the present 8 Principles of the Communist Party 
of Malaya. With the fullest strength, struggle for the complete realization 
of these Principles. Double our energy and struggle persistently to realise 
the New Democratic System of Malaya.
All police, detectives and Government servants! The period of 
Japanese domination has now passed. You have previously betrayed the 
interests of the compatriots. Your crimes and misdeeds will not be 
considered by us now, unless you still possess National Conscientiousness, 
and repent sincerely for your past misdeeds. Henceforth, you must serve 
truly the interests of the nation. Love and protect the compatriots, and 
we will consider you as compatriots as well. We ardently hope that you 
will support the Principles of the Communist Party of Malaya in serving 
for the interests of the compatriots.
All robbers and gangsters! With the help of the enemy, you have 
previously committed innumerable infamous deeds. Now, Japan has surrendered 
unconditionally. We hope that you will earnestly repent for your past 
misdeeds, and we will not consider you as our enemy unless you love and 
guard the interests of the people; respect and consider the lives and 
properties of the people as well.
Britain is a member of the United Nations. We hope that the 
British Government will end their dominating policies on colonies;' 
genuinely execute the decisions of the San Francisco Conference by giving 
'Self-Government* to the Malayan people establish an organ according 
to the wishes of the people; practise democratic politics and wholly 
realize the 8 Principles suggested by us.
Dear compatriots of all nationalities! In these 3 odd years of 
Anti-Japanese Struggles, you have by your shining examples displayed the 
wonderful courage and gallantry of the Malayan people. Now, you should 
learn from the people of Europe, and keep up your gallant spirit. Our 
dear compatriots! The new generation has arrived, we must unite on a 
far wider scale, and form into files and fall in under the New Democratic 
Flag, struggle to the last.
Let us hail loudly:
ALL NATIONALITIES OF MALAYA! BE MORE WIDELY UNITED!
MATERIALIZE THE 8 PRINCIPLES!
MATERIALIZE THE NEW DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM!
LONG LIVE THE FAR EASTERN ANTI-FASCIST VICTORY!
LONG LIVE THE PEACE AND DEMOCRACY OF MALAYA!
Issued by:
The Selangor State Committee
The Communist Party of Malaya.
Dated this day 27th August, 1945.
Source: Sei.C.A.162/45, B.M.A. (Malaya).
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APPENDIX E
BANDITS ATTEMPT TO DISTURB PEACE OF MALAI 
Series of Serious Incidents Reported from All Parts of
the Country
Malai Sinpo, Monday, 3 September 1945
One of the biggest obstacles to the peaceful progress of 
Malai, since its occupation by the Japanese forces, has been the 
trouble constantly caused by bandits.
From the day it was announced that hostilities had ceased 
in East Asia these bad elements have been more active in Malai. That 
their depredations have been confined to a few incidents in remote 
parts of the country, is mainly due to the rigorous steps taken 
by the Japanese military, who have been entrusted with the maintenance 
of peace and order in the country till the arrival of the British 
forces .
The Japanese military authorities feel it their duty to 
the Malaian public to ensure their safety and an act of their good 
faith to the Allies to mete out severe punishment to these bandits.
In the proclamation published on Saturday the Japanese 
army in Malai stressed that it would not permit the existence of 
such bandits, nor would the Allies when they came. These bandits, 
therefore, would be destroyed in the near future.
The public of Malai are strongly advised not to believe in 
the falsehoods circulated by the bandits but instead to co-operate 
with the Japanese Army to ensure the security of their homeland.
Should there be any who have been misled into joining the 
bandits, they are advised to come forward and to help in the 
preservation of peace and order for the sake of the happiness of 
the people.
BANDIT ACTIVITY
Since Aug.15 there have been many cases of bandit activity 
throughout the country some of which are summarised below:
On Aug.15 in the neighbourhood of Kuantan, 20 bandits 
attacked 12 police constables, several of whom were killed and wounded, 
but the bandits were repulsed with casualties and some ammunition 
captured.
On the same day in the suburbs of Kuala Lumpur, bandits 
attacked the house of Nippon-zin residents, but were repulsed, while 
50 bandits wearing Nippon Army uniforms, attacked a factory in Batu
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Cape, Negri Sembilan, and made their escape after plundering some 
arms and other things.
Near Bentong, Negri Sembilan, on Aug.17, 30 bandits made 
an attack. After some fighting they escaped leaving a prisoner.
On the following day 10 others reappeared when one was killed and 
another arrested. 30 bandits who attacked the town of Bentong were 
repulsed, leaving a prisoner, and at Karaku, in the same state, several 
of them attacked the Sultan, and escaped without achieving their 
purpose.
At- Rengam, also in the same state, a very powerful group 
of bandits attacked the police but were repulsed after many casualties. 
On the Japanese side the Shidekan and some others were killed and 
wounded. A Nippon-zin pedestrian in Furega (Negri Sembilan) was 
fired upon by bandits, but he gallantly counter-attacked and repulsed 
them.
At Ninberis, in Pahang, 15 Nippon soldiers repulsed a party 
of bandits who attacked them.
On Aug.18 about 10 p.m. 10 bandits attacked the police 
station at Jerantut, and were repulsed after a 30 minute struggle. 
After reinforcing their number to 30 they attacked again and were 
repulsed a second time leaving behind several dead.
IN SELANGOR
At Kampong Gajah, in Selangor, 13 Nippon soldiers, including 
Sub-Lieut. Miyake were attacked, also labourers employed by the army 
at Rawang. At Batu Arang, a group of bandits attacked the railway 
station and the telephone and other materials were looted. At Kepong 
military engineers were attacked.
A group visited the house of Nissan Norin and Co, 3 miles 
south of Kuala Lumpur and demanded a lorry. A Nippon army unit went 
into action upon receipt of a message and repulsed the bandits.
At Telok Anson one group attacked the telephone exchange 
and another the police station at about 8 p.m. but after fighting 
they were repulsed leaving four dead and some arms and ammunition.
On Aug.19 they attacked a motor-car belonging to the Pahang 
Government, 3 miles north of Mentakab, while another group carried 
out anti-Nippon propaganda among labourers in the same place.
Near Klang four constables were attacked by bandits and 
seriously injured. On the same day they attacked a police station 
in Malacca and the next day 40 bandits attacked the headquarters of 
the Volunteers Corps. They were repulsed by a crack police squad.
Near Runketua in Perak a powerful group of bandits encircled 
and attacked the police station twice. Receiving an urgent message 
a Nippon army unit rescued the police and repulsed the bandits.
At Tanjong Toh Alang, two bandits surrendered after serious fighting.
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At Nibong Tebal, in Kedah, a group of 30 bandits attacked 
the police station but all surrendered after a furious counter-attack.
The Asahan police station in Johore was attacked on Aug.20 
and on the same day a powerful armed group of bandits attacked the 
police station at Semenyeh but escaped without gaining their objective.
At Seremban 14 bandits attacked a Nippon residence in the 
day, but as a Nippon army unit took immediate action they escaped 
leaving four dead and two motor lorries. They repeated their attack 
on the Seremban police station without success.
On Aug.21 bandits attacked the Tanks police station in 
Malacca and at Ketan Island, Selangor, they attacked the volunteer 
headquarters without success.
A group of 100 bandits attacked the Kamotu-Syo at Rasa 
and escaped after receiving serious injuries. About 200 bandits 
attacked the barracks of the Indian National Army in Tapah, Perak.
They attacked a Nippon-zin residence at Lahat and a Nippon civilian 
at Tindal.
The police station at Kuala Kangsar was attacked on Aug.22 
when they unsuccessfully demanded the policemen to deliver their arms.
At Rimba Panjang, they destroyed the railway and a train crashed.
All communications were destroyed checking transport. Senda and 
Co. at Kurankan, in Kedah was attacked.
At Mantin they compelled about 200 inhabitants to assemble 
and collected information from them. Sixty bandits on the same day 
and 40 the following day attacked Malai [Malay] villages at Sungei 
Ton, Sungei Man and three other areas in Perak.
On Aug.23 seven bandits blew up a ferry on the Pahang river 
at Jerantut and 10 unsuccessfully attacked the Kati police station in 
Perak. The police stations at Bagan Serai and Parit Buntar were attacked 
on Aug.24.
In addition to the above, an armed group of 100 bandits 
attacked merchants recognised by the Gunseikanbu and caused a dynamite 
incident at Kemanan, in Trengganu, kidnapping local constables.
In several punitive expeditions there were glorious deaths 
of Nippon-zin civilian officers, and casualties among local policemen. 
The local inhabitants are grateful to the Japanese military for the 
protection afforded to them.
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APPENDIX F
The Malay Literary View of the MPAJU/MPAJA
How do Malay writers treat the issue of Malay collaboration 
during the Japanese administration? This is an important question, 
as the issue of collaboration was one of the immediate causes of the 
inter-racial clashes in Johor . What emerges is a fascinating pattern 
in Malay writing. In a number of Malay novels which deal with the 
role of the 'wicked Malay informer', whether it is the penghulu 
in the novel Amrun, or the Kempeitai informer in Nyawa di hujong pedang, 
the writers adopt an attitude of compassion and mercy. The principal 
Malay characters who have been wronged still show magnanimity, but 
not the Chinese MPAJA guerrillas and their Malay supporters who appear 
cold, heartless and unrelenting in exacting their 'pound of flesh'.
The latter are also depicted as being concerned only with revenge, 
murder and brutality. The Malays prefer to adopt the attitude of 
'forgive and forget' or to leave the punishment and judgement of the 
wicked in the hands of God. However, if there is to be justice, they 
will agree that the wrongdoers should be arrested, tried and 
if found guilty, be sentenced to imprisonment, but not killed.
In his 1965 novel Amrun,1 Muhammad Haji Kidin describes how 
a young Malay man becomes an MPAJA guerrilla in order to attempt the 
overthrow of his district's tyrannical penghulu, because of the 
latter's role as a Japanese agent and his ill-treatment of the villagers 
It is a fine story of class conflict, in which the hero, Amrun, who 
is of a lower class background, becomes a kampung rebel and later a 
communist. The penghulu and his eldest son swagger about the village, 
oppressing the people, forcibly taking whatever food supplies they 
want and press into corvee all the able-bodied Malays who refuse to 
become their errand-boys for work at the 'Death Railway' in Thailand 
and Burma. These corvee labourers never return. The Chinese villagers 
also oppose the penghulu, and their young men one of whom is a friend 
of Amrun, join the MPAJA. After a brawl in which he injures the 
penghulu's son, Amrun is forced to flee to Singapore, where he joins 
the Heiho. His Heiho regiment is sent to Keluang, Johor , where 
they go into action against the MPAJA in the areas of Paloh, Bekok,
Yong Peng, Cha'ah and Labis. ______
One day, Amrun encounters his Chinese friend who is in the 
MPAJA who persuades him to join the MPAJA to fight the Japanese and 
to remove the penghulu. Amru.n agrees, is taken to meet the MPAJA 
Chinese commander in Labis and together they plan an attack on a 
Japanese army camp. Amrun and several of his Heiho compatriots join 
in the attack and then make their escape to the MPAJA Headquarters. 
Amrun becomes a member of the MPAJA with the rank of sergeant and is
1 Published by Saudara Sinaran, Penang.
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soon promoted to sergeant-major. When the war ends Amrun is demobilised 
and returns to his kampung, but the villagers turn against him because 
he has joined the MPAJA. It is said that the villagers' attitude 
was partly influenced by the penghulu, whom Amrun had failed to capture 
and execute.
Many people in the kampung did not like Amrun 
because he was a Bintang Tiga soldier. Although 
Amrun had committed no crime, still they disliked 
him. This was because the villagers hated some of 
the acts which the Bintang Tiga soldiers had committed, 
such as cruelly abducting and killing people without 
any investigation whatever. Some of these acts were 
worse than those of the Japanese.
Amrun's conflict with the penghulu eventually forces him to join the 
Chinese communists in the jungle again, when the Emergency is declared 
in June 1948.
The class conflict is never resolved because Amrun fails to 
kill the wicked penghulu, but the author administers poetic justice.
The penghulu is eventually killed by a criminal gang, and his eldest 
son is jailed by the BMA on charges of corruption - evidence that 
Providence punishes the wicked, and rewards the good in His own 
mysterious ways. In Ahmad Murad's 1963 novel, Nyawa di hujong pedang,^  
the wicked informer is finally executed by the MPAJA, but the execution 
is regarded as a crime because it was not 'proper justice'. Those 
who were wronged by the wicked informer, comfort the suffering mother 
and show compassion. Whether such magnanimity is a post facto 
rationalisation in the light of the Malay experience of the mass 
executions by the MPAJA during the interregnum, or the genuine compassion 
which Malays generally display in such situations for their Malay 
fellowmen or for other wrongdoers suffering a similar fate, is 
difficult to tell.
Other Malay stories and accounts of the MPAJA reveal that 
while the Malays support the MPAJA's cause in principle, they disapprove 
of most of its methods. Not more than a few hundred Malays actually 
joined the MPAJA, though a greater number joined the MPAJU. Their 
combined figures did not exceed more than five percent of the total 
strength of the MPAJA at any one time. The Malays preferred to 
participate in the MPAJU's activities because it did not require 
them to carry arms and engage in armed combat with the Japanese. In 
Ahmad Murad's novel Nyawa di hujong pedang (Life at the sword's edge), 
set in the Kinta valley of Perak, the Malays of a kampung agree to 
support the MPAJU, but are not keen to join the MPAJA. They would 
prefer to _b_ayar yuran (pay their contributions) to the MPAJU because 
they are afraid that if the Japanese learnt that any of the villagers 
had joined the MPAJA, they would attack the village and punish the 
inhabitants.
2 Published by Khee Meng Press, Kuala Lumpur.
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Malay w r i t e r s  a r e  e q u a l l y  u n s y m p a t h e t i c  i n  t h e i r  p o r t r a y a l  
o f  Malay members o f  t h e  MPAJA, w i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  Muhammad H a j i  
S i d i n .  In  W ijaya  M a la ’ s Saka Kampong G e r g a s i ^ (The l e g e n d  o f  Kampong 
C e r g a 8 i ) , w r i t t e n  i n  1965,  t h e  Malay members o f  t h e  MPAJA a r e  r e g a r d e d  
by t h e  kampung f o l k s  as  ’h a n t u '  ( d e v i l s ) ,  a s  o p p r e s s i v e  as  t h e  
J a p a n e s e  a u t h o r i t i e s .  The Malay l e a d e r  o f  t h e  MPAJA i s  s a c r a s t i c a l l y  
r e f e r r e d  to  as  ’G ab e n o r ’ ( G o v e r n o r ) .  No C h inese  f i g u r e  i n  t h e  s t o r y ,  
b u t  t h e  f e a r  t h e  v i l l a g e r s  h o l d  o f  t h e  two Malay MPAJA o f f i c i a l s ,
Mansor  and K a r im in ,  i s  s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  h e l d  by o t h e r  Malays o f  t h e  
C h in e se  MPAJA. One o f  t h e  Malay c h a r a c t e r s  i n  t h e  s t o r y  sp e ak s  o f  
t h e  MPAJA t e r r o r  i n  t h e i r  kampung i n  muted t o n e s :
We must remember, t h e  b i g  change  t h a t  has  t a k e n  
p l a c e  i n  o u r  kampung now i s  t h a t  t y r a n n y  i s  b e i n g  
meted ou t  to  t h e  i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  t h i s  kampung.
The kampung p e o p le  s u b m i t  t o  t h e  t y r a n n y  o f  t h e  
A n t i - J a p a n e s e  Movement. T h a t ’ s why we must 
t a l k  a b o u t  t h i s  c a u t i o u s l y  h e r e .  We c a n n o t  s ay  
what  we l i k e ,  w h e t h e r  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  J a p a n e s e  
o r  to  oppose  t h e  A n t i - J a p a n e s e  p e o p l e ,  b e c a u s e  
t h e  P e r a k  R iv e r  h a s  c a r r i e d  t h e  c o r p s e s  o f  
t h o s e  who d a r e d  to  do s o .
In  Ahmad Murad’ s Nyawa d i  h u jo n g  p e d a n g , t h e  Malay MPAJA l e a d e r  i s  
s e e n  m ere ly  as  a t o o l  o f  t h e  C h ine se  High Command in  t h e  MPAJA, as  
a l s o  i n  Muhammad H a j i  S i d i n ’ s Amrun.
Malay w r i t e r s  a l s o  d e p i c t  o t h e r  examples  o f  C h inese  a n t i -  
J a p a n e s e  r e s i s t a n c e  d i f f e r e n t  f rom th e  C h inese  i n  t h e  MPAJA. ^For  
i n s t a n c e ,  i n  T a j u l  ’A r i f f i n ’ s 1964 n o v e l  f o r  c h i l d r e n ,  Manj a , a 
C h inese  yo u th  i n  t h e  kampung d i s a p p e a r s  to  j o i n  an a n t i - J a p a n e s e  f o r c e  
l e d  by an Engl ishman  known on ly  as  ’Tuan R h i n d ’ . His  mother  and l i t t l e  
s i s t e r  a r e  a f r a i d  to  l i v e  by t h e m s e l v e s ,  so when they  were asked  t o ,  
move i n t o  t h e  home of  a Malay widow who has  a s m a l l  a d o p te d  boy.
The ’v i l l a i n ’ o f  t h e  s t o r y  i s  t h e  v i l l a g e  b u l l y ,  Bang Seman who becomes 
a K e m p e i t a i  a g e n t ,  o f  whom even t h e  p e nghu lu  i s  a f r a i d .  The C h inese  
y o u t h  and ’Tuan R h i n d ’ e v e n t u a l l y  c a p t u r e  Bang Seman and keep him i n  
c u s to d y  u n t i l  t h e  J a p a n e s e  s u r r e n d e r .
In  Ib ra h im  Omar 's  n o v e l  Embun dan Tanah  ^ (The dew and t h e  
e a r t h ) ,  w r i t t e n  i n  1965,  s e t  i n  s t r i f e - t o r n  J o h o r ,  a s i m i l a r  c l a s s  
c o n f l i c t  be tw een  t h e  p e nghu lu  and t h e  v i l l a g e r s  o c c u r s  as  i n  t h e  n o v e l  
Amrun. In  t h i s  s t o r y ,  t h e  C h in e se  s h o p k e e p e r ,  who i s  a member o f  t h e  
MPAJU, r e s c u e s  t h e  n a r r a t o r ’ s f a t h e r ,  a Malay s h o p k e e p e r ,  and f i v e  
o t h e r  Malays when th e y  a r e  a b o u t  t o  be s h o t  by th e  MPAJA e x e c u t i o n  
s q u a d .  As a ’ tow k a y ' ( b u s i n e s s m a n ) ,  h i s  d e c l a r a t i o n  t h a t  none o f  
t h e  c a p t u r e d  Malays had  done any c r im e  and s h o u ld  be f r e e d
3 P u b l i s h e d  i n  Malacca  by Toko Buku Abbas Bandung.
4 P u b l i s h e d  by S a u d a ra  S i n a r a n ,  Penang ,  1964.
5 P u b l i s h e d  by P u s t a k a  Melayu B a ru ,  Kuala  Lumpur.
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was listened to by the Chinese MPAJA commander. The theme of 
Malay-Chinesc cooperation during the Japanese occupation is also not 
uncommon. In A. Samad Ismail's famous short story, 'Ah Khaw Masuk 
Sliurga' (Ah Khaw Enters Heaven),6 a Malay family provides shelter 
and comfort to a poor old Chinese rickshaw-puller in their home 
during the Japanese Occupation until he dies of illness.
6 The story is included in the anthology Pertentangan (conflict), 
edited by Omar Mohd. Hashim, published by Dewan Bahasa dan 
Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, 1970, 127-39.
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